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Abstract
An examination of the structure of the Australian Labor Party, 
a general view of its history and a knowledge of what others have 
written about organisations yields hypotheses about the likely 
influences on decisionmaking by the Federal bodies of the ALP in three 
specific areas. The thirteen hypotheses relate to various strivings 
within the party and to a number of possible external influences upon 
it. The hypotheses are tested in three case studies which concern 
unity tickets in trade union elections, 1955-61, state aid to non-state 
schools, 1963-66, and foreign and defence policy, especially in relation 
to Vietnam, 1966-67. The case studies yield three more hypotheses about 
how the party makes decisions. These further hypotheses incorporate 
concepts which have been found useful in studies by others of 
decisionmaking in other organisations but which rarely have been applied 
to political parties, as they are here. As well as testing the 
hypotheses, the thesis draws general conclusions about the effects both 
of the party's structure and conventions and of its susceptibility to 
external influences upon its ability to make decisions. It also suggests 
how the way the party made decisions affected its ability to survive as 
an organisation. The central argument of the thesis is that, during the 
period under consideration, 1955 to 1972, and perhaps always, the need 
to keep the coalition together by making concessions to sub-coalitions 
is just as important a consideration for decisionmakers as is the need 
to produce electoral policy and that the former need will affect all 
the party's important decisionmaking. Finally, the thesis examines a 
number of attempts at organisational reform which attempted to by-pass 
the parts of the structure mainly concerned with coalition-maintenance,
iv
in order to make electoral policies on their merits as vote winners and 
as solutions to problems in the community. It is argued that by-passing 
was based on a particular political strategy which became associated 
with E.G. Whitlam, that this strategy incorporated an incomplete view 
of the nature of politics and that the party's future development 
requires the closer identification of electoral policy with the internal 
politics of the party.
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Preface
This thesis grew out of my awareness that most students of political 
parties had failed to confront the important question of how parties make 
the decisions which bear the party name. While there had been a number 
of constitutional histories of parties and many discussions of whether 
particular parties were oligarchies in the sense meant by Robert Michels, 
few writers had tried to describe the internal politics of party 
organisations.
The possibility of attempting such a task in relation to the 
Australian Labor Party was first opened up for me by the publication of 
Ken Turner's detailed guide to the records of the party's New South Wales 
Branch and by the lodging of similar sets of records by the Victorian 
Branch and by the Federal Secretariat.^ Secondly, I felt that many 
protagonists in Labor Party history of the 1950s and 1960s might be 
willing, some years having elapsed, to be interviewed about their 
experiences. Thirdly, discussions with colleagues at the Australian 
National University during the early stages of my research suggested to me 
that some of the literature on public and organisational decisionmaking 
might provide a useful framework for my analysis.
Ken Turner, Guide to the Records of the New South Wales Branch of the 
Australian Labor Party 1956-1969, Sydney, 1973. There is as yet no 
equivalent guide to the Federal and Victorian records, though the holding 
libraries have at least a skeleton guide to the collections. Permission 
of the p'arty was required before access was given to the New South Wales 
and Federal collections and to the more recent records of the Victorian 
Branch. A smaller collection of South Australian Branch records was 
consulted (again by permission) in the party offices in Adelaide. The 
Federal and New South Wales records are being sorted and are identified 
in my footnotes in the standard form for manuscript collections 
(collection/box/folder/folio). The Victorian and South Australian 
collections are unsorted and are identified here by folder labels only.
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These three bodies of material, party records (about two thousand 
boxes of them), interviews (fifty) and writings on decisionmaking in 
organisations, were augmented by the newsclippings files of the Department 
of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian 
National University, other newspapers, pamphlets, party publications, 
secondary works and other sources. I have been unable to draw upon the 
collection of Calwell Papers (about sixty boxes awaiting sorting in the 
National Library of Australia), a collection of papers of A.D. Fraser, 
former member of Parliament, which are soon to be donated to the same 
Library, James Walter’s forthcoming doctoral thesis on E.G. Whitlam and, 
despite my efforts to obtain access to them, the Minutes of the Federal 
Parliamentary Labor Party. I do not feel the omission of these materials 
has seriously affected the argument of the thesis.
The thesis was commenced in the Department of Political Science, 
Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 
Canberra, in February 1976 and was in its final stages when I left the 
Department three years later to enter the Australian Public Service. 
Needless to say, the opinions expressed in it are mine alone, not those 
of the Service nor of any of the people who assisted me in various ways 
during my research and writing.
The postgraduate student accumulates many debts. Mine are owed to 
my supervisor, Don Rawson, to Colin Hughes, who acted as supervisor for 
a time, to colleagues in the Department of Political Science, Research 
School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, to many 
librarians throughout Australia, to party officials and others who helped 
me gain access to documents, to those party activists and former 
activists who consented to be interviewed or who wrote to me. In
Xparticular, I thank the New South Wales, South Australian and Victorian 
Branches and the National Executive of the ALP for giving me access to 
party records, the manuscript sections of the La Trobe, Mitchell and 
National Libraries, especially Cathy Santamaria of the National Library, 
and Colin Hughes, Maggie Indian, Peter Loveday, Don Rawson, Helen South, 
John Warhurst, Pat Weller and Gough Whitlam, who read drafts of part or
all of the thesis.
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Introduction
The Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is a study of decisionmaking in the Australian Labor 
Party during the years 1955 to 1972. It is not a constitutional 
history, a narrative which tries to include everything that happened 
or a series of biographies of important people. Instead it attempts 
to test certain hypotheses about how organisations both make decisions 
and sustain themselves. In doing so, it also pursues an argument 
about the development of the ALP, especially in the late 1960s, and
l
suggests how the party should develop in the future.
Chapter 1 sets out what observers and protagonists have said about 
the ALP, introduces some of the protagonists, gives a general 
description of the structure and some of the conventions of the party 
and provides an inventory of some possible external influences on its 
activities. It makes use also of what others have written about other 
organisations. It provides the context for the following chapters.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 examine how the party made decisions on three 
different subjects, unity tickets in trade union elections, state aid 
for non-state schools and foreign and defence policy, especially 
regarding Vietnam. While each case study is arranged chronologically, 
none claims to be a full history of the matters to which it refers. I 
have concentrated upon those parts of the party and those incidents 
where organisational politics was most intense.
The concluding pages of chapter 4 and the early pages of chapter 5 
draw some conclusions, first, about the relative importance of the 
influences encapsulated in the hypotheses upon decisionmaking in the 
cases studied and, secondly, about the way the party made decisions in
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these cases. The gist of the second set of conclusions is the effect 
of the structure and conventions of the party as an organisation upon 
its decisionmaking ability. The central argument of the thesis is 
that the need to keep a coalition structure together and to make 
concessions to many internal and external influences is just as 
important a consideration when making decisions as is the need to 
produce electoral policy, that is, proposals which can be offered to 
the voters as solutions to problems in the community. To some party 
decisionmakers at some times the first need easily over-rides the 
second.
The balance of chapter 5 describes three partly successful attempts 
to by-pass the problems of the party structure in order to make electoral 
policy on its merits in winning votes and solving problems. These 
attempts were the party reform of 1967, the system of Standing Policy 
Committees and the informal network of policy advice headed by 
E.G. Whitlam.
The final chapter discusses the Whitlam strategy of party-electorate 
relations and the incomplete conception of politics which underlay it.
The chapter suggests the future of the party lies in a synthesis of the 
better parts of the Whitlam approach and redirected internal politics. 
Electoral policy which lacks a base in the life of the party which 
advocates it is destined to leave little mark on the party or on the 
electorate.
The Hypotheses
The recurring theme of this thesis is the multiple influences on 
decisionmaking in the ALP during the period covered. Chapter 1 attempts 
to encapsulate these influences in thirteen hypotheses. It does not
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suggest that only these influences will affect the decisions which are 
studied in chapters 2, 3 and 4 or that other influences will not be 
important in the decisions the party makes at other times. The 
thirteen hypotheses are those derived from the information about the 
party presented in chapter 1 and from what others have written about 
other organisations.
Five of the thirteen hypotheses relate to ’internal strivings', 
activity within the party in pursuit of the goals of individuals or of 
groups within the party. It is suggested that the search for party 
unity and for compromise decisions which will ensure unity is a constant 
preoccupation of some party decisionmakers which tends to over-ride even 
their desire to achieve their own goals or those of their group.
These five hypotheses relate to the nature of the party as a 
coalition. THIS IS THE FIRST SET OF HYPOTHESES.
There are eight hypotheses relating to ’external pressures’ on 
party decisionmakers. These hypotheses provide an inventory of possible 
influences from other parts of the political system and from the 
environment upon decisions made in the party’s name.
These eight hypotheses relate to the permeability of the party.
THIS IS THE SECOND SET OF HYPOTHESES.
Three more hypotheses emerge from the case studies. They concern 
how the party makes decisions. While the inclination of party 
decisionmakers to seek unity and compromise was described in chapter 1, 
the details of these hypotheses and the similarity of the processes 
they encapsulate to those detected in other organisations could not 
emerge until we actually studied a case of decisionmaking. These three 
hypotheses, thus, refer not to influences upon decisionmakers but to 
methods decisionmakers use, partly consciously, partly unconsciously, to
reconcile conflicting influences in order to produce decisions in the 
name of the organisation. The hypotheses are derived from the 
information provided by the case studies and from the writings of 
others on how decisionmakers in other organisations make decisions.
These three hypotheses relate to how the party makes decisions.
THIS IS THE THIRD SET OF HYPOTHESES. They are not hypotheses about 
influences on decisionmakers but about ways in which decisionmakers 
react to these influences. Thus, if the need for compromise decisions 
is an influence on decisionmakers, the method of 'partisan mutual 
adjustment', the subject of one of the third set of hypotheses, 
produces compromise decisions. Similarly, if decisionmakers have to 
react to a continually changing environment, the method of 
'incrementalism' allows them to make a series of short-run decisions, 
to continually adjust and tinker to take account of changing 
circumstances. Finally, if the multiple pressures upon them involve 
decisionmakers in many subjects at once, the method of the 'garbage 
can' may allow one decision to solve many problems.
To summarise. There are three sets of hypotheses. The first set, 
HYPOTHESES I to V, relate to internal strivings. The second set, 
HYPOTHESES VI to XIII, relate to external pressures. These thirteen 
hypotheses are introduced in chapter 1. The third set of hypotheses, 
HYPOTHESES XIV to XVI, encapsulate methods of reconciling the subjects 
of the first two sets, internal strivings and external pressures. These 
hypotheses are introduced at the end of chapter 2 (HYPOTHESES XIV and 
XV) and at the end of chapter 3 (HYPOTHESIS XVI). They are tested 
against the facts of chapters 3 and 4.
Here is the complete list of hypotheses:
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HYPOTHESIS I: Decisionmakers on Federal Conference and Executive will
pursue the goals of the controllers of State Branches whom they represent. 
HYPOTHESIS II: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their own personal
histories and relationships.
HYPOTHESIS III: Decisionmakers will seek different balances between
’exclusive’ and ’inclusive' approaches to the electorate.
HYPOTHESIS IV: Decisionmakers will try to keep the coalition together.
HYPOTHESIS V: Decisionmakers consciously seek compromise between the
goals of sub-coalitions.
HYPOTHESIS VI: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to
the goals of affiliated trade unions.
HYPOTHESIS VII: Decisionmakers will be influenced by changes in the
environment.
HYPOTHESIS VIII: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes
to and relationships with Communists.
HYPOTHESIS IX: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to
and relationships with Catholics.
HYPOTHESIS X : Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to
and relationships with the Democratic Labor Party.
HYPOTHESIS XI: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to
and relationships with 'friendly advisers'.
HYPOTHESIS XII: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to
and relationships with the media.
HYPOTHESIS XIII: Decisionmakers will be influenced by the actions of the
Federal Liberal-Country Party Government.
HYPOTHESIS XIV: Decisionmakers will practise partisan mutual adjustment.
HYPOTHESIS XV: Decisionmakers will practise disjointed incrementalism.
HYPOTHESIS XVI: Decisionmaking will show evidence of ’garbage can
characteristics'.
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Definitions
It is necessary to clarify how the words * decision *, * policy’, and 
’politics' are used in the thesis. ’Decision’ is the crucial word. A 
decision is a set of words that bears the name of the party or of a 
unit of it. A decision could be a Federal Conference resolution, a 
motion passed by a Federal Executive meeting or an agenda item produced 
by a State Branch for a Federal meeting. It might also be a form of 
words agreed on by an informal group of party members as representing 
their collective view. 'Decisionmaking’ is the process of producing a 
decision. This process might involve activity ranging from a paid 
official deliberating alone for five minutes over whether or not to send 
a letter advising other officials of a coming meeting, to lengthy and 
complex bargaining between many individuals and groups who have diverse 
and only partly common goals in relation to the issue to be decided. In 
the first case, while there is an identifiable process, it is not helpful 
to say that there is a range of conflicting desires to be reconciled.
The decision to send a letter is routine, like dozens of others taken by 
the official during a day, any questions surrounding it being resolved 
quickly by the official himself in the light of how he dealt with 
similar situations in the past.
In the second case, the conflicting goals will be resolved (in the 
absence of the ability of one group within the organisation to impose 
its will by force) by a political process, involving the reconciling of 
conflicting goals to produce decisions in the name of the organisation 
as a whole.
Thus, not all decisions emerge from ’politics’. Politics attends 
the making only of those decisions which require the reconciling of the 
conflicting goals of members of the organisation.
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What then is 'policy1 23? Hugh Heclo gives a clue. Policy, he says, 
is 'a course of action or inaction pursued under the authority of 
government’.^  It is made up-of ’decisions’, but also of indecision and 
of acceptance of circumstances produced by chance happenings and by 
actions of other organisations over whom the organisation in question 
has no control. Strictly speaking, although the words 'decisionmaking' 
and 'policymaking' are often used interchangeably, policy is discovered
after the event. Here is an example of this view, in a study of
decisionmaking in a college:
Indeed, the term policy is probably somewhat 
misleading if it conveys a notion of systematic 
collective decision-making .... Academic ’policy' 
is the accretion of hundreds of largely autonomous 
actions taken for different reasons, at different 
times, under different conditions, by different 
people in the college. This collection of actions 
is periodically codified into what is presented as 
an educational program by the college catalog or a 
student or faculty handbook.2
Heclo agrees:
The point of distinguishing policies from programs, 
decisions, social movements, and intentions is to 
suggest that policy is not a self-evident, independent 
behavior fact. Policy acquires meaning because an 
observer perceives and interprets a course of action 
amid the confusions of a complex world. Policy 
exists by interrogating rather than by intuiting 
political phenomena.3
It follows from this that policy, too, need not emerge from 
’politics'. The decisions of our lone administrator could, under this 
definition, be as important in the long term as the decisions emerging
Hugh Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden, New Haven & 
London, 1974, 4. 'Government' can be taken to apply to the government 
of an organisation as well as of a state.
2James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, 
Bergen, 1976, 185-6.
3Heclo, Modern Social Politics ..., 4.
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from complex political activity. In fact, in the period of Labor 
Party history covered in this thesis complex political activity did 
attend many important decisions. To show why this occurred - and why 
it did not occur in some instances - is part of the task of the
thesis.
Chapter 1: A Permeable Coalition
Politics is about reconciling conflicting goals to produce
decisions in the name of a collective. When it is said that 'the
Australian Labor Party believes' or 'the government decision is' or
'this is the firm's policy', the process by which the organisation
has produced the decision is left unstated. We may not be told
whether party factions have wrangled bitterly, whether Cabinet
ministers and their departments have reached agreement in a few
moments or only after many hours debate, whether and how far different
branches of the firm are pleased with the policy they must implement.
While disgruntled sections of the organisation may ensure that their
own version of how the decision was reached becomes public knowledge,
party discipline, Cabinet solidarity, or loyalty to the firm will
often mean that the organisation presents a solid front to the outside
world. The process of decisionmaking may remain murky.
Yet the decision could not have emerged from the organisation
without some activity. What James Q. Wilson says of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People applies to any
organisation, large or small.
[A] fairly complex social structure - the NAACP - 
has produced a statement that, whatever else it 
represents, must at a minimum be responsive to the 
internal dynamics of that organization, coming to 
terms somehow with the needs of and conflicts 
within, the NAACP.1
Nevertheless, complex organisations, comprising people and groups 
with different backgrounds and goals, need not harbour conflict, need
^James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations, New York, 1973, 8-9. Nation 
states are organisations, too: 'It is ... realistic to regard law as a
reflection of the desires of those who win out in the political 
struggle; it is an instrument through which they express and give 
effect to their will. It thus registers the score in the game' (Vernon 
Van Dyke, Political Science, London, 1960, 140).
2not always engage in politics. If there is total agreement there is
2no need for politics. For there to be politics there must be issues, 
that is, there must be conflict over decisions that have to be made 
in the name of the collective. Even where disagreement exists, if 
there is no attempt to reconcile it through the organisation's 
decisionmaking machinery, there is no politics. Politics is
(1) activity occurring within and among groups
(2) which operate on the basis of desires that are 
to some extent shared, (3) an essential feature of 
the activity being a struggle of actors (4) to 
achieve their desires (5) on questions of group 
policy, group organization, group leadership, or 
the regulation of intergroup relationships
(6) against the opposition of others with 
conflicting desires.3
It follows from this emphasis on the conflict of goals that a 
study of the internal politics of an organisation is not concerned 
with 'organisational decisionmaking' as such. Organisations may make 
decisions without politics. To adapt the words of Philip Selznick, 
'decisions are with us always', but politics is present only in 
'critical decisions', those which involve 'the dynamic adaptation of 
the total organization to internal strivings and external pressures'.
2C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination, Harmondsworth, 1970,
15; Van Dyke, Political Science, 133.
3Van Dyke, Political Science, 134. My emphasised words cf. F.G. Bailey, 
Stratagems and Spoils, Oxford, 1969, ix, who seeks a concept of 
politics applicable alike to gangsters, villagers, facultymen, generals 
and statesmen, and Martin Meyerson & Edward C. Banfield, Politics, 
Planning and the Public Interest, Glencoe, 111., 1955, 303, who want one 
to 'apply as well to office politics as to national politics'.
4Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration, Evanston, 111., 1957,
29, 31. My emphasis. Selznick's discussion is much more complex than 
this short sentence indicates. It is based on a clever analogy from 
psychology, with 'routine decisions' analogous to the field of interest 
of biological psychology and 'critical decisions', those which affect 
the character of the organisation, to that of clinical psychology. On 
internal and external influences, a basic distinction in organisation 
theory, see: James G. March & Herbert A. Simon, Organizations, New
York St London, 1958, 9-10; Philip Selznick, 'Foundations of the Theory 
of Organization', American Sociological Review, 13 (February 1948), 28; 
Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man, New York St London, 1957, 204, 241-73.
3The classification of internal and external influences on critical 
decisions and on those who make them is a basic one for this thesis. Let 
us therefore clarify it at once. Strivings arise because organisations 
comprise disparate elements with only partially common goals. Individuals 
with goals (or ’desires’ or ’interests') combine with other individuals 
to produce decisions bearing the name of the larger group. Organisations 
are coalitions comprising sub-coalitions. They are all permeable by 
influences from other organisations and from the broader setting or 
’environment’ in which they operate. Political parties are organisations 
and, as such, they are permeable coalitions.“* This thesis shows the 
Australian Labor Party producing collective decisions out of the strivings 
of its parts and the influences of the world outside the organisation.
Some decisions could be labelled, in Van Dyke's terms, ’group policy', 
others 'group organization', still others 'group leadership' or 'the 
regulation of intergroup relationships'. The balance of this chapter 
will suggest, first, which parts of the coalition make the decisions, 
then delineate the parts of the coalition and outline possible ways in 
which it could be permeated. Finally, it will consider what others have 
written about decisionmaking in organisations.
The ALP Coalition: Five Hypotheses about 'Internal Strivings'
THE INEVITABILITY OF CONFLICT
James Q. Wilson includes political parties among 'formal voluntary 
associations', a sub-classification of organisations.
^On the structure of organisations, including parties, see: Graham T.
Allison, Essence of Decision, Boston, 1971, 5-6, 67; Robert A. Dahl & 
Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, New York, 1953,
327; Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties, Chicago, 1964, 70-7;
Richard Rose, The Problem of Party Government, Harmondsworth, 1976,
323; Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems Volume I, Cambridge, 
1976, 70-9; C.H. Waddington, The Ethical Animal, London, 1960, quoted,
Sir Geoffrey Vickers, The Art of Judgement, London, 1965, 117.
4[B]y 'formal* is meant that class of association 
[organisation] with a clearly definable membership 
(thus excluding loose social movements) and a 
consciously adopted name (thus excluding many short­
lived or casual associations and kinship networks); 
by 'voluntary' is meant associations whose members 
are generally not full-time employees and do not 
earn their livelihood as a result of their membership 
(thus excluding firms and government agencies).6
The ALP had a definable membership which was part of, but distinguishable 
from the larger 'labour movement'; it adopted the name 'Australian 
Labor Party' in 1908; only a tiny proportion of its members were full­
time employees.^
By definition, members of voluntary associations cannot be coerced 
into joining or remaining. They become or remain members because they 
expect to achieve through collective decisions some of their goals as
g
individuals or as members of sub-coalitions within the coalition. In 
the case of the ALP, rank and file members had the constitutional right, 
either as members of affiliated unions or of district based local 
branches, to make authoritative decisions. Policy 'is not framed by 
directives from the leadership' but by resolutions from the mass
Wilson, Political Organizations, 31. See also: Cameron v Hogan, 51
CLR (1934) 358, where, in a case involving the ALP, the High Court 
reviewed the law on voluntary associations (those 'established upon a 
consensual basis'); Weber's definition of parties as 'an associative 
type of social relationship, membership in which rests on formally 
free recruitment' (Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization, New York & London, 1964, 407).
^Almost all of these were in the State Branch offices of the party, 
except that between 1963 and 1969 and after 1971 a full-time Federal 
Secretary and a staff of two or three occupied a Canberra office. The 
largest single establishment was probably the New South Wales Branch 
office (about fourteen in 1962) and full-time staff throughout 
Australia would have numbered less than fifty during our period. Most 
of these would have been party members.
g
Drawing on earlier work by himself, Peter Clark, Barnard and Simon, 
Wilson Political Organizations, 30-51, elaborates a classification of 
'incentives' by which the organisation attracts contributions of 
effort from its members in order to maintain itself. The idea of 
'system-maintenance' as a goal of organisations is a useful one for 
our present purposes and will be taken up later. The incentives 
classification as such is less convincing because it is hard to see 
the ALP - or any organisation? - as an entity separate from its 
constituent parts.
5membership. All members, ’through the constituted channels, have 
equal opportunity in formulating, and equal voice in determining the
Platform and Objects, Constitutions, Laws and course of action of the
, 9Movement .
However, the record of rank and file participation in the ALP 
shows this ideal was not achieved. Members of local branches and 
affiliated unions discussed many subjects amongst themselves but a 
study of rank and file opinion in the party is not the concern of this 
thesis. Unless resolutions resulting from these discussions are 
forwarded to the party's central organs, they will have little or no 
impact beyond the participants. A study of the agenda of ALP State 
Conferences, the supreme bodies within the State Branches, shows that 
only a minority of branches and unions provided items for discussion. 
For example, in New South Wales in 1960, when there were about five 
hundred local branches, only ninety-six contributed items as branches 
and only twenty-nine sent five or more items (a modest level of 
activity when the total number of branch items was 385). In South 
Australia in the same year twenty out of forty-seven branches sent 
items but only three sent more than two items (the agenda was much 
shorter than in New South Wales so a different measure is necessary).
In Victoria in 1963 only eighty out of '306 effective branches' 
contributed and only thirty branches sent four or more items. Similar 
figures can be compiled for unions. Seldom did more than three out of 
ten affiliated unions in the States of New South Wales, South 
Australia and Victoria contribute agenda items to an Annual Conference. 
The proportions of fourteen contributing out of about ninety affiliated
9ALP, Federal Platform Constitution and Rules as approved by the 26th 
Commonwealth Conference 1965, 4; ALP (Victorian Branch), Constitution 
and Platform as revised by the 1962 State Conference and the Federal 
Constitution and Platform (as adopted by the 24th Commonwealth 
Conference, Canberra, April 1961), 9. Both cited hereafter in 
shortened form.
6in New South Wales in 1960, sixteen out of seventy-four (Victoria,
1965) and fourteen out of forty (South Australia, 1967) provide a 
fair sample. Again, a small number contributed disproportionately, 
with two unions providing nearly half the union items in New South 
Wales in 1960, six supplying almost two-thirds in Victoria in 1965 
and three sending half of all union items to the South Australian 
ALP Convention in 1967.^
It is unnecessary here either to discuss the reasons for the low 
level of participation or to investigate mass performance in other 
areas such as political education or assistance at election campaigns.il 
But if the rank and file abdicate, who then makes the collective 
decisions that bear the party name? Studies of other parties direct 
us to a characteristic of the ALP which probably would have militated 
against concerted rank and file initiative even if the mass had not 
excluded itself. Robert Michels suggested long ago that parties, to 
achieve their goals,require hierarchical, almost military organisation. 
'Democracy is utterly incompatible with strategic promptness, and the
These figures are based on a comprehensive study of State Conference 
(Convention in South Australia) agenda over the period 1956-69. There 
are some complications involved in such calculations, for instance, 
the practice of sending joint items (more than one branch, branch and 
union, union and union) and the right of groupings of branches, such 
as State Electorate Councils, to send items. Joint items are not 
common enough to upset the overall picture and the SEC and equivalent 
contribution figures confirm it. The quotation about Victorian 
branches is from ALP (Victorian Branch), 1963 Central Executive Report, 
11, and other branch and union figures all come from similar documents 
or party records. Figures for number of branches are notoriously 
unreliable since some branches, especially rural ones, were dormant 
except at election times. Union affiliations remained fairly constant 
throughout the period.
11For a sample of comments on local parties, Australian and other: 
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, London, 1954, 24; Leon D.
Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, London, 1967, 102-3; 
James Jupp, Australian Party Politics, Carlton, Vic., 1968, 209; 
Humphrey McQueen, 'Glory without Power', John Playford & Douglas 
Kirsner, ed., Australian Capitalism, Ringwood, Vic., 1972, 371-3;
Helen Nelson & Lex Watson, 'Party Organisation', Henry Mayer, ed., 
Australian Politics: A Second Reader, Melbourne, 1969, 271;
D.W. Rawson, Australia Votes, Melbourne, 1961, 252.
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forces of democracy do not lend themselves to the rapid opening of a
campaign'. Technical considerations, like the impossibility of fitting
the whole membership into one room to make decisions, plus the
unwillingness of the mass to take initiatives, create a need for
delegation, leadership and organisation. The desire for political
office accentuates these tendencies towards concentration of important
12decisionmaking in a relatively small group. In the State Labor 
Branches in our period every local branch constitutionally could make 
decisions applicable to its own members, as could every affiliated 
union. But the 'critical' decisions for the State Branches, those 
that involved, in Selznick's words, its adapting to internal strivings 
and external pressures, were made by State Executives. Since their 
decisions had a great bearing on those at the Federal level of the 
party, which are our main concern, we must examine the role of State 
Executives.
Supreme power within State Branches rested formally with their 
Conferences. However, Conferences elected Executives to run the 
Branches between Conferences and State Branch Constitutions gave 
Executives wide powers, subject only to appeal to Conferences. For 
example, the Victorian Central Executive established and maintained 
party organisation in the electorates, conferred with the State 
Parliamentary Party, proposed rules amendments and other resolutions 
to Conference, applied the rules, managed finances and made statements 
in the party's name on matters that arose between Conferences. It 
heard and sometimes laid charges against members, adjudicated disputes 
between them and could suspend or expel them as punishment. It held 
ultimate control over who stood as Labor candidates in all elections
■^Robert Michels, Political Parties, New York, 1959, 25-37, 42, 49-59, 
365-76, 401-4.
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13for public office, Federal, State and local.
To these formal powers the VCE and its equivalents in other States
added the advantages of regular (weekly or fortnightly) meetings, an
esprit de corps and familiarity with the issues confronting the party
and with its machinery. Moreover, the Executives broadly reflected the
composition of Conferences, since the main consideration in forming a
'ticket’ for the election of the Executive was which combination of
names, representing unions and branches, could win the support of a
majority of Conference delegates. Thirdly, Executives could control
the business of Conferences through Agenda Committees, dominated by
their nominees, which determined the order of business and ensured
that items regarded by Executives as important would receive priority.
The complete agenda was rarely covered, even with the use of devices
like grouping items of similar import or Committee reports which made
14general recommendations to cover a collection of items. If all else
13Branch structures and Executive powers differed in detail from State 
to State. In South Australia a State Council, meeting monthly or 
thereabouts, was placed between Annual Convention and Executive, 
without detracting greatly from the latter's importance. In 
Queensland, the Executive was larger than in other States and the 
equivalent body in many respects was the small 'inner Executive'. In 
Queensland and Western Australia, Conferences were held only every 
three years. In each State, bodies based on electorates but bearing 
various titles had limited functions, subject to Conferences. Pre­
selection of Labor candidates rested with local branches, Executives, 
electoral colleges or special conventions, depending on the State and 
the office, but ultimate endorsement as the ALP candidate rested in 
every case with Executives, subject to an almost never used appeal to 
the Federal Executive. See the various State Branch rule books for 
the period, for example ALP (Victorian Branch), Constitution and 
Platform, 1962, and the general survey in Nelson & Watson, 'Party 
Organisation', 270-5.
14The claim that the 1963 NSW Branch Conference had 'completed all 
its business' A. L.P. Journal, July 1963, 28) was only possible because 
Policy Committees comprising Executive members had used these devices 
more efficiently than usual. This is not to say, of course, that some 
pre-Conference organisation was not legitimate. But those who 
objected had little recourse.
9failed or as additional insurance, the Conference Chairman, usually 
the President or a Vice President, could manipulate meeting procedures 
to favour the Executive view.'*'“’
Procedural barriers curbed the mass role in decisionmaking even 
if the mass had wished to play a role. The barriers did not stifle 
influence broadly in line with the views of the Executive majority but 
they enabled the Executive to choose whether it could be so 
influenced'.^
Some Executive members were more active and effective than others.
The party officers, President, Vice Presidents, Secretary (and Assistant
Secretary in some States) possessed in enhanced form the resources of
the Executive itself - access to party records, frequency of meeting
17and superior knowledge. In some Branches, especially where Labor was 
in power, State Parliamentarians allied with party officers and 
Executive activists. These politicians may not have been members of 
State Executives but shared their power. Federal politicians, too, 
were sometimes part of this inner group.
Critical decisions for State Branches, then, were made by the most 
active and effective members of State Executives, by party officers and
This was by no means confined to the NSW Branch, but see: [Tom
Burns] , The New South Wales A.L.P.: Report by the Federal President of 
the Australian Labor Party, 1970, presented by order to the Federal 
Executive, Sydney, November 23, 1970, 6-7. The South Australian Branch 
Convention of 1965 failed to adopt a branch item that a microphone be 
provided for delegates! (ALP [SA Branch], Official Report, Sixty- 
second Annual State Convention, 1965; Canberra Times [CT] 11 June 
1965.)
 ^We shall take up later in the chapter the point about sub-coalitional 
representation on Executives. On the general point, individual 
Executive members would often feel obliged to put forward their union's 
or branch's view but need not then have sought support for it.
"^Executive officers in Victoria and New South Wales, for example, met 
about half as many times again as did their Executives.
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by their allies. We may call this group, the 'controllers' of State
Branches. But why did the pattern of control of State Branches affect
18Federal decisionmaking? This occurred, first, because the 'tickets'
of delegates elected to Federal Conference and Federal Executive by
State Conferences were determined by State Executives and, secondly,
because State Branches had equal representation on Federal Conference
and Federal Executive. Until 1967, Federal Conference comprised six
delegates from each State, Federal Executive two from each State.
Thirdly, all State Branches, except Queensland, could instruct their
delegates to support State Branch decisions. Even when free of
explicit Branch instructions, State delegates would establish a
consensus view on important issues or caucus and vote according to the
19majority view of the delegation.
State Branches thus provided the 'decisionmakers' for the Federal 
party, those who occupied seats on its formally supreme bodies, the 
Federal Conference and Federal Executive. By this series of steps 
critical Federal decisions could emerge from the reconciliation of the
The two bodies we are concerned with here are the Federal Conference, 
'the supreme governing authority and policy-making body [whose] decisions 
shall be binding upon every member and every section of the Party', and 
the Federal Executive, the administrative body between Conferences:
ALP, Federal Platform 1965, 40.
19J.B. Keeffe, Federal President, 1962-70, remembered that Western 
Australian, New South Wales and Victorian delegates normally would 
caucus on major issues. Queensland and South Australia preferred to 
seek a consensus. A South Australian delegate, G.T. Virgo, remembers 
that his State's delegates did caucus and vote as a block on important 
issues. W.W.C. Brown from Victoria remembers organising caucusing.
He was State President and delegation leader and this was part of his 
Conference responsibility. However, Queensland delegates at one 
Conference were marshalled behind one resolution by Branch President,
B.R. Milliner, not a delegate at the Conference (interviews). Even 
where delegates lacked a prior instruction, Branch views would influence 
the decision reached by caucus or consensus. Queenslanders, while 
constitutionally unable to be bound by the State, often were constrained 
to follow the known Branch view for the sake of harmonious relations 
between themselves and the Branch controllers.
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goals of a small group within each State Branch. The goals of the six 
groups often conflicted fundamentally and were never identical. If 
all six delegations were caucused or bound, crucial votes were likely 
to be decided 36-0, 30-6, 24-12 or deadlocked 18-18, unless individuals, 
risking the wrath of their Branch's controllers, could be 'peeled off' 
to support an alternative view.^
We can now state our first hypothesis. Its nub is that internal 
ALP politics at the Federal level can be seen in terms of State 
Branches pursuing State Branch interests which do not coincide and 
which must be reconciled.
HYPOTHESIS I: DECISIONMAKERS ON FEDERAL CONFERENCE AND EXECUTIVE WILL
PURSUE THE GOALS OF THE CONTROLLERS OF STATE BRANCHES WHOM THEY REPRESENT.
Let us consider now the members of the Federal Conference and 
Executive.
A basic dichotomy of organisation theory is that between formal 
structure and informal process. Formal structures are the frameworks 
of rules of organisations. A formal organisation for Chester Barnard 
was 'a system of consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or 
more persons'. Within such organisations develop informal processes,
'the aggregate of the personal contacts and interactions and associated 
groupings', which also influence the decisions the organisation makes. 
Organisations, including political parties, do not involve merely 
interactions between offices according to a set of rules, but between 
people who fill offices, who have personal histories, qualities and 
prejudices and the capacity to make alliances and enmities accordingly. 
The approach of office holders, such as members of the Federal Executive 
of the ALP, to issues is deeply affected by their past and present.
2Ö 'Peeling off' was especially important to avoid tied votes, since 
18-18 meant defeat of a resolution.
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Graham Allison writes vividly that 'each person comes to his position
with baggage in tow. His bags include sensitivities to certain issues,
commitments to various projects, and personal standing with and debts
21to groups in the society'.
Some delegates to the Federal Executive and Conference stood out 
from their fellows. Francis Edward ('Joe') Chamberlain was born in 
London in 1900. He came gradually to prominence in union politics in 
Perth, Western Australia, during the 1930s and 1940s, was full­
time Secretary of the Tramways union by 1944 and by 1949, Secretary of 
the Trades and Labour Council and of the ALP, Western Australian Branch. 
(The unions and party had a combined structure until 1963). Although he 
had been a Federal ALP delegate since 1948, Chamberlain did not become 
nationally significant until the Hobart Federal Conference of 1955. He 
became Federal President of the party in the same year, holding that 
position until 1960 and that of Federal Secretary from 1961-63. He
remained Western Australian Secretary and Federal Executive delegate
22throughout the period.
Chamberlain's importance rested on a number of bases. First, as 
Federal Vice President and Acting President he showed chairmanship 
skills at crucial meetings in the months preceding the Hobart Conference. 
He was a natural choice for Federal President after this Conference, 
especially because, as a Western Australian, he was free of the factional
Allison, Essence of Decision, 166; Chester I. Barnard, The Functions 
of the Executive, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, 73, 115, 225. My emphasis. 
See also: Peter M. Blau & W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations,
London, 1963, 2-7; Selznick, 'Foundations of the Theory of 
Organization', 25-8.
22F.E. Chamberlain, Interview transcript, Oral History Project, 
Manuscripts Section, National Library, 1: 1/1-40, 2/1-11;
F.E. Chamberlain, F. Crean, interviews with the author; Douglas 
Mitchell, 'The Trade Unionist: F.E. Chamberlain', draft chapter for
L. Hunt, ed. Westralian Portraits, Nedlands, WA, forthcoming, 1979; 
Robert Murray, The Split, Melbourne, 1972, 198-9, passim.
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identifications of the Branches more deeply affected by the Split. In
the two or three years after Hobart, Chamberlain consolidated his own
position and cemented party unity by skilful balancing between
factions and the Federal Parliamentary Leader, H.V. Evatt. Evatt came
to rely heavily on him. Moreover, the ill-health of J. Schmella, the
part-time Federal Secretary, meant Chamberlain carried much of the
23secretarial as well as the Presidential work. His position established,
Chamberlain built upon it. As President, and then as Secretary, he was
spokesman of the Executive. A persuasive and subtle speaker, he could
place his own interpretation on Executive or Conference decisions.
Meetings were closed to the press and public until 1965 when the Federal
Conference was opened, so the media relied on Chamberlain (and on
2 Aunauthorised ’leaks' from other members) for their stories. Thirdly,
Chamberlain built up a reputation as an ideologue and guardian of the
party conscience, by stressing the need to place socialist principles
above political expediency, to defend Labor against its enemies and to
remember the lessons of the Split.
We must not depart from the course that was charted 
at Hobart. The target must not be Parliamentary 
seats at any price, but Parliamentary seats to be
ALP, Official Report of the Proceedings of the 21st Commonwealth 
Conference, Hobart, 1955; Murray, The Split, 198, 221, 229-30, 294, 331; 
J.A. Mulvihill, interview; Nation, 23 May 1959; Observer, 26 July 1958. 
As President and Secretary over the period 1959-63, Chamberlain was 
assisted greatly by his private secretary, Miss L. Elliott. 'She 
never missed a trick. She knew everything. Very, very capable and she 
would prompt Joe' (W.R. Colbourne, interview. See also Chamberlain's 
own tribute: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 58).
24Chamberlain recalls that he remained spokesman as Secretary on the 
insistence of the new President, J.V. Stout, who said, 'I'm always 
satisfied with what you say'. Chamberlain had doubts (and the 
arrangement caused some adverse press comments at the time: Advertiser
[Adelaide], 18 February 1961; Sydney Morning Herald [SMH], 10 April 
1961) but agreed. He consulted Stout before making statements but he 
does not mention whether this consultation continued under later 
Presidents, Colbourne and Keeffe (F.E. Chamberlain, NLA interview 
transcript, 3:1/11). The Secretary has remained the Executive 
spokesman ever since.
occupied by members of this Party who will go 
fearlessly into the electorates of this country 
and expound the cause of Democratic Socialism. ^
The significance of speeches like this was not their literary
merit, which was limited, nor even their eloquence, although Chamberlain
was a forceful speaker. Their concept of socialism was neither specific 
26nor radical. Instead, the speeches expressed the inchoate feelings of 
a section of the party which sought a principled, even moralistic, 
approach to politics, which saw the Labor platform as a citadel to be 
defended and from which to launch attacks against exploitative 
capitalism. When such feelings were aroused in Chamberlain by 
particular issues there was a corps of purists within the party ready to 
support him. For the Federal Executive itself, since Chamberlain was a 
central figure, such feelings in his breast were likely to be important 
in its critical decisions.
The final basis of Chamberlain’s power was his skill in the meetings 
of the Federal Executive. From his days as a union official, Chamberlain 
had brought a fondness for advocacy: ’I used to love preparing cases and
14
25This paragraph is from Chamberlain's Presidential Address to the 1957 
Federal Conference, often quoted as an example of his outlook:
F.E. Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles on Australian Labor 
Party Principles, Perth, 1964? 17-18. See also: foreword, 5, 9-11, 18, 
21. What 'Labor Principles' actually were was a lot vaguer than the 
exhortations that they should be followed. Essentially they were what 
the majority at ALP Conferences had decided. Chamberlain's discussions 
of principles as against expediency are linked closely with strictures 
about obeying majority decisions and with his feeling that politicians 
as a class were primarily interested in office as such rather than how 
they got it or what they would do with it (ALP, Official Report, 
Commonwealth Conference, 1959, 49-50; F.E. Chamberlain, interview;
F.E. Chamberlain, NLA interview transcript, 2:1/32-3.
26Murray, The Split, 332-3; J.D. Playford, Doctrinal and Strategic 
Problems of the Communist Party of Australia, 1945-62, unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, Australian National University, 1962, 324. Chamberlain did 
indeed talk vaguely of security, the right to work and a fair wage, 
application of science to reduce the drudgery of housework, education 
for all children and other unremarkable goals. But intimates had no 
doubt he believed in 'traditional socialist' aims like nationalisation 
of basic industries (J.M. Wheeldon, interview).
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27winning’. By 1955 he was, writes Murray, 'a superb committee
politician’. Freudenberg, biographer of E.G. Whitlam and a close
observer of Labor politics as press secretary to A.A. Calwell during
Chamberlain’s years of power, wrote from intimate acquaintance:
His personal strength sprang from a singleness, 
even narrowness of mind, a terrier grip on the 
essential point of an argument, and a steely eye 
for the weaknesses of an opponent’s case ....
He came to a committee thoroughly prepared, 
knowing exactly what he wanted and how to argue 
for it.28
Chamberlain’s colleagues confirm both his importance and the reasons
for it. He had a clarity of purpose, fluency of speech and coolness of
29mind matched by few of his fellows.
To call someone a master of committee politics implies that there
are differing goals which politics must reconcile. Whose views were
likely to diverge from Chamberlain’s? Asked who dominated the Executive,
W.R. Colbourne, Secretary of the New South Wales Branch and Federal
delegate until 1969, replied carefully: ’Oh, I don't think you'd have
to judge it. Joe Chamberlain dominated the majority of seven votes to
five. It would be equally right to say that probably Charlie Oliver
and myself dominated the other five. Not dominated but certainly 
30influenced'. Leaving Colbourne aside for the present, let us introduce 
Oliver, whom most members and observers of the Executive would agree was
27F.E. Chamberlain, interview; F.E. Chamberlain, NLA interview 
transcript, 1:2/17. Note also the praise from the President of the 
Western Australian State Arbitration Court, E.A. Dunphy, after 
Chamberlain won a case in 1947:'He did a splendid job ... [The case] 
could not have been bettered by any other advocate': Western Australian
Industrial Gazette, 27 (1947), 522, 524, quoted, Mitchell, 'The Trade 
Unionist . . . ' , 4.
2 8Graham Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, South Melbourne, 1977, 27-8; 
Murray, The Split, 198.
29F.H. Campbell, W.R. Colbourne, J.B. Keeffe, P.J. Kennelly, J.P. Toohey, 
G.T. Virgo, interviews.
30W.R. Colbourne, interview.
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almost as influential as Chamberlain in the period after 1960 when
31they faced each other as Executive delegates.
Cecil Thompson (’Charlie') Oliver came to Western Australia from 
North Wales in the early 1920s and by the 1940s was an official of the 
Australian Workers' Union and State member of Parliament. Apart from 
the last his career thus paralleled closely Chamberlain's and, in 
fact, the two were acquaintances in Perth in the 1940s. (During our 
period, Oliver remembers, they tended to be 'friends socially, while 
disagreeing on everything politically'). Oliver came to Sydney in 1951 
to become State Secretary of the AWU and he held this position 
throughout our period. He favoured Federal intervention during the 
New South Wales Split and was elected a Vice President of the ALP, New 
South Wales Branch, in 1956 and President in 1960. The latter office
32carried with it that of delegate to Federal Executive and Conference.
Oliver lacked Chamberlain's philosophic pretensions but possessed
negotiating skill, a bluff, direct manner and a disinclination to
decentralise power. Moreover, he saw the main purpose of politics as
winning benefits for one's members and supporters through Labor
Governments. When he came to Sydney, Oliver became an admirer of
J.J. Cahill, Premier of New South Wales from 1953-59. In reminiscing
about Cahill, Oliver summarised the style of politics he admired, a
combination of persuasion and authority:
He was one of those persuasive blokes. He was a bit 
like Jack Curtin. He knew how to work the party. He 
had blokes scattered around whom he could ring up to 
find out what was going on. Yet he had the essence 
of leadership: to do things but let it appear
everyone else was doing it along with him.33
3^J.B. Keeffe, interview; SHH, 18 August, 4 September 1964; G.T. Virgo, 
interview.
3l.LP. Year Book (frI.S.W. Branch) for 1966, Alexandria, NSW, 1966? 18;
J.L. Armitage, F.E. Chamberlain, interviews; Murray, The Split, 189, 
301, 331; C.T. Oliver, interview; SMH, 12 November 1960.
33C.T. Oliver, interview. Also: J.L. Armitage, interview.
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Part of the reason for Oliver's importance was that he represented 
New South Wales, the largest Labor Branch, with the most Federal seats, 
the most money and (apart from Tasmania) the best electoral record.
Yet on the Federal Executive during our period, as the excerpt from the 
Colbourne interview suggests, New South Wales was often in the minority 
on crucial issues. On some issues New South Wales might have been in 
the majority; certainly the breakdown (seven-five) was not as rigid 
as Colbourne implies. But it was still possible to identify through 
much of our period a basic alignment on many issues, with Chamberlain 
and two Victorians on one side, Oliver and Colbourne from New South 
Wales, plus one or two Tasmanian delegates on the other, and South 
Australia and Queensland in the centre. Oliver, as a New South 
Welshman, a strong personality and a good negotiator, tended to be the 
pole of the minority on the Executive. As part of the minority he was 
less important than Chamberlain, the centre of the majority, but his 
attributes were comparable. Jim Keeffe, Federal President, 1962-70, 
made use of both of them: 'As Chairman, I had a technique, if we were
having trouble, of adjourning early and telling Charlie and Joe to go 
and work something out. They were both very skilled negotiators.
34Between the twelve of us we worked out a lot of good compromises'.
Chamberlain and Oliver, the polar figures, were men of 
superficially similar background who developed differently: both
English migrants, itinerant workers and union officials. But one did 
not become a politician and was suspicious that politicians would 
betray Labor principles, the other gave up a safe seat to become a 
senior union official, admired politicians and offered them room to
Q  /
J.B. Keeffe, interview. Oliver recalls many a 'rezzo' (resolution) 
worked out in this way between himself and Chamberlain (interview).
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manoeuvre in government. One was in 1955 the leader of the forces of 
reconstruction and intervention in New South Wales, who remembered the 
enmities built up then and warned about the resurgence of the 
temporarily defeated opponent; the other, part of a group aiming to 
overthrow existing control for fairly limited ends and able soon to 
work comfortably with the remnants of the old Executive. One a minor 
ideologue, the other a pragmatist. Nevertheless, despite these 
differences of character and personality, both men were skilled 
politicians within a party where intense political activity was never 
long absent.
Who were the other members of the Executive, who tended to 
congregate around Chamberlain and Oliver? From New South Wales came 
Colbourne, Federal President 1961-62 and Senior Vice President 
thereafter. He had crossed swords with Chamberlain during the Split, 
when he was New South Wales Secretary and Chamberlain Federal President 
and leader of the Federal forces of intervention in the State Branch. 
Colbourne held his position but the mutual irritants implanted in 1955 
flared intermittently in subsequent years. Looking back in 1978, 
Colbourne felt that 'the predominant issue' on the Federal Executive 
in the years after the Split 'was to do New South Wales over. Never 
mind what the reasons or causes were, the Federal Executive's got to 
assert itself in New South Wales'. The anecdotes Colbourne used to 
illustrate this assertion came primarily from the years 1956 and 1957
35Murray, The Split, 199, and others tentatively link Chamberlain's 
antipathy to politicians to his failure to become one himself. He 
made three attempts to enter politics, in 1930 (Labor candidate in a 
rural seat), 1957 (rumours he would seek preselection in Kalgoorlie), 
1964 (withdrawal of his nomination for Senate preselection on grounds 
of other work, although some said because he lacked the numbers):
CT, 7 April 1964; F.E. Chamberlain, NLA interview transcript, 1: 
1/31-40; SMH, 3 August 1964; West Australian, 9 April, 4 May 1957.
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when the Federal forces, led by Chamberlain, were active in New South
Wales. Colbourne’s remarks suggest his relations with Chamberlain
were not harmonious: 'You couldn't do anything with Joe in those
days. He was the top dog .... I'm Joe Chamberlain, I'm not going to
miss out'. Press reports in the late 1950s and the 1960s occasionally
referred to a 'feud' between Colbourne and Chamberlain; it seems to
have commenced at this time. Looking back in 1978, Colbourne said
emphatically: 'I've never known the Federal Executive coming to New
South Wales and do a good job. When they get in there and they do
36interfere they make things worse . . . ' . His contacts with Chamberlain 
in 1955-57 coloured this judgment; his relationship with Chamberlain 
on the Executive in the years after the Split was likely to be 
influenced by their contacts during it.
Chamberlain often allied himself with the delegates of the 
Victorian Branch, which had been just as strongly influenced by the 
Split as had New South Wales, but in a rather different direction. The 
Split carved off part of the party, mainly in local branches and the 
State and Federal Parliamentary wing, eventually to form the Democratic 
Labor Party, and left.a rump in which participation in the Split was an 
important credential for office after it. Thus J.V. Stout, Secretary 
of the Melbourne Trades Hall Council, was a leading opponent of the 
Grouper dominated Victorian Central Executive during the Split, was 
President of the new VCE 1955-58, and remained a Federal Executive 
delegate until 1962, serving as Federal President for six months in 
1961. Venerable rather than venomous (he died at 78 in 1964) Stout's 
influence also suffered because he had been an early ally of the 
Groups. This handicap notwithstanding, the Victorians drew strength
36W.R. Colbourne, interview.
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from the Branch's martyrdom during the Split. The Victorian Labor
Government had been a victim of Grouper perfidy and the Branch
delegates often referred to the continuing need for vigilance against
37the Grouper threat. Another elderly union official involved in the
Split was Albert McNolty, State Secretary of the Sheetmetal Workers'
union, President of the VCE 1959-61, Chairman of the Trade Unionists'
Defence Committee (established in 1961 to wage propaganda war on the
remaining Industrial Groups) and a Federal Executive delegate from
Victoria, 1964-66. McNolty was a Vice President in the first post
Split VCE but something of an ideological socialist in contrast to the
38more opportunist Stout. Different again was J.P. 'Bob' Brebner,
Federal and State Secretary of the small Pulp and Paperworkers' union,
who is described by Murray as 'bitterly anti-Grouper' and a 'left
winger', but was primarily a machine politician, who needed quick
footwork to compensate for his lack of a large union power base.
Brebner held senior offices in the Victorian Branch for a decade after
39the Split and was Federal Executive delegate 1958-64.
Stout, McNolty and Brebner were above all union officials, 
creatures of the ancient corridors and murky politics of the Melbourne 
Trades Hall. Their ccree,r$ shout that the- Federal Executive included 
members whose main interests and expertise lay outside Federal politics
37For Stout, see: Tom Sheehy, 'The Attitudes of J.V. (Vic) Stout', 
Recorder, 3, 8 (February 1969), 2-7; David Stephens, 'Some Notes on 
James Victor Stout', Recorder, 88, (June 1977), 8-12. On Victoria's 
position, see Chamberlain's remark to the 1959 State Conference that 
the Branch had 'borne the brunt of the attack upon us over the past 
four years' (Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles ..., 39).
38Murray, The Split, 222. The unsympathetic Bulletin ridiculed 
McNolty's beliefs in world brotherhood by giving him the nick-name 
'Peace-medal' McNolty.
39Murray, The Split, 103, 184. These three pen-pictures and those that 
follow draw generally on Murray and on interviews with Victorian Branch 
and Federal Executive members.
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but whose political skills, honed in one arena, could be applied in
cuvothec . From a different background came R.W. Holt, VCE President
1962-65 and Federal Executive delegate 1963-65. Holt was Minister
for Lands in the Cain Labor Government and his action in 1953 in
tearing up an amendment he regarded as influenced by B.A. Santamaria's
National Catholic Rural Movement made him a symbolic figure for the
Victorian Branch after the Split. He held official positions from
1959, even though his ideas differed considerably from those of his
40VCE colleagues who considered themselves socialists. Holt's period 
as Federal delegate served as a bridge between Stout, McNolty and 
Brebner and two younger men. These were W.H. Hartley, a protege of 
Chamberlain, who succeeded C.S. Wyndham as State Secretary late in 
1963 and became a Federal Executive delegate two years later, and 
W.W.C. Brown, elected to the VCE in 1959, State Secretary of the 
Furnishing Trades Society and State President of the ALP from 1965-69. 
Brown joined Hartley on the Federal Executive in June 1966.
We have dwelt at some length on the New South Welshmen, the 
Victorians and Chamberlain since, both to observers at the time and 
to members of the Executive, these were the 'poles' of that body 
around which majorities and minorities formed. But what of the other 
States' delegates? The least significant may be disposed of first. 
Throughout this period Tasmania provided no delegates who could be 
seen as leaders rather than followers. Small States often lack 
politically experienced individuals, membership numbers and financial 
resources. Tasmania was so weak financially that the New South Wales
40Holt may have been more than a symbol during his period as President 
W.H. Hartley, who admits he and Holt were often opponents within the 
party, suggests Holt manipulated the elderly McNolty rather than the 
reverse, which tends to be the received view (W.H. Hartley, interview) 
Bulletin, 10 August 1963 suggests Holt and Wyndham were fairly firmly 
in control of the Branch.
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Branch, according to Oliver in an interview in 1978, helped it pay its 
Federal affiliation fees during the 1960s. The Tasmanians’ inclination 
to follow the New South Wales delegates on many issues was influenced 
in any case by the similar composition of the union movement in 
Tasmania, with moderate unions predominating, and most of all because 
Tasmania, like New South Wales until 1965, had a Labor Government 
which its Federal delegates sought to protect. While the Victorians, 
lacking a Labor administration since 1955, often felt they had little 
to lose by a militant approach, the Branches where Labor governed were 
more circumspect.^
The Tasmanians did not always vote as a bloc, which tended to
make them less important as State delegates and more important as
individuals. A comment by the Victorian, Brebner, brings this out:
The only change in State representation was in that 
of Tasmania where Mr V.S.C. ’Paddy’ Williams 
replaced Mr J. Miley. Due to previous evenly 
divided Executive there was much speculation as to 
which side Paddy Williams would support. He was 
certainly the most ’met’ delegate at the Essendon 
Airport, no less than three separate persons were 
there to welcome him.42
As it turned out, Williams often voted with Chamberlain and the 
Victorians against his fellow Tasmanians, R.H. Lacey or L.H. Barnard, 
MP. But this group just as frequently lost the support of the other
One Victorian contrasted the Victorian unions' - and therefore the 
union dominated Victorian ALP - need to be militant because they 
could not rely on cooperation with a State Labor Government as in 
New South Wales (W.W.C. Brown, interview). Regarding Tasmania's 
financial straits, Oliver's remark is partially confirmed by 
Australian, 25 July 1969, which retails an allegation that Tasmania 
has been 'unfinancial' in four recent years and should thus have 
lost its right to vote.
42Federal Executive Meeting - July 1962: Report by the Victorian
Delegates, ALP (Victorian Branch) Records held in La Trobe Library, 
Melbourne, .unsorted (hereafter cited as 'Vic. Rec.') , Federal 
Executive 1962.
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West Australian delegate, C.H. Webb, a Federal MP from 1954-58 and 
again from 1961, who often opposed Chamberlain during their fifteen 
years on the Executive together. Webb and Barnard, as Federal 
politicians, helped to bring a broader perspective to Executive 
meetings. The New South Wales Branch excluded politicians from its 
Federal delegations until 1965; the Victorian delegates, as we have 
seen, were usually union or party officials, or both.
South Australian Federal Executive delegations from the early 
1950s included politicians: Senator J.P. Toohey, an Executive
delegate from before the Split to 1960, J.C. Sexton (1957-60), who was 
elected to Federal Parliament in 1958, M.H.Nicholls (1960-63, 1964-69) 
elected to Federal Parliament in 1963, D.A. Dunstan, (1960-64) member 
of the South Australian House of Assembly, and G.T. Virgo, (1963-70) 
who entered the same House in 1968. All served also as State Branch 
officers, Toohey, Sexton, Nicholls and Virgo successively filling the 
office of State Secretary from 1946-68, and Dunstan being Junior Vice 
President, Senior Vice President and President over the years 1958 to 
1961. The four Secretaries moved straight from administration to 
Parliament and Virgo's successor as State Secretary, M.J. Young, served 
as part-time Federal Secretary while a Federal Executive delegate, 
became full-time Federal Secretary and entered the Federal Parliament 
in 1974. The smoothness of transition and the close interlocking of 
machine and politicians was a South Australian characteristic. It was 
accompanied by a tendency to bloc voting, either as a result of State 
instructions or working out a consensus as issues arose. Partly 
because the politicians tended to avoid extreme positions, partly 
because of the consensus method and partly because South Australia had 
escaped the worst effects of the Split - which tended to produce extreme 
views - its delegates often found themselves in the middle between the
24
Victoria-Chamberlain and New South Wales ’poles'. While over the
long term the South Australians probably lined up more frequently on
important issues with the former than the latter it is still possible,
as a general rule of thumb, to see South Australia - and Queensland -
filling a middle position. Virgo, a delegate during the 1960s,
remembered that South Australia, voting as a bloc on important issues,
could often say to other States 'South Australia and Queensland
support Western Australia' or 'South Australia and Queensland support 
43New South Wales'.
South Australia's ability to shift blocs of votes did not suppress
the personal attributes and friendships of individual delegates. Only
Duns tan among all Executive delegates, according to Colbourne,
approached Chamberlain in thoroughness of preparation and skill of
presentation. Toohey had been closely involved in the Split and was a
skilled negotiator of Chamberlain's calibre but without his zealotry -
which meant he was probably more widely liked among his colleagues.
Virgo remembers having good personal relations both with Colbourne of
New South Wales, more often than not a voting opponent, and with Keeffe
44of Queensland, a regular ally. Personal relations could both reinforce 
and counter political alignments. Brown of Victoria co-existed well 
with Colbourne and Oliver of New South Wales; McNolty of Victoria was 
widely liked, Stout less so; Wyndham, when Federal Secretary, maintained 
his Victorian connections with Holt; Hartley was a protege and friend 
of Chamberlain; personal friendships as well as shared interests as 
smaller States may have underlaid the links Virgo remembers existing 
between South Australia and Tasmania; Keeffe remained President from
43G.T. Virgo, interview.
44F.H. Campbell, W.R. Colbourne, interviews; Murray, The Split, 126,
287; J.P. Toohey, G.T. Virgo, interviews.
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1962 to 1970, usually unopposed at elections, because he was personally
> 4acceptable to both sides as well as because he was a competent chairman.
Finally, we should mention those participants in Federal Executive
meetings who did not represent States. As Federal Secretary, 1963-69,
C.S. Wyndham could speak but not vote. Cyril Stanley Wyndham came to
Australia from England in 1957 as press secretary to the Leader of the
Federal Opposition, Dr.H.V. Evatt. Although still in his twenties he
already had solid credentials in party administration in the British
Labour Party and in 1960 became Secretary of the Victorian Branch of the
ALP. Australian Labor was primitively organised in contrast with the
British party and Wyndham sought to improve it. But both as Victorian
Secretary and Federal Secretary from 1963 to 1969 he was a better
administrator than a publicist of his reform plans or a politician
within the party. He was more often prickly and irascible than
diplomatic. The contrast between the state of party records during his
terms and those of other administrators attests to his bureaucratic
skills but the infrequency of his appearance in the recollections of
other protagonists suggests the relatively small part he played in the
negotiation and politicking at which the Chamberlains, Olivers, Tooheys
46and Dunstans excelled.
45W.W.C. Brown, interview; Bulletin, 10 August 1963 (Wyndham and Holt);
F. E. Chamberlain, interview; Chamberlain to Wyndham, 13 September 1963, 
Vic. Rec., Applications for State Secretary (Victoria) August 1963 (job 
reference for Hartley); W.R. Colbourne, J.B. Keeffe, C.T. Oliver,
G. T. Virgo, interviews; Wyndham to S.G.L. Dimmick, Warden,International 
House, University of Melbourne, 23 June 1965, ALP Federal Secretariat 
Records held in Manuscripts Poom, National Library of Australia 
(hereafter cited as 'Fed. Rec.'), NLA MS 4985/47/Outwards Correspondence 
2/4/65-30/6/65/735 (advising he usually stayed with Holt when visiting 
Melbourne).
Zl 0Bulletin, 10 August 1963; F.E. Chamberlain, W.R. Colbourne, interviews; 
Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 90-1; W.H. Hartley, interview; Nation,
18 May 1963; Alan Reid, The Gorton Experiment, Sydney, 1971, 260; SMH,
29 May 1964; Kylie Tennant, Evatt - Politics and Justice, Sydney, 1970, 
244-5; G.T. Virgo, interview; E.G. Whitlam, interview. Wyndham was 
born 'Isaacs' but changed his name at about the time he came to Australia.
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The politicians who came onto the Executive in 1967 as ex officio 
members also brought with them distinctive personal histories. All 
were between forty-five and fifty years of age when they became 
Parliamentary leaders. All were young enough to have escaped the 
moulding experiences of the Depression. All had grown up in or grown 
into reasonably comfortable circumstances. Three, E.G. Whitlam, the 
Parliamentary Leader, L.K. Murphy and S.H. Cohen, the Senate Leaders, 
were lawyers. The fourth, L.H. Barnard, Whitlam*s deputy, had been a 
school-teacher. Whitlam had entered Federal Parliament in 1952 before 
he had established a substantial legal practice but he showed the 
lawyer's characteristics of meticulous research, capacity to learn a 
brief and skill in advocacy. Murphy and Cohen, who were both Queen's 
Counsel before entering Parliament in 1962, possessed similar skills. 
None of the three had the ideological pretensions of a Chamberlain 
nor the religious devotion of the Catholic Colbourne, nor the worries 
about Asian Communism of Oliver. None were leading players in the 
drama of the Split. Whitlam had tended to avoid close contact with 
his State machine but Murphy was an intimate of the group which 
opposed the New South Wales Central Executive and Cohen became a 
member of the VCE in the 1960s. Barnard came from an old Tasmanian 
Labor family (his father had been in Chifley's ministry), had a 
strong grasp of the intricacies of Labor's internal politics, and had 
been a solid, if not distinguished, member of the Federal Caucus.
While the Parliamentary Leaders came to the Executive as ex officio 
representatives, their actions there would be influenced by these and 
other individual characteristics, as well as by alliances and enmities 
previously built up with their Executive colleagues, either as fellow 
members of State Branches, as fellow members of Federal Caucus (for 
instance, C.H. Webb of Western Australia had first entered Parliament
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in 1954 and Keeffe entered the Senate in 1965) or as politicians 
seeking to influence the Executive's deliberations before they became 
members themselves.^
HYPOTHESIS II: DECISIONMAKERS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THEIR OWN
PERSONAL HISTORIES AND RELATIONSHIPS
We do not claim that these brief biographies include all possible 
personal influences on incumbents of offices in Labor's Federal 
machinery. Other influences may be invoked by particular cases. But 
we have given enough details to show the need to consider their effects 
in the case study chapters. We have said enough to suggest also that 
those chapters may show the intertwined effects on critical decisions 
of personal backgrounds and the goals of State Branches. If, for 
instance, the events of the Split established personal enmities, such 
as that between Colbourne and Chamberlain, they also directed collective 
preferences - in Victoria, continuing opposition to the Industrial 
Groups within the unions, in New South Wales, cementing further the 
determination to protect the existence of the State Labor Government. 
Similarly, if Chamberlain and Oliver differed personally over foreign 
policy their respective Branches were also likely to differ, since 
both were influential in their States. Again, those who were politicians 
as well as Executive delegates were likely to be influenced not only by 
their personal histories and preferences but by the demands of their 
dual offices.
Let us say more about politicians. Nearly seventy years ago,
Michels explored the reasons for what he called 'the great authority 
exercised by the socialist parliamentarian'.
47Cohen died in 1969 and was replaced by D.R. Willesee of Western 
Australia, who had been elected to the Senate in 1949. Barnard had been 
a Tasmanian delegate to the Executive, 1965-67.
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He owes his comparative independence to the fact 
that the parliamentary representative is elected 
for a considerable term of years, and can be 
dispossessed by no one so long as he retains the 
confidence of the electors. In the second place, 
and even at the moment of his election, his 
dependence on the party is but indirect, for his 
power is derived from the electoral masses ...48
Where 'the confidence of the electors' depends greatly, as it does in
Australia, on whether candidates bear party labels, politicians are
constrained to a considerable extent. However, parties usually
recognise that politicians will often have to act in the legislature
with no more than a general reference to the goals of the party.
Parties, including the ALP, cannot foresee all the circumstances likely
to confront their representatives in a term nor can they presume to
direct them regarding the intricacies of legislation. Parties recognise
the importance of expertise. Despite the party rhetoric that
politicians were 'the servants of the movement', Labor's rules provided
remarkable leeway for them.
The Federal Parliamentary Labor Party shall have 
authority in properly constituted Caucus meetings 
to make decisions directed towards establishing 
the collective attitude of the Parliamentary 
Party to any question or matter in the Federal 
Parliament, subject to - (i) At all times taking 
such action which may be possible to implement 
the Party's Platform and Conference decisions;
(ii) on questions or matters which are not 
subject to Federal Platform or Conference or 
Executive decisions, the majority decision of 
Caucus being binding upon all members in the 
Parliament; (iii) no attitude being expressed 
which is contrary to the provisions of the 
Party Platform or any other decision of Federal 
Conference or Federal Executive.49
48Michels, Political Parties, 136. My emphasis.
49ALP, Federal Platform 1965, 40 (rule 5 [d]). My emphasis. This wording 
was officially adopted by the 1963 Federal Conference. Chamberlain, as 
Federal President, had presented to the Federal Executive in 1960 drafts 
for revised rules and these were approved with minimal alterations. The 
previous rule relating to Caucus had read simply: 'On all questions
affecting members of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party, the 
decisions of the Federal Conference shall be final. Pending 
consideration by the Federal Conference, the ruling of the Federal
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The rule is permissive rather than mandatory; it is up to the 
politicians to decide when action is possible; they have to keep within 
Federal decisions rather than speak only to express them; there will be 
issues an which Caucus members have to commit themselves where the 
party has provided no guide to action; there will always be a question 
of interpretation as to whether a particular action is within Federal 
policy. The rule establishes the authority of the Caucus to make 
decisions as a separate body, ’ subject to’ certain limitations. It 
recognises Caucus has a different constituency to these bodies. Members 
of the party bodies can lose their positions only by votes of party 
members but politicians fear the electors, only a few of whom are party 
members. Since Labor wished to retain elected representation and 
because it recognised that its politicians would have superior knowledge 
of Parliamentary issues and often should act before extra-Parliamentary 
machinery could be assembled, it avoided detailed supervision in favour 
of more generalised control.50
49 (continued)
Executive shall be binding'. The 1961 Federal Conference did not reach 
the item although the new draft appeared at the end of the official 
Conference report. Conference referred the remaining agenda to the 
Executive which sent this part back. The 1963 Federal Conference 
finally passed the new draft, again with minimal debate. If delegates 
had felt the Caucus rule was unacceptable or a new departure they had 
plenty of opportunities to say so. That they did not suggests it was 
unexceptionable and a fair statement of the party's attitude to its 
politicians - as the previous shorter formulation had been. The new 
formulation merely stated the convention in more detail: ALP, Official
Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1959, 67; 1961, 49, 68-71; 1963, 13;
Federal Executive Minutes (FX), 5-8 September 1960, 3-7 July 1961, Fed. 
Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/18-20, 118.
~^For discussion of the historical relationship between Caucus and 
Executive, including the evidence that Executive has at times protected 
Caucus from the State Branches, especially when Labor was in government 
during World War II, see: L.F. Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour 
Party, 1901-1951, London, 1955, 126-9; Graham Freudenberg, 'Labor's 
Myths and Hopes', Dissent, 19 (Autumn 1967), 48; D.W. Rawson, 'The A.L.P. 
Federal Machine', Australian Quarterly (AQ), 37, 3 (September 1965), 29; 
Labor in Vain? Croydon, Vic., 1966, 25, 39; 'Bringing Back the Polies', 
Dissent, 18 (Spring 1966), 32; W.J. Waters, 'Labor, Socialism and 
World War II', Labour History, 16 (May 1969), 14-19; Leicester Webb, 
Communism and Democracy in Australia, Melbourne, 1954, 35-7; Aaron 
Wildavsky, 'Party Discipline under Federalism: Implications of
Australian Experience', Social Research, 28 (Winter 1961), 449-54.
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Our cases may show that, in practice, Federal Caucus made 
critical decisions for the party while acting within party rules or 
even outside them. Constitutionally at least, Caucus controlled only 
its own destiny. But Federal politicians also sought to make critical 
decisions in Caucus, as members of Federal Executive or Conference, or 
as non-members seeking to influence these bodies. Within Caucus 
itself, as in the extra-Parliamentary machinery, there were conflicts 
between individuals and sub-coalitions with differing goals. Since 
Caucus' power was limited constitutionally the decisions which emerged 
from the reconciliation of these goals could be of less formal 
importance for the party, although they could be just as 'critical' in 
the sense we have defined that word - defining the character of the 
organisation. They could make it a winner or loser of elections, 
effectively destroy a long-held party principle or create a new one, 
nullify or implement a party policy and, by reacting to circumstances 
unforeseen by the most recent Federal Conference, commit the whole 
party to a course of action in a matter on which its supreme body had 
expressed no opinion.
Caucus decisions might be different from those which would have 
been made by Labor's extra-Parliamentary bodies faced with the same 
circumstances. This difference might arise partly because politicians 
and non-politicians served different constituencies. The first 
appealed ultimately to the electors, the other to the party. The first 
looked, to put it crudely, at winning votes and holding seats; the 
second at serving the interests of party supporters and strengthening 
the party itself.
Let us look more closely at this simplification. There had always 
been a crusading element in the Labor Party, usually expressed in talk 
of Labor's 'message of reform' and of convincing the electorate of the
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correctness of Labor’s view of how the world needed to be changed.
Thus Calwell complained in 1955 that 'we do practically nothing in the 
way of educating the people to understand our ideals ..♦ the great 
principles for which we stand'. Four years later, Chamberlain insisted: 
'There is nothing outmoded in the policy of the Australian Labor Party. 
Our real trouble is getting it understood so that conservative 
editorials and propaganda will cease to scare people'."^ Such views 
implied there was something immutable about Labor principles, that it 
was unnecessary to sway with the wind, that the search for electoral 
success should not mean the abandonment of basic beliefs. It also 
implied that the first goal of the ALP was to look after its 'core' 
supporters, those who saw the world similarly to the party's ideologues, 
those who saw themselves as 'workers', those who always voted Labor. 
These were the people who suffered when capitalism stumbled, as it did 
during the Depression of the 1930s, to help whom should be the first 
duty of Labor Governments and who should not be deserted by Labor 
Oppositions in search of votes. Political power was not worth betraying 
a party's most faithful supporters, nor its principles. Power would 
come as conservatives foundered and the pendulum swung back to a still 
'pure' Labor Party. Such a view, which combined an attitude to the 
electorate and to the sort of policies Labor should pursue, could be
A.A. Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, Hawthorn, Vic., 1972, 191; 
Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles ..., 14, 35. My emphasis. 
See also Dr (later Senator) F. Dittmer, first President of Queensland 
Labor College: 'If Labor is to succeed it must tell its story to
everyone' (Labor, June 1959, 7); C.R. Cameron, MP, President, SA 
Branch: 'I will rather see Labor in opposition for another ten years
than see us abandon a correct policy just because the electorate failed 
to understand it': ALP (SA Branch), Official Report, State Convention, 
1959, 3. My emphasis in both cases. When H.F. Jensen, Labor Lord Mayor 
of Sydney, submitted a proposal for improved research facilities the 
Federal Executive referred him to the new National Publicity Committee 
whose aim was 'informing the public mind both on Labor's basic policies 
and its attitude towards current topical questions' (ALP, Official 
Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1959, 14-15, 44; FX 11-14 August 1958, 
Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/123/55; H.F. Jensen, interview).
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called an 'exclusive' view. Against it can be placed the 'inclusive'
view, implied in Michels' remarks about the consequences for political
parties of the search for electoral success. While parties draw their
direct membership from only a part of society, they seek votes, says
Michels, from all parts of it. '"Parliamentarism" signifies the
aspiration for the greatest number of votes'. The modern party is 'the
methodical organization of the electoral masses .... In democracy
every one appeals to the people, to every one of the people, without
discrimination'. This 'omnibus tendency' is a logical consequence of
the search for an electoral majority, it is 'the integrative tendency
of the numerical maximum, mortal enemy to all freedom of program and
thought'. It kills a party's distinctiveness, it destroys radicalism
52in reforming parties. From a more favourable perspective, on the other 
hand, the inclusive approach requires a party to remain modern, to keep 
up with changes in society, to continually re-examine principles and 
policies.
The exclusive-inclusive dichotomy is not an absolute one. It is 
perhaps better seen as a continuum, from extreme exclusivists to extreme 
inclusivists, with individual decisionmakers starting at different 
points on the continuum at different times. For instance, Labor 
politicians had never appealed entirely to a union or working class 
'core', although some were more willing than others to go far beyond 
this - to seek the support of professional and manufacturing classes, 
say, as well as the small farmers and skilled non-union workers, who
52Roberto Michels, First Lectures in Political Sociology, Minneapolis, 
1949, 134, 144-7; Michels, Political Parties, 3-8, 16-18, 268, 367.
Note the passing use of the exclusive-inclusive idea, with reference 
to groups generally, in Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective 
Action, Cambridge, Mass., 1965, 40-2, especially: 'When there is
organized or coordinated effort in an inclusive group, as many as can 
be persuaded to help will be included in the effort'.
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were early supporters of political labour. Nor is the distinction
synonymous with that between non-politicians and politicians. We have
quoted the politician Calwell as an example of the exclusive approach.
53His colleague J.F. Cairns expressed similar sentiments. On the other
side, Chamberlain, in the speech quoted, admitted the need to adapt
policies, if not principles, to changing circumstances. Oliver went
54further, questioning principles as well. Dual office-holding broke 
down rigid distinctions, too. Some politicians occupied machine 
positions; Executive members entered Parliament. Then, even the most 
doctrinaire Executive members agreed there could be benefits in 
electoral success; even they weighed up appeals to swinging voters. 
Fourthly, neither Executive nor Caucus was monolithic. We have said 
something of State and personal differences on the former; Federal 
Parliamentarians also differed ideologically and personally, formed 
cliques around rival leaders, owed allegiances to different States, 
made individual and group judgments of principle against pragmatism,
53J.F. Cairns, 'The A.L.P.'s Strategy in the Affluent Society', Henry Mayer, 
ed.,Australian Politics: A Reader, Melbourne, 1967, 246 ('The role of
Labor is that of advocacy, not that of calculators of public opinion'); 
'Defending Liberties', Dissent, 13 (Spring 1964), 34.
54Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles ...y34. Oliver: ALP
(NSW Branch), Presidential Address by C.T. Oliver, State President, to 
1967 Annual Conference held at Sydney Town Hall on June 10, 11 and 12, 
1967, 4 ('Are we prepared to accept that the function of a political 
Party is to win Government even at the sacrifice of some often 
meaningless ideals?') While Chamberlain distrusted politicians because 
they too easily followed the inclusivist line, Oliver was much more 
willing to concede them independence, quoting with approval the belief 
of Morgan Phillips of the British Labor Party that Executives and 
Conferences should not have the right to direct Parliamentary parties 
but should always be able to have their advice considered: ALP (NSW
Branch), Official Report of Proceedings of the 1964 Annual Conference, 
3-4. While Chamberlain would have found it harder to admit this, 
Labor's practice was closer to Phillips' prescription for Britain than 
to its own rhetoric. Oliver found it much easier than did Chamberlain 
to say 'our appeal must be made to all age groups, to all sections of 
the community': ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1969 Annual
Conference, 6.
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benefit for the solid Labor classes as against the less reliable. 
Finally, rhetoric and practice often differ. Those who spoke of 
principles and benefits for the workers, or even of socialism, might 
at times offer the crudest of inducements to normally non-Labor voters. 
Those who were normally inclusivists might occasionally take a 
principled stand which could appeal only to committed Labor supporters.
To summarise: we can posit a continuum between, on the one side,
pursuit of Labor principles and an appeal to the Labor ’core' who 
identify with them and will benefit from policies pursuing them and, 
on the other side, pragmatism, a search for votes from all sections by 
presenting a wide range of policies not easily linked to a set of 
unchanging Labor principles and not intended to be.“*^ The first, 
exclusive, approach tends towards protection of a citadel of immutable 
precepts, the second, inclusive, approach towards walking in the market 
place of ideas and absorbing myriad influences, to the extent that 
nothing is sacred or free from the possibility of change. The two 
tendencies will often conflict.
Crotty provides a useful classification of approaches to the electorate 
Strains generated by the organization's will to 
survive and its corresponding response to pluralistic 
social forces can be resolved through: (1) a
coalitional attempt to put forward priority items 
of meaning to the greatest number of electors, the 
American experience; (2) an accommodation designed 
to advance in diluted form a group's welfare or a 
particular strain of ideology, yet in combination 
with other policy interests directed at sufficient 
numbers of voters to enable the party to exercise 
substantial influence upon policy making - a 
constraint upon the operations of European socialist 
parties that Michels recognized but whose resolution 
he deplored; and (3) a failure to compromise with 
other social groupings, in other words, an explicit 
unwillingness to change. In the last situation, the 
party retains its original identity, its goals 
intact, and its limited electoral support, and hopes 
for factors beyond its control to rearrange electoral 
forces in its favour.
(William J. Crotty, 'Political Parties Research', Michael Haas & Henry 
S. Kariel, ed., Approaches to the Study of Political Science, Scranton, 
Pa., 1970, 301-2.)
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HYPOTHESIS III: DECISIONMAKERS WILL SEEK DIFFERENT BALANCES BETWEEN
'EXCLUSIVE' AND 'INCLUSIVE * APPROACHES TO THE ELECTORATE
The possibility of conflict over a particular issue or issues 
between those who want more exclusivism and those who want more 
inclusivism will always be present in the ALP. Conflict will be most 
likely when the party faces its closest contact with the community - 
when it seeks votes at periodic elections. The number of elections 
during our period suggests that such conflicts - and the need to find 
a balance between the two tendencies that is acceptable to the party's 
sub-coalitions - could have occurred frequently. For instance, the 
New South Wales Branch of the ALP fought sixteen State and Federal 
elections between 1955 and 1972 and was free of an election in only 
two years. In Victoria in the same period there were also sixteen 
campaigns and State and Federal campaigns fell in the same year six 
times. Other Branches bore similar loads. There were nine Federal 
elections, six of them between 1963 and 1972.
The exclusivist suggested only that the primary responsibility, not 
the sole responsibility, of Labor should be to its core supporters.
Votes could be sought more widely but not at the expense of Labor 
principles. If potential voters, once apprised of Labor's advantages, 
did not then vote for the party, it was to their misfortune. The 
inclusivist, on the other hand, was more prepared to ask the electorate 
what it wanted, to respond to trends among many groups within the 
community. To the exclusivist, politics was action to popularise and 
implement the Labor platform of specific policies based on immutable 
principles; to the inclusivist, it was a combination of action and 
reaction with policies and principles continually evolving. The future 
existence of the whole party depended on its ability not only to respond 
to electors' demands but also to balance the differing views within
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itself over how to respond to these demands. Frequent elections 
heightened the urgency of both imperatives.
THE SEARCH FOR UNITY
HYPOTHESES I, II and III encapsulate three phenomena, derived from 
a ’static' study of the ALP and from relevant literature, which we hope 
to find influencing decisions in later chapters. All three refer to 
characteristics of individuals and sub-coalitions within the party: 
they pursue State Branch goals, they follow personal inclinations, they 
approach the electorate in a more exclusive or more inclusive way. In 
all three cases the stress of our approach has been on the possibility 
of conflict: between State Branches, between individuals and between
approaches. At the same time we have referred to Federal decisions 
emerging from the reconciliation of State goals, to alliances between 
individuals and to balancing exclusiveness and inclusiveness. In each 
case we may suspect that individuals and sub-coalitions have to make 
concessions - forego some of their goals - in order to accommodate 
those of others. Let us now construct two hypotheses which recognise 
more explicitly that makers of critical decisions may often pursue 
goals that have only an indirect connection to their own goals as State 
Branch representatives, individuals or vote and benefit seekers.
We began by describing all organisations, including parties, as 
coalitions. We placed parties within a sub-classification of voluntary 
associations. Now we shall examine the evidence that the Labor Party 
is a coalition, that this fact is widely recognised and that it imposes 
along with associational voluntariness, the status of being part of a 
voluntary association - certain constraints on those who make critical
decisions at the Federal level of the ALP.
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Roy Forward is one of the few writers to provide any extended 
consideration of the ALP as a coalition, 'a collection of heterogeneous 
elements'. Forward enumerates these elements as union officials, union 
rank and file, branch members, big financial donors, public relations 
firms, voters, party officials, members of Parliaments, Parliamentary 
Leaders and their staffs, and the media if it is favourable to Labor. 
Cutting across these divisions are those between State Branches, 
between different age groups or 'generations', between the party at 
Federal, State and local levels of government, between religious
5 6allegiances, sexes, classes, status groups and ideological tendencies.
Forward goes further than some would want to in his list of 
elements. Since his approach dissolves boundaries between the party 
and the world, he includes non-members of the party, such as voters 
and communicators, whom others might prefer to classify as 'supporters'. 
(In this thesis I, too, have preferred to retain the boundary between 
members and non-members, while recognising that the boundary is 
permeable. My concept of 'coalition'differs from Forward's to that 
extent.) But Forward does reveal the multitude of possible divisions. 
Parties, like all organisations, are composed of a number of parts; 
coalitions comprise sub-coalitions. Other observers of the ALP and of 
organisations generally suggest other ways of dividing the ALP: those
who seek power within the party for its own sake or for the control of 
patronage and wealth at the party's disposal against those who seek to 
implement policies; union against union; the following of one leader 
against that of another; 'networks' of friends against other networks; 
ideological divisions (socialists of various kinds, private enterprisers,
~^Roy Forward, 'The Australian Labor Party', Richard Lucy, ed., The 
Pieces of Politics, South Melbourne, 1975, 171.
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liberals, conservatives); strategic differences (exclusivists, 
inclusivists).
But ways of dividing are also ways of uniting. To form majorities 
sub-coalitions must unite. Dual allegiances facilitate this process. 
Take a group of socially conservative Catholic union officials from New 
South Wales, who seek to preserve the State Labor Government but 
dislike the Australian Workers’ Union, support overseas military 
involvement against Communism but seek limited nationalisation of 
industries at home, support Whitlam’s attempt to win the party 
Leadership but have close personal connections with other union 
officials who would prefer a different Leader. These men have a number 
of potential bases for alliance with other sub-coalitions. But 
multiple allegiances seldom push individuals in the same direction.
How sub-coalitions unite and divide will depend to a large extent upon 
the issue. Issues provide cues for sub-coalitions. How does this 
issue affect our interests? How do other sub-coalitions feel about it? 
Is it possible to form a larger sub-coalition to make the decision that 
emerges serve the interests of our small sub-coalition?
The existence of sub-coalitions affects the coalition as a whole. 
Every sub-coalition within the ALP, whether it is a State Branch, a 
union or a group of unions, the supporters of a potential Leader or the
For material on the ALP and generally: Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils,
23-6, 32-7, 52-5; Jeremy Boissevain, Friends of Friends, Oxford, 1974; 
R.W. Connell, 'Whitlam v Cairns’, Mayer, ed., Australian Politics: A
Second Reader, 369-70; James Jupp, ’The Political Situation in 
Australia’, Twentieth Century, 15 (Winter 1961), 333; Australian-Party 
Politics, Carlton, Vic., 1968, 96; Peter Y. Medding, 'A Framework for 
the Analysis of Power in Political Parties’, Political Studies, 18 
(March 1970), 1-17; Murray, The Split, 5; Nelson & Watson, ’Party 
Organisation’, 273; Louise Overacker, Australian Parties in a Changing 
Society, 1945-67, Melbourne, 1968, 35-43; Rawson, Labor in Vain? 34-5; 
Rose, The Problem of Party Government, 312-28; Sartori, Parties and 
Party Systems, 70-82; Tom Truman, Ideological Groups in the Australian 
Labor Party and their Attitudes, St Lucia, Qld, 1965.
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proponents of a certain policy, if it wishes to remain together, must 
develop a process for resolving the collective attitude of the sub­
coalition. For example, what decisions are to bear the label 'State 
Branch policy', what proposals on industrial matters are to be put up 
to the party, how is the new Leader's candidacy to be promoted or the 
policy pursued? The content of the outcome - policy, mode of 
organisation, set of leaders or other decision or decisions - and the 
shape of the sub-coalition's organisation, are both less important than 
the processes by which it pursues the twin courses of making decisions 
and keeping the sub-coalition together. The same applies to the 
coalition itself, the sum of the sub-coalitions, the Australian Labor 
Party. Inherent in the ALP, writes Forward, are 'processes of 
adjustment' between its various elements; 'when disunity occurs it is 
merely a sign that the processes of adjustment within the coalition 
are not working well'. When in 1974 the party's life ran relatively 
smoothly it showed 'that a sufficient number of compromises have been 
made to keep a sufficient number of the contributing elements sufficiently 
happy, at least for the time being', to keep them contributing to the 
coalition. 'The party as a whole is ... rarely, if ever, completely
satisfactory from anyone's point of view since it is always in a state
58of compromise or internal contradiction'.
Associational voluntariness, the ability of members to join or 
leave at will, encourages compromise. Sub-coalitions aggrieved by a 
decision can leave the coalition. Whether they do_ will depend on the 
existence of alternative associations - presumably a disgruntled ALP 
union, for instance, could affiliate with the Democratic Labor Party or 
pursue its members' interests without party affiliation - on what value
C O
Forward, 'The Australian Labor Party', 171, 174, 178.
40
they placed on a favourable decision and whether they thought they 
could reverse the decision. Labor rhetoric includes the injunction to 
obey decisions made constitutionally, even if they are unpalatable, 
while at the same time, working to change them through the proper party 
channels. There is little point in the proponents of one view having 
it adopted as party policy if, meanwhile, the proponents of all other 
views have left the party in disgust. At the very least such decisions 
may reduce the cooperation decisionmakers receive from some sub­
coalitions in the future. Sub-coalitions may, in a common Labor term,
, . ,, 59run dead .
The effect of decisions on a voluntary association constrains
decisionmakers. They must consider other things than how best to
reconcile their own personal and State Branch views. Is there a
possibility that this concern for the unity of the organisation will
prevail over the function of decisionmaking? Duane Lockard has defined
an ’issue’ as ’something that cannot readily be a v o i d e d L o c k a r d  was
referring specifically to American political parties in their relations
with interest groups, but a similar tendency has been attributed to all
organisations. The most frequent 'decision' may be one not to decide,
to avoid issues, to accommodate divergent views to avoid conflict
between sub-coalitions whose goals differ to the extent that full
61pursuit of them might threaten the unity of the coalition. Some writers
59Wilson, Political Organizations, 52, 114, 215-6, 235-6. Avery 
Leiserson, Parties and Politics, New York, 1958, 182, provides an 
inventory of how disgruntled members may react to such actions: ’counter­
political activity (organization) within the group purposes and norms 
(politics), appealing to established practices (law), passive non­
cooperation [run dead’.], criminal disobedience, joining in revolutionary 
displacement of the authority system by conspiracy and violence, 
withdrawal, or secession'. See also: Eldersveld, Political Parties, 97;
Medding, ’A Framework for the Analysis of Power ...', 2.
60Duane Lockard, The Perverted Priorities of American Politics, New York, 
1971, 80.
61Barnard, Functions of the Executive, 189-90, 225-6; Richard M. Cyert 
& Kenneth R. MacCrimmon, 'Organizations’, Gardner Lindzey & Elliot 
Aronson, ed., The Handbook of Social Psychology? Volume One, Reading, 
Mass., 1968, 580-1.
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have concluded that the search for coalition unity is a dominant
characteristic of all organisations. ’If there is a distinctive
motivation and attitude characteristic of political parties’, writes
Avery Leiserson, 'it is the survival and the power of the organization,
but in this the party is no worse than the church, the army, the
corporation, or the trade union'. Similarly, March and Olsen, after
studying school boards and university faculties, concluded that 'the
formal decision-making process sometimes is directly connected to the
maintenance or change of the organization as a social unit as well as
to the accomplishment of making collective decisions and producing
6 2substantive results'. Finally, James Q. Wilson writes that 'the
behavior of persons occupying organizational roles (leader, spokesman,
executive, representative) is principally, though not uniquely,
determined by the requirements of organizational maintenance and
enhancement ...'. Maintenance does not mean mere survival but 'securing
essential contributions of effort and resources from members, managing
an effective system of communications, and helping formulate purposes:
63 /in short, producing and sustaining cooperative effort'.
HYPOTHESIS IV: DECISIONMAKERS WILL TRY TO KEEP THE COALITION TOGETHER
6 2Leiserson, Parties and Politics, 200; James G. March & Johan P.
Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, Bergen, 1976, 16. See 
also: Amitai Etzioni, 'Two Approaches to Organizational Analysis: A
Critique and a Suggestion', Administrative Science Quarterly, 5 
(September 1960), 257-78; Alvin W. Gouldner, 'Organizational Analysis', 
Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom & Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., ed., 
Sociology Today, New York, 1959, 400-28; Herbert A. Simon, 'On the 
Concept of Organizational Goal', Administrative Science Quarterly, 9 
(June 1964) , 1-22.
6 3Wilson, Political Organizations, 13, 30-2. My emphasis. Wilson 
attempts to show how organisations use 'incentives' to maintain 
themselves. I am not convinced by the incentives concept as he presents 
it (see above, note 8). The idea of system-maintenance itself is more 
acceptable - and more widely accepted, as the preceding quotations 
suggest.
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There is considerable evidence that this hypothesis could be
supported in the ALP, even without studying specific decisions. Party
rhetoric stresses 'unity', 'solidarity', 'loyalty', avoidance of
'disruption'. The veteran Labor publicist, Henry Boote, said: 'Give
us Labor unity and the attainment of our objectives is as certain as
the sunrise'. Similar exhortations were a staple of Conference
addresses by party Presidents and others throughout our period. Both
the debilitating effects of past schisms and the achievements of Labor
when united were used to rally the party.
The Fishers, Curtins, Chifleys, Ryans, and many 
others had one idea always in mind ... to uplift 
the living standards of the great masses of 
Australians. They had one other great attribute 
too, and that was a deep sense of internal loyalty 
and mateship within the Party machine. These 
great men respected majority decisions, and never 
attempted to impose personal views contrary to 
established policy.64
Of course, rhetoric is not action. Talk of unity behind the majority 
decision can mask a bludgeoning use of numbers. '"Solidarity" is invoked 
in the name of every contending faction at once'.65 Punishment for 
'disruption' may be a convenient way of getting rid of opponents whose 
views are unpalatable. Still, there _is concrete evidence that such talk 
stood for something. The Labor newspapers of the period are notable for
64J.B. Keeffe, Federal President, ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth 
Conference, 1963, 7. My emphasis. The Boote quotation (1939) is at 
L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley, Croydon, Vic., 1963, 108. See also: ALP, 
Official Reports, Commonwealth Conference , 1961, 7 (Stout); 1967, 33
(Keeffe); ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1969 Annual Conference,
5-6 (Oliver); A.L.P. News, 24 June 1967 (Wyndham). On the historical 
references: Age, 19 January 1959 (Calwell claims ALP, not DLP^is the
heir of Scullin); Circular 59/258, Central Executive 30/10/59, ALP 
(NSW Branch) Records held in the Mitchell Library, Sydney (hereafter 
cited as 'NSW Rec.') ML MSS 2083/454/1181 (resolution on the death of 
Premier Cahill puts him in the tradition of Curtin and Chifley); 
commemorations of Chifley's death appearing in various party newspapers 
in June for at least a decade after his death in 1951; quotations from 
Chifley as frontispiece to conference reports.
^J.D.B. Miller, 'The Development of Party Discipline in Australia (II): 
An Historical Survey', Political Science, 5, 2 (September 1953), 30.
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their blandness and failure to pursue internal controversies. While
there were occasional complaints, especially in Victoria in the 1960s,
of suppression of articles expressing a different view to that of the
State Executive, a more supportable criticism was of the papers'
dullness. They reported decisions of party meetings but any reader
wishing to discover the details of the process of reconciling conflict,
had to go to the daily press or read between the lines with the aid of
his own knowledge. The blood of battle could not appear often in
66publications designed to reinforce party brotherhood.
Secondly, there is clear evidence that State Branch Executives were
constructed to represent the various elements of the ALP coalition within
the State. Let us admit at once that the extent of this practice varied,
that the degree of representativeness was determined by the controllers
of the Branch and that, at least in the three States we shall consider,
the controlling group remained basically similar in orientation, if not
in personnel, throughout the period from the Split to the late 1960s.
Given these caveats, it is still possible to see a strategy which took
account of divisions and sought united action in spite of them.
The strategy was expressed in a compromise ticket presented by the
Executive to the electors at each Annual Conference.
The ticket will comprise representatives of the 
dominant trade unions, plus other members of the 
party who are of the same line of thought, and
66The newspapers looked at were: A.L.P. Journal (1960-69), A.LP. News (1961— 
67), A.LP. Newsletter (1962-63), all published by the NSW Branch, Fact 
(Victorian Branch, 1961-70), Herald (SA Branch, 1957-67), Labor 
(Victoria, 1953-61), New Age (Queensland Branch, 1961-64) and Western 
Sun (WA Branch, 1966-67). The journals of sections within the party, 
on the other hand, were much more opinionated - not surprisingly, since 
their purpose was to attack State Executives or promote sectional 
viewpoints. The most important were Labor Comment (anti-VCE), Scope 
(anti-industrial Groups and defender of the VCE) and Socialist and 
Industrial Labor (anti-NSWCE and favouring militant unionism).
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other prominent members, who, while not closely 
identified with the dominant union group, help to 
give the ticket a universality which will attract 
stray votes to it at the conference. In this 
fashion the State executive gives a rough 
proportional representation to a variety of 
elements within the party - although it may 
squeeze out altogether certain factions opposed 
to the dominant group. ^
Miller, writing in 1953, described what seemed to him then a universal 
practice in the ALP. During our period the practice applied most clearly 
in New South Wales and South Australia. Numerous interviewees in both 
States have described the process of calculating the numbers required for 
majorities, of assessing the stance of possible members, of occasionally 
rejecting a union nominee because of his unacceptable outlook, of deciding 
that some unions were of such a size or some individuals of such 
reputation that they could not feasibly be left off the ticket, of 
including individuals of promising ability, of preserving the existing 
balance on the retirement or death of an Executive member by seeking 
another representative of similar views from the same union, of giving 
representation to organised minorities within the party, such as the 
Steering Committee in New South Wales, on the grounds that they 
represented a viewpoint in the party which had a right to be represented, 
of some attempt to give geographical representation to parts of the
From the idea of the ’balanced' or 'representative' Executive other 
things followed. The controllers of the New South Wales Branch believed
^Miller, 'The Development of Party Discipline ...', 28.
£ O
NSW: J.L. Armitage, F.H. Campbell, W.R. Colbourne, J.D. Garland,
interviews. See also: Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor News Letter, April
1960 (letter from J.A. Mulvihill); D.C. Howitt, Secretary, Miscellaneous 
Workers' Union, NSW Branch, to Colbourne, 8 June 1964, NSW Rec., ML 
MSS 2083/380/969; Overacker, Australian Parties ..., 58; SMH, 17 June 
1958, 5 June 1969 and other press comments on annual Executive
elections. South Australia: C.R. Cameron, J.L. Cavanagh, J.P. Toohey,
interviews. See also the references in note 70.
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their Executive should keep the middle course between extremes of right
and left, to act, in the words of one of them, like the stabilisers on
an ocean liner, not impairing forward movement but providing any
69necessary slight deviations to either side. The South Australians 
hoped to identify all elements of the party with the Executive and with 
the decisions that emerged, so that all possible opposition could be 
thwarted at the source, since all parts of the coalition could see 
something of themselves in the decisions that bore the party label.^ 
Representation of a wide range of sub-coalitions never meant loss 
of control for those most closely allied to the people who composed the 
Executive ticket, whether the latter were the party officers, as in New 
South Wales, the delegates of a group of unions, as in Victoria, or a 
handful of significant individuals, as in South Australia. Abdication of 
power, of course, was never the intention of those who made up the ticket.'
69J.L. Armitage, F.H. Campbell, W.R. Colbourne, R.R. Downing, J.A.
Mulvihill, interviews. See also: Bulletin, 10 January 1978 (Oliver);
Mulvihill to Miss M.S. Johnston, United States Embassy, 14 April 1960,
NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/35/72/553; Observer, 23 July 1960 (Mulvihill).
^C.R. Cameron, J.P. Toohey, G.T. Virgo, interviews. For discussions 
which emphasise the ’smoothness’ of the internal politics of South 
Australian Labor and point to some of the factors that made it possible, 
including the ’card vote' (which gave voting strength at Annual 
Conventions to the larger trade unions), the skill of significant 
individuals and the close cooperation between industrial and political 
wings, see: Neal Blewett & Dean Jaensch, Playford to Duns tan: The
Politics of Transition, Melbourne, 1971, 86-7; R. Hetherington & R.L.
Reid, The South Australian Elections, 1959, Adelaide, 1962, 39-47; Nation,
18 November 1961; Overacker, Australian Parties ..., 74-80; Robert 
Smith, 'Organisation Party', Dissent, 16 (Summer 1966), 36-8.
^For instance, Colbourne: 'There was a left wing and they were entitled 
to some representation on the Executive, although not, of course, to 
majority representation' (interview). Left or militant unions were a 
minority of affiliated unions in NSW - and in South Australia - so the 
ticket roughly reflected the balance of forces. But the minority argued, 
especially in NSW, that Executive decisions did not. Note a feature of 
the Federal interventions in the NSW and Victorian Branches in 1970-71:
'what might be termed the 'rhetoric of intervention' - greater rank and 
file participation, lessening of executive authority and greater 
representation for differing points of view within the party': Judith 
Walker, 'Restructuring the A.L.P. - NSW and Victoria', AQ, 43, 4 (December 
1971), 33. Thus the new structures in both States incorporated proportional 
representation to try to ensure, by an organisational device, the sort 
of consensus decisions that the South Australians claimed were achieved 
there without such a device.
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The controlling group retained the whip hand and recalcitrant members
72often disappeared from the Executive. If one were to paint a general
picture of the control of the New South Wales and South Australian
Branches in the period from the Split to 1970, one would depict, firstly,
concentration of power in a State Executive majority drawn from a fairly
constant set of unions and from individuals of broadly similar
persuasion and status - or at least able to bury minor differences -
but with gradual changes in personnel; secondly, limited influence from
the rank and file but an opportunity for those in it who supported, or
enjoyed access to members of the Executive majority, to have some
influence; but, thirdly, the opportunity for other sub-coalitions within
the party to have at least a voice on issues if not an influence on
decisions. Even in Victoria, where it was possible, because of the
decimation of the Branch in the Split, to form majorities on Conference
and Executive from a group of unions of broadly similar outlook, without
having to worry about minority representation, there was serious
discussion on at least one occasion of including minority representatives
on the ticket. Even without conscious representation of minorities in
Victoria, those interviewed could distinguish shades of difference
73between members of a far from monolithic body.
The representativeness of the NSWCE declined gradually over a decade 
after about 1958: J.L. Armitage, interview; Australian, 4 June 1969;
[Tom Burns], The New South Wales A.LP.Report by the Federal President ...; 
J.D. Garland, A.T. Gietzelt, J.A. Mulvihill, interviews. See also the 
June and July issues of Socialist and Industrial Labor, the anti-NSWCE 
organ, for the years 1965-70, containing 'out-group' complaints.
73W.W.C. Brown, J.N. Button, M.H. Cass, G. Crawford, interviews; Fact,
8 February 1965 (X. Connor); W.H. Hartley, S. Merrifield, G. Foyser, 
interviews. Brown, Branch President 1965-69, suggests that a reason 
for not taking stronger action against the VCE's internal critics who, 
he says, were often quite outrageous, was that he believed in the 
representation of all shades of opinion, 'though, of course, I wanted 
the Left view, the progressive view, to prevail. But you could count 
on the fingers of two hands those we actually expelled during those years' 
(interview). Incidentally, compare Brown's remark with Colbourne's in 
note 71 above.
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Through balancing sub-coalitions, the concentration of power at
State Executive level was at least marginally modified. Hearing the
views of minorities at least gave a wider selection of information on
which the controllers could base their decisions. What about at the
Federal level, where equality of representation between States provided
a built-in inducement towards reconciling conflicting interests?
Further evidence of the political processes of Labor’s coalition comes
from the remarks of delegates to the Federal Executive and their
political colleagues. We have seen earlier in this chapter that much
of the importance of Oliver and Chamberlain on the Federal Executive
rested on their skill as negotiators, on helping to achieve what Keeffe,
74their President, described as 'a lot of good compromises’. Oliver’s
predecessor as New South Wales President and Federal delegate,
F.H. Campbell, provides this description of the Executive's work:
There was always lobbying. You’d sit late into the 
evening, bogged down on something, and some of the 
log rollers would get to work after the adjournment 
and generally somebody convinced somebody else they 
ought to change their view to get a decision.
All members contributed to this process at some time, some with more
skill than others. Toohey was a ’very diplomatic sort of a fellow’,
Chamberlain ’could sit down quietly without getting emotional and talk
to people, point out the error of their ways’.^  When Chamberlain
retired as Federal Secretary, his colleagues recalled ’many times when
the quick and incisive mind of Joe Chamberlain put diversive thoughts into
a compromise motion which the Executive or Conference had been able to
, 76 carry .
^See above, pp.14-17.
^F.H. Campbell, interview. The importance of adjournments as times for 
’log rolling’ and of bars, bathrooms, bedrooms, Chinese cafes, corridors, 
street corners, strolls and other reasonably private locations as places 
for it, is a staple of such interviews: J.L.Armitage, W.W.C.Brown,
C.R. Cameron, J.B. Keeffe, C.T. Oliver, J.B. Renshaw, interviews.
76ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 58.
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The nub of such remarks is not the skill of individuals but the 
process described.
You'd debate a question on the Federal Executive 
and you'd know the numbers were against you and you 
had no chance of getting what you wanted through.
So you'd look for the second best, so you'd get 
some sort of a compromise, fifty per cent of what 
you wanted, sometimes more. Now when we got to 
that position I'd have a talk to Charlie Oliver or 
Jim Blackburn, who was there before him, possibly 
sometimes it was to Arthur Calwell or Nick McKenna 
..., and I'd say, 'we're getting nowhere where we're 
going. What about if we change our course?' Well, 
we'd come to an agreement and I'd drop that into 
Joe's lap. Well, Joe would be wise enough to say,
'well, we can get a unanimous decision out of this' 7?
In similar vein, the Victorian, Brown:
The usual form was for a couple from each delegation, 
say, the President and the Secretary, to meet in 
someone's room until someone might break off, saying,
'No, we can't accept that' and the others would 
carry on to try to work something out. Or perhaps 
one might say, 'we can accept some of this, but not 
all of it'.78
Thirdly, Brown's colleague, Hartley, after reading a foreign affairs
resolution which had emerged from an Executive committee remarked to the
interviewer, 'that's fairly close to the Victorian position at that
time, except that we would have included a reference to American
imperialism'. Finally, Oliver remembers agreeing with a fellow delegate
79at a crucial Conference that 'this resolution will do us'.
This evidence suggests that critical decisions at Federal 
Conferences and Executive meetings involved sub-coalitions seeking to 
match their goals against proposals emerging from a political process 
in which at least some representatives of each sub-coalition
W.R. Colbourne, interview. My emphasis.
I
W.W.C. Brown, interview. My emphasis.
W.H. Hartley, C.T. Oliver, interviews. My emphasis.I
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participated. The references to falling short of all that the sub­
coalition sought, to 'accepting', to formulations being satisfactory 
rather than perfect, show that sub-coalitions have sets of goals, some 
more important than others. Some goals can remain unfulfilled by some 
decisions and the decisions still be satisfactory to the sub-coalition. 
Other goals will rarely if ever be allowed to slide. Where a decision 
can be formulated that infringes none of the latter, non-negotiable 
goals for any sub-coalition, the decision can be supported unanimously.
All sub-coalitions can be said to have identified with it; to have 
formed one coalition on that issue. Where a decision is opposed, some 
sub-coalitions have withdrawn from the attempt to produce a result 
satisfactory to all sub-coalitions. Majority and minority sub-coalitions 
will persist down to the final vote which 'registers' their persistence.
All politics seeks to reconcile conflicting goals to produce decisions 
in the name of a collective. If the collective is a nation-state 
compromise decisions may be enforced by machinery wielded by the 
government elected by the majority. Disobedient citizens suffer the 
consequences. If dissatisfaction takes the form of departure from the
state, the state is little affected. It is unlikely to disintegrate as
most
the result of individual reactions to isolated decisions, since^citizens 
place a higher value on remaining part of the collective than on one
80
Brown's remarks show that at a Conference of thirty-six delegates, 
spokesmen did most of the work. But at both Conferences and Executives 
the freedom of so-called lobbying sessions would be restricted by how 
many delegations felt themselves bound by State Branch instructions.
Brown says that Victorian delegations always felt they had room to 
manoeuvre within the specific terms of State resolutions but K.E.Beazley 
recalls Chamberlain's view that if WA delegates could not get support 
for the exact terms of a binding State resolution they could support only 
the status quo (K.E. Beazley, W.W.C. Brown, interviews). Whether
Chamberlain always followed this precept would have to be examined but, 
of course, if all six delegations were solid, either as a result of State 
instructions or Conference caucusing, only six views needed to be 
reconciled. This often occurred at Conferences, somewhat less often at 
Executive. On caucusing and binding, see above, pp. 10-11.
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decision. In any case, they may have no real alternative to remaining.
On the other hand, members of voluntary associations can leave them
more easily or, remaining, can cause disruption with more impunity than
they can as citizens. The voluntary association, relying for its
existence on the voluntary contributions of its members, suffers more
from disruption than does the state. Decisionmakers cannot afford to
let compromise occur by chance. They seek it actively. Compromise
81decisions help ’keep the coalition together’.
HYPOTHESIS V: DECISIONMAKERS CONSCIOUSLY SEEK COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE
GOALS OF SUB-COALITIONS
The search for compromise will be influenced by the factors we have
summarised under the previous hypothesis: if some account is not taken
of the views of all sub-coalitions the coalition may come apart. The
desire to compromise and the urge to survive may work side by side. Both
Campbell and Colbourne, for example, link descriptions of decisionmaking
with the responsibility delegates felt ’to keep the ship afloat’ or the
’trouble’ that might follow an attempt to force all parts of the party to
accept an unacceptable decision. Calwell believed a Federal Conference
which failed to represent all viewpoints in the party had lost 'the very
basis on which it makes progress' and could not produce consensus
82decisions which could command the loyalty of the whole party.
However, diverse views were important not only because of the 
internal consequences of neglecting them but because of the external 
forces which they represented. Each sub-coalition of the party had 
connections with the world outside it, and a view of that world, both of 
which influenced ips approach to decisionmaking within the party. We
81These seem to me more plausible cement than Wilson's 'incentives’ (see 
notes 8, 63, above).
82F.H. Campbell, W.R. Colbourne, interviews; 3KZ 'Labor Hour' Talk by 
Hon A.A. Calwell, M.H.R., 25 July 1965, Vic. Rec., packet labelled 
'Mr Calwell -Personal', containing material dated 1964-67.
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have described the ALP as 'a permeable coalition’. Having discussed 
its nature as a coalition, let us turn to its permeability.
The ALP, the Political System and the Environment: Eight Hypotheses
about ’External Pressures’
Political parties, as office-seeking organisations, have a closer
relationship with the world outside than do most other organisations.
Winning office in a democratic society depends on winning the votes of
electors, almost all of whom are not party members, so, by definition,
parties have to take account of forces outside their own boundaries.
More than most organisations, they are 'not closed but permeable,
subject to infiltration, influence, and control at all levels from
8 3other social structures and hierarchies’.
Let us examine in more detail the likely external influences on 
ALP decisionmakers. Labor rests on the twin bases of affiliated trade 
unions and local branches. Affiliated unions stand in a unique 
relationship to the ALP since they are both constituent parts of the 
party and pressure groups, trying to influence it. They were and are 
an institutionalised source of external influence on ALP decisions and 
they provided decisionmakers.^ Affiliated union items, provided they 
gained the support of the controllers of State Branches, themselves
83Leiserson, Parties and Politics, 177.
84 'Trade unions', writes Rawson, ’are the essential features of Labor 
parties, The only satisfactory definition of a Labor party is a party 
to which trade unions belong' (D.W. Rawson, Labor Parties and Trade 
Unions, Melbourne, 1964, 3). Non-affiliated unions stand in the same 
relationship to the ALP as to other pressure groups. Individual members 
of affiliated unions are not renowned for joining local branches of the 
ALP. McNolty painted a fairly typical picture when he told the 1963 
Conference of the Victorian Branch that only about 200 of the 9,000 
members of his Sheetmetal Workers Union, Victorian Branch, were 
individual members of the ALP. (The union had eleven Conference 
delegates): Labor Comment, May 1969, 4. For an interesting and little-
known American doctoral thesis on the party-union relationship, see 
Gerald Laverne Houseman, Trade Unions and the Australian Labor Party,
Ann Arbor, Mich., 1976.
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drawn heavily from unions, were far more likely to be adopted by the 
party than were those promoted by any other 'external’ group. Party 
decisionmakers drawn from unions assumed other responsibilities and 
became subject to new influences but to some extent they remained 
dedicated to the interests of the members of their own union and of 
unionists generally. This dedication could be aroused by issues where 
union interests seemed at stake and even decisionmakers who lacked such 
commitment to union interests could not ignore the demands of unionists. 
HYPOTHESIS VI: DECISIONMAKERS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THEIR ATTITUDES TO
THE GOALS OF AFFILIATED TRADE UNIONS
Trade unions, affiliated and non-affiliated, are pressure groups.
With other pressure groups, such as business organisations, charitable
associations and churches, they form part of a political system. Parties,
the institutions of government, the media and the electorate are also
parts of this system. Since, in a 'system' a change in one part leads to
changes in others, the ALP, as one part of the Australian political
system, will be influenced by the activities of other parts. But political
systems exist within and are influenced by a wider world, generally
called the 'environment', which comprises ecological, biological,
psychological, social, cultural, demographic, economic and international 
85systems. Before turning to the influences of other parts of the 
political system on ALP decisionmakers, we shall examine their 
environment.
Australia after the Second World War saw rapid social changes. High 
export prices, tariff protection, capital inflow, immigration, full 
employment and high wages contributed to growing prosperity, which the 
occasional economic slump could not long dampen. Increased prosperity
85David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs,
N.J. , 1965, 69-75.
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was channeled towards material comfort and security - private
expenditure on dwellings increased four-fold in the decade from 1948-
8649, on automobiles five-fold - and towards the education of children 
born in the early post war years. Out of depression and war Australia- 
was producing a materialistic, well educated society, disproportionately 
young, living in new outer suburbs and making new types of demands on 
political parties. Outside Australia, prosperity was unevenly 
distributed and stability fleeting. Cold War tensions impinged on 
Australians as on the rest of the Western World. World economic 
movements, reflected in export price fluctuations and consequent changes 
in the material welfare of Australians were felt strongly; poverty and 
hunger overseas aroused rather less interest in Australian breasts and 
required less action from Australian politicians.
Some environmental influences will affect the party's decisions via 
the sub-coalitions we have discussed: politicians will respond to
demographic changes, such as an increased proportion of children in the 
population, by seeking from the party a commitment to increased child 
care; trade unions seek protection for their members against the social 
change of automation; Catholics in the ALP seek state aid for a Church 
education system suffering the effect of a decline in recruitment to 
teaching orders. The goals of State Branches and of individual 
decisionmakers have always been broader than the winning of benefits for 
party sub-coalitions. Decisionmakers have always recognised that the 
interests of members of the party and many non-members will coincide. 
Granting benefits to Catholics, families or trade unionists will assist 
both ALP members and non-members. Meanwhile, electors respond to 
environmental changes by seeking different sorts of goods from parties -
8 6Kelvin Rowley, 'The Political Economy of Australia since the War', 
Playford & Kirsner, ed., Australian Capitalism, 273.
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schools rather than aged pensions, roads rather than housing, guns 
instead of butter. Many such influences gain easy access to party 
decisionmakers, are often sought out or promoted from within the party. 
Other influences infiltrate gradually, without being consciously 
promoted by anyone. The idea of 'full employment', for example, 
becomes accepted wisdom. Still other influences, like war, sudden 
depression, epidemic or flood, hardly need advertising, but impinge 
with as much force on Labor decisionmakers as on anyone else. In some 
cases, decisionmakers have a range of possible reactions; put another 
way, they can choose which goals of what external pressure groups they
will adopt as their own. In other cases they may see very little room
 ^ 87 to manoeuvre.
HYPOTHESIS VII: DECISIONMAKERS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY CHANGES IN THE
ENVIRONMENT
Other influences are less likely to be sought out but just as likely
to be unavoidable. These are influences from other parts of the
political system. Affiliated trade unions have been considered
separately because of their unique position in relation to the Labor
Party. Let us turn to some political organisations whose relationship
with the party is more equivocal.
'From its earliest days theA.LP. has been affected by two
international forces of very different character and Australian
88significance - Marxism and Roman Catholicism'. Marxism impinged
The interesting question is not why men act as they do but 'why men in 
certain circumstances must act the way they do' (Selznick, 'Foundations 
of the Theory of Organization', 31); 'Sometimes decision making proves 
to be no more than the painful process of discovering that there is only 
one thing to do or even "nothing to be done'" (Vickers, The Art of 
Judgement, 14).
88L.F. Crisp, Australian National Government, Camberwell, Vic., 1970, 
205. See also: Oliver's way of putting the New South Wales - and his
own - strategy of balance. 'For everyone that's dedicated to Moscow, 
there's one dedicated to the Vatican. So I go straight up the middle' 
(Bulletin, 10 January 1978); Rawson, Australia Votes, 5-7.
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because affiliated unions included members of the Communist Party of
Australia (which began to split into competing parties after 1963). Since
the establishment of an Australian Communist Party in the early 1920s a
series of Labor Conference decisions had proscribed cooperation with 
89Communists. But Labor Party members and Communists (as well as members
of other parties or of none) worked side by side in affiliated unions and
some unions elected mixed ALP-Communist executives. Critics of Labor
argued that thereby Communists exerted direct influence over Labor
policies, since some affiliated union delegations to ALP Conferences,
while ALP members, were chosen and controlled by Communist-dominated
90executives and were pledged to promote Communist policies. Other
observers found little evidence of distinctively Communist policies in 
91Labor platforms. There was often little difference in outlook between 
Communists and militant Labor people. While most ALP decisionmakers 
would have rejected the revolutionary methods espoused by the Communists, 
many would have agreed with J.F. Cairns that Labor and Communist goals
89The Federal decisions are collated at ALP, Official Report, 
Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 133-4. See also: Chamberlain, A
Selection of Talks and Articles ..., 37-9; Fact, 25 October 1962 
(Wyndham on Labor as a ’bulwark against the perfidy of Communism’); 
Cyril S. Wyndham, The Unbridgable Gulf between Democratic Socialism 
and Communism, Canberra, 1964. The last was produced on the 
instructions of the Federal Executive.
90The main exponent during our period was B.A. Santamaria: The
Australian Labor Movement 1966-71: The Issue of Control, Melbourne, 
1971; Observer, 14 November 1959; The Price of Freedom, Melbourne, 
1964, 7-9. See also: John Bennett, ’The ALP. 1', Dissent, 20
(Winter 1967), 46-8; Peter Samuel, 'Calwell’s Cow Palace’, Dissent,
13 (Spring 1964), 37-8; SMH, 9 November 1961 (Senator Cole, DLP 
Leader).
91D.W. Rawson, Politics in Trade Unions - Does it Matter? Australasian 
Political Studies Association Annual Conference Paper, Canberra, 1966; 
Ken Turner, ’Who Whom? "Outside Control" in the ALP', Dissent, 21 
(Spring 1967), 23-4.
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often were very similar and they would often advocate the same industrial
92and social causes.
HYPOTHESIS VIII: DECISIONMAKERS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THEIR ATTITUDES
TO AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH COMMUNISTS
Labor’s relations with Roman Catholics had an even longer history
than those with Communists. They involved relations with the Catholic
rank and file, with the Catholic hierarchy and with Catholic political
organisations. As late as 1958, J.D. Pringle could write that Labor
'has always been a party of which about one-fifth of its voters, one-
quarter of its members and perhaps one-third to one-half of its leaders
were Catholics, a party which, for this reason, enjoyed the sympathy,
guidance and sometimes the support of the Catholic Hierarchy in 
93Australia'. Catholics had been associated with Labor from the earliest
days, partly because it lacked the anti-Catholic tendencies of some of
its rivals, partly because it tended to support Irish independence and
most of all because Labor's egalitarian philosophy and welfare policies
94appealed to people drawn predominantly from the working class.
92Cairns: 'Defending Liberties', 34; letter to editor, Age,
10 December 1964. One cause where ALP members associating with 
Communists drew criticism from inside and outside the party was the 
peace movement. Federal Labor bodies regularly warned members to 
beware of such organisations being used for Communist purposes but the 
critics were not satisfied: ALP, OfficialReport, Commonwealth
Conference, 1959, 14, 45; 1963, 96; Anonymous, The Peace Movement,
Melbourne, 1964; FX 26-28 October 1959, 24-27 June 1963, Fed. Rec., 
NLA MS 4985/123/55; 125/57/58-9; J.P. Forrester, Fifteen Years of
Peace Fronts, Sydney, 1964.
93John Douglas Pringle, Australian Accent, London, 1958, 56.
94Celia Hamilton, 'The Irish Catholics of New South Wales and the 
Labor Party, 1890-1910', Historical Studies, 8 (November 1958), 254- 
67; R.N. Spann, 'The Catholic Vote in Australia', Henry Mayer, ed., 
Catholics and the Free Society, Melbourne, 1961, 118-9; T.L. Suttor, 
'Catholicism in Australian Politics since Federation', Mayer, ed., 
Catholics and the Free Society, 37-40; I.E. Young, 'Catholics and the 
N.S.W. Labor Party: 1919-39', A>P.S.A. News, 6, 4 (November 1961),
2-3.
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Accordingly, in the years 1946-54 about seventy per cent of Catholics
said they would vote Labor at Federal elections, compared with about
95forty per cent of members of other churches.
The Catholic hierarchy reflected the Labor allegiance of its
followers and reinforced it in the hope that the ability to ensure a
fairly solid Catholic Labor vote would extract from Labor Governments
assistance to causes dear to Catholics, notably aid for the Catholic
96education system and for Catholic social welfare activities. The
closeness of the relationship varied over time and according to the
diocese and the incumbent. Cardinal Moran, Archbishop of Sydney 1884-
1911, is described by Crisp as ’often a sympathetic friend of organised
Labour’, while in Melbourne, Archbishop Mannix (1917-63) enjoyed close
97relations with many Labor leaders. But it was in New South Wales under 
Archbishop, later Cardinal, Gilroy that Church-party relations are 
reputed to have been closest. Gilroy became Archbishop in 1940, a year 
before Labor's quarter century of government began. A large proportion 
of the Labor ministries during that period was Catholic and there was 
regular speculation about the closeness of the relationship between 
politicians and hierarchy. Gilroy himself was cautious about promoting 
Catholic claims and the Labor Governments seem to have found it a 
congenial relationship. Fear of arousing sectarianism inhibited both 
sides, although the Governments concerned were not renowned even for 
spectacular concessions to trade unions, let alone to Catholics. The
Spann, 'The Catholic Vote in Australia', 115-16. Gallup poll figures.
96The state aid issue will be discussed in chapter 3.
97Crisp, Australian National Government, 17; Niall Brennan, Dr. Mannix, 
Adelaide, 1964; Patrick Ford, Cardinal Moran and the A.L.P., Carlton, 
Vic., 1966; Patrick O'Farrell, The Catholic Church in Australia, 
Melbourne, 1968.
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consequence of moderation on both sides was that New South Wales
Catholics fared similarly to their co-religionists in other States.
Certainly there was no sign of New South Wales Labor rushing to grant
state aid, the key Catholic goal, even after it became possible to do
98so under Labor policy between 1953 and 1957.
As well as direct contact with governments the Catholic hierarchy
99fostered various political or quasi-political organisations. This 
type of link became most important in Victoria from the 1940s with the 
support and encouragement given by Mannix and most of his bishops to the 
National Catholic Rural Movement and the Catholic Social Studies 
Movement, led by B.A. Santamaria and known generally as 'the Movement' 
(replaced by the National Civic Council in 1957). One of the aims of 
the Movement came to be to purge the ALP of alleged Communist and pro- 
Communist influences by taking control of local branches and of the ALP 
Industrial Groups, which had been formed in the 1940s to fight Communism 
in affiliated unions. The Movement's excesses in pursuit of this aim 
helped cause the Labor Split of 1955, which involved the abolition of 
the Industrial Groups and the departure from the party, especially in
Note the comments of Professor Patrick O'Farrell, interviewed by 
Malcolm Long,’Broadband*, ABC Radio 2, 25 October 1977, 10.15 p.m. (after 
Gilroy's death): Gilroy had an 'exaggerated need for acceptance' for
himself and for Catholics, feeling 'we should fit in'. He became a 
political figure (at the time of the Split) in spite of himself and 'the 
only single end, I think, he had in politics was to secure state aid', 
although he probably saw this as a religious rather than a political 
aim. See also: Graham Williams, Cardinal Sir Norman Gilroy, Sydney,
1971, 8-9.
99For New South Wales, see: William Goff, 'New South Wales', Max
Harris & Geoffrey Dutton, ed., Sir Henry, Bjelke, Don Baby and Friends, 
Melbourne, 1971, 169-70; Michael Hogan, 'The Sydney Style. New South 
Wales Labor and the Catholic Church', Labour History, 36 (May 1979), 
39-46; Murray, The Split, 337; Nation, 13 February 1960, 6 October,
15 December 1962, 9 March 1963; Observer, 1 November 1958, SMH, 12,
13 June, 28 October 1959.
Murray, The Split; Paul Ormonde, The Movement, Melbourne, 1972;
B.A. Santamaria, The Price of Freedom, 14-60.
59
Victoria, of many of those most amenable to the influences of political
Catholicism. In New South Wales, the lack of sympathy for the Movement
felt by Gilroy and his Coadjutor, Bishop Carroll, a firm Labor
supporter, protected much of the old undemanding relationship between
Church and L a b o r . I n  Victoria, the situation was rather different.
Besides the continuing pressure of the Industrial Groups and the National
Civic Council over the issue of ALP-Communist relations in the affiliated
unions, Labor confronted Mannix and the majority of his episcopal
102colleagues, who supported the new Democratic Labor Party. Labor's 
relationship with Catholics came to turn on whether Catholics could 
vote Labor - because of its Communist connections - and remain good 
Catholics, whether they would vote Labor or DLP and how non-Catholic 
Labor people would treat Catholics and their political demands. Some 
Catholics might reject Labor but some Labor decisionmakers might abhor 
Catholics.
W.R. Colbourne, interview; Nation, 24 October 1959; Ormonde, The 
Movement, 97-104. For a tongue-in-cheek or exasperated DLP view:
Frank McManus, The Tumult and the Shouting, Adelaide, 1977, 131 
('Before every State election the Catholic Weekly [Sydney diocesan 
newspaper] would show on page 1 Joe Cahill with a Convent Reverend 
Mother, on page 3 Joe Cahill with the Cardinal, and on page 5 Joe 
Cahill with a bevy of priests').
102One estimate, early in 1959, was that twelve out of thirty-four 
Australian bishops supported the DLP (Observer, 10 January 1959).
This was based on the ten who had supported Mannix's intervention in 
the 1958 election (note 103) plus Mannix himself and his auxiliary,
Fox. The ten included the bishops of Ballarat, Sale and Sandhurst 
in Victoria, but not Simonds, Coadjutor Archbishop of Melbourne, who 
dissociated himself from Mannix's intervention. The ten: Daily
Telegraph (DT), 25 November 1958. Simonds and Knox, Mannix's 
successors, were much more neutral in politics.
103Mannix tried to influence Catholics not to vote Labor at the 1958 
election. Gilroy's spokesman denied that the Church could give such 
advice and Labor sought to salvage the Catholic vote: Anonymous
[Brian Fitzpatrick], ALP, DLP: What Cardinal Gilroy Says - Facts for
Catholic Voters; ALP (Victorian Branch), The Truth about the DLP and 
its False Claims (election pamphlets); Rawson, Australia Votes, 134-8. 
On divisions in the Catholic hierarchy at this time: Brennan,.
Dr. Mannix, 277-8, 283-8; Murray, The Split, 335-7; Observer,
25 June 1960.
60
Spann shows that the Catholic intended vote for Labor fell from
nearly three-quarters before the Split to about half in 1955 and 1958.
The slump, and the broadly corresponding shift to the DLP, was by no
means uniform across States. While the DLP vote seemed to be
predominantly Catholic, its composition varied, depending on the
strength of DLP organisation, the proportion of Catholics in the
population, the attitude of the hierarchy and the stance of the ALP
in the State, especially its apparent attitude to Communism. Thus in
the first few Federal elections after the Split, the DLP vote was
highest in Victoria, lowest in New South Wales and fluctuated in 
104the other States. The DLPfe importance lay, however, in directing 
its preferences to assist the Liberal and Country parties retain 
government in Canberra. This practice probably lost the 1961 and 1969 
Federal elections for Labor and the knowledge of its effects led to 
periodic attempts by some Labor decisionmakers to channel DLP 
preferences to the ALP or even to reunite the two parties.Nevertheless, 
the DLPfe demands that Labor modify its policies helped prevent any
104Charles A. McCoy, 'Australian Democratic Labor Party Support: An
Analysis of Two States', Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies,
3 (1965), 199-208; Malcolm Mackerras, Australian General Elections, 
Sydney, 1972, 220-1; Spann, 'The Catholic Vote in Australia', 115-16. 
Mackerras shows a range from 15.1 per cent (Victoria 1961) to 4.4 per 
cent (NSW 1963). The then Anti-Communist Labor Party polled 15.8 per 
cent (House) and 17.8 per cent (Senate) in Victoria in the 1955 
Federal election (Murray, The Split, 279).
The most notable instances were during the 1958 Federal election 
campaign, when Evatt offered to resign as Federal Leader in return 
for DLP preferences, late in 1960, when much of the initiative seems 
to have come from the DLP, and in February 1965, when the prime mover 
was Labor's Deputy Senate Leader, P.J. Kennelly. It has been 
estimated that 81.5 per cent of all DLP preferences at Federal 
elections 1958-69 went to anti-Labor parties: P.L. Reynolds, The
Democratic Labor Party, Milton,Olid, 1974, 49-50.
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106compromise. The chance of a reconciliation was already remote 
because a majority on Labor's Federal bodies, carrying bitter memories 
of the Split, exacerbated by the continuing activities of the 
Industrial Groups, opposed reconciliation on almost any terms.
In summary, the electoral significance of DLP preferences and the 
attractions of the party for the ALPb traditional Catholic supporters 
gave it the potential to influence Labor decisionmakers, even against 
their will. We may postulate two hypotheses.
HYPOTHESIS IX: DECISIONMAKERS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THEIR ATTITUDES TO
AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH CATHOLICS
HYPOTHESIS X: DECISIONMAKERS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THEIR ATTITUDES TO
AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY
A reasonably complete inventory of DLP demands would read: reduction
of power of unions in the party, purging of Communist influence, support 
for secret ballots in union elections, rank and file ALP preselection, 
rejection of pro-Communist foreign, defence and disarmament policies, 
support for social welfare policies that favoured the family, less 
machine control of MPs, dropping the socialist objective and replacement 
of the current ALP Leader (whoever he was): Age, 12 December 1960,
12 August 1961; Courier-Mail (C-M) , 18 December 1961; DT^ , 17 August 
1965; Frank McManus, 'DLP Deal Terms', Dissent, 11 (Autumn 1964), 10- 
12; SMH, 25 November 1960. The terms actually stated varied 
considerably from time to time.
"^^Critics inside and outside the ALP occasionally felt elements of the 
party were more interested in attacking the DLP than the Liberal and 
Country parties: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1967,
53 (Whitlam); Age, 11 May 1966 (Barry Jones, Victorian anti-VCE 
activist); CT, 13, 15 January 1965 (ALP Senator Cohen, QC, represents 
Liberal Senator Hannan in disputed returns case against DLPfe McManus). 
The Victorian Branch Secretary, J. Tripovich, put the VCEfs official 
attitude to the DLP as at 1960: 'We have declared this party right at
the outset to be a Santamaria Party representing the viewpoint of a 
section of the Catholic Church and have treated it ... as just another 
Anti-Labor Party .... We have always favoured the attitude of 
forgetting about the D.L.P. and concentrating our attack where it should 
be logically centred in the interests of the workers, and that is 
against the Liberal Party' (Tripovich to Norm Kirkwood, Bendigo Federal 
Campaign Committee, 1 September 1960, Vic. Rec., 1960 Campaign 
Committees, Federal Municipal State).
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The influence of both Communism and political Catholicism could
be channeled into the party via the affiliations, through formal
membership or informal 'networks’, of ALP decisionmakers with
Communists as members of unions or of 'peace committees', with Catholics
as fellow worshippers and with DLP men as former members of the same
party. Similar connections existed with other inhabitants of the
world outside the party. (Some of these people may have been members
of local branches but their importance derived from other attributes.)
One such was Brian Fitzpatrick, historian and publicist, who had been
expelled from the ALP in 1944, but tried through personal contacts and
through his Labor News Letter, published from 1958 until his death in
1965, to point the party in a radical direction, especially in foreign
and defence policy. Another sympathetic individual was J.W. Burton,
once Evatt's private secretary, later Secretary of the Department of
External Affairs, who influenced new directions in Labor's approach to
foreign policy and socialism. E.L. Wheelwright and H.W. Arndt,
economists, were party members who provided public and private advice on
economic policy and general philosophy. The head of the party's
advertising agency, S. Rubensohn, enjoyed a close relationship with
leading party decisionmakers over two decades. Wyndham thanked a group
of media and advertising people for assisting the party at the 1966 
108election. Finally, members of Fabian Societies, especially that in
108 (1) Arndt says he was rarely consulted on economic matters by Evatt 
or his successors, although he remembers an occasion 'when I was one of 
several whose ideas on the budget became part of Dr. Evatt's scissors- 
and-paste exercise in speechwriting': H.W. Arndt, 'Three Times 18: An
Essay in Political Autobiography', Quadrant, 13,3 (May-June 1969), 33. 
Earlier, Arndt had suggested a reworking of the socialist objective and 
had engaged in a controversy with Santamaria over the Movement.
(2) J.W. (John) Burton, The Alternative, Sydney, 1954; Labour in 
Transition, Kingston, ACT, 1957?; The Light Glows Brighter, Sydney, 
1956?; The Nature and Significance of Labor, Melbourne, 1958; DT,
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Victoria, as well as contributors to the 'little magazines', Dissent, 
Outlook, Quadrant, Arena, Meanjin and Overland, tried to criticise 
constructively. They wrote not only for lay readers but also for ALP 
decisionmakers.
Whether decisionmakers heeded sympathetic advice depended as much 
on their attitude to the advisers as on the content of the messages. 
Evatt had a circle of literary and artistic friends, Chifley had 
enjoyed close connections with the wartime public service elite in 
Canberra and later Whitlam built up networks connecting him with 
Australia's educated strata. Generally, those decisionmakers who 
adopted an inclusive approach were more amenable to the opinions of 
people not necessarily hard-core Labor supporters. But Calwell more 
than once seemed to identify himself with that exclusivist strand of 
Labor thinking which suspected such advice would divorce the party from 
its central ideals and its union base. Those who advised the ALP to 
drop its socialist objective included, Calwell noted, 'one university
108 (continued)
18 March 1957; Murray, The Split, 330; Nation, 19 December 1959; SMH, 
12 September 1956, 18, 19, 24 March 1957. (3) Fitzpatrick: Helen
Bourke, 'A Reading of Brian Fitzpatrick', Labour History, 27 (November 
1974), 10; Nation, 6 April 1963; Truman, Ideological Groups in the 
Australian Labor Party ..., 98-112; Ian Turner, 'Introduction', Brian 
Fitzpatrick, A Short History of the Australian Labor Movement, South 
Melbourne, 1968, 31-4. Fitzpatrick made a point of publicising the ALP 
subscribers to his newsletter, among them Calwell, Kennelly, Chamberlain, 
Schmella, Mulvihill, McNolty, Campbell, Whitlam, Stout, Brebner,
McKenna, Cairns, Haylen, State Branches and unions. (4) 1966 helpers: 
e.g. Wyndham to R.H. Croll, ATN Channel 7, Sydney, 14 December 1966,
Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/57/Federal Secretariat Correspondence - 11/1/66 - 
23/12/66/2456. Other helpers included P. and J. Westerway, M. Newton,
B. Johns and staff of Rubensohn's agency in a private capacity.
(5) Rubensohn to Chamberlain, 18 October 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/ 
11/F13 (offering help in establishing ALP Federal Secretariat).
(6) E.L. (Ted) Wheelwright, 'The Future of the ALP: Finance and 
Organisation', Outlook, 6, 3 (May-June 1962), 12-13; 'The Future of the 
Labor Party', Bridge, 1, 3 (January 1965), 23-7; FX 6-9 April 1961,
Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/85 (receives from Wheelwright nine 
discussion papers on economic and related subjects).
64
professor, [Arndt] one doctor of philosophy [possibly Burton] and
several other people who have been through universities .... We’re not
going to be taken over by the intellectuals or the pseudo-intellectuals
any more than ... by the Communist Party, the D. L P. or anyone else who
109does not belong to the movement'. Like that of other inhabitants 
of the world outside the party the advice of sympathetic individuals 
of expertise and judgment was unlikely to be accepted without question. 
Still, a hypothesis can be constructed.
HYPOTHESIS XI: DECISIONMAKERS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THEIR ATTITUDES
TO AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH 'FRIENDLY ADVISERS'
109SMH, 13 June 1960. Calwell was speaking to the NSW Branch of the 
party and some commentators suggested the attack was a pose and for 
internal consumption. Later, Calwell denied he was anti-intellectual 
but insisted 'there is some feeling that university men - as distinct 
from university-trained men - sometimes prefer theories to practical 
policies, and do not always understand the need for compromise so often 
required in the day-to-day political and industrial battle' (Arthur 
Calwell, Labor's Role in Modern Society, Melbourne, 1963, 61). For 
discussion: Arthur Burns, 'Intellectuals and the A.L.P.', Meanjin
Quarterly, 24 (September 1965), 347-8; J.F. Cairns, 'Intellectuals and 
the A.L.P.', Mean jin Quarterly, 25 (March 1966), 112-14; Miriam Dixson, 
'Intellectuals and the ALP: The Case for ALP Radicalism', Mayer, ed.,
Australian Politics: A Second Reader, 374-9; Brian Fitzpatrick, 'The
Intelligentsia and the Labor Movement', Arena, 5 (Spring 1964), 13-15; 
James Jupp, 'The Political Situation in Australia', Twentieth Century, 
15 (Winter 1961), 332; Race Mathews, 'Fabians and the A.L.P.', Fabian 
Newsletter, August-September 1964, 1-2. Some of these commentators 
admitted intellectuals were often not willing to engage in routine 
political work, while ever ready to criticise. Note also the remarks 
of one of Calwell's Caucus colleagues after attending a Balwyn, Vic., 
discussion group on the Common Market: ' [T]here were fifteen people
in attendance, mostly of the type which could be classified as 
intellectuals. I would think that most of them were not members of 
the Australian Labor Party. However a good discussion ensued and I 
feel that the night was not completely wasted. I would hesitate, 
however, to suggest that a great deal, if anything, was achieved from 
the point of view of Party organization. I suggested to the Group in 
a friendly way that I have never been enamoured of discussion groups 
as in my opinion they seldom shine out brightly when it comes to real 
Party activity' (F. Courtnay, MP, to Wyndham, 18 September 1962, Vic. 
Rec., Parliamentarians A to D 1962. My emphasis).
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Labor decisionmakers also enjoyed a complex relationship with the
press, radio and television. First, the media (especially the
metropolitan daily press) were the most frequent critics of Labor's
decisions and of how it made them and the quickest to provide advice
on how the party should change its 'image' to improve its appeal.
Many Labor decisionmakers resented what they saw as biassed reporting
and interference in the party's affairs.
The press, by and large, is controlled by the 
conservative elements in the community, and therefore 
one would not expect them to look kindly upon a Party 
with an avowed socialistic objective which, in their 
opinion, contained a threat to their well-being ....
[T]he press is only concerned with the establishment 
of policy on the part of the Australian Labor Party 
which will fit the conservative thinking and 
interests of the people it represents.H O
Exclusivists like Chamberlain might be expected to be hostile to 
the diluting influences of the press but even they relied on it to 
give a version of public opinion, to convey news of the outside world, 
the demands of pressure groups and details of events overseas. The 
danger, which some Labor decisionmakers recognised, was that their view 
of the world would be excessively coloured by the biasses of the media. 
This applied as much to their view of their own party. No matter how 
staunch the resistance, a party which lacks significant support in the 
media is in danger of hearing and heeding only its critics. Thirdly,
Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles ..., 49, 55. Also 
Calwell: Age, 9 July 1962, 26 July 1965; CTT, 26 July 1965; Campbell:
ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1959 Annual Conference, 1; Keeffe: 
ALP, Special Commonwealth Conference, July, 1966: Report, Findings
and Documents, 31; NSW Branch: AL.P.News, 15 April, 4 December 1962; 
Virgo, Secretary, SA Branch: Herald (ALP, SA Branch), May 1961, 8.
Agenda items favouring a Labor newspaper to counter press bias were 
perennials at ALP Conferences.
^^For reminders that 'public opinion' was shaped by basically anti- 
Labor instruments: Anonymous, 'Labor in Search of an Identity',
Outlook, 10, 2 (April 1966), 4; Herald (Melbourne), 12 December 1964 
('Labor Speaks'); Socialist and Industrial Labor, May 1961, 2, March 
1964, 2; Max Teichmann, 'A Course for Labor', Arena, 14 (Spring 1967), 
7-10; Western Sun, June 1967, 1-2 (Chamberlain).
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nevertheless, Labor decisionmakers used the media to communicate with
the electors and to promote their own version of activities inside the
party. Calwell's alliance with the Sydney Morning Herald during the
1961 election and his use of a journalist, Maxwell Newton, as a speech
112writer is well documented. It is equally clear from the detailed
press reports of supposedly private ALP meetings that sub-coalitions
and individuals 'leaked' assiduously to journalists. 'All the
reputations in commentary in Australian journalism over the years',
one Labor politician complained, 'have been made out of the Labour
Party'. Alan Reid of the Daily Telegraph, the journalist who most
exasperated Labor decisionmakers, could say: 'As a press-man, I can
113find out virtually anything I like about the Labor Party'. In the 
complex relationship between Labor and the press, the raw material for 
a story that one decisionmaker saw as 'anti-Labor' often came from the 
lips of a colleague or rival.
HYPOTHESIS XII: DECISIONMAKERS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THEIR ATTITUDES
TO AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE MEDIA
The rhetoric of Labor's exclusivists included a warning against
becoming an 'alternative Liberal Party' by slavish imitation of
114government policies. But any party in opposition, as Labor was
112Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, 204-6; Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 
16; Laurie Oakes, Whitlam PM, Sydney, 1973, 95.
113Kim E. Beazley, 'Labor and Foreign Policy', Australian Outlook (AO),
20 (August 1966), 130; K.S. Inglis, 'The Daily Papers', Peter Coleman, 
ed., Australian Civilization, London, 1962, 164; Sam Lipski, 'The 
Education of Alan Reid', Quadrant, 12, 2 (March-April 1969), 29-34.
The Caucus included ex-journalists, A.D. Fraser and L.C. Haylen, who 
retained their links with the profession, but Haylen could rightly 
claim that the leaks continued after his departure in 1963: Leslie
Haylen, Twenty Years Hard Labor, South Melbourne, 1969, 166.
114ALP (SA Branch), Official Report, State Convention, 1967 (Presidential 
address, M.H. Nicholls, MP); Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, 261; 
Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles ..., 55.
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between 1949 and 1972, often has to fight on issues not of its own 
choosing and to react to government initiatives over which it has no 
control. Frequently laying aside their chagrin at such decisions, 
opposition parties may have to manoeuvre on fairly narrow ground. 
Furthermore, a government long in office, winning election after 
election, may come to be accepted by the electors as the ’natural' 
government, making an Opposition’s task much more difficult.
An entrenched government also can mould public opinion in its 
favour. For instance, in an era of Cold War and anti-Communism, a 
reservoir of opinion could be channeled against a domestic opponent 
whose affiliated unions included members of the Communist Party. 
Similarly, a government which guided prosperity rather than took 
fundamental initiatives could paint Labor election promises as 
unnecessary and extravagant. ’In most countries a Government is on 
trial at elections', wrote Kim Beazley in 1966. 'At least from the 
time of Evatt's assumption of leadership and onwards (except in 1961) 
it has been the special feature of Australia that the Government is 
never on trial, the Opposition is'.^^
HYPOTHESIS XIII: DECISIONMAKERS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE ACTIONS OF
THE FEDERAL LIBERAL-COUNTRY PARTY GOVERNMENT
Beazley, 'Labor and Foreign Policy', 132. Note also: 'Without doubt
in many people's minds there is a stigma attached to the ALP. By voting 
for "Mr Menzies" they feel they are doing the "right" thing & in this 
one instance they can rub shoulders with the great. If they vote ALP 
they always appear as though they have to justify their action. 
Undoubtedly the tag of Communism attached so unfairly to us by so many 
has contributed to the production of this stigma’ (L.J. Romey, [Report 
on Corio electorate, 1963], Vic. Rec., Hon. R.W.Holt, Federal Election 
Survey Committee 1964). On the use of the Communist issue by the 
Liberals and on the issue in general, see: Reid, The Gorton Experiment,
131-55; John Lewis Warhurst, The 'Communist Bogey': Communism as an
Election Issue in Australian Federal Politics, 1949 to 1964, unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, Flinders University of South Australia, 1977. For a good 
summary of the advantages of office see: Laurie Oakes & David Solomon,
The Making of an Australian Prime Minister, Melbourne, 1973, 318.
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We have looked at a number of ways in which the ALP coalition may
be permeated and have produced eight hypotheses. Not all influences
will be evident in every case since, for example, Communist officials
in affiliated unions may not be interested in party policy on child
care, nor the press in the size of the Federal Executive, nor
intellectuals in worker control of industry. Some decisions may be made
without much external influence at all; in others the ALP may seem like
an empty shell blown this way and that by competing forces. Often the
party may seem so subject to permeation as to reduce the concept of a
boundary between it and the world outside to the most formal of
analytical distinctions, especially because there are multiple points of
access to the Labor coalition. Those rejected at one gate can knock on
the next. Every influence will confront resistance of some sort, for
there are people in the party who always suspect those not unequivocally
pro-Labor and who will always warn that Labor decisions and the methods
of reaching them should not ’be altered capriciously or because people
opposed to the Party have said [they] should be, but only after very
116careful, objective and detailed consideration'.
The Literature of Decisionmaking in Permeable Coalitions
In this chapter we have tried to establish who made critical decisions 
for the ALP at the Federal level in the years 1955 to 1972, we have 
depicted the party as a coalition comprising sub-coalitions whose 
conflicting goals need to be reconciled, and we have examined the possible 
external influences on its critical decisions. Thirteen hypotheses have 
been constructed for testing in later chapters. Although we began by
"^^Cyril S. Wyndham, Establishment of a Northern Territory Central 
Executive, Agenda Appendix R, FX 4-6 August 1964, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 
4985/119/37.
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placing political parties within a sub-class of organisations - 
voluntary associations - we have gone only rarely beyond data drawn 
from the ALP. Our hypotheses have been drawn from a static picture 
of the ALP, its structure, personnel and decision ’style’, combined 
with some basic organisation and functionalist theory. Is it possible 
to use, in a more detailed way, some of the literature on decisionmaking 
in organisations of the type of the ALP as we have described it, that 
is, ’permeable coalitions', to construct more hypotheses? Can what has 
been written about other organisations, some of them not voluntary 
associations, appropriately be applied to political parties?
Although political parties appear in standard lists of formal
organisations there is very little evidence that their workings have
been s t u d i e d . A  possible reason for this lack of interest has been
suggested by Neil McDonald. Formal organisation theory requires the
student to look for 'formality, definition, explicitness, efficiency,
118determinateness of authority, and like qualities’. If most parties
are as affected as the ALP seems to have been by associational 
voluntariness and diffusion of power between sub-coalitions, by the 
personal histories and informal connections of office holders and by the
Blau & Scott, Formal Organizations, 45-9; Amitai Etzioni, A 
Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, New York, 1961, 24-5, 
66-7; March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 11. Apart from the 
classics, Duverger and Michels, few books on parties appear in the 
extensive bibliographies of these works, nor in that of Cyert & 
MacCrimmon, 'Organizations'. Two isolated but extended attempts to 
apply aspects of formal organisation theory to the organisation of 
parties are Lee Anderson, 'Organizational Theory and the Study of State 
and Local Parties', William J. Crotty, ed., Approaches to the Study of 
Party Organization, Boston, 1968, 375-403; B.R.W. O'Shea, Organization 
Structure under Varying Conditions of Certainty of Goal Achievement, 
unpublished M. Admin.thesis, Monash University, 1974 (study of ALP 
election campaign organisation at the electorate level).
118Neil A. McDonald, 'Party Perspectives: A Survey of Writings', Harry
Eckstein & David E. Apter, ed., Comparative Politics, London, 1963,
336.
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influences of the world outside, it is not surprising that those who 
stress the bureaucratic qualities of authority, hierarchy and 
predictability steer away from parties as objects of study. Not only 
are parties often loosely connected and apparently disorganised; they 
also provide examples of only rudimentary bureaucracies, often lacking 
task specialisation, clearly defined responsibilities or an identifiable 
’pyramid' of inferiors and superiors. The ALP during the period of our 
interest had a bureaucracy of about fifty full-time officers, 
supplemented by volunteers or by elected politicians, both part-time. 
Responsibilities overlapped, politicians did the work of party organisers, 
party officials wrote policies, press statements and publicity came as 
much from Parliament House as from party headquarters. Even within the 
extra-Parliamentary organisation the jobs which within a business firm 
(a favourite of the formal organisation theorists) might be performed 
by marketing, publicity, sales (equivalent to electoral organising), 
accounting and personnel (equivalent to membership recruitment) 
departments, fell to a handful of employees able to turn their hands to 
a variety of tasks.
Nevertheless, the characteristics of political parties - and of the 
ALP in particular - which make them less amenable to the formal 
organisation theorists may make more relevant the work of those who 
start by emphasising informal connections, associational voluntariness 
and the coalitional nature of organisations. These writers go on to 
elaborate how such organisations will make decisions bearing the label 
of the organisation.
Cyert and March saw some similarity between phenomena in the 
business firms that they studied and those in hospitals, a voluntary 
charitable association and the British National Health Service.
Further, regarding political organisations, while differences in their
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traditions, operating procedures and external relations will ’probably
lead to important differences in the detailed process’ of decisionmaking
in them, ’[o]ur reading of the literature on political institutions
suggests that the concepts needed for a theory of decision making by
political organizations are not strikingly different from those needed
119in dealing with the firm'. Much of Cyert and March's book is about
the process of resolving goal conflicts within a business firm to
produce a collective goal. A similar process occurs in parties. Samuel
Eldersveld, whose work on party activists in the Detroit area starts
from the idea of a party as a coalition, specifically recognises the
usefulness of earlier work by Cyert and March, while warning of the
danger of uncritical use of a model developed in another context.
The chief value of the model is that it begins to 
operationalize insights about the structural 
properties of parties which have remained vague 
and unresearchable for many years. IF clarified 
and systematically utilized, it is a construct 
which will prove useful in explaining internal 
organizational relationships as well as leadership 
perspectives. 120
Another concept that seems at first glance useful for our purposes 
is ’partisan mutual adjustment', where decisionmakers formulate decisions 
that will at least partly achieve the goals of each decisionmaker. Labor 
men like Brown, Colbourne and Hartley, described seeking 'some sort of a 
compromise, fifty per cent of what you wanted, sometimes more1 and the theorisl 
Lindblom, who developed the concept, explicitly recognised the relevance 
of mutual adjustment, earlier simply called ’bargaining’, to political
119Richard M. Cyert & James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963, 285-6.
120Eldersveld, Political Parties, 7-8. The work he refers to (Cyert & 
March, 'A Behavioral Theory of Organizational Objectives', Mason Haire, 
ed., Modern Organization Theory, New York, 1959, 76-89) became part of 
Cyert & March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm.
72
parties. ’In Britain most bargaining over policy takes place among an
essentially unified group of leaders of a single party operating within
a very broad context of agreement.' In all democratic systems 'a party
platform ... is worked out in partisan mutual adjustment among
121interest-group leaders and party leaders'.
The work of March, Lindblom and others has been used by students of
public policy, of administrative behaviour and of the politics of
bureaucracies. Nevertheless:
It might be advantageous to apply to the study of 
parties the active body of knowledge about large- 
scale organizations which has been developed in 
recent years .... Particularly disappointing has 
been the failure to produce some sort of 'break­
through' in the development of middle-range theory 
concerning parties, including the function of 
public policy analysis.122
Whether knowledge of other organisations assists understanding the 
internal politics of one political party is a question this thesis will 
try to answer. Since the knowledge relates to how such organisations 
make decisions its usefulness can only be judged by studies of how 
decisions were made in the ALP during our period. The next three chapters 
of this thesis will attempt to make such a judgment. These chapters will 
also test the thirteen hypotheses constructed in this chapter. They are 
reproduced below.
There are five hypotheses regarding the types of 'internal 
strivings' likely to influence critical decisions.
121Dahl & Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, 345-8; Charles E. 
Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy, New York & London, 1965, 97-8, 
117-20.
122Murray S. Stedman, 'Political Parties, Interest Groups and Public 
Policy', Robert N. Spadaro, et. al., The Policy Vacuum, Lexington, Mass., 
1975, 155. The possibilities are occasionally recognised. For example, 
one review of March & Olsen's Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations:
'It is an easy step to begin thinking about extending the analysis [about 
the problems of a university President] to, say, prime ministers, party 
leaders and permanent heads': R.F.I. Smith, 'Public Policy and
Political Choice: A Review Article', Australian Journal of Public
Administration, 36 (September 1977), 268.
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HYPOTHESIS I: Decisionmakers on Federal Conference and Executive will
pursue the goals of the controllers of State Branches whom they 
represent.
HYPOTHESIS II; Decisionmakers will be influenced by their own personal 
histories and relationships.
HYPOTHESIS III: Decisionmakers will seek different balances between
'exclusive* and 'inclusive' approaches to the electorate.
HYPOTHESIS IV: Decisionmakers will try to keep the coalition together.
HYPOTHESIS V : Decisionmakers consciously seek compromise between the
goals of sub-coalitions.
There are eight hypotheses regarding the types of 'external pressures' 
which could influence critical decisions.
HYPOTHESIS VI: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to
the goals of affiliated trade unions.
HYPOTHESIS VTI : Decisionmakers will be influenced by changes in the
environment.
HYPOTHESIS VIII: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes
to and relationships with Communists.
HYPOTHESIS IX: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to
and relationships with Catholics.
HYPOTHESIS X : Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to
and relationships with the Democratic Labor Party.
HYPOTHESIS XI: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes to
and relationships with 'friendly advisers'.
HYPOTHESIS XII: Decisionmakers will be influenced by their attitudes
to and relationships with the media.
HYPOTHESIS XIII: Decisionmakers will be influenced by the actions of
the Federal Liberal-Country Party Government.
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Chapter 2: Unity Tickets 1955-1961
While critical decisions are those which show evidence of internal 
striving and external pressure, they do not necessarily occupy much 
space in documents bearing the organisation’s name - the platform of a 
political party, the articles of a firm or the constitution of a 
nation-state. Nor does their making take as much time as does routine 
’administrative’ decisionmaking. But critical decisions shape the 
basic lines of the 'face’ the organisation turns both to its members
to
and/the rest of the world. A study of how an organisation makes 
critical decisions should tell us much about the organisation itself.
Decisions, or series of them, are usually labelled according to 
their content, which is ascertained from the wording of the resolution 
or other document which emerges bearing the organisation's name. Thus, 
a political party might make decisions able to be labelled 'internal 
organisation', 'party leadership' and 'election strategy' or 'foreign 
affairs', 'social welfare' and 'education' or 'preference distribution 
in elections', 'relations with Indonesia', 'pensions' and 'secondary 
scholarships'. One series of decisions by the ALP during our period of 
interest related to unity tickets.
The phenomenon of unity tickets arose from the organic relationship 
of the ALP with its affiliated unions. While such unions were an 
essential feature of the party, no party rule required that all 
individual members of affiliated unions be individual members of the 
party, let alone supporters of it. Affiliated unions, therefore, 
contained members and supporters of other parties or of none, as well 
as of the ALP. This case study examines how the party coped with the 
jumbling together in ALP unions of people of diverse political 
allegiances.
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The Nature and Incidence of Unity Tickets
Unity tickets in union elections may be defined as how-to-vote 
advice or other material wherein members of the ALP are coupled with non­
members so that they do not oppose each other for individual positions."*" 
While some unity tickets involved ALP members collaborating with DLP or 
non-party candidates, most involved ALP-Communist collaboration.
Although they were not new in the 1950s unity tickets proliferated in 
that decade, first, because of the tactics and strategy of Australian 
Communists and, secondly, because of the Labor Party's internal struggles 
culminating in the Split of 1955.
Communist influence in Australian trade unions reached its peak
about 1945, but it was dissipated over the next few years by excessive
2use of strikes and other forms of confrontation. The Communist leadership
then turned to the concept of the 'united front', which was
an agreement on specific issues of struggle with 
those whom on most general issues, we are in 
disagreement with. It is an agreement whereby 
workers supporting the Communist Party and the 
Labour Party, who politically are opposed, agree 
on common action for the defence of the interests 
of the working class.3
Cf. the definition in the resolution of the 1965 Federal Conference, 
which seems to be the only official and explicit Federal definition:
'(2) A Unity Ticket shall mean a How-to-Vote guide or other election 
material in an election for Trade Union office where A.L.P. members 
appear with members of another Political Party for the purpose of 
securing a common result' (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 
1965, 35). The definition followed argument over whether a newspaper 
advertisement came within the ban on unity tickets.
^G.C. Bolton, '1939-51', F.K. Crowley, ed., A New History of Australia, 
Melbourne, 1974, 494; Alastair Davidson, The Communist Party of 
Australia, Stanford, Calif., 1969, 126.
3R. Dixon, President, Communist Party of Australia (1951), quoted,
E. Thornton, 'Communists and the Trade Unions', Communist Review, 
September 1954, 268. See: J.D. Playford, Doctrinal and Strategic
Problems of the Communist Party of Australia, 1945-62, unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, Australian National University, 1962, 222-42.
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The immediate aim of this policy was to regain Communist union
4positions lost to the ALP Industrial Groups in the years 1950-52.
ALP allies emerged as the Groupers turned to unions where other ALP 
members, rather than Communists, held office. The consequent ALP 
resentment provided fertile ground for the united front advocates.
The new moderation of the Communist union officials and their qualities 
as unionists were also important in gaining allies, while on the non- 
Communist side increased militancy in 1952-53 facilitated convergence. 
Many ALP union leaders allied with Communists in preference to Groupers 
and the alliance was expressed in a 'unity ticket'.
In which unions did unity tickets occur? One anti-unity ticket 
publication found documentary proof of unity tickets in the following 
unions: Australian Railways Union (New South Wales, Victoria and South
Australia), Watersiders (Victoria, New South Wales, Western Australia), 
Meatworkers (Queensland and Victoria), Tramways (Victoria), Amalgamated 
Engineering Union, Ironworkers (New South Wales), Postal Workers (New 
South Wales) and Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen (New South Wales)
ß
and party records indicate this list is not exhaustive. Since this 
chapter is not a study of unity tickets but of ALP decisionmaking, the 
question does not require a definite answer, although it is clear that 
tickets occurred in a minority of affiliated unions. Once the unity
4Robin Gollan, Revolutionaries and Reformists, Richmond, U.K., 1975 , 271; 
L.L. Sharkey, 'After the Federal Elections', Communist Review, July 
1954, 197.
~*As Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia, 142-3, points out, for 
the Communists to control a union they required the support of the 
moderate majority. There were occasional allegations during our period 
that Communists always won the choice positions in unions, especially 
that of Secretary, sometimes by duping ALP candidates and voters. The 
allegations were based on the reports of a former Communist member of 
the Waterside Workers' Federation. See: Bernard Barrett, 'Unity
Tickets: How Good?', Outlook, 3,3 (May 1959), 16.
John Williams, Collaboration with Communism, Melbourne, 1960? 10-12.
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ticket ban was established tickets only became an issue for the party 
when someone (often a defeated candidate) laid a charge or when the 
ticket's existence came to light in some other way. They were likely 
to appear when union factions had to combine, since they were unsure 
of winning elections on their own, or because a ticket containing 
members of a number of factions had other advantages, for example, 
including potential contacts with other organisations, such as the ALP 
in the case of Communist-dominated union executives.
There were a variety of factional patterns evident in our period. 
Continuing battles against Grouper executives in the New South Wales 
ARU and Ironworkers led to unity tickets there, while in the Victorian 
ARU the Communist J.J. Brown was re-elected Secretary on a unity ticket 
in 1955 to break the short-lived Grouper control of the branch. The ARU 
Industrial Group continued to harass the unity executive and run 
tickets against it, while some ALP members tried to organise tickets of 
ALP members and supporters. Three-way battles became common and 
allegations of unity tickets accompanied every biennial Victorian ARU 
election from 1959 at least until 1969, with the same names involved 
again and again. In the Postal Workers multi-sided battles occurred in 
New South Wales, Victoria and Federally, as the descendants of the 
formerly dominant Communist faction tried to return to office on unity 
tickets against the new administration, originally Grouper but later 
bitterly divided by personal animosity and disputes over union 
administration. In a number of unions, rival teams claimed they were 
'genuine Labor' or 'genuine ALP' candidates, whether or not they had 
fccxctfc or semi-official blessing from the party. In the Watersiders, 
elections after 1961 were complicated by the consequences of the support 
by some ALP politicians for C.H. Fitzgibbon in an election for Federal 
Secretary of the union. A Fitzgibbon-supporting faction became a strong
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contestant against unity ticket executives and Industrial Groupers in 
Sydney and Melbourne. In other unions, for instance, the New South Wales 
Electrical Trades and Builders Laborers, factions were partly based on 
disputes over whether Federal or State rules should apply to the unions. 
Generally, while the most ubiquitous bases of faction were attitudes to 
the Groupers, the significant point was the variety of possible bases 
and combinations of bases - political differences, differences over 
industrial claims, over union administration, between ’ins' and 'outs' 
and personality differences. The crux of the problem of unity tickets 
was the many bases of union factionalism beside political party 
membership.
1955-1959
BANNING UNITY TICKETS 1955-1957
Like much of the post Split history of the ALP, its attitudes towards 
unity tickets can be traced to the resolutions of the Hobart Federal 
Conference in March 1955, though the roots went much further back. The 
resolution withdrawing party recognition from the Industrial Groups 
included the paragraph:
We are of the opinion that any form of industrial 
organisation designed to combat Communist activity 
in the unions should be a matter for the sole 
determination of the members of the union concerned.'7
In this resolution and at other stages of the Conference, the Conference
greaffirmed the party's traditional opposition to Communism. But the 
Split and the removal of recognition from the Groups in fact provided 
an opportunity for Communists and their allies in the militant and anti-
^ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1955, 41.
g
See the decisions reprinted in ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth 
Conference, 1965, 133-4.
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Grouper sections of the ALP to make further gains in the unions. This 
development was acceptable to most of the new controllers of the ALP in 
Victoria, who represented its more militant elements there, but not to 
the New South Wales Executive, still with a Grouper element and now 
engaged in a struggle against supporters of the Federal Executive for 
control of the Branch and its affiliated unions.'*"^
The differing situations in the two largest State Branches produced 
differing interpretations of the Hobart resolution. The Victorian 
Central Executive (VCE) declared that it had no authority ’to direct 
members of the ALP in activities within the confines of Union membership' 
except that the principles in previous Conference decisions repudiating 
the Communist Party, prohibiting officers of affiliated unions from 
opposing endorsed ALP candidates at public elections and prohibiting 
opposition to union affiliation with the ALP should have full effect.
The resolution concluded:
2. That direction on any matters other than those 
in the preceding clause constitutes undue 
interference in the domestic rights of Trade 
Unionists in the internal affairs of their 
Unions, and is therefore in conflict with the 
Federal Conference [i.e. Hobart] policy, and
3. That this declaration shall provide a basis of 
relationship between the ALP and affiliated 
Unions and/or their members.
The resolution, said J. Tripovich, State Secretary of the Victorian 
Branch, restored the union-party relationship 'in keeping with the true
Robert Murray, The Split, Melbourne, 1972, 255, 331; Playford, 
Doctrinal and Strategic Problems ..., 273-9. It is over-dramatic to 
say, as Murray does, that the result 'was to remove the effective 
barrier to communist penetration of the Trade Union Movement' - the 
roll-back of Grouper power had begun at least two years earlier as a 
result of Communist tactical revision and the Groupers' own excesses.
"^Both unity tickets and charges concerning them became weapons in this 
struggle and the most notable cases were in the Ironworkers and the 
Operative Painters (SMH, 3-5 September, 4 October, 18, 21 November, 7, 
14 December 1955; 10 January, 11, 12 April 1956). The bases for
charges were various NSW Branch resolutions.
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spirit of Labor’, that is, of non-interference by the party in the 
affairs of the union movement.^
The Victorian resolution left the way often for Communist-ALP
alliances against the Industrial Groups. (The Groups continued to
operate without ALP endorsement but became allied with what was to
become the Democratic Labor Party.) The New South Wales Executive,
however, declared that the Hobart resolution ’means that members of
the Australian Labor Party shall not collaborate with members of the
Communist Party or any other Party in any way which would assist such
political Parties to establish or strengthen their influence in the
Unions’. ALP members knowingly included on unity tickets against other
12ALP members would be expelled upon being found guilty.
From the beginning then, the two largest Branches had different 
attitudes to unity tickets. The Hobart resolution contained two 
strands: affirmation of the ALP’s long-standing opposition to Communism, 
on the one hand, and, on the other, rejection of interference of the 
type engaged in by the Groups. The New South Wales Branch, while 
accepting that the Groups' days were over, produced an interpretation 
which continued to pursue the goal of an anti-Communist Labor Party 
with such rhetorical vigour that its critics could claim the Branch 
supported other types of interference against Communists in unions. To 
the Victorians, it was more important to defeat Groupers than to win 
points for ’bashing the Communists'.
Circular G13, Tripovich to all Affiliates and MPs, 10 October 1955, 
Vic. Rec., Circulars. Extra Copies 1955. The formulation came from an 
amendment moved by A.E. Monk, President, Australian Council of Trade 
Unions, seconded by Senator Kennelly and accepted by the movers,
J. Wood, Assistant Secretary, and McNolty, so it had wide support across 
the shades of opinion in the Executive. However, it was opposed by 
J. Cain, State Parliamentary Leader: VCE 7 October 1955, ALP (Victorian
Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G 8738.
^Colbourne to Schmella, 8 August 1956, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/4/F11 
1956 Correspondence.
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The two interpretations came before the September 1956 meeting of
the ALP Federal Executive which resolved
that any member of the Labor Party who agrees to 
join with members of the Communist Party and/or 
any other Party opposed to Labor on any How-to- 
Vote ticket commits an offence against this Party.
We therefore direct State Branches to protect the 
policy of the Party by taking action against any 
member who so offends.
This decision was close to the New South Wales Branch interpretation,
shorn of its rhetoric. But only H,0. Davis of Victoria and Toohey and
Sexton of South Australia spoke against it and the motion passed on the 
13voices. At the Brisbane Federal Conference, where the Executive
decision was confirmed, South Australia and Victoria again fought
doggedly to prevent what they saw as interference in the affairs of
unions. C.R. Cameron of South Australia moved an amendment opposing
the new policy and a lengthy and heated debate followed with New South
Wales, Tasmanian and Queensland delegates supporting the policy and four
Victorians and one South Australian opposing it. Cameron's amendment
was eventually lost by ten votes to twenty-five and another amendment,
which sought to appoint a committee to draft a clarifying resolution
14was defeated nine to twenty-five.
The decision was formally a clarification of past decisions about 
Labor's relations with Communists. It was based on 'an interpretation 
of the decision of the 1948 Federal Conference' proscribing cooperation 
with the Communist Party or its auxiliaries.^“* Moreover, compared with 
the New South Wales formulation, the Federal resolution was in the 
lowest possible key and narrowly defined. The full recommendation
13FX 10-13 September 1956, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/123/55/90-1.
14ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1957, 30, 46.
^Delegates F.H. Campbell (NSW) and J.P. Toohey (SA) both stressed the 
decision was primarily a clarification of past policies of dissociation 
from Communists (interviews).
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commenced specifically: 'Does a member of the Labor Party commit an
offence against the Party if he permits his name to appear on a How-to-
Vote ticket with a member of the Communist Party or any other Party
opposed to the Labor Party?' Then, by leaving enforcement to the State
Branches (mainly because the Federal party lacked the machinery) the
Executive left the way open for State Branch attitudes to unity tickets
16to influence their implementation of the Federal decision. The 
resolution also contained at least three opportunities for the exercise 
of judicial discretion: it referred to 'any member ... who agrees' to
appearing on a unity ticket; then, membership of the ALP man's allies 
in a rival political party had to be proven and, thirdly, the 
determination of guilt might be influenced by extraneous factors such 
as where accuser and accused stood in the State Branch factional structure.
Already there is some evidence to support the hypotheses set up in 
the first chapter. The decision approximated the goals of the controllers 
of the New South Wales Branch, yet its enforcement provisions allowed the 
controllers of the other Branches to pursue their differing goals if they 
wished (HYPOTHESIS I). The decision tried to steer between a tradition 
of opposition to Communism (HYPOTHESIS VIII) and another tradition that 
the party should not interfere in the affairs of its affiliated unions, 
part of the party-union relationship (HYPOTHESIS VI), which was expressed 
by the Victorians and South Australians. Cognisant of the bitterness of 
the Split, which had affected each personality (HYPOTHESIS II), and of 
the need to avoid dissension in some States over an unpopular decision
16The resolution concluded: 'We therefore direct State Branches to
protect the policy of the Party by taking action against any member who 
so offends' (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1957, 30.
My emphasis). Chamberlain, Federal President, said the Federal 
Executive would 'expect' expulsion in proven cases (SMH, 12 September 
1956) .
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(HYPOTHESIS IV), the Federal bodies sought a compromise (HYPOTHESIS V) 
which reiterated and clarified past decisions about relations with 
Communists while providing room for manoeuvre in enforcement. Clearly, 
the party could not expel unionists without a trial or an admission of 
guilt - the New South Wales Branch resolution itself had referred to 
numbers who 'knowingly', appeared on unity tickets - but the decision 
faced the probability of varying standards of proof from State to State.
The influences summarised in these hypotheses affected Labor's 
approach to the unity ticket problem over the three years after the 
decision of September 1956. External pressure can also be detected at 
this early stage. One reason for caution in 1956 had been that the most 
strident voices against unity tickets came from the expelled Labor members, 
rapidly transforming themselves into the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), from 
their allies in the Industrial Groups and the Movement, the associations 
which carried the message of political Catholicism, from the more extreme 
anti-Communist Liberal and Country Party Parliamentarians and, increasingly, 
from the metropolitan press (HYPOTHESES X, IX, XIII and XII). Those who 
began to move in the direction suggested by these external influences were 
members of Labor's Federal Caucus, who feared loss of votes if Labor did 
not cleave more determinedly to the principle of anti-Communism rather 
than to that of non-interference in unions (HYPOTHESIS III). The Cold War 
seemed to make anti-Communism electorally advisable (HYPOTHESIS VII).
The Parliamentary representatives of those who were to become the 
DLP helped ensure that the first important unity ticket after the Labor 
Split did not go unnoticed. The election, in the Victorian Branch of 
the Australian Railways Union in July 1955, saw the Communist J.J. Brown 
win back the Secretary's position after a period of Industrial Group 
control. The representatives of the Australian Labor Party (Anti- 
Communist) - as they were then known - believed the new VCE, with Evatt's
r
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support, was using unity tickets to benefit Communists who threatened
industrial peace and Australia’s security.^ Liberals took up the refrain:
Prime Minister R.G. Menzies alleged Labor was helping to promote a
resurgence of Communist control in the unions, while his External Affairs
Minister, R.G. Casey, linked Evatt's alleged support for neutralist or
even pro-Communist foreign policies with his opposition at home to the
18Industrial Groups and his alleged support for unity tickets.
Labor politicians at first did not respond to such taunts. The 
party wanted and expected its members in unions to support ALP members 
who stood for union positions, said Evatt in mid 1955, ’but we cannot 
ensure that that shall be done’. The party would not ’interfere in any 
way with the complete right of self-government of trade-unionists to 
elect officers in the way in which it is most advantageous -to trade 
unionism’. Senator Kennelly disagreed with the Federal Executive decision, 
saying he had no right to interfere in the elections of a union, ’a body 
with which I have no connection’. Years later, Kennelly remembered: ’Of
course, Communists are a nuisance but you don’t have to sink all your
^^Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives) (CPD)
H. of R., 6, 24 May 1955, 991-3 (S.M. Keon), 997-9 (J.M. Mullens);
9 June 1955, 1583-6 (W.M. Bourke), 1593-6 (Keon). The burden of the 
argument is clear in the terms of the motions: ’The renewed drive of
the Communist party to recapture control of key trade unions following 
the attempted disbandment of and attacks upon Australian Labour party 
industrial groups' (985). 'The alliance between the Communist party 
and the Evatt-Stout-Cain Labour party in running a joint unity ticket ... 
to re-establish control of the railways industry by the Communist 
party under the leadership of J.J. Brown' (1578).
1 O
CPD H. of R., 14, 11 April 1957, 832 (Casey); SMH, 27 July 1955. 
(Menzies. See also the editorial, for an early example of post Split 
press criticsm of unity tickets). All except Senators Cole and 
McManus of the ALP (Anti-Communist) representatives lost their seats at 
the Federal elections late in 1955. Cole, McManus and Government 
members continued to nag at the ALP on the unity ticket question, 
especially by drawing attention to unity ticket elections as they 
occurred: CPD H. of R., 15, 1 May 1957, 975 (W. Aston); 8 May 1957,
1206 (W.C. Wentworth); (Senate) S.8, 29 May 1956, 1042 (D. Henty),
1047-8 (J. Gorton); S.ll, 16 October 1957, 624 (Cole); S.13, 20 August 
1958, 131-2 (Cole); 16 September 1958, 331-6 (McManus).
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principles to beat them. Anyway, after 1955, after the Groupers had 
split the party we weren’t going to bend over backwards to please 
them’,19
By the late 1950s many of the same politicians not only supported
the ban but favoured its vigorous enforcement, mainly to prevent the
loss of the votes of those Australians who feared that Labor was aligned
too closely with Communism. Kennelly himself was a member of a
committee which wrote early in 1961:
The Unity Ticket issue is a factor of considerable 
significance in a political election and the view 
was put [by those the committee interviewed] that 
either an explanation that the public regarded as 
satisfactory would have to be found or an effective 
ban would have to be imposed if support lost was
to be regained.20
The apparent electoral effect of unity tickets was first noticed in
Victoria, the State where the tickets had become most common. In the
campaign for the State election of June 1958, ’DLP canvassers revealed
a greater degree of rank-and-file dissatisfaction in the A.L.P.- over such
21issues as unity tickets - than expected’. Far from convincing the
Victorians that the policy should be enforced more strongly, DLP 
activities helped persuade the Branch’s Federal delegates, Stout and 
Brebner, to move that the matter be referred to the 1959 Federal 
Conference ’ for the purpose of reviewing the 1957 decision'. Instead,
1 9CPD H. of R., 6, 9 June 1955, 1588-9 (Evatt): S.9, 17 October 1956,
668 (Kennelly); P.J. Kennelly, interview; SMH, 27 July 1955 (Evatt). 
Kennelly had seconded the original VCE interpretation (note 11 above).
20Second Report of the National Organising Committee to Federal Executive, 
30 June 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/11/F13. The other members of the 
committee were Senators Dittmer (Queensland) and Ormonde (NSW).
21SMH, 10 June 1958. For examples of DLP campaign references to unity 
tickets: Age , 13, 16 May 1958. For alleged unity tickets in the 
Australian Railways Union and the Waterside Worker^ Federation, on which 
the VCE took no action: Age, 6, 7, 22, 25 June, 4, 5, 9 July 1957, 24,
28 June, 14 July 1958; SMH, 6 June 1957.
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the Executive carried an amendment, moved by Colbourne, drawing attention
to the existing policy. The Executive further resolved, against
Victorian opposition, to recommend that, in view of the assaults by the
DLP, Queensland Labor Party (a child of the Split in that State and
later merged in the DLP) and Communist Party on the traditional
relationship between the ALP and the unions, Federal Conference should
'consider the practicability of taking appropriate steps - with adequate
safeguards - to ensure that the influence of the Australian Labor Party
22is maintained and expanded in the Trade Union movement'. While the
resolution suggested no practical steps for achieving this goal its
sentiments seemed opposed to the idea that the ALP should not interfere
in union affairs, an idea which the Victorians at least still supported
23strongly, although they differed over its implementation.
Evatt realised that, had the DLP preferences at the Victorian 
election been directed to Labor rather than the Liberals, Labor could
FX 30 June-2 July 1958, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/123/55. The second 
resolution was moved by the Queensland delegates, J. Schmella and 
J. Bukowski, and reflected a Queensland Central Executive decision of
22 May which blamed the Communists and QLP for unity tickets while 
reaffirming the Federal prohibition (Queensland Branch Circular 13/58,
30 May 1958, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/4/1957 Correspondence [misfiled]). 
The Executive discussion followed receipt from all States of requested 
letters outlining the practice in their States regarding union ballots 
and their attitude thereto.
23The VCE officers (VCEO) had discussed attacks on unity tickets, 
especially in News Weekly, the organ of the National Civic Council, and 
suggestions for answering the allegations. The officers recommended a 
strong statement reaffirming the independence of unions. After a series 
of inconclusive meetings, including a threat by one member, F. Courtnay, 
to walk out because of the contents of this recommendation (which was 
apparently intended as defiance of Federal policy) the matter was 
dropped. Stout and Brebner, as stated above, tried instead to have the 
policy reconsidered at Federal Conference (VCEO 22 April, VCE 23 April, 
VCEO 6 May, VCE 9 May 1958, Vic. Rec., Minutes June 1957 to June 1958). 
That the VCE took eight months to reply to the Federal request referred 
to in note 22 (made in October 1957) is further evidence of its unease 
(Schmella to Tripovich, 29 May 1958; Tripovich to Schmella, 6 June 
1958, Vic. Rec., Central Executive, Federal Executive 1958).
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well have won. Realising that his opponents hoped to make Labor’s
relations with Communism an issue at the Federal elections later in the
year, Evatt sought stronger action on unity tickets. He gave the Federal
Executive meeting of August 1958 a list of at least eight names for
expulsion and pleaded for a decisive gesture. The delegates instead
settled for a lengthy manifesto which, first, attacked Menzies for
introducing the Communist bogey to distract attention from his economic
mismanagement, secondly, noted that State Branches had enforced the
policy when guilt was established but not when ALP members 'have been
victims of Communist tactics which have resulted in their names being
placed upon so-called Unity Tickets without their consent', and, thirdly,
reaffirmed the unity ticket ban but called upon all ALP members to
24preserve party integrity against attacks by anti-Labor forces.
This resolution was seen by some observers as a victory for the 
Victorians and a rebuff for Evatt but it was actually a careful compromise 
which reflected the multiple forces acting upon the Executive at the 
time. First, Evatt, as Parliamentary Leader, wanted drastic action 
against unity tickets before the Federal election. The Executive, on 
the other hand, aware of rumours that militant affiliated unions in 
Queensland and Victoria would react unfavourably to such action, saw 
the impending election rather as a reason to avoid action which would 
divide the party. The Federal Caucus was divided on the issue, the
9  / FX 11-14 August 1958, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/123/55; SMH, 14-16 
August 1958. Unity tickets were not on the agenda of the meeting, but 
the President (Chamberlain) introduced the discussion by 
referring to Liberal attacks in Federal Parliament the previous night. 
See CPD H. of R., 20, 13-14 August 1958, 343-60, an earlier radio 
broadcast by Menzies (SMH, 17 July 1958) and a press series on the issue 
(SMH, 31 July, 2, 4 August 1958) as indications of interest from what 
Labor men liked to see as the anti-Labor alliance. The SMH articles 
bore the by-line 'a special correspondent', usually an indication that 
the writer was other than normal reporting or editorial staff.
88
majority, led by Evatt and his Deputy A.A. Calwell, supporting some
stronger action and the minority, led by Cameron and E.J. Ward, opposed
to it, along with the Victorian and South Australian Executives, although
the Victorian body was divided, with some politicians seeking action and
25union officials resisting it. Even the New South Wales Executive, the
one most opposed to unity tickets on principle, was taking a judicious
2 6rather than draconian attitude to enforcement.
DT, 1 October 1958; VCE 5, 12, 19 September, VCEO 7 October 1958,
Vic. Rec., Minutes 24 June 1958 to 22 April 1959. Brebner and Holt, 
the latter a Federal MP, were most outspoken against interference in 
unions but P.J. Clarey, also a Federal politician, sought to uphold the 
August decision. Again, the discussion was inconclusive, but Holt 
restated the defence in Parliament, accentuating the party tradition of 
non-interference rather than the unity ticket ban and describing the 
ALP’s Catholic critics as 'clerical fascists' (CPD H. of R., 20, 14,
21 August 1958, 354-6, 652-7).
2 6NSW Branch officers saw enforcement of the unity ticket policy as 
part of their strategy of steering a middle course between extremes of 
right and left. They claimed to be even-handed in their treatment of 
those who appeared on unity tickets with the DLP and with Communists:
FX 11-14 August 1958, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/123/55 (Campbell);
J.A. Mulvihill, interview; Mulvihill to W.R. Smirl, Secretary, Randwick 
West Branch, 12 August 1958, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/210/521; Observer,
23 July, 20 August 1960 (Mulvihill). In other letters, Mulvihill 
described the process followed: no pre-publicity of charges to avoid
prejudicing the case, ensuring the punishment (suspension or expulsion) 
fitted the degree of guilt, avoiding 'smears', avoiding assisting one 
union faction against another and exonerating where 'we were satisfied 
that the people involved were actually victims of circumstances beyond 
their control': Mulvihill to W.J. McCarthy, Secretary, Armidale
Branch, 10 October 1961; Mulvihill to E. Ramsay, President, Balgownie 
Branch, 25 November 1964, NSW Rec . , ML MSS 2083/165/405; 175/432.
The result was the expulsion of approximately thirty ALP members for 
unity tickets in NSW in the ten years to 1965: Colbourne to I. Swords,
Secretary, Caringbah Branch, 9 November 1965; Expelled for Unity 
tickets 11 November 1963, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/240/603/175-7; 469/
1213; Executive Reports to Annual Conferences during this period.
While most of those expelled were for ALP-Communist tickets, this was 
because there were many more of these than ALP-DLP tickets. But 
representatives of militant unions still complained to Chamberlain in 
September 1958, of the harshness of enforcement and one militant union 
official remembers 'quite determined application' of the policy, even 
in cases where people had not consented to their names appearing:
J.D. Garland, interview; SMH, 23 September 1958; Socialist and 
Industrial Labor, October 1958, 3. Critics on the other side alleged 
the NSW Executive was too lenient and the policy half-heartedly 
applied: DT_, 1 October 1958; Observer, 25 June 1960; SMH, 5 January
1960 (Santamaria).
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Secondly, the essence of the approach to unity tickets, in view
of the conflicting attitudes within the party, was its declaratory
nature. In words at least, Labor was firmly against unity tickets.
Words alone did not prevent action contrary to the ban but enforcement
risked re-opening divisions in the party, especially since many of the
sternest critics of unity tickets were Labor’s bitter opponents. 'We
reject with the contempt it deserves’, ran the Federal Executive
resolution, ’the suggestion that we should take action as a consequence
of the politically motivated and distorted statements made by members
of the Liberal and other Parties’. In Victoria, and to a lesser extent
in other States, harsh action would have been seen as a betrayal of
those who still fought the Industrial Groups, the enemies of 1955. In
such circumstances the best approach was to re-affirm and embellish the
declaration of 1956-57 and leave enforcement to the States. The
Executive's most noticeable concession to Evatt's plea was to remind the
Branches, in view of 'the deliberate campaign that is being organised to
damage electorally the Australian Labor Party ... to guard the decision
of Conference ... with the utmost vigilance' or the Executive would take
27'appropriate Federal action' where the States did not.
The viability of the policy, then, depended on allowing the Branches
flexibility in enforcement. This is reflected in Chamberlain's approach
to unity tickets. He had supported the policy from the beginning. He
had opposed Communists in the unions in Western Australia and argued
that only Labor could remove the social and economic conditions in which
28Communism thrived. He was always opposed to unity tickets, recalled his 
__
This was the part of the decision upon which Evatt laid particular 
emphasis: CPD H. of R., 20, 14 August 1958, 449.
2 8F.E. Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles on Australian 
Labor Party Principles, Perth, 1964? 25, 39; Murray, The Split, 198-9; 
J.M. Wheeldon, interview.
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secretary, Lyla Elliott, but rejected interference in unions 'as was
the case during the days of the industrial groups'. After the Split,
because of the witch-hunting activities of the Groupers and the DLP,
he was careful, she added, to ensure that a unity ticket defendant had
29consented to his name appearing. The reference to the external 
pressures and the stress on consent were representative of the attitudes 
of most of Labor's decisionmakers in the late 1950s. But Miss Elliott's 
statement that Chamberlain was opposed both to unity tickets and to 
interference in unions encapsulates the party's dilemma. While it was 
easy enough to set these two principles side by side, the problem was 
to strike a satisfactory balance between them. Flexibility of enforcement 
provided the means.
CHAMBERLAIN'S RESIGNATION AND THE FEDERAL CONFERENCE APRIL-MAY 1959
The year 1959 saw an attempt to achieve a rather different balance. 
Labor's Federal election prospects in 1953 seemed to have been affected 
adversely by unity tickets and the apparent lack of enforcement of the 
ban. The DLP publicised the issue stridently and on the eve of the poll 
Archbishop Mannix of Melbourne advised his followers that no good
30Catholic could vote Labor because of its associations with Communists.
29L. Elliott to the author, 14 August 1978.
30R.S. Milne, 'The Australian 1958 General Election. IIT, Parliamentary 
Affairs, 12 (1958-59), 420-4; Murray, The Split, 342-50; D.W. Rawson, 
Australia Votes, Melbourne, 1961, 90, 93, 130-8. Other Catholic 
spokesmen denied Mannix's claims. For editorial criticism of unity 
ticket enforcement, see SMH, 19 November 1958 and for occasional 
Parliamentary attacks on unity tickets following that of 13 August, see 
CPD H. of R., 20, 14 August 1958, 446-51 (H.E. Holt, H.G. Pearce);
H. of R., 21, 10 September 1958, 1030-2 (R.C. Wheeler), 1060-4 (Holt);
17 September 1958, 1364-6 (Wentworth); S.13, 20 August 1958, 131-2 (Cole); 
16 September 1958, 331-6 (McManus). During the campaign about 40 per 
cent of DLP press advertising emphasised unity tickets. The equivalent 
LCP figure was about 6 per cent (derived from tables in John Lewis 
Warhurst, The 'Communist Bogey': Communism as an Election Issue in
Australian Federal Politics, 1949 to 1964, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
Flinders University of South Australia, 1977, 187, 197, 221, 276-80).
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Whether or not unity tickets were an important contributor to Labor’s
disappointing performance the result probably confirmed Evatt's resolve
31to do something about them. But Evatt was not in a strong position
within the party. Challenged for the Parliamentary Leadership by
E.J. Ward, Evatt won by forty-six votes to thirty-two, but some
observers felt the result was because of the lack of an acceptable
32successor rather than warm support for the incumbent. Ward and his
supporters were disturbed by, among other things, Evatt's arguments in
the press with the DLP and the Catholic hierarchy, by press advertisements
appealing to DLP rank and file voters to support Labor and especially by
Evatt's offer to resign as Leader in return for DLP preferences in the 
33election. Those who had fought the Movement and the Industrial Groups 
in 1955 looked unkindly at Evatt's actions. Chamberlain's first 
reaction was to say that the issue was closed as soon as the DLP 
replied to it with unacceptable conditions. (These included an effective 
ban on unity tickets and reintroduction of ALP endorsement of candidates 
in union elections as had been the practice with the Industrial Groups.) 
The Evatt offer, while sensational, had little effect and some 
commentators expressed doubts as to its sincerity. But given that the 
DLP had frequently made clear the nature of its differences with the ALP 
Evatt's closest allies in the party, including Chamberlain, must have
31At the election on 22 November, Labor's House of Representatives vote 
fell by 1.8 per cent and it lost two seats (Murray, The Split, 279,
348-9) .
32For discussion of Evatt and the Leadership: Advertiser (Adelaide),
29 November 1958; SMH, 26 November, 6 December 1958; West Australian,
25 November 1958. For the Leadership election: Age, SMH, 17 February 
1959.
~^Age, 13 December 1958, 10 February 1959; A.A. Calwell, Be Just and 
Fear Not, Hawthorn, "Vic. , 218-20; C-M, 13 December 1958,; Elwyn 
Spratt, Eddie Ward, Adelaide, 1965, 237-8.
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harboured serious doubts of his judgment and his loyalty to the spirit 
of Hobart, 1955.^
If this was so, the decision in April 1959 of Evatt and a majority
of his Caucus colleagues (the vote was forty-one to twenty-three) to
support rises in Parliamentary salaries provided further fuel. Such
increases always provoked some hostility in a party inclined to disparage
its politicians. The difference on this occasion was that Chamberlain
resigned as Federal President.
The details of Chamberlain’s reasons, the reactions to his
resignation and the manoeuvres surrounding his return to the position
concern us only in relation to the decision on unity tickets taken at
35the Federal Conference of May 1959. Evatt, Calwell and the Senate 
Leader, N. McKenna, asked the Federal Executive and then the Conference
Age, 24, 25 October 1958; DT, 23, 29 October 1958; Murray, The Split, 
346-7. These differences, over ALP-Communist links, secret ballots in 
unions, the role of the Industrial Groups and foreign and defence policy, 
would have been raised in any reconciliation negotiations. Chamberlain 
and others feared Labor would be asked to modify what they regarded as 
vital principles.
35Chamberlain saw his resignation as a matter of principle, a protest 
against Caucus supporting a salary increase so soon after a Federal 
election at which the increase had not been mentioned and when people on 
fixed incomes, especially pensioners, were living close to poverty. He 
consulted few, if any, colleagues before resigning. There is a suggestion 
in remarks like the following (in his National Library interview) that 
his views about Parliamentarians (see chapter 1 above) affected his 
decision. 'I suppose I was making a comparison between people who were 
working hard for a living and what they were getting and what they had 
to do, as against that of a Parliamentarian.1 Apart from the possible 
connection with unity ticket policy, to be discussed in a moment, 
speculation touched on Chamberlain's alleged desires for a Federal seat, 
even the Leadership, for the full-time Federal Secretaryship or to cement 
a temporarily weak position in the WA Branch or even on the Federal 
Executive. There is very little evidence for any of these latter 
suggested reasons for his resignation: Advertiser (Adelaide), 25 April
1959; Age, 21 April 1959; C.R. Cameron, F.H. Campbell, F.E. Chamberlain, 
interviews; F.E. Chamberlain, Interview transcript, Oral History 
Project, Manuscripts Section, National Library, 1:2/35-6, 3:1/1—3; Nation,
25 April, 23 May 1959; SMH, 17, 21, 22 April, 21 July 1959; J.M. Wheeldon, 
interview.
93
itself to excise what Evatt called the ’running sore' of unity tickets.
A South Australian Conference delegate then replied by moving:
That the Federal Conference be asked to declare 
that the AX.P. is fundamentally opposed to any 
interference in the fundamental right of a trade 
unionist to nominate for any position in his 
Union or to vote and work for the person whom he 
considers most suited for any industrial position 
to be filled in his particular Union, providing 
that the name of theAL.P. is not used in such a 
way as to create political unity with any other 
political party.37
This formulation was almost identical to an item from Victoria, was 
seconded by Brebner and can be seen as the culmination of an approach 
developed by the VCE by 1959. At least as early as June 1957, the 
Victorian Secretary, Tripovich, said that any ALP member who knowingly 
used the party's name on a union election ticket which included 
Communists would automatically forfeit his party membership. 'Labor 
would not tolerate any Union members who used the name of Labor to win 
a union election to a post to which perhaps his personal qualifications
90did not entitle him.' Twice in 1958 Brebner tried unsuccessfully to 
have the VCE adopt resolutions merely prohibiting ALP members from using 
their membership to win votes at union elections where they stood in 
alliance with non-ALP members. Such an approach clearly recognised that 
unity tickets were permissible provided they did not implicate the ALP.
36The details in the following paragraphs are drawn from: Age, 11-16
May 1959; ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1959, 4-8,
46-8; DT, 6-9, 11, 15, 16 May 1959; FX 5-8, 10, 15 May 1959, Fed.
Rec., NLA MS 4985/123/55; SMH, 6-9, 11, 16 May 1959; Sun-Herald,
10 May 1959.
 ^My emphasis.
38Age, 6, 7 June 1957; attachment to Tripovich to Schmella, 22 August 
1957, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/4/1957 Correspondence. Tripovich pointed 
out: 'Labor does not advocate support for, or itself support, Communists
or members of any other political party opposed to Labor' (my emphasis) 
and to Schmella he insisted there was no collusion between ALP and non- 
ALP members on a political basis in unions to the detriment of the ALP.
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It was avoided at first by Brebner's more cautious colleagues, who would
39have seen it as too close to defiance of Federal policy. However, by 
early 1960, one observer concluded that the 'official' Victorian 
definition of a unity ticket required the party affiliations of both 
ALP and Communist candidates to be stated. 'Where individual members of 
the A1..P. stand as individuals, without party designation, they are not 
involving theA.Li>. in a unity ticket, the argument goes.'^
There were two main reasons behind the development of the Victorian 
'interpretation' of the Federal resolution. First, laying stress on the 
use of the ALP name enabled the Federal policy to be widened into a
39VCE 23 April, 19 September 1958, Vic. Rec., Minutes June 1957 to June 
1958, 24 June 1958 to 22 April 1959. The first motion was lost although 
discussion on unity tickets continued (notes 23 and 25 above) and the 
second lapsed for want of a seconder. Tripovich, too, was somewhat more 
decisive than the Executive as a whole. When sent finally, the long- 
delayed letter referred to in note 23 concluded: 'The Victorian Branch 
has adopted the attitude that Australian Labor Party members should be 
given every freedom to engage fully in Union activities, but any member 
who adopts or espouses political policy in opposition to the Australian 
Labor Party will not be allowed to continue his membership of this Party' 
(Tripovich to Schmella, 13 June 1958, Vic. Rec., Central Executive, 
Federal Executive, 1958. My emphasis). This letter does not seem to 
have been discussed by the VCE. Secondly, Tripovich had drafted a reply 
to questions from Redcliffe, Queensland ,b ranch, about elections in the 
WWF. The draft included a paragraph that the VCE had no need to act 
because there was 'no evidence of any association between members of 
this Party and any other political party ... to the detriment of the 
Australian Labor Party'. Following the inconclusive discussions referred 
to in note 25 these sentences were not included in the letter (Schmella 
to Tripovich, 30 September 1958; Tripovich to Schmella, 9 October 1958; 
draft letter to be submitted to E.O's Tuesday, 7 October 1958, Vic. Rec., 
Accounts, Equal Pay, Insurance,Interstate Branches, Industrial Printing, 
1958).
40Creighton Burns, Parties and People, Melbourne, 1961, 39, n.43. Evatt 
himself once had taken just this position, before the Groups and other 
pressures had converted him: CPD H. of R., 6, 9 June 1955, 1588.
Sections of the NSW Branch also supported it: R.B. Bowman, Secretary,
Reid F.E.C. to Colbourne, 16 February 1959, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/308/ 
774; SMH, 24 March 1958 (report of southern suburbs regional conference) 
Reid had recently become the seat of T. Uren, a supporter of the Steering 
Committee (anti-NSWCE) which included militant unions.
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statement prohibiting interference in unions by the ALP and especially
by the Industrial Groups, who continued to use labels like 'ALP', 'ALP
Group', 'ALP Industrial Group', 'Labour' or 'Labor' long after the
1955 Federal Conference had withdrawn recognition from the Groups. In
October 1955, before the unity ticket ban, Tripovich had contrasted
the new VCE's scrupulous prohibition of the use of the party name with
the practice in the Grouper era. This approach continued after the
unity ticket ban, which was seen as subsidiary to the more important
41principle of non-interference. Secondly, the VCE was trying to solve
the problem of the 'split personality' of ALP members in unions. By
joining the party as an individual the unionist made himself subject to
its rules, including the ones on unity tickets, but he remained a
member of a union in whose affairs the party traditionally did not
interfere. The New South Wales Branch tried to solve the problem simply
by describing the unity ticket policy and its enforcement as a matter
between the individual member and the party rather than the union and the 
42party. The Victorians instead, by making use of the ALP name the 
criterion for 'political collusion', put the onus on individuals to 
forfeit their rights as unionists to freedom from interference. Very 
few unionists in the past had used the ALP name in this way, so the 
passage of the new formulation effectively would have nullified the unity 
ticket ban.
Chamberlain left his Presidential chair at the Federal Conference to 
support the South Australia-Victoria resolution. Previously a supporter,
41Labor, October 1955, 1. See also the VCE decision of that month 
interpreting the Hobart resolution (above note 11) and the letter in 
note 38 which has such tickets attached as well as an anti-Group ticket 
which shows no party affiliation and, says Tripovich, 'in our minds ... 
is not what is claimed a unity ticket'.
/ 9Circular 58/300, 5/9/58, NSWCE, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/453/1176.
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if not a vocal one, of the 1956-57 decision, he now argued that the new
formulation was within the spirit of the Hobart Conference decision and
warned of the dangers of returning to the 'bad old days' of political
interference in unions in the style of the Groups. Why did Chamberlain
shift his ground in this way? One explanation was that he needed
Victorian support to regain the Presidency, after his resignation had
encountered an unfavourable reaction among Labor decisionmakers. There
is certainly evidence of a search for the right balance between
43attitudes to Chamberlain and to the Caucus. But this argument has the
flaws, first, that dissatisfaction with Caucus was so widespread in the
party that an attempt to punish Chamberlain by denying him re-election
would have been unpopular and, secondly, that it is hard to see who,
other than Chamberlain, the Victorians could have supported for the
Presidency. Campbell, who was mentioned as a candidate, would hardly
have been acceptable to them, given the Victorian attitude to New South
Wales. In any case, the VCE had been so hostile to the Caucus action
that Chamberlain would have received Victorian support in any contest,
44regardless of his attitude to unity tickets.
A more plausible explanation is that Chamberlain resented Evatt's 
search for strong enforcement of the unity ticket policy. The decision
The Federal Executive requested Chamberlain to reconsider his 
resignation and.urged him to withdraw it but defeated an amendment that 
he be requested to withdraw it and an election be deferred until after 
his decision. The Conference then produced four formulations of a 
resolution before adopting (by twenty votes to sixteen) one containing 
a mild reproof for Caucus, satisfaction at the withdrawal of Chamberlain's 
resignation and the opinion that his resignation had represented rank and 
file attitudes. At the Executive meeting after the Conference,
Chamberlain was re-elected unopposed.
44The Victorian amendment at Conference (eventually lost 8-28) followed 
closely a VCE resolution of 17 April, the day after Chamberlain 
resigned, but hostile discussions had commenced a fortnight earlier, 
before the Caucus decided to support the recommended rises (VCE 3, 13,
14, 17 April 1959, VCEO 17 April 1959, Vic. Rec., Minutes 24 June to 
22 April 1959).
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could be accepted by the parts of Labor's coalition as long as 
enforcement remained flexible. But Evatt’s actions allied him with 
external forces seeking to destroy one of Labor's principles, non­
interference in unions. Evatt had already sought DLP preferences and
rank and file DLP support, wooed the Bishops and produced a domestic
45policy closely akin to that of the DLP. Further dilution might follow
and, in the process, the unity of Labor's coalition might be threatened
by union dissatisfaction over harsh enforcement. Chamberlain had
worked since 1955 to maintain this unity and may have been dismayed at
the prospect of its destruction. Yet, years later, Chamberlain
remembered the incident in personal rather than party terms. He
described it as 'my quarrel with Dr. Evatt' and recalled telling his
Leader that he (Chamberlain) could not 'back down'. He related the
events as an example of how he had applied principle in politics and he
46insisted they had nothing to do with unity ticket policy. Others
interviewed by the author also failed to remember any connection between
Chamberlain's resignation and his attitude to unity tickets. But his
change on unity tickets could have been connected with his attitude to
Evatt. His resignation and his support for the South Australian motion both
arose from his belief that Evatt was betraying Labor principles by
conniving at a salary rise and by persecuting his own members at the
47behest of anti-Labor outsiders.
^~*DT, 20 November 1958 describes Evatt's election policy in this light.
4 6F.E. Chamberlain, interview; F.E. Chamberlain, NLA interview transcript, 
1: 2/35-6, 3:l/l-3. Chamberlain seems to have suffered some anguish from
his resignation: 'And this upset me more than anything, you know,
because I couldn't back down'. Age, 11 May 1959 also saw the issue as a 
personal one between Evatt and Chamberlain.
47At the Victorian Branch Conference a month later, Chamberlain complained 
of the effects of steady anti-Labor propaganda on 'men and women who can 
justifiably claim to be loyal workers of the Labor Movement' (Chamberlain, 
A Selection of Talks and Articles ..., 34). Did he mean Evatt?
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Despite Chamberlain's advocacy the South Australian motion failed.
A Queensland delegate, J. Egerton, seconded by Oliver, produced an 
amendment which, in effect, combined the Hobart 1955 and the Executive- 
Brisbane 1956-57 resolutions and included all the major existing 
attitudes to unity tickets except the change sought in the defeated 
motion. The first paragraph of the amendment set out the tradition of 
non-interference in the affairs of unions in much the same terms as the 
first part of the original motion. The second and third paragraphs, 
however, restated the resolution of June 1958, referring to the 
interference in unions by other parties and declaring the responsibility 
of all ALP members 'to ensure that the Trade Unions remain in control of 
Executives sympathetic to and supporting A.L.P. policy'. The final 
paragraphs reaffirmed 'previous decisions of the Hobart and Brisbane 
Conferences in respect to Unity Tickets', directed that offenders be 
brought before State Executives and, 'failing a satisfactory explanation, 
dealt with in accordance with the Rules'.
By reaffirming in one motion both the unity ticket ban and that 
'there should be no interference with the internal affairs of the Trade 
Unions', including the freedom to nominate for union office, the Federal 
Conference implied that two apparently contradictory principles could be 
balanced by the States determining, in each case, whether a 'satisfactory 
explanation' - in most cases, the defence of non-consent - had been 
given. Further, since the resolution incorporated a range of sentiments 
about Labor's relations with unions, State Branches could seize upon 
whichever parts they chose in order to support their own preferences. 
Unity tickets, condemned by the fourth paragraph, could be justified by 
the third, since most Labor people, in Victoria at least, would have 
regarded Communists as more 'sympathetic' to Labor than were Groupers.
The third paragraph, however, also seemed to justify use of the ALP name
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in union elections - or how would electors know which candidates were 
’sympathetic to and supporting A.L.P. policy’? Yet, at what point 
occurred interference in unions, proscribed by the first paragraph?
These were questions for each State Branch to answer for itself.
The Egerton-Oliver amendment was adopted, put as the motion and
carried by twenty votes to sixteen. The importance attached to the
vote was indicated in that a division was requested and the names
recorded, an extremely rare occurrence at Federal Conferences of the 
48period. Those supporting the Egerton-Oliver formulation comprised six 
each from New South Wales, Tasmania and Queensland and two from Western 
Australia, while the minority comprised four from Western Australia, 
six from Victoria and six from South Australia. Given that the 
original motion had the support of South Australia and Victoria and that 
two Western Australians who opposed the Egerton amendment (J. Wheeldon 
and K. Dowding) spoke in favour of the motion, it seems likely that a 
vote on the original motion would have been lost by the same margin, 
four votes, as the eventual vote was won. If so, we can see the 1959 
Conference as the closest the party came to ending the 1956-57 ban. The 
new motion from South Australia and Victoria was not merely a better 
statement of the 'spirit of Hobart'. Though presented as a modification 
of the existing policy, the motion, if passed, would have destroyed this 
policy, since those few ALP unity ticketers who previously had included 
their party affiliation on tickets would certainly have omitted it as 
the price of freedom from harassment by the party. The crucial shift was
Tg
Standing Order no.11, in operation at the Conference, stated: 'Any
member not satisfied with the result of voting, as declared from the 
Chair, may demand a division; but names of members voting in such 
division shall not be minuted unless demanded by at least five members 
rising in their places, when the division shall be recorded in the 
Official Report' (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1957, 
90). At four Federal Conferences, 1955-61, there were only three 
divisions with names minuted, all of them at the 1959 Conference, the 
other two being on the parliamentary salaries issue.
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in the West Australian delegation, which provided the four extra votes
against the ban. Although Chamberlain, as President, lacked a vote at
Conference, it was alleged by at least one commentator that he had
hand-picked the Branch delegation to support his position on Parliamentary
salaries if not on the unity tickets issue itself. If this was so, the
attempt failed, for two delegates, A. Moir and H. May, both State members
of Parliament, supported Egerton and Oliver, rather than Chamberlain.
Even if the West Australian delegation had all supported the South
Australia-Victoria motion, the vote would have been deadlocked eighteen 
49all. An end to the unity ticket ban in 1959 would still have required 
'peeling off' at least one Queensland, Tasmanian or New South Welsh 
delegate, all of whose Branches would have looked unkindly on such a 
defection.
Let us return to our initial set of hypotheses in the light of the 
events just described. The catalyst for the 1959 Conference decision 
was the deteriorating relationship between Chamberlain and Evatt. To 
that extent, there is support here for our HYPOTHESIS II. Other 
hypotheses also seem relevant. The 1959 decision synthesised decisions 
going back to at least 1948 concerning Labor's relations with unions and 
with Communists. These relationships were always at the root of the 
unity ticket problem (HYPOTHESES VI, VIII). Since attempts to reconcile
Cc>ul(X
these two relationships/ tu-Ke different forms in different States, the 
resolution, like its predecessors, was one in which all parts of Labor's 
coalition could find some satisfaction, if not in the actual words then 
in the opportunity provided for enforcement according to the views of
49See Nation, 23 May 1959 for the comment about Western Australia. 
Dowding,- Wheeldon and E. Ellis, were all new delegates in 1959 and all 
supported Chamberlain's position, as did C. Jamieson, State Branch 
President, who had been a delegate previously. Both Moir and May had 
been delegates previously.
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each State Branch. The resolution was 'both-ways worded', wrote the 
journalist, Brian Fitzpatrick, who supported Labor but was quick to 
point to its paradoxes. 'Paraphrased: the unions' business is their 
own - except that it is the A.L P.'s, ' A less sympathetic observer, Alan 
Reid, concluded that the majority of the Federal Executive opposed unity 
tickets but was not prepared to bring the issue to a head. On the eve 
of the Conference debate, Reid predicted that the Victorians would 
'agree to a motion affirming the present policy provided it is agreed 
tacitly that it is not enforced'.While his prediction of the Victorian 
vote was wrong his characterisation of the decision was reasonably 
accurate, especially as it applied to Victoria. The resolution and its 
enforcement were both designed to maintain unity between sub-coalitions 
based on State Branches whose goals differed according to the nature of 
their controlling groups and the differing industrial and political 
situations they faced (HYPOTHESES I, IV). The ingredients of the final 
resolution depended upon the balance of votes between the States at the 
Federal Conference. For the moment, those prevailed who placed more 
store on anti-Communism than on non-interference in unions but even they 
did not yet see any need to change the terms of the compromise, whereby 
the minority States, especially Victoria, were allowed some leeway in
Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor News Letter, July 1959, 4-6; JDT, 8, 15 May 
1959. See also SMH, 16, 19 May 1959. For an earlier comment, similar to 
Reid's: Age, 26 January 1959: 'Federal executive did its electoral duty
and banned unity tickets, but it was a ban applied only for the benefit 
of the public. It certainly was not intended to apply in Victoria and the 
Victorian A.L.P. knew it. The alternative would have been a wider party 
breach than ever'. While probably understating the ideological opposition 
to unity tickets of some on the Executive, notably the NSW delegates, 
Colbourne and Campbell, the comment is generally valid, especially in its 
context, a discussion of the ALP as a collection of State parties only 
theoretically subject to Federal authority. Campbell's opposition to 
unity tickets allowed him to support the 1959 decision (and solve the 
personality-splitting problem) thus: 'If a member of the A.L.P. wants to
run on a unity ticket it is his business as far as Union membership is 
concerned, but it is our business as faras A.LT. membership is concerned': 
ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1959 Annual Conference, 2.
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enforcement (HYPOTHESES I, V). This situation would continue as long as 
the Federal party could resist the pressure from some of its own 
politicians seeking votes from sections of the community conditioned to 
anti-Communism (HYPOTHESES III, VII, VIII). The most vocal publicisers 
of unity tickets remained the Groups, the DLP, the Movement and the 
Liberals. Whether they were genuine supporters of an effective ban may 
be doubted, since this would have deprived them of an effective stick 
with which to beat Labor, but their clamour reached the ears of voters 
whom Labor was trying to attract (HYPOTHESES III, IX, X, XIII).^
Finally, the media reported unity tickets and their consequences both to 
ALP decisionmakers and the voters. Even if voters did not read the 
occasional editorials on the subject, which usually attacked Labor for 
giving comfort to Communists or for equivocation or both, politicians
52knew that they read and heard about the problem itself (HYPOTHESIS XII).
1959-1961
ENFORCEMENT IN VICTORIA
After the 1959 decision one observer wrote that ’the closeness of 
the vote - 20 to 16 - and the apparent bitterness with which the issue
All three of these had conflicting interests: an end to unity tickets
could have assisted the Groups to win control of some unions and 
affiliate them to the DLP. But, to the extent that both DLP and Groups 
wished to cleanse the ALP of its Communist influences, this might come 
more quickly by publicity of existing unity tickets to influence electors 
and thus to influence politicians who reacted to the loss of votes.
The Liberals, too, gained from keeping the unity ticket issue alive but 
also complained that unity ticket control of unions led to increased 
industrial unrest. On the validity of this last connection, see:
Phillip R. Bentley, 'Communist Trade Union Leadership and Strike 
Incidence - with Specific Reference to the Waterside Workers’ Federation', 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 12 (March 1970), 88-97; R.J. May, 
'Determinants of the Industrial Relations Pattern in the Australian 
Stevedoring Industry', Journal of Industrial Relations, 3 (October 1961), 
157-65; D.W. Rawson, 'Trade Union Politics 2 - Self-Assertion', Current 
Affairs Bulletin, 48, 1 (June 1971), 25-6.
52Editorials during Conference: Advertiser, 12 May 1959; Age, 8, 11 May
1959.
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has been fought since the Federal executive met a fortnight ago indicate
53that there is much yet to be done to achieve unity'. The majority at 
the 1959 Conference compromised by proscribing unity tickets but leaving 
enforcement to the States. The minority, beneath the obscuring formula
54of the unsuccessful motion, wanted to nullify enforcement even further.
A common reason underlay both attitudes: because the strongest pressure
for enforcement came from outside the party, no one wished to appear the
dupes of anti-Labor forces. Many would have agreed with Brebner's bitter
remark that Evatt should have paid more attention to the members of his
55own party than to the Grouper, Gould.
The majority's leniency became less marked over the next two or 
three years. While outside pressure continued to provoke resentment, 
elements of the party itself became more willing to enforce the policy of 
1956-57. The object of most attention was the Victorian Branch. Under
~^*Age, 18 May 1959.
54This may need some qualification as regards South Australia. Here unity 
tickets had been much less frequent than in Victoria, mainly because the 
unions were less factionalised due to the weakness of Industrial Groups, 
whose recognition had been withdrawn by the State ALP Branch as early as 
1951. In 1958, the Branch was able to advise the Federal Secretary 'that 
no problem exists here' although a press article in the same year claimed 
there had been a unity ticket in the Australian Railways Union: ALP
(South Australian Branch), State Executive (SASE) 8 September 1958, 
unlabelled book containing typed Minutes, 1953-64, ALP (SA Branch) 
Headquarters, Adelaide (hereafter cited as 'SA Rec.'); SMH, 2 August 
1958. The lack of cases meant less pressure on the Branch's controllers 
than in Victoria to produce a formula such as that contained in the item 
eventually sent to the Conference, but impetus would have come instead 
from the strength in the Branch, as in Victoria, of relatively militant 
unions who rejected, on principle, party interference in union affairs.
~^Age, 16 May 1959. Evatt had stated explicitly to the Conference his 
preference for the views of Gould over those of R. Pauline, an ALP member 
and Victorian President (on a unity ticket) of the ARU, who had asked 
the party to confirm the policy of non-interference but clarify its 
interpretation (SMH, 8 May 1959). Gould had circularised every Caucus 
member with details of the alleged unity ticket: Gould to Evatt,
28 April 1959, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/18/ALP - Unity Tickets (copy of 
the original circular with unity tickets attached).
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pressure, the Victorians relied more on evasion of the policy than 
trying to change it. The Federal Executive, on the other hand, was led 
almost to the point of intervention in Victoria to ensure enforcement 
of its policy in an election year.
This change occurred gradually. There were indications soon after
the 1959 Federal Conference that the Victorians resented the decision.
VCE representatives insisted the Branch had been loyal to Labor principles
and some complained that Evatt did not understand the special difficulties
of the continuing struggle against the Groups. Evatt retorted that
Federal rules must be obeyed. Chamberlain suggested, however, that if
Victoria found the decision unworkable it should seek a special Federal
Conference to review it. Meanwhile, it should abide by the majority 
5 6decision. At the Victorian Branch Conference delegates decided by 286 
votes to thirty-one to follow Chamberlain's advice and seek a special 
Federal Conference to reconsider the May decision on, as the motion 
(moved by Brebner) described it, 'interference by the Australian Labor 
Party in the affairs of Trade Unions'. Chamberlain, addressing the 
Conference, was loudly applauded as he thanked the Conference for the 
privilege of addressing 'a Branch which has borne the brunt of the 
attack upon us over the past four years
Age, 20 May, 4 June 1959; Sun (Melbourne) 4 June 1959; VCEO 19 May,
VCE 3 June 1959, Vic. Rec., 20 March 1959 to 15 June 1959 [Minutes]..The 
Federal representatives were Evatt, Chamberlain, McKenna and Wyndham, 
then Evatt's press secretary. The Minutes show that the others had to 
leave early to catch a plane but that Chamberlain stayed for further 
discussions. While the others were merely thanked by the VCE President,
R. Cameron, Chamberlain rec^tved a vote of thanks, carried by acclamation. 
57Age, 15 June 1959; ALP (Victorian Branch), Annual Conference, 6th & 7th 
Sessions, Vic. Rec., Annual Conf. 1959 [Minutes]; Chamberlain, A Selection 
of Talks and Articles ..., 39. One of Brebner's arguments was that legal 
opinion had suggested the Federal policy was illegal under section 171(2) 
of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, dealing with union 
elections. This opinion had come from barristers S. Cohen and 
R.M. Eggleston. Evatt and McKenna, also lawyers, replied with a 
conflicting opinion and the two opinions were tossed around by the opposing 
sides for some years: Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor News Letter, September
1959, 4-5, November 1959, 3; W.W.C. Brown,interview; F.E. Chamberlain, 
Unity Tickets - Two Points of View, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/93/210.
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Not surprisingly, given the vote in May, there was no special
Conference. Federal Executive rule 9(b) required a majority of Executive
members to accede to Victoria's request but only Chamberlain supported
58the two Victorian delegates. There is some evidence that the request
for a special Conference was made, not in the hope of success, but rather
to gain time for the Victorian Branch to work out its position, which was
still oscillating between defiance and evasion. Victorian spokesmen like
Brebner and the Branch Treasurer, H.O. Davis of the AWU, were careful to
say that the Branch would not defy the Federal decision, but a number of
meetings between August and October 1959 showed that the VCE was deeply
59divided over strategy. In August the VCE accepted, with only Kennelly
speaking in opposition, explanations from four ARU members of how their
name appeared on tickets with Communists. It is clear from an earlier
remark by Tripovich in reply to a DLP challenge and from two alternative
motions at the Executive meeting that the explanations turned on the
lack of ’political collusion', which probably meant that no political
60affiliation appeared on the ticket. If adopted, either motion would
“^ Schmella to Chamberlain, 9 September 1959, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/12/ 
F28 Unity Tickets.
~^Age, 18 May, 15 June 1959; Nation, 20 June 1959. The Victorian 
resolution had not denied the Federal authority but concentrated on 
technicalities (like the alleged lack of sufficient time to digest and 
discuss the successful amendment at the 1959 Conference) and the 
Eggleston-Cohen legal opinion. Tripovich's letter conveying the request 
argued that agreement to a special Conference would say nothing about 
the merits of the issue but merely concede the Victorians' right to 
present more evidence (Tripovich to Schmella, 30 July 1959, Vic. Rec., 
Federal Executive File 2, 1959).
60Age, 17 July 1959 (Tripovich tells K. Gregson, Victorian Secretary, 
Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, that the VCE is quite 
satisfied its members in the ARU had not supported Communist policy to 
the detriment of the ALP); VCEO 16, 28, 31 July 1959, VCE 31 July,
14 August 1959, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf 
G8738. The motion read that the VCE was 'of the opinion that there was 
no political collusion between the A.LP. members seeking election in A.R.U. 
ballots and any other political Party' and the amendment that there was 
no political collusion 'between members of the AL.P.' in the ballot. (If
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have indicated the VCE was applying an interpretation rejected at the
Federal Conference only weeks before. Instead of taking this explicitly
defiant position, the Victorians adjourned discussion to await the
outcome of the application for a special Federal Conference. As in
1958, when defiance, in the form of a reaffirmation of the independence
of unions, had been avoided by seeking a review of the Federal policy
at the next ordinary Federal Conference, the VCE again avoided both
confronting the Federal Executive and provoking division in its own
61ranks between compromisers and defiers. While the terms of the Federal 
compromise allowed leeway in enforcement, they precluded a criterion 
designed to destroy the policy.
The VCE discussion continued after the refusal of the request for a 
special Conference. At the meeting of 23 October, Kennelly moved, as a 
further amendment to the 'political collusion' motion of August, that, 
because of the conflicting interpretations of the Federal policy, no 
action be taken against past offenders but that future offenders be dealt 
with. After further discussion the Executive appointed a sub-committee, 
including Kennelly, which produced a 'composite resolution' recommending
60 (continued)
the latter is correctly recorded it means, presumably, that political 
considerations were irrelevant in the making-up of the ticket, but I 
suspect, rather, that words about collusion with other parties have been 
left out. The main distinction between the two formulations is that the 
amendment accepts explicitly the explanations offered, while the motion 
implies this [DS]).
61See notes 22 and 23 above. The Victorian reply to the Federal letter 
advising of the failure of the' special Conference request was ambiguous 
as to which parts of past Victorian practice would continue - further 
evidence of the fine line the Branch was treading: 'I wish to advise,
on behalf of the Victorian Executive, that there has never been any 
political collusion between Union members of the Victorian Branch of the 
A.L.P. and members of any other political parties. The good name of the 
A.L.P. has been upheld on this point and we will continue to do so': 
Tripovich to Schmella, 16 September 1959, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/4/
[1959 Correspondence]. My emphasis.
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that no action be taken against the ARU members, since they had not
infringed the rules 'as then interpreted' (that is, presumably, they
had not colluded politically) but, secondly, that ALP members were
bound by the Federal decision until it was changed by a later Conference.
Neither this nor any other formula attracted majority support.
Successively, a motion that 'the question be not put', an amendment
which introduced a new undefined criterion of 'active association'
between ALP members and members of other parties, a further amendment
that reproduced the first 'political collusion' formulation and,
6 2finally, the composite resolution itself were all defeated. Such a 
circumstance is rare enough in the ALP to be remarkable and it indicates 
the growing division in the Victorian Executive, just as the Federal 
decision of May had shown the division at that level. At least the 
Federal Conference had produced a majority for one formula. No formula 
in the VCE meeting, no matter how it made concessions to both sides or
6 2VCE 23 October 1959, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes,
NLA mf G8738. (The amendment moved in August - note 60 above - had been 
withdrawn). It is of interest that the 'active association' amendment 
implied that the original (1956) Federal Executive decision was intended 
to apply only where such an association was established. In the context 
of this VCE meeting the definition of such an association may have been 
less than political affiliations appearing on ballot papers but elsewhere 
an unnamed Victorian ALP union official describes as 'the original 
Chamberlain definition of a unity ticket ... ONLY one' where political 
affiliations appear after candidates' names (Socialist and Industrial 
Labor, November 1961, 3). My emphasis. Whether one is to gather from 
this that Chamberlain, at least privately, gave such an interpretation i05b 
and thus that his shift in 1959 was less significant - is unclear. There 
seems no evidence that Chamberlain said this publicly before 1959, 
although it is noteworthy that neither Cameron nor Wheeldon, both fairly 
close to Chamberlain and the latter a WA delegate at the 1959 Conference, 
remembered a change in his views at this time. Both had only a limited 
recollection of the Conference, however (C.R. Cameron, J.M. Wheeldon, 
interviews). However, if one argues this was the 'real' interpretation 
of the 1956 decision one has to ask why NSW was able to expel unity 
ticketers between 1956 and 1959 without reference to whether the ALP 
name appeared on the ticket and why the NSW unions who complained to 
Chamberlain in 1958 (SMH, 23 September 1958, Socialist and Industrial 
Labor, October 1958, 3) about these expulsions did not refer to such an 
interpretation.
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left leeway in enforcement, could bridge the gap between those like 
Kennelly, and his Federal Caucus colleague, P.J. Clarey, who were 
sympathetic to those who had fought the Groups but wanted to win 
political elections, those like Brebner, who knew the Federal 
Conference majority would not brook open defiance, and the more 
militant unionist members who stood firm for the 'political collusion' 
formula. As a result, the VCE failed to support either compromise or 
defiance.^
The Federal compromise gave the State Branches judicial discretion 
in establishing consent. Since the ALP was not a court with recognised 
standards of proof, the existence of consent could be determined by, 
for instance, the attitudes of the State Branch to the 'law' being 
applied, to the accuser and the accused and to the likely effect of the 
verdict. Thus, the Victorian Branch disliked the unity ticket ban for 
reasons of principle and because it was forced to act by people outside 
the party or by ALP unionists opposed to the VCE majority. This 
majority, further, was drawn from unions sometimes controlled by 
officials elected on unity tickets or, more often, sympathetic to their 
use. Finally, the VCE majority could argue that discouraging unity 
tickets might lead to Industrial Group victories against fragmented ALP 
and Communist tickets and, consequently, affiliation of the unions with 
the DLP.
Another example to show the rarity of this incident. During a similar 
period of turmoil in the New South Wales Executive a motion and two 
amendments, regarding the attitude to be taken to a Federal report on 
the Branch, were all defeated. E.J. Ward, MP, wrote to a friend that 
this was a 'remarkable result': Ward to F.A. McCauley, The Hague,
2 July 1956, Edward John Ward, Papers, held in the Manuscript collection, 
National Library of Australia (hereafter cited as 'Ward Papers') NLA MS 
2396/1/255 (Box 1). For an incomplete description of meeting to which 
Ward refers, see Murray, The Split, 300.
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For these reasons, the establishing of consent was always a
conditional exercise. Principles of justice, in any case, would have
required some attempt to prove intention and this might prove difficult
in some cases.^ Occasionally the ALP unionist might claim that he did
not know his ally was a Communist and in that sense could not be said to
have consented.^ Popular or unbeatable candidates might appear on a
6 6number of tickets without consenting in every case. As a general rule,
remarked Brown, a former VCE member and President, ’if someone said he
didn't know, you'd think it was possible he didn't know, but I'd put it
no higher than that. You could never prove he did know'. 'You knew
they were lying', said Kennelly, 'but you couldn't prove it and there was
6 7no point laying a charge unless you could make it stick'. While
6 AAs Stout, Brebner and McNolty told Evatt and Chamberlain: Sun
(Melbourne), 4 June 1959. One later observer (Observer, 4 March 1961) 
claimed that Chamberlain had suggested the non-consent defence to the 
VCE, but there is evidence of at least one occasion before 1958 where, 
in an alleged unity ticket in the Federated Engine Drivers' and Firemen's 
Association (FEDFA), the defendants disclaimed any knowledge and 
responsibility for their names appearing on the ticket (L.F. Cummins to 
Tripovich, 7 December 1958; S.J. Williams to Tripovich, 28 November 
1958, Vic. Rec., Unions A - H, 1959). Kennelly remembers non-consent 
was the 'time-honoured' excuse, even before the Split, when members were 
charged under earlier resolutions about collaboration with Communists 
(P.J. Kennelly, interview).
6 5These denials were sometimes reported as rather disingenuous. For 
example, R. Hunter, charged in a case in the Federated Ironworkers' 
Association in Wollongong, NSW: 'One hears rumours, but I know nothing
...' (DT, 23 November 1964). Hunter was expelled.
^ A  point made by Whitlam: CPD H. of R. 32, 30 August 1961, 667-9. For
some years in the Melbourne Branch of the WWF one ticket sought support 
for a popular Grouper, J. Cummins, as President, and for ALP and 
Communist candidates for other positions. Cummins always denied his 
consent to this unity ticket. 
f) 7W.W.C. Brown, P.J. Kennelly, interviews. Also J.B. Keeffe, A.G.
Poyser, interviews. The stress on consent led some ALP members to 
define unity tickets as those where consent was established rather than 
see non-consent as a defence to a unity ticket charge: Age, 24 August
1960 (Tripovich), 24 April 1961 (Cairns); SMH, 13, 20 June 1960 
(Calwell denies unity tickets exist, presumably as defined in this way), 
19 April 1961 (Chamberlain in similar vein). For a later official 
definition, which encapsulated the more common version, see note 1 above.
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Kennelly’s position in the VCE discussions of 1959 indicates he would 
have liked more charges to have 'stuck' than would Brown, both 
recognised the nature of this part of the Federal compromise.
The consent clause could only be used in this way if pressure for 
strong enforcement remained below a certain intensity. But the VCE's 
dislike for the Federal policy still provided evidence for Labor's 
opponents. In two cases in 1960, in the Meatworkers and the Waterside 
Workers, the VCE, while using perfunctory procedures to establish non­
consent, continued to use the political collusion test as well. Thus it 
was announced that the nine accused WWF members would be asked if they 
consented and if they had not no action would follow 'as trade unionists 
were free to nominate for official positions provided they did so as an 
individual unionist and not as a member of the A.L.P.'. The Meatworkers 
were exonerated because they had not authorised or seen the ticket nor 
consented to their names appearing nor 'collaborated politically with 
members of any other political party to achieve any objectives within our 
Union which would be opposed to the policy of the Australian Labor Party'§8
/CO
Age, 16, 17, 29 June, 2 July, 24 August, 3 September 1960; W.J. Curran, 
D.C. Rountree, G. Wood to Tripovich, 23 August 1960; Report to Central 
Executive Meeting, Friday, 2 September 1960, re 'How to Vote' Cards in the 
Meat Industry Employees Union Annual Elections 1960, Vic. Rec., Unions 
C to S 1960; Report to be made to Full Executive meeting at 7.30 p.m. on 
Friday, 1 July 1960. Re: Waterside Workers' Federation Elections; VCEO
28 June, 23 August 1960, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, 
NLA mf G8740. Tripovich said before the WWF investigation, that while the 
ALP 'anticipated' there had been no consent there would still be an 
investigation to comply with the Federal rules. At the investigations 
each accused replied in the negative to the questions 'Did you allow your 
name to be placed on this ticket?' and 'Did you see this ticket before it 
was distributed?'. The Meatworkers signed statements to the same effect. 
At the WWF investigation the ALP President (McNolty) spoke 'at length' 
about the consent issue 'and advised regarding the care necessary in any 
statements made'. The WWF members then signed a statement which stressed, 
rather than non-consent, the lack of political collusion and reaffirmed 
the principle of non-interference in union affairs. One might add that in 
both these cases (and in most others) the accused were members or 
supporters of the incumbent union executive. One assumes that executive 
members would not be uninterested in producing a ticket designed to 
maintain them in their positions. The defence of non-consent becomes 
ludicrous in some circumstances.
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The VCE and its affiliated unions thus combined evasion - through the 
Federally sanctioned consent loophole - and defiance - by employing the 
unsanctioned political collusion formula. To comply with the Federal 
rule it was enough to show non-consent; the other criterion satisfied 
the militant unions and saved the 'face' of the VCE yet would not upset 
the Federal party providing its own rule was also satisfied.
The VCE's critics were not content with such technical enforcement.
The accuser in the Meatworkers claimed the party knew of the unity
ticket before the election but delayed action until after the ticket had
won. An anti-unity ticket publication alleged one of the non-consenters
in this election had actually signed a letter supporting the unity
ticket, while J. Cummins, the Grouper President of the WWF, offered to
provide evidence of ALP men and Communists speaking on the same platform
69and collecting donations in support of the unity ticket. Publicity 
such as this, as well as the efforts of Liberal Parliamentarians, made 
unity tickets at least a minor issue at the Latrobe Federal by-election 
in April 1960, and somewhat more than that at the Bendigo Federal by- 
election in July. In Bendigo, DLP complaints were supported strongly by 
Santamaria and by Catholic Bishops Fox, Mannix and Stewart, who revived 
the idea that Catholics could not support Labor because of its connections 
with Communists, especially through unity tickets. This was done to such 
apparent effect that Calwell, now Labor's Federal Leader, told Federal 
Labor politicians canvassing the area that they must unequivocally support 
the Federal ban if the question was raised.^ This instruction may have
69Age, 21 June 1960; Observer, 29 October 1960; F.P. Troja to VCE,
29 August 1960, Vic. Rec., Unions C to S 1960; Williams, Collaboration 
with Communism, 14-16.
7°Age, 6, 19, 20 June, 14 July 1960; CPI) H. of R. 26, 7 April 1960, 1078- 
83; 27, 12 May 1960, 1659-65; S. 17, 4 May 1960, 748-54; SMH, 16 May,
2, 10, 14, 20, 27 June, 9 July 1960; West Australian, 20 June 1960. See 
also note 20 above - much of the evidence for that conclusion would have 
been drawn from the Bendigo by-election in which many Federal politicians 
campaigned.
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helped Labor to hold Bendigo with only a slight reduction in votes. In 
any case, swings to Labor in Latrobe and at two other by-elections in 
Victoria in 1960 seemed to undermine temporarily the argument that 
unity tickets lost Labor votes.^
THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE MEETING OF AUGUST 1961
The Victorian State elections of July 1961 revived interest in the 
electoral effects of unity tickets. Six weeks before the elections, an
ALP survey of five marginal electorates had shown unity tickets falling
72well behind social and economic issues in the eyes of voters. With
unemployment rising due to the Federal Government's 'credit squeeze',
Victorian Labor expected to benefit electorally. Yet at the poll on
15 July the party barely improved its Legislative Assembly vote, lost one
seat to a Liberal and saw the DLP vote increase by 2.6 per cent overall
73and rather more than that in some city seats. The party sought reasons
Malcolm Mackerras, Australian General Elections, Sydney, 1972, 283, 
calculates per cent 'swings' as follows: to the ALP in Latrobe (April),
7.5, Balaclava (July), 4.4, Higinbotham (December), 9.2; to Liberals in 
Bendigo, 0.1. Balaclava and Bendigo both voted on 16 July but Balaclava 
and, to a lesser extent, Latrobe, remained safe Liberal seats, despite 
the swing to the ALP, while Bendigo was and remained marginal Labor. In 
Higinbotham, after the stringent Federal Budget of 1960, Labor came 
within three hundred votes of victory. Finally, regarding Bendigo, one 
should note that the advice to Catholics again conflicted, with the Sydney 
diocesan spokesman sayingCoirKoU'cscould support any party other than the 
Communists and, secondly, that the Catholic hierarchy, especially Stewart, 
the local Bishop, criticised Labor also for its attitude to state aid to 
church schools. See note 30 above and chapter 3 below.
72Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor News Letter, July 1961, 3; Survey of Opinions 
obtained prior to Victorian State Elections - 1961. Co-ordinated by 
A.M. Menere, Vic. Rec., Election Comments (Completed) 1961. Six hundred 
electors were asked to choose from a list and rank three issues they felt 
deserved top priority by governments. Replies were allocated points 
according to ranking and unemployment (698 points), housing finance (492) 
and credit squeeze (468) topped the ballot. Unity tickets scored 56 
points to finish last of twelve issues.
^ Age, 17, 18 July 1961; James Jupp, Victoria Votes, Sydney, 1961, 27-8; 
SMH, 17 July 1961. In the southern and eastern suburbs of Melbourne, the 
DLP vote increased by almost five per cent.
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for this disappointing result. They knew that DLP spokesmen in the
campaign had made well-publicised allegations of unity tickets in the
ARU and WWF and the Central Gippsland Trades Hall Council. Lurid
television advertisements suggested that 'Khrushchev must be pleased with
the Victorian ALP'. Bishop Fox repeated his previous warnings to Catholics
74about supporting Labor. The effect of this barrage was felt in varying 
ways in the ALP. Many activists, from the State Parliamentary Labor
I
Party down, admitted freely that the 'Communist smear' had hurt Labor 
but they differed over the solution. The SPLP report referred to '[t]he 
continued failure to deny effectively allegations about the breaking of 
the Federal conference decision on unity tickets' but many candidates, 
campaign directors and branch officials, surveyed by Wyndham, seem to 
have regarded the result as an indication not that the ban should be 
enforced more strongly but that the VCE should take the fight to its 
critics, if necessary by careful explanations of the aim of unity tickets, 
the 'real' (that is, conservative Catholic) nature of the DLP and of the 
rights of the unions to independence. For these people, Victorian Labor 
had fared badly not because of unity tickets but because of equivocation.^
74Age, 17 May, 19, 30 June, 11 July 1961; Jupp, Victoria Votes, 6-12; 
Nation, 29 July 1961. The DLP tried to link a current electricity strike 
to the unity control of the Central Gippsland unions. The Bolte Government 
stood mainly on its record but occasionally joined the DLP attack.
^The SPLP report was quoted SMH, 22 August 1961. For the Victorian 
activists' reports see: Vic. Rec., C.S. Wyndham Personal File 1961 and
Election Comments (Completed) 1961. The letters cite, inter alia, 
deficiencies of organisation and presentation, press bias, local issues, 
doubts about the cost of Labor promises and about party unity. But the 
unity ticket-Communist link issue, especially as used by the DLP, is 
mentioned in two-thirds of the forty-five letters and most of these 
advocated an aggressive reply. Only three letters argued unequivocally 
for enforcement of the unity ticket ban. Six letters suggested that 
many voters had little idea of what a unity ticket was except that it 
somehow connected the ALP with Communists. On this point note Warhurst, 
The 'Communist Bogey* ... , 276: The DLP and Industrial Groups' knowledge
of the workings of unions 'did not prevent the vagueness prevalent also in 
the L.C.P.'s explication of the communism issue, which suggests that the 
demands of campaign rhetoric overcame scruples about an accurate 
representation of the relationship between theA.L.P. and communism.'
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The VCE President, F. Carey, first blamed the defeat on 'clerical
fascists', which suggested that the Executive's official attitude of
7 6ignoring the DLP weakened in the first flush of defeat. Over the 
longer term the VCE asked a private firm 'to ascertain reasons for loss 
of election at a cost not exceeding £250' but when the results showed 
the importance of the unity ticket-Communist link issue to the swinging 
voter, the Executive seems to have taken little notice.^ Labor's 
Victorian controllers, remembering the battles of the Split and still 
fighting them in some unions, were likely to respond rather differently 
to evidence of the effectiveness of the DLP and its clerical supporters 
than were Federal politicians and Executive members from other States, 
who reacted to other pressures.
Jupp, Victoria Votes, 25. The VCE attitude (not always observed, even 
before the elections) was expressed in reply to a query after the Bendigo 
election: 'We have always favoured the attitude of forgetting about the
D.LT. and concentrating our attack ... against the Liberal Party'
(Tripovich to Norm Kirkwood, Bendigo Federal Campaign Committee,
1 September 1960, Vic. Rec., 1960 Campaign Committees, Federal Municipal 
State). Thus the general theme of the 1961 State policy speech, as 
agreed by the VCE and the Leader, C.P. Stoneham, was 'to closely associate 
the Bolte regime with the economic crisis created by the policies of the 
Menzies government': VCE 26 May 1961, ALP (Victorian Branch), State
Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8740.
^The survey covered three hundred voters in areas where Labor lost votes 
to the DLP. Of the 150 who changed their votes, swingers from the ALP to 
the Liberals (29.2 per cent) and from the Liberals to the ALP (28.3 per 
cent) almost cancelled out while a small number of DLP voters swung to 
the ALP (3.8) and the Liberals (2.8). The significant swings were ALP to 
DLP (22.7) and Liberal to DLP (13.2). All who swung from the ALP were 
asked why they had done so and 50.7 per cent replied with answers 
concerned with Labor-Communist connections ('Don't like unity tickets', 
'They're run by Comms', etc). In two other questions similar proportions 
believed Labor collaborated with the Communists and said allegations 
about such collaboration had influenced their vote: Confidential Report:
Survey of Voters who changed their vote at the Victorian Elections, Vic. 
Rec., Survey electors Oakleigh, Ringwood, Mitcham, Glenroy 1962 
[mislabelled]. The survey took a month and was discussed by the VCE on 
completion. The formal motion to receive the report was adopted after 
seven questions had been asked and answered and eleven members had spoken, 
three to oppose receipt of the report. Brown moved an amendment that the 
report be destroyed. H. Holgate, the interviewer, was eventually thanked 
for his efforts: VCE 21 July, 18 August 1961, ALP (Victorian Branch),
State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8740.
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While the result of the Victorian election may have helped
consolidate the VCE's attitudes, the prospect of a Federal poll before
the end of 1961 stiffened the resolve of others to 'do something about
Victoria'. The Federal Conference of April 1961 had managed to avoid
the issue, discharging both a Victorian item identical to the political
collusion motion of 1959 and a Queensland item allowing ALP members and
7 8supporters in unions to use the party's name. However, after the
Victorian election, the Federal Executive meeting commencing on
21 August 1961 heard three out of four Federal Parliamentary Leaders
urge strong action against unity tickets.
The loudest voice was Kennelly's. He had argued in the VCE for a
middle course on unity tickets. As a politician he suspected the
electoral disadvantages of the practice and he had confirmed this as a
member of the National Organising Committee (NOC) in the latter months 
79of 1960. As a member of the Committee, too, he had been accused of 
exceeding his brief in seeking a rapprochement with the DLP, which had 
always insisted that any such coming together would require action about 
unity tickets. As in 1958 and 1959, Labor's approach to the unity ticket 
issue was affected by its relations with the party whose preferences helped 
to keep it out of Federal office. But any chance of a reconciliation was 
rejected firmly by the Federal Executive, led by Chamberlain, and by
7 8Age, 15 April 1961; ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference,
1961, 39; Bulletin, 19 April 1961; SMH, 10-12, 15 April 1961.
79On the NOC (Kennelly and Senators Dittmer and Toohey) and unity 
tickets, see note 20 above. As told to the author, Kennelly's views on 
unity tickets could be summarised as: unionists should vote for the
best man since their living standards relied on their union; unity 
tickets only won when the opposition was weak or incompetent; unity 
tickets would not have been necessary but for the rabidness of the 
Groups and would not have been an issue but for the 'hue and cry' by 
politicians at election times and by defeated candidates at union 
elections (P.J. Kennelly, interview).
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Kennelly's own Victorian Executive. Resentment at Kennelly's
activities on the NOC may have contributed to his not standing in 1961
for re-election to the VCE but, in any case, his departure from that
body freed him of most of his former inhibitions about taking a firm
81stand against unity tickets. Successfully persuading the Federal 
Executive to prosecute the Victorian offenders might yet allow, Kennelly 
believed, some form of cooperation or even unity between the Labor 
parties to defeat the Menzies Government. At the least, some DLP voters 
might switch.^
Thus, when he spoke to the Federal Executive in August, Kennelly 
appealed for enforcement of the unity ticket policy. Probably realising 
that the VCE would not give in easily, he argued that the Federal Executive
The NOC had been established in September 1960, to examine Labor's past 
electoral performance and make recommendations for the future. The DLP 
had offered to exchange preferences with Labor at the Higinbotham by- 
election in December. While the ALP rejected this, Kennelly was accused 
of having discussions with DLP Senators Cole and McManus. Publicly, he 
said that any deal which did not involve the ALP giving up fundamental 
principles should be considered, although he denied he had negotiated 
with the DLP. The Federal Executive rejected the DLP advances and the 
NOC was told to keep within its terms of reference. The NOC’s work was 
'deemed to be concluded' on presentation of its report in July 1961, by 
which time the DLP was adopting a less conciliatory stance. Throughout, 
the VCE majority had been strongly opposed to concessions: ALP, Official
Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1961, 29, 38; correspondence and other 
material, FX 5-8 December 1960, 3-7 July 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/10/ 
F9; 11/F13; 124/56/36-9, 43-5, 48-52, 115; Nation, 3 December 1960;
SMH, 25-30 November, 5-7, 9 December 1960, 28, 30 January, 19-20 April 
1961; VCE 3 February 1961, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive 
Minutes, NLA mf G8740.
81Kennelly's then private secretary recalls that Kennelly's ill-health 
was a reason for his leaving the VCE but that he had come also to believe 
the VCE, as presently constructed, was achieving little and had to be 
reformed by Federal intervention (P. Cullen, interview).
82The NOC listed twenty-four Federal seats which, on 1958 figures, were 
winnable by Labor with a 'moderate' or 'large' swing. Fourteen of these 
had been won by the Government on DLP preferences and all were in the 
'moderate' swing category (Kennelly, Ormonde & Dittmer to Chamberlain,
2 December 1960, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/11/F13).
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should dissolve the Victorian Branch and set up a new Executive which
would enforce the unity ticket policy. ’You lost the Victorian
election’, he told the Victorian delegates, 'because people did not
trust the Victorian Labor party. How can they trust it when unity
tickets are going on despite what you say? ... The way Labor is going,
it could be out of [Federal] office for years.' McKenna, Kennelly's
Senate colleague, supported him. Whitlam, Deputy Leader in the House of
Representatives, stopped short of supporting intervention but insisted
that Federal policy must be enforced if Labor was to win the public.
'If we conform with our own policy on this matter, it cannot be said
that we are bending to the dictates of the Democratic Labor party.' As
a first step the VCE should act against offenders in the ARU where, he
83was convinced, unity tickets had occurred.
Kennelly, McKenna and Whitlam probably represented the views of the
84majority of Federal Caucus. But what of the fourth and senior Leader,
8 3Age, 24 August 1961; Bulletin, 13 January 1962; Laurie Oakes,
Whitlam PM, Sydney, 1973, 94; SMH, 24 August 1961; E.G. Whitlam, 
interview. Earlier in the year Whitlam had written to the VCE asking it 
to look into the ARU election. He did not assume that the three ALP men 
concerned had consented but '[i]t would be of great assistance to us all 
if [they] were to disown this card, or were to issue a card containing 
their names alone' (Age, 25 May 1961). After the Executive meeting he 
complained that Labor's opponents did not provide evidence for their 
claims about unity tickets. He had done this in the ARU and he would be 
surprised if the men concerned could explain the ticket. 'If any other 
honorable member gives me corresponding information, I will see that it 
is followed up' (CPD H. of R. 32, 30 August 1961, 669). As fuel for the 
Victorian allegations that their own politicians were conspiring with 
outsiders against the independence of unions this was approached only by 
Evatt's use of the Gould circular in 1959 (note 55 above) and by 
K.E. Beazley, MP, who wrote to Gould thanking him for his letter and 
agreeing with his views (Sunday Telegraph, 10 May 1959) .
84SMH, 17, 24 August 1961. Incidentally, the Federal Executive Minutes, 
in a masterpiece of avoidance of controversy, recorded that the three 
Leaders spoke only 'in connection with financing Labor's proposals and 
basic pensions in the Social Services programme'. Later Brebner and 
Stout successfully requested the Minutes be amended to add the words 
'referred to the Victorian elections and matters related thereto' (FX 21- 
24 August, 26-28 September 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/161, 185/)
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Arthur Calweil? Since he became Parliamentary Leader in March 1960,
Calwell had shown both notable reluctance to agree with the opinions of
Labor’s critics on unity tickets and sympathy for the position of his
own Victorian Branch. He used the absence from the agenda of the New
South Wales, Victorian and South Australian Branch Conferences of 1960
of any items regarding unity tickets to deny that unity tickets were an
issue for the party or, indeed, any more than the figments of the
imaginations of a discredited, anti-Labor minority. Confronted with
evidence, he brushed it aside. He said that the VCE was doing its best
in enforcing Federal policy, given the problems it faced with Industrial
Groups and the DLP. While he hoped that ALP members would eventually
mount and support, on their own initiative, purely ALP teams in union
elections, there was a danger, meanwhile, that Grouper wins could take
85unions into the DLP camp. Calwell feared also that stern action in 
Victoria could lead to dissension there when a united Labor Party could 
defeat a Liberal Federal Government whose economic policies were likely 
to lose it electoral support. For this reason Calwell had helped 
persuade the Federal Conference in April against debating unity tickets.'
0 C
Age, 13 June, 1 July 1960, 6 March 1961; CPD H. of R. 30, 8 March 1961, 
73; 12-13 April 1961, 773-91; Mercury, 17 April 1961; Nation,
19 December 1959, 7 May 1960; Observer, 2 April 1960; SMH, 13, 20 June,
1 July 1960. When it was suggested it was self-contradictory for him to 
deny unity tickets were an issue and to defend the VCE's enforcement of 
the policy, Calwell said his denials were intended to flush out evidence 
from the critics. When evidence appeared (though not evidence of consent), 
he rejected it as coming from people outside the ALP. See also note 67 
above. Did Calwell mean that consent to appearing on a unity ticket was
a figment of the imagination of the critics? Yet Calwell seems to have 
supported Evatt's approach to unity tickets (see pp. 88, 92 above) and at 
least as early as May 1958, declared he was 'irrevocably opposed' to 
them, while aware of the problem of losing unions to the DLP (Age, 22 May 
1958).
Bulletin, 19 April 1961; SMH, 28 July 1961. Although McKenna concurred 
in this course he had also warned the Federal Executive of 'the part that 
would be played in anti-Labor propaganda in respect to unity tickets'
(FX 6-9 April 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/88).
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As a Victorian in a State where the Executive controlled preselection of
Parliamentary candidates, Calwell could not afford, in the interests of
his own political future, -to head the forces sniping at the VCE. The
Branch and most of his Caucus colleagues from Victoria had not supported
him for the Federal Leadership nor found him the place he sought on the
8 7VCE, so his position was not strong in his home State.
Calwell's private views also may have been similar to those of the
VCE. His book, Labor's Role in Modern Society, written during 1962,
defends the independence of the trade unions and denies the right of the
88party 'to interfere directly in trade union affairs'. He also echoed 
the attitudes of the VCE when he boasted after the Victorian election 
that '[t]he setback will not make us more ready to surrender our ideals 
for a mess of D.LP. pottage'. His biographer concludes that, while Calwell 
opposed unity tickets, he opposed the DLP more, partly because of the 
treatment he had received from his fellow Catholics during the Split.
'His attitude to unity tickets was dictated less by his alliance with
8 7The VCE supported R. Pollard against Calwell and F. Crean, MP, gathered 
support for Pollard (with himself to be deputy and successor) from 
Victorians before withdrawing from the race in confused circumstances 
(CT, 26 February 1966; Observer, 23 January 1960; Alan Reid, The Gorton 
Experiment, Sydney, 1971, 96; SMH, 8, 11, 15 March 1960). Some 
observers suggested the VCE opposed Calwell because it feared he would 
act against unity tickets and truckle with the DLP: Advertiser
(Adelaide), 27 February 1960; West Australian, 22 February 1960. On 
Calwell's bid for a VCE seat, see Age, 23 April 1960; Nation, 7 May 
1960; SMH, 14 June 1960. The reason given for his eventual non­
candidacy (a heavy work-load) may have been the real one, given that 
Calwell's actions had already begun to indicate the VCE's fears of him 
were unfounded.
88Arthur Calwell, Labor's Role in Modern Society, Melbourne, 1963, 62-3. 
It is clever, but not very relevant, to point out that this book was 
probably written by G. Freudenberg, Calwell's press secretary: Humphrey
McQueen, [Book Note on A.A. Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not], Labour 
History, 26 (May 1974), 110. Calwell would hardly have let a book 
appear under his name that did not contain his sentiments, if not his 
words. More relevant for our present purpose is to point out that the 
book was written after Calwell had identified himself with the VCE
position on union independence.
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left-wing elements in the Australian Labor Party than by his opposition
89to the Democratic Labor Party. '
Calwell did not accompany his three colleagues to the Executive
meeting and spoke the following day only to express his support for a
proposed decision that had been worked out by Executive delegates. He
90had read the motion, he said, and agreed completely with it. This 
reaction fitted his conception of his own role. Calwell brought to 
crises not only his private views of the merits of an issue and his 
commitments to sub-coalitions of the party (the Victorian Branch and the 
Federal Caucus) but also a view of the role of a Labor leader. 'The 
leadership, in the final analysis', he wrote in 1959, 'is more or less 
collective. There is the Parliamentary Party Executive, the Federal 
Conference, Federal Executive and the trade unions ...'. The ALP was a 
democracy, according to Labor's Role in Modern Society, wherein the 
Parliamentary Leader was both servant of the party and the people it
89Colm Kiernan, Calwell, West Melbourne, 1978, 214. Calwell's reaction 
to the Victorian election is quoted SMH, 28 July 1961. Calwell wrote 
that he knew, once the DLP had rejected Evatt's offer to resign in 1958, 
'the only way to deal with the DLP was to fight them and try to destroy 
them as an effective political force' (Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not,
192) but G. Freudenberg, his press secretary from August 1961, suggests 
his employer preferred to let the splinter party 'wither on the vine' 
(National Times, 3-8 January 1977). Calwell's shifting positions 
regarding the DLP during 1960-61 are suggested by (1) his informing 
Chamberlain of a move to discuss in Caucus rapprochement with the other 
party. Calwell agreed with Chamberlain that the matter was entirely one 
for the Executive (FX 5-8 December 1960, NLA MS 4985/124/56/41-2);
(2) his claim that the DLP rank and file were deserting their extremist 
leaders in favour of the ALP (Age, 15 May 1961); (3) his promise to
Caucus, after the DLP effort against Labor in Victoria and despite his 
initial vehemence, quoted above, that the Federal Executive would have 
a full enquiry into the election (SMH, 17 August 1961). The effect of 
the Split on Calwell's relations with his church is described in 
Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, 141-6; Kiernan, Calwell, 218, 238-9, 242.
90Age, SMH, 25 August 1961. Calwell had a plausible excuse for not 
accompanying his colleagues, since he was to deliver his speech on the 
Commonwealth Budget later in the evening.
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served and mouthpiece for its collective decisions. ’Calwell stood for
the idea', writes his biographer, 'of the leader as the first servant of
i , 91the cause ....
This ideal was close to that of the party's folk lore, if not to 
92its practice. But Calwell's critics argued he was too passive, too
subservient to forces which he could have tempered. 'He waited upon
events', wrote Freudenberg, 'and baulked at that kind of action which
creates or changes events'. Throughout his career, while revelling in
a fight, he lacked that part of courage which 'involves taking the risk
which might win all or lose all'. The Calwell of 1961, wrote the
journalist, Alan Reid, was 'diffident, uncertain, almost timid, a drifter
on the tide of Labor events'. On many issues 'he gives no lead either 
93way'. Freudenberg portrays Calwell unfavourably to heighten the 
contrast with his successor Whitlam, the subject of Freudenberg's 
apologia. Kiernan is just as ham-fisted in the opposite direction.
Reid's views of the Labor Party and its politicians were jaundiced as
91Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, 219; Labor's Role in Modem Society, 
52-6; Kiernan, Calwell, 4. The original Calwell letter: Calwell to
E.J. Ward, 9 February 1959, Ward Papers, NLA MS 2396/15/872 (Box 51).
92On the party's attitudes to its leaders and on the positive achievements 
of two of Calwell's predecessors whose rhetoric, at least, was similar to 
his, see: L.F. Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party, 1901-1951,
London, 1955, 127-9, 153; Ben Chifley, Croydon, Vic., 1963; Michelle 
Grattan, 'The Australian Labor Party', Henry Mayer & Helen Nelson, ed., 
Australian Politics: A Third Reader, Melbourne, 1973, 392; D.W. Rawson,
Labor in Vain? Croydon, Vic., 1966, 29-33; Lloyd Ross, John Curtin,
South Melbourne, 1977.
93Bulletin, 15 March 1961 (Reid); National Times, 3-8 January 1977 
(Freudenberg). See also Nation, 14 December 1963; SMH, 28 July 1961 
and contemporary remarks by Freudenberg: 'Labor's Myths and Hopes',
Dissent, 19 (Autumn 1967), 47-8; Labor Comment, May 1966, 4-5.
Freudenberg resigned from Calwell's staff in February 1966 and joined 
Whitlam's a year later.
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often as they were accurate. Nevertheless, there is evidence from the
recollections of Calwell's Caucus colleagues that while Freudenberg and
Reid approach the truth, some of Kiernan's sympathy is not misplaced.
Frank Crean remembers him as an 'inefficient' leader who tended to 'let
things run along too much', while to J.L. Armitage, a backbencher under
Calwell from 1961-63, he was a charming individual but a weak leader.
Tony Mulvihill, a New South Wales Senator who moved in Caucus in 1966
that all leadership positions be declared vacant - a motion designed to
end Calwell's tenure - retails this version of a conversation with
Calwell after the meeting:
Calwell: That was a despicable thing you did.
I've done a lot for Labor unity.
Mulvihill: That's not the point, Arthur.
You've fumbled too many balls. I want to see 
a Labor Government. You should be out the 
front giving a lead.
Calwell: But I might lose.
Finally, Keeffe, Federal President for most of Calwell's Leadership term
and a Senator after 1965, also remembers Calwell's wariness about placing
himself at the head of his colleagues, but sees this as a virtue.
Calwell's basic aim was party unity. 'He wasn't going to have the party
95kicked to death over state aid or unity tickets or any other thing'.
The same man, then, as prevaricator or unifier, inefficient fumbler 
or charming conciliator. Here are the words of Calwell himself, late in 
his career, when Labor faced the denouement of the 'Victorian problem'
94Graham Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, South Melbourne, 1977, 9, does 
less than justice to Calwell by describing Be Just and Fear Not as 'an 
extended denunciation of the Catholic Church in Australia'. Other faults 
of interpretation will be noted in later chapters of the present thesis. 
Kiernan reciprocates (Calwell, 4, 260-1) by depicting Whitlam as an 
unsuitable type (independent, intellectual, messianic) for Labor 
leadership. In both cases, hagiography has clouded judgment. Reid was 
no hagiographer, however. For a particularly nasty example of his style, 
see: Sunday Telegraph, 24 March 1963.
95J.L. Armitage, F. Crean, J.B. Keeffe, J.A. Mulvihill, interviews.
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of which the events of 1961 were an early example.
I suggest ... a discussion of all issues in a 
conciliatory fraternal manner so that 
compromise settlements can be reached by 
unanimous agreement .... The penalty of failure 
will mean the cost of at least two more elections 
and I want to see another Labour Government before 
I die .... The workers of Australia believe that 
the unity of Labour is still the hope of the world 
and will ultimately destroy our Party if we impair 
or damage that unity.96
Implicit in such statements is the recognition that Labor is a coalition
wherein critical decisions must take account of the views of a number of
sub-coalitions if 'the unity of Labour' is to be preserved. Calwell's
approach to his party embodied our fourth and fifth hypotheses: he saw
the need to keep the coalition together, especially in 1961 with victory
in sight, and he knew Labor's critical decisions must compromise between
the views of those sub-coalitions which held strong views on the matters
in question. While Calwell's character may have been flawed as
Freudenberg suggests, it was moulded by an intimate knowledge of the
structure of the party, derived from long years as a machine politician
in Victoria and from awareness of the consequences of disunity, of which
97the Split of 1955 was only the most recent in his memory. His awareness 
of the significance of compromise in the ALP may have encouraged him to
96Telegram, Calwell to T. Burns, Federal President, ALP, 28 August 1970, 
Fed. Rec., NLA 4985/128/86. The telegram was sent when the Federal 
Executive was about to intervene in the Victorian Branch. See also 
Herald (Melbourne) 27 March 1965, where Calwell seeks in his party 
'unity in things essential, independence in the things which are not 
essential and, in all things, tolerance'.
97In the telegram quoted above, Calwell points out he has lived through 
three splits in his fifty-four years in the party. Of Calwell's 
Victorian experience before 1955, Freudenberg writes: 'He knew where
all the levers of the Victorian machine were, as well as anybody, with 
the possible exception of Pat Kennelly' (National Times, 3-8 January 
1977). By 1961, Kennelly's power in Victoria was dwindling but Calwell 
was learning to work with the post Split structure. See also on the 
early period: Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, 38-44; Kiernan, Calwell,
1-6, 34-59.
124
work ’unobtrusively, obliquely, and inoffensively' in his relations with
the Federal Executive knowing, as Evatt did not, that the stability of
the party on the unity ticket question depended upon not altering the
98fundamental terms of the compromise the Executive had evolved. At the
most, he could have helped refine these terms by taking part in the
negotiations which produced the Executive’s new decision. If that was
the case, his speech to the delegates was mere advocacy of a formulation
he had helped frame. How far he acted in such negotiations as an
extension of the Victorian delegation (perhaps fearing loss of his
99preselection if he did not support Branch goals ) and how far as the 
Leader looking to the Federal election we do not know. It _is_ clear that, 
as a politician, he felt it was more important to attract votes by an 
appearance of unity than by an appearance of anti-Communism. Finally, 
since the unity ticket issue concerned the party’s relations with the 
unions, he may have argued that it was a matter for the machine, where 
the formal ties with the unions were, not for the Parliamentary Labor Party.
Since Calwell was Leader, his views normally carried greater weight 
than those of any other politician. His views were influenced by his 
awareness of the goals of his Victorian Branch (HYPOTHESIS I), by his 
own personal characteristics (HYPOTHESIS II), by his awareness of the 
need to keep the coalition together by means of a compromise decision
100
98The quote is from Alan Reid (Bulletin, 15 March 1961) who attributes 
Calwell's style at this time to his knowledge that Chamberlain controlled 
the Executive.
99Presumably, however, it was somewhat more difficult for a State 
Executive to deny preselection to a Party Leader than a backbencher - 
and even backbenchers did not often suffer this fate. For an occasion 
when Calwell did go against his Branch without losing preselection, see 
chapter 3, below, regarding the July 1966 Special Conference.
"^^This is Kiernan's view (Kiernan, Calwell, 213-4, 222, 231-2).
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(HYPOTHESES IV, V) and by his appreciation of the relations between the 
party and the unions (HYPOTHESIS VI). Further, one could argue that he 
preferred a less ’inclusive' approach to the electorate than did his 
three colleagues (HYPOTHESIS III). While they sought strong action in 
the hope of gaining support from voters not then supporting Labor because 
of its alleged sympathy with Communists, Calwell preferred to seek a 
decision that would retain the loyalty of those of Labor’s core members 
who placed a higher value on the independence of unions than on anti­
communism, and on retention of union power than on an easier passage for 
the enemies of 1955.
But Calwell could only persuade the Executive against stronger 
enforcement and intervention. Where did the Executive itself stand? The
Victorians had become increasingly isolated on the unity ticket question. 
Early in 1961, their allies of 1959, the South Australian Branch, 
cancelled the party membership of two Meatworkers' Union members found 
guilty of unity ticket charges. (Membership cancellation was equivalent 
to expulsion in other States.) This case ’was the first one dealt with 
by the State Branch of the A.L.P. under the Federal Rules’ and it turned 
on the consent question. The question of political collusion, the crux 
of the South Australian motion of 1959, was not raised, suggesting that 
the Branch could now live comfortably with the Federal policy and would 
provide no further support for Victorian efforts to destroy it. ^  At the
101SASE, 14 October, 7, 10 November, 5 December 1960, 27 January, 1,
7 February 1961; ALP (SA Branch), State Council (SASC), 9 February 1961, 
SA Rec., unlabelled Minute book, 1953-64; packed labelled 'Minutes of 
State Council Meetings from 8th October 1953 to 12th December 1963'. The 
Branch acquitted two other meatworkers. In all four cases the excuse was 
that the accused had not known there were Communists on the ticket. The 
Branch also cancelled the membership of two Tramways Union members who 
had collaborated with Communists in other ways. The 5 December Executive 
meeting also adopted an approach to the DLP offer (discussed in note 80 
above) which was the most receptive put to the Federal Executive. It is 
worth noting that these events took place in the absence from the 
Executive for one year of C.R. Cameron, engaged on reforming the AWU. 
Cameron had been a leading defender of the independence of unions and was 
very influential in the Executive. The 1960 State Convention also saw the
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April 1961 Federal Conference the political collusion item, had it
been moved, would have received the support only of the Victorians and,
102probably, the Western Australians.
101 (continued)
defeat by D.A. Dunstan of J.C. Sexton as a delegate to Federal Executive, 
when Sexton had been unopposed for the position since 1953. Toohey, the 
other Federal delegate, had been ill and did not seek re-election but 
Sexton, under the normal Branch practice, could have been expected to 
retain his place while he remained the immediate past State Secretary.
Under the same practice, M. Nicholls, who had succeeded Sexton as State 
Secretary, would normally have become a Federal delegate without 
opposition. Yet E. O’Connor, an AWU opponent of Cameron' s, made a fourth 
(unsuccessful) candidate for the positions. There are also some 
indications in the election of the State Executive, especially the success 
of three newcomers in the last three positions, that the controlling group 
ticket did not hold as firm as it usually did - probably because of a 
division in AWU votes between O’Connor's and Cameron's supporters. None 
of these three was re-elected in 1961. Cameron himself remembers the 
years 1960-61 as a period of slight instability in the Branch, when 'the 
wheels wobbled a little bit' (C.R. Cameron, interview. The above sentences 
are based generally on Advertiser reports of State Conventions, on 
Convention Minutes, including Returning Officers' reports, held in SA Rec. 
and on interviews with Cameron, J.L. Cavanagh and J.P. Toohey). But if 
South Australian activities regarding unity tickets were an outcome of this 
small upheaval, they did not occur willingly. From complaint to 
conclusion the Meatworkers' case took four months, including a seven week 
deferral over Christmas. This length of time suggests the uneasiness among 
Executive members. Then, before cancelling the two memberships the 
Executive carried a motion (quoted in the text) moved by Toohey, critical 
of the delay of the Meatworkers' Secretary, W.W. Pirie, in notifying the 
case. The Meatworkers were not one of the controlling group of unions in 
South Australia at the time. Pirie had written earlier to the Federal 
Secretary of the ALP, complaining on behalf of his union at the use of the 
card vote in the ALP in South and Western Australia to the advantage of 
large unions (Pirie, Federal Secretary, Meatworkers' Union, to Schmella,
23 September 1958, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/4/1958 Correspondence). This 
union also moved in 1959 an unsuccessful motion to abolish the card vote 
(Advertiser, 15 June 1959). Indeed, one of the three new SASE members who 
lasted only one term, R. Husdell of the Ironworkers' Association, was also 
a long-time opponent of the card vote (Advertiser, 18 June 1957, 4 June 
1962). In a 'normal' year such an opponent would not have been elected.
But the wheel wobbled to the more militant side, too, since J.L. Cavanagh, 
never part of the controlling group, won preselection for the Senate at 
this time (Advertiser, 14 November 1960) . On the card vote and the SA 
Branch, see pp.44-6, above.
102Bulletin, 19 April 1961; SMH, 10, 11 April 1961. The last reference 
has it that the South Australians had been 'instructed' by their Branch to 
vote to retain the ban if the matter was raised. While this is possible, 
there seems to be no record of it in the Executive Minutes at least. But 
the trend outlined in the previous note suggests strongly this would have 
been the delegates' approach. Perhaps there was an informal consensus 
between the six of them. This was a normal practice for South Australia 
delegations (J.B. Keeffe, G.T. Virgo, interviews). Certainly the press 
had no doubt and by August the two Executive delegates, Dunstan and 
Nicholls, were regarded as 'right wing' on the issue (SMH, 25 August 1961).
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On the eve of the August Executive meeting, observers speculated
that six of the twelve delegates, those, from New South Wales, Tasmania
and South Australia, would support drastic action in Victoria. The
grounds for action would have reflected the terms of a draft petition
being circulated by anti-VCE individuals in Victoria (some centred
around Kennelly). This petition referred to deteriorating organisational
structure, lack of funds, dwindling branch membership, the selection of
VCE members for safe Parliamentary seats and, particularly, the adverse
effects of the lax enforcement of the unity ticket ban. The petition
concluded with a request for action under Federal rules 9(i) and (k),
covering investigation of State Branches and the replacement of their 
103Executives. A motion under these rules required seven supporters. 
Chamberlain, Victoria’s staunch supporter in 1959, was felt to be 
wavering. His resentment towards Evatt, crucial in 1959, no longer 
influenced his approach to unity tickets. Perhaps a strong stand from
103Age, 21, 22, 28 August 1961; Bulletin, 2 September 1961; DT, 22-24 
August 1961; SMH, 11, 24, 25 August 1961; Sun-Herald, 27 August 1961. 
See also: Australian Labor Party, Victorian Branch. The Urgent Need
for Reform from Within. August 1961, Fed. Rec.,NLA MS 4985/59/ALP- 
Victoria; correspondence from Victorians^especially J. Jupp and 
W.J. Thomas, seeking NSW support for Federal intervention, NSW Rec.,
ML MSS 2083/107/240/313-587. Developments in Victoria included the 
withdrawal of an endorsed Federal candidate, public criticism by 
J. Jupp, a. Labor-supporting, but anti-VCE academic and growing unrest 
in State Caucus. Meanwhile, Kennelly and a Federal MP, A. Fraser, were 
alleged to have raised again the prospect of rapprochement with the 
DLP: Age, 26, 29 July, 10 August, 14 September 1961; Nation, 29 July
1961; SMH, 17, 26 August 1961; VCE 13, 18 August, 1, 15 September,
20 October 1961, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA 
mf G8740. (The later meetings investigated earlier events.} On the 
possibility of intervention at this time G. Bryant, a Federal MP from 
Victoria, remembers that 'an innocent afternoon tea in Parliament 
House with a few right wingers' led, such was the siege mentality of 
the Victorians at the time, to his having to write, at Wyndham's 
request, a letter which denied he was involved in 'moves by Inter- 
State people to remove the Victorian Executive from office' (Bryant 
to Wyndham, 28 August 1961, Vic. Rec., Parliamentarians A to G 1961; 
G.M. Bryant, interview).
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the new Leader, Calwell, might have influenced Chamberlain to support 
the six favouring intervention.
Chamberlain's strongest loyalty, however, was to the compromise of 
1956-57, to the balancing of the conflicting principles of anti­
communism and union independence on the pivot of enforcement by the 
States. Other delegates were producing a reformulation of just this 
compromise. While Kennelly and his group laboured in one room in 
Parliament House to shape a resolution for intervention and investigation 
of unity ticket offences, Brebner and others met in Calwell's room to 
produce a resolution which would avoid intervention in Victoria but still 
obtain the majority support of the Executive. The latter motion began: 
'The Federal Executive is determined that the rule banning unity tickets 
in trade union elections will be carried out'. It continued that any 
member who discovered that his name appeared on a unity ticket and did 
not immediately place a press advertisement denying both knowledge of 
the preparation of, and consent to the ticket and did not provide, if 
required, a supporting statutory declaration to his State ALP Secretary
'and/or to the Federal Secretary' would be automatically expelled from 
106the party. Exactly who helped produce this motion is unclear. 
Chamberlain almost certainly did, given his closeness to the Victorians 
since 1959 and his opposition to Kennelly, the leader of the opposing
104Chamberlain's usual fellow delegate, Webb, a former MP, who might 
have been influenced by the three pro-intervention politicians, had been 
replaced for this meeting by K. Dowding, a close ally of Chamberlain's, 
although there is no evidence available that this was other than 
coincidence. Unity tickets were not on the meeting agenda and 
Chamberlain would not have known of the three leader^ intentions 
sufficiently early to engineer a substitute - even had he wished to or 
been able to.
^^^Bulletin, 2 September 1961 provides the meeting location (Alan Reid).
106FX 21-24 August 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/162; SMH,
25 August 1961.
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forces, because of his flirting with the DLP. (Negotiation with the
DLP almost certainly would have followed intervention.) Keeffe,
Secretary of the Queensland Branch, who seconded the motion before the
Executive, probably suggested the press repudiation procedure, which had
108been the practice in his Branch since at least 1958. Calwell told the 
Executive he had 'read' the motion and he may have done no more (since he 
was engaged in preparing his speech in the Budget debate) but his views 
were well-known and overlapped those of the Victorian delegates: retain
affiliated unions in the Labor camp and give no comfort to the DLP.
These arguments, which Calwell put to the Executive, may have attracted 
less sympathy than his fears of disunity on the eve of an election.
Chamberlain had shown his closeness to the Victorian Branch by his 
support for Stout's election to the Federal Presidency in February 1961. 
This exchange of letters took place: 'I strongly hold the view that the
Executive should, for tactical and public reasons, elect as a successor 
to yourself [as Federal President] a Victorian and, if at all possible,
Vic Stout. Such an election would kill any suggestion that the Federal 
Executive looks unfavourably upon the Victorian Party ... [and] is 
going to "move in" ... I have already discussed with Albert [McNolty] 
the idea that we can go very strongly out in support of Victoria'
(Wyndham to Chamberlain, 19 January 1961, Vic. Rec., C.S. Wyndham 
Personal File 1961). 'He [Chamberlain] said to tell you he fully agrees 
with the sentiments you express in your recent letter to him re the 
Federal Officers' (L. Elliott, Chamberlain's secretary, to Wyndham,
26 January 1961, Vic. Rec., Federal Executive 1961 File 2). After 
abortive attempts by Campbell, Kennelly and others to get majority 
support for H. Jensen, Lord Mayor of Sydney, Dunstan or Toohey, Stout was 
elected unanimously (Advertiser, 18 February 1961; Campbell to 
Chamberlain, 17 November 1960; Chamberlain to Campbell, 14 December 1960, 
Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/13/F46; F.H. Campbell, H.F. Jensen, interviews; 
Nation, 25 February 1961; Observer, 4 March 1961; SMH, 15, 17, 21 
February 1961).
108The Queensland Central Executive had resolved in May 1958 that any 
ALP member 'who permits' his name to be used on a unity ticket 'without 
repudiating same immediately through the press' shall be expelled. The 
QCE unanimously approved the August 1961 decision as one which resembled 
their own practice. Keeffe remembered few expulsions for unity tickets 
in Queensland under this rule but there were a few reprimands. Generally, 
he recalled, 'it was an acceptable policy but unpleasant to administer': 
ALP (Queensland Branch), Circular 13/58, 30 May 1958, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 
4985/4/1957 Correspondence [misfiled]; C-M, 29 August 1961; J.B. Keeffe, 
interview.
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Since 1958 there had been veiled threats that the Victorian unions would
form a militant, exclusively union Industrial Labor Party should there
be drastic ’interference with unions'. Calwell and others would have
reminded delegates of this unpleasant prospect and the recent experience
of the electoral effects of a split Labor movement would have made them
receptive. Alan Reid wrote that Brebner, moving the motion, played on
109the fears of delegates. Above all, the fear of a new Split still 
lingered.
Nevertheless, the successful motion would have failed without
concessions from the Victorians. The speculation over Chamberlain's vote
underlined how delicately balanced the Executive was on the unity tickets
question and on attitudes to Victoria generally. Twice in 1961 elections
for Federal officers' positions had been decided on a draw from a hat;
110twice more the pro-Victorian candidate had been narrowly defeated.
109Bulletin, 2 September 1961. For threats and warnings about the 
possibility of an Industrial Labor Party, see CPD H. of R. 20, 21 August 
1958, 654, 656 (R.W. Holt says interference in unions will lead to VCE 
and unions running industrial candidates in political elections in 
retaliation); DT, 8, 15 May 1959 (Victorian delegates to Federal 
Conference); SMH, 6 December 1960 (Stout threatens ILP if any pact 
with DLP); Sun-Herald, 27 August 1961; Tom Truman, Ideological Groups 
in the Australian Labor Party and their Attitudes, St Lucia, Qld , 1965, 
158 (Calwell to the Executive). It was occasionally suggested that 
these threats were bluffs and that few unions would have left the party 
but the threats would have seemed especially salient in an election 
year.
^^In February 1961, F. Taylor, a Tasmanian delegate, who had supported 
Stout for the Presidency in return for Victorian support for himself for 
a Vice Presidency, tied 6-6 with D.A. Dunstan (SA) in the ballot for 
Junior Vice President. Taylor won on a draw from the hat but later lost 
his position as a Tasmanian delegate, apparently because his Branch 
resented his deserting Colbourne in the manoeuvring for the Presidency. 
(Dunstan was elected unanimously to the Junior Vice Presidency in 
April.) In July, Colbourne, Senior Vice President, stood against Stout 
for the Presidency and won on a hat draw after another tied vote. The 
pro-Victorian (and Victorian-supported) candidates for the Vice 
Presidencies both then lost, Keeffe by 5-7 to Dunstan for the Senior 
position and Brebner by 5-6 against R.H. Lacey for the Junior (FX 13-16 
February, 6-9 April, 3-7 July 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/80-1, 
85, 121-2; Nation, 25 March 1961; SMH, 8 July 1961).
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That delegates spent an hour, much longer than usual, in informal 
discussions over morning tea, between Calwell's speech and Brebner's 
putting his motion formally before the meeting, suggests that the pro­
intervention delegates took some convincing to support the motion and 
achieve the unanimous decision which emerged.
What were the concessions which led the pro-intervention delegates 
to concur so reluctantly? First, the motion itself included the sentence 
’All States will promptly report to the Federal Executive officers 
action taken under the rule in all instances'. Despite the remarks of 
some commentators, this was not the first time the Federal Executive had 
given itself a role regarding unity tickets. For instance, the August 
1938 resolution said the Executive would act against offenders if_ it 
had reliable evidence that State Branches were not acting. Moreover, 
there was always the possibility of gaining a majority for Federal action
against State Branches by the method Kennelly and his supporters used in
1121961, using unity tickets as a ground under rules 9(i) and (k). But 
the new resolution, by directing Branches to report all action taken, 
introduced a formal procedure for general supervision. If this
The debate itself took only ten minutes, just long enough for Brebner 
and Keeffe to present the motion. On the long morning tea, note the 
remarks of Federal delegates about the importance of such sessions for 
discussing alternatives and persuading doubters (chapter 1, note 75, 
above). On this occasion, one observer 'suspects that the compromise 
resolution ... had been informally accepted by the executive before 
Mr Calwell spoke' (Age, 28 August 1961), that is, before the tea break. 
(Remember: the order was Calwell-tea break- debate). In this case, a
majority probably had decided to support the motion already and the 
delegates who 'stood in groups discussing the motion' (SMH, 25 August 
1961) would have been ensuring merely that the decision was unanimous. 
This may have been the time, also, when delegates were advised that 
Whitlam supported the Brebner formulation. Alan Reid says Whitlam gave 
such support (DT, 25 August 1961).
112For the August 1958 resolution see above p. 89. One could also read 
something into Chamberlain's remark after the original decision of 
September 1956 that the Federal Executive would 'expect' expulsion 
in proven cases (note 16 above).
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supervision revealed blatant laxity Federal action might follow, jLf the
'numbers’ could be mustered on the basis of the facts revealed in the
case or cases under discussion. The motion itself did not make Federal
113action automatic, merely slightly more possible.
Secondly, the Victorian Branch, through Brebner and Stout, gave 'an
undertaking that they would recommend to the Victorian Executive that
action be taken in respect to all current alleged offences against the
Party's rules'. Unusually, this part of Brebner's speech was recorded
in the Executive Minutes, which suggests that it was seen as a concrete
114concession in return for which the formal motion was less drastic.
Given how close the Executive had come to intervention in Victoria such 
an undertaking is not surprising. It was implemented immediately, with 
investigations into alleged unity tickets in the ARU and Amalgamated 
Postal Workers' Union and into allegations of WWF support for a 
Communist in the Victorian general election and donations to Communist 
candidates in the Federal general election.Then, finally, two weeks
113The September 1961 Executive meeting decided further that copies of 
all reports on unity ticket cases should be sent to the Federal Secretary 
(this had not been specified in the August resolution) who would supply 
all Executive members with copies (FX 26-28 September 1961, Fed. Rec.,
NLA MS 4985/124/56/195).
114FX 21-24 August 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/162. This part of 
the Minutes, along with the motion itself, is included in the compilation 
of Executive and Conference decisions on trade union elections, included 
as an appendix to the 1965 Conference report (ALP, Official Report, 
Commonwealth Conference, 1965,130). Could this have been the crucial 
concession extracted from Brebner and Stout during the long morning tea? 
Sun-Herald, 27 August 1961 suggests the Executive's September meeting 
was a concession to show the pro-intervention forces that enforcement was 
under way. While progress in enforcement was reported at this meeting it 
seems just as likely that the extra meeting was held mainly to deal with 
election policy matters.
11 5FX 26-28 September 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/188, 194-6; 
Nation, 26 August 1961; SMH, 18, 26 August, 16, 30 September 1961; VCE 
18 August, 15 September, 10 November 1961, ALP (Victorian Branch), State 
Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8740; Wyndham to Chamberlain, 13, 20 
September 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/12/F28 Unity Tickets.
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before the Federal election, the Victorian Branch made its first
expulsions for unity tickets since the Split, when two members of the
Building Workers’ Industrial Union refused to avail themselves of the
repudiation procedures introduced in August and consequently were expelled
automatically. This expulsion was hardly an example of rigorous
enforcement - the two virtually 'expelled themselves’ - and it occurred
with little fanfare and too soon before the election to influence voters
116susceptible to anti-Communist gestures. But, for the watching Federal 
Executive delegates these activities in Victoria served as the swallows 
of a Victorian summer of enforcement of Federal policy.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the Federal Executive had laid down 
a smokescreen. The Communist Federal Secretary of the Waterside Workers’ 
Federation, J. Healy, had died on 13 July and his successor was to be 
elected in November, only weeks before the general election. The 
Newcastle Branch President of the WWF, C. Fitzgibbon, a member of the 
ALP New South Wales Executive, was persuaded by the officers of the 
latter body to nominate for the vacancy against T. Nelson, a Communist.^^
There were suggestions from the DLP that one of those expelled,
B.H. Workman, had been enrolled in the ALP only weeks before, for the 
specific purpose of providing a unity ticket scapegoat. The other,
R.V. Bradbury, had been an ALP member for about two years: Age, 25,
30 November, 1 December 1961; Bradbury to the author, 11 October 1978; 
correspondence and other material on BWIU election, Vic. Rec., Letters 
from Members whose Names were put on Union 'How to Vote’ Tickets 1961; 
A.G. Poyser, interview; SMH, 20, 25, 27 November 1961; VCE 24 November 
1961, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8742.
"*"^^Fitzgibbon said: ’I nominated on my account, and for the good of the
union, not for the A.L.P. ’. Oliver told the Federal Executive that 
Fitzgibbon did not want ALP ’endorsement’ (which he could not have had 
under party rules in any case) . But Oliver and Colbourne both remember 
looking around for a suitable candidate and persuading Fitzgibbon, who 
was reluctant to leave Newcastle, to stand. (A press report stated that 
ALP Branches throughout Australia were looking for candidates and three 
had been mentioned: C-M, 15 August 1961). Fitzgibbon was opposed to the
NSW Branch controlling group on a number of issues and was a relatively 
militant unionist, but he had taken stands against Communist tactics in 
the Newcastle union movement. As early as three weeks before Fitzgibbon 
announced his candidacy Mulvihill had excused Fitzgibbon from a NSWCE
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Calwell reacted enthusiastically. 'Mr Fitzgibbon's victory on this 
occasion', he said, 'should be the first major breakthrough in a rank- 
and-file campaign to rid trade unionism of everything alien, un- 
Australian and anti-democratic'. He wished Fitzgibbon, 'my fellow- 
Laborite, every success in his campaign and in his attempt to break the 
stranglehold which the Communist party has had on this important position 
for nearly a quarter of a century'. Every worker, he concluded, 'should 
vote to remove Communists from union office when their opponents are 
members, or supporters of the Australian Labor party'. Colbourne, New 
South Wales Branch Secretary and Federal President, added that Fitzgibbon 
'will carry with him the best wishes and full support of all members of 
the ALP'.118
Five days after Fitzgibbon's announcement the Federal Executive 
meeting determined the party's official attitude to his candidacy. The
117 (continued)
committee meeting in terms that suggest the possibility of his standing 
had been canvassed ('Assuming that your Federal Secretary's Ballot is on, 
it will be fully understood if you cannot attend this meeting'). The 
best interpretation of why Fitzgibbon stood seems to be: he had been
considering standing and was convinced to do so by advance undertakings 
of ALP tacit support and concrete assistance to make up for his lack of 
a 'machine' to match those of the Communists and Industrial Groups. The 
withdrawal of the Grouper, Alford,provided further encouragement (note 
124 below): A.L.P. News, 15 October 1961, 3; W.R. Colbourne, interview;
Mulvihill to Fitzgibbon, 26 July 1961, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/41/83/221; 
C.T. Oliver, interview; C.T. Oliver, note on sheets of paper containing 
drafts of FX motion, inserted in Minute book, FX 21-24 August 1961, Fed. 
Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/150; SMH, 17 August, 18 November 1961 
(Fitzgibbon interview, quoted).
118 A.L.P. News, 15 September 1961, 3. See also: Age, SMH, 17 August
1961, which have immaterial differences in wording. Colbourne became 
President in July 1961 (note 110 above). Note also the discussion at the 
meeting of the Commonwealth Labor Advisory Council (representatives of 
FX, FPLP and Australian Council of Trade Unions) on 18 August: Colbourne
reported to the Executive that the ACTU officers (Monk, Souter) asked 
about the effect of the Fitzgibbon candidacy on affiliates. The CLAC 
Minutes record: 'It was generally felt that there should be an A.L.P. 
candidate in the ballot. Party Leaders there had expressed support for 
an A.L.P. candidate. The A.C.T.U. officers were in agreement with the 
running of a candidate' (CLAC 18 August 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/ 
56/148-9).
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Executive faced considerable constraints. The removal in 1955 of the
Industrial Groups' party endorsement had ended what many unionists saw
as a denial of the Labor tradition of non-interference in the affairs
of unions. Calwell and Colbourne had made clear their positions.
Calwell's statement sought votes from Australians who responded to
rhetoric about alien philosophies and Communist strangleholds. He
disguised his enthusiasm hardly at all. Colbourne came from a Branch
which had been relatively severe on unity tickets and correspondingly
119willing to support ALP candidates in union elections. But the Federal 
Executive included representatives of five other Branches with differing 
views about the merits and the importance of the issue of Labor-Communist 
relations in the unions. Thus a decision emerged only after lengthy 
discussion. The President, Colbourne, his two Vice Presidents, Dunstan 
(South Australia) and R.H. Lacey (Tasmania), and Oliver supported a 
formulation which declared the duty of all ALP members in unions to 
support competent, Labor-supporting candidates in union elections, welcomed 
the candidacy of Fitzgibbon by name and expected all ALP members 'to 
support efforts to break the quarter-century grip of the Communist Party
119The help the NSW Branch was to supply Fitzgibbon was only 'the best 
publicised example' of such support (J.A. Mulvihill, interview). (This 
was distinct from the widespread phenomenon of tickets which claimed to 
to be ALP-s.upported but lacked even tacit support. Many of these tickets 
did comprise solely ALP members and some were successful, even in 
Victoria). Tacit NSWCE support for tickets always existed (as it did in 
any other State) but material support, such as the supply of names of ALP 
members in unions, would have been more judiciously provided, given the 
Federal prohibition of endorsements. The NSWCE's public stance was that 
while union candidates could make 'passing reference' to their ALP 
membership they must not imply they had party endorsement. No one had 
exclusive right to the ALP name: Mulvihill to E.S. Ryan, Mt. Kembla,
24 October 1956, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/11/24/373 (other similar letters 
in later years) . Both the 1959 and 1961 Federal Conferences discharged 
Queensland items which would have allowed official ALP tickets, although 
no specific endorsement procedure was set out in either item (ALP, 
Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1959, 48; 1961, 39).
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on that position’. This motion resembled closely Calwell’s sentiments
and words but it was criticised by Nicholls (South Australia) and
Miley (Tasmania) for the specific reference to Fitzgibbon. The party
might be embarrassed, they reasoned, if another ALP member should
nominate. Brebner and Stout opposed the motion, and Brebner asked
Colbourne, the Chairman, to rule that the motion and a Nicholls-Miley
amendment which merely omitted Fitzgibbon's name were against the 1959
Conference decision - or that part of it which referred to interference 
120with unions. Colbourne, who had left the chair earlier to support
the original motion, refused Brebner's request. Chamberlain then spoke,
to argue that ’any proposition approved by the Executive should only
contain reference to a general principle'. He moved an amendment to
omit both the reference to Fitzgibbon and any expression of pleasure
connected with the WWF election, leaving only a declaration of the duty
121of ALP unionists to elect competent, ALP-supporting officers.
Even if both the Queenslanders, Keeffe and Whiteside, had supported
the original motion it would have received only six votes. None of the
122three amendments was likely to receive a majority. While, on this 
occasion, the South Australian and Tasmanian delegations were both split, 
the Executive was just as delicately balanced on the Fitzgibbon question 
as it was to be on unity tickets three days later. In the earlier case, 
too, a unanimous decision emerged after informal discussion. The 
resolution agreed to include the general declaration Chamberlain had
120For this resolution, see above pp. 97-9. For the FX debate: Age,
22 August 1961; FX 21-24 August 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/ 
150-1; SMH, 22 August 1961.
121This declaration also had been expressed in slightly different words 
in another part of the 1959 Conference resolution.
122The other amendment (Dowding-Brebner) fell between those of Nicholls 
and Chamberlain, making the general declaration but authorising the 
officers 'to make an appropriate statement' after nominations closed. 
Chamberlain spoke against this (and against the motion and the Nicholls 
amendment) so the WA delegation also was divided.
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sought but gained the support of those who had favoured the original,
'Calwell-line’ motion by endorsing ’the statements of the Federal
Parliamentary Leader and the Federal President on this issue'. Victorian
feelings were smoothed by leaving out the anti-Communist rhetoric and by
a reference to 'the two extreme groups' - Communists and Groupers -
which ALP unionists fought. The possibility of another ALP candidate
was overcome by leaving out Fitzgibbon's name and, indeed, any specific
reference to the presence of ALP candidates in the election. Each
Executive member contributed to producing the resolution; each saw
something in it which took account of his views or at least nothing that
condemned his practices. Above all, by endorsing the remarks of Calwell
and Colbourne welcoming the candidacy of an individual, the resolution
allowed the party - ostensibly through individual members rather than
as a body - to apply Calwell's words: 'Anything I can do to help
[Fitzgibbon], and any influence I can exercise in support of his
123candidature, will be freely done and willingly given'.
123A.L.P. News, 15 September 1961, 3. Help given by ALP members included 
advice on campaign literature, research assistance, writing of pamphlets 
and of letters commending Fitzgibbon, collection of funds, individual 
donations and grass roots organisation on the wharves. Those who helped 
included Mulvihill, Colbourne, A. Scholes (publicity officer, NSW ALP), 
Ward and Whitlam. Most members of Federal Caucus contributed donations: 
Bulletin, 25 November 1961; W.R. Colbourne, interview; correspondence 
and other material including Colbourne to Fitzgibbon, 4 September 1961, 
Fitzgibbon to Mulvihill (n.d., received 30 August 1961), Mulvihill to 
Fitzgibbon, 22, 24 August, 5, 6 September, 23 October 1961, NSW Rec., ML 
MSS 2083/41/83/203-17; 373/949; 374/954; J.A. Mulvihill, C.T. Oliver,
interviews; SMH, 18 August, 1 September 1961; F.E. Stewart, interview. 
One observer described the effort as 'the most open official entry of 
the Australian Labor Party into a union election since the hey-day of the 
Industrial Group movement': R.M. Martin, 'Australian Trade Unionism,
1961', Journal of Industrial Relations, 4 (April 1962), 62. Emboldened 
by it, Whitlam publicly urged ALP members in the Boilermakers' Union to 
vote for the ALP candidate and Calwell congratulated L. Short on his 
defeat of Communist opponents in the Ironworkers' Association: Martin,
'Australian Trade Unionism, 1961', 63.
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Nevertheless, while the ALP effort was designed to prove Labor's
anti-Communism it also lessened the pressure for stronger enforcement
of the unity ticket ban. Perhaps, without the compensations of
Fitzgibbon, Calwell might have agreed with his Caucus colleagues about
Victoria. Perhaps, without the opportunity to provide Calwell and the
politicians with an alternative strategy, Chamberlain might have deserted
the Victorians and cast the vital seventh vote for intervention.
Fitzgibbon's candidacy had effects far beyond the Waterside Workers'
Federation. It galvanised some of Labor's decisionmakers to become part
of 'an alliance of men of all shades of political and religious opinion',
including Fitzgibbon campaign committees of ALP rank and file members and
supporters in the WWF, Industrial Groupers and press editorialists, 'who
12 A-for whatever mixed reasons' wanted Fitzgibbon elected. It helped other
124The quotation is from Bulletin, 25 November 1961. The WWF Industrial 
Group and the DLP claimed credit for Fitzgibbon's win. The Grouper 
candidate in the election in progress when Healy died, V. Alford, 
offered to withdraw from the new ballot if the ALP supported a genuinely 
anti-Communist candidate. When Alford withdrew after the FX meeting he 
set his machine to work unobtrusively for Fitzgibbon. Oliver remembers 
that the ALP had 'good relations' with Alford: Age, 21 July 1961;
Bulletin, 25 November 1961; C.T. Oliver, interview; SMH, 21 August, 24,
27 November 1961. Some ALP members were less enthusiastic. Nine Federal 
politicians, T. Uren, E. Ward, L. Haylen, A. James, F. Crean, H. Mclvor,
C. Cameron, L. Johnson and J. Cairns, were reported to have refused to 
contribute to a collection sponsored by Calwell, though Ward, at least, 
agreed to write to a WWF contact in Tasmania in support of Fitzgibbon 
(note 123 above). An obscure ALP branch member nominated against 
Fitzgibbon, underlining (probably intentionally) the problems of party 
support for one candidate, to which critics of the Fitzgibbon 'tacit 
support' alluded. Militant unions protested at ALP 'interference' and 
the VCE felt obliged to investigate the statements of three leading WWF 
members of the ALP who said they would support the Communist Nelson 
rather than Fitzgibbon. (The explanations of the three, members of the 
unity ticket executive of the Melbourne WWF, were accepted): Correspondence
and other material complaining at ALP interference, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 
4985/12/F28 Unity Tickets; SMH, 22, 26 August, 1, 16 September 1961; 
Socialist and Industrial Labor, November 1961, 3; VCE 1, 15 September 
1961, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8740.
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Labor decisionmakers, especially in Victoria, to breathe rather more 
easily - for a time at least.
Conclusions and Further Hypotheses
One could tell another story about unity tickets after the 1961 
125Federal election. The story would show how the Victorian Federal
Executive delegates, aware of that body's attitude to unity tickets as
an election issue in 1961, tried to persuade the VCE to stronger
enforcement early in 1962 and of how the Federal Executive, while not
satisfied entirely with Victoria's response, gave the Branch another
chance. It would show that, just as a change in the attitude of the
South Australian Branch had brought the Federal Executive close to
intervention in Victoria in 1961, a change in the composition of the
Tasmanian delegation to the Executive in July 1962 helped prevent
126intervention in that year and after. It would show the development, 
out of the relatively divided VCE of the late 1950s, of a body much more 
united against unity ticket enforcement but which, at the same time, 
provided token enforcement of Federal policy by accepting explanations 
claiming non-consent. The story would show that complaints about unity 
tickets in Victoria were combined with charges of unrepresentativeness, 
administrative incompetence, declining funds and membership, lack of 
interest in winning elections and sheer bloody-mindedness.
The next four paragraphs are based on Minutes, party records, interviews 
with participants and contemporary accounts. They are meant as no more 
than the most general description. Excessive detail would disturb the 
structure of the thesis as a whole.
126See chapter 1, p.22, above. The arrival of V. Williams was reflected 
immediately in the defeat of Colbourne by Keeffe for the Federal 
Presidency. The vote was 7-5.
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Unity tickets with Communists continued to help ensure that the
control of a few important trade unions remained out of the hands of the
Industrial Groups and, later, of moderate, 'responsible* 1 rather than
127militant teams of ALP-supporting unionists. Unity tickets with 
Communists expressed the commonality of industrial and, to some extent, 
of political views, regardless of party loyalties, in one wing of the 
ALP's affiliated unions. ALP men often found themselves 'in the same
places as communists on some occasions, doing the same things for the
, , 128 same ends .
A study of unity tickets in the years after 1961 would show also 
that their importance for the party declined. Given what we have said 
about attitudes to enforcement within the Victorian Branch, this was not 
because unity tickets were stamped out. There were only six expulsions 
for unity tickets in Victoria from 1961 to 1965 and in five of these 
cases the expelled men had refused to deny consent, ensuring their 
automatic punishment. The sixth, W. O'Brien of the ARU, was expelled 
reluctantly by the VCE in 1963, two years after the charge was first laid 
Unity tickets in the ARU continued unabated and O'Brien continued to 
stand on them after his readmission to the ALP. Unity tickets in the 
Waterside Workers' Federation were similarly unaffected by having to 
comply at each election with the technicalities of the non-consent 
clause. 'Enforcement' could have provided little more than a passing 
irritation in these circumstances. While some people interviewed 
remember union unrest over the unity ticket policy it is difficult to 
see how this could have arisen other than from annoyance at this
127I use the concept of 'responsibility' contained in D.W. Rawson, 
Politics and "Responsibility" in Australian Trade Unions', AJPH, 4 
(November 1958), 224-43.
1 o o
J.F. Cairns, 'Defending Liberties', Dissent, 13 (Spring 1964), 34.
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irritation, coupled with a genuine regard for the principle of non-
interference in unions. Since the VCE/supported this principle and
included members of unions with unity ticket executives, the irritations
were likely to be slight and the responses from unions proportionate.
The lingering possibility of a breakaway Industrial Labor Party based on
the union group which controlled the VCE may have restrained the Federal
party and Federal politicians from bearing too heavily on Victoria but
adverse reaction from Victorian unions to VCE enforcement seems unlikely
129to have been a reason for the decline of the issue within the party.
These comments are not meant critically. The unity ticket ban was 
based on a contradiction. Since the distinction between ’unionist as 
unionist' and ’unionist as ALP member' was unreal and since the Federal 
party rejected the 'political collusion' interpretation, reconciling the 
potentially incompatible principles of anti-Communism and non­
interference in unions rested on the enforcement of the policy according 
to the lights of the State Branch concerned. By making enforcement a 
State matter the party brought upon itself its problems with unity 
tickets in Victoria. But it could not have been otherwise in the Federal 
bodies of the 1950s and 1960s where no Branch, whether plagued by unity 
tickets or not, wished to allow the Federal party, represented by members 
from other States, to act as 'first enforcer', to be able to interfere 
in the most intimate of State Branch affairs, the relationship between 
the party and its affiliated unions. Having left enforcement to the 
States, the Federal party and Federal politicians could hardly complain 
if the ban was enforced in six different ways.
129In New South Wales, where enforcement was stricter, unions protested 
more often. But party records only disclose one case of a union, the 
Victorian Branch of the Tramways union, withholding affiliation fees in 
protest at unity ticket enforcement. Three Tramwaymen were automatically 
expelled late in 1964 when they refused to deny consent. The union 
delayed payment for four months.
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Moreover, since most Labor decisionmakers, Federal and State,
recognised the inherent difficulties of the policy, State enforcement
and Federal pressure to enforce greatly depended on pressure from
outside the party, where belief in anti-Communism far outweighed belief
in the independence of unions. Probably the main reason for the decline
of the unity ticket issue through the 1960s was the reduction of this
pressure. One of the most committed anti-Communists within the party
complained to the author that 'anti-Communism has gone out of fashion
in Australia'. Others have traced through the 1960s the loosening of
Cold War tensions, the growth of societal divisions over the Vietnam
War, the lessening tendency to regard Communists as a danger to national
security - and therefore a reduced inclination to condemn those who
130associated with them - or as alien to Australia. Further, the 
splintering of the Communist Party of Australia into two, three and more 
parties not only made union factional structures more fluid, allowing 
the election of purely ALP teams in some cases, but also made internal 
bickering rather than disciplined solidarity synonymous with Australian 
Communism. The connections of Labor men in a minority of unions with 
fragments of a divided movement probably seemed less dangerous than when 
Communism had seemed monolithic.
By the mid 1960s then, to the extent that issues connected with 
Communism had been central to Australian politics, they were giving place 
to those of foreign and defence policy, education, national development 
and social welfare. Labor's concern with union elections by no means
130 'Even Communist unionists were too obviously within a nationalist 
radical tradition: there were too many of them, and they were too open
about their views, to appear genuinely subversive ... and yet not 
enough of them to appear really threatening' : Dennis Altman, 'Australia 
and Vietnam: Some Preliminary Speculations', AQ, 42, 2 (June 1970), 61.
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died, but it was expressed, in New South Wales, in a continuation of the
'Fitzgibbon election’ technique of support for favoured ALP candidates
in union elections and, more generally, by an expansion of the old
practice of ALP members and supporters in unions forming their own
tickets to carry out the 1961 Federal Executive injunction 'to elect
competent officers in their unions loyal to the principles and policies 
131of the ALP'. The New South Wales Branch tried unsuccessfully in 1964 
and 1965 to introduce ALP 'certification' on request of unionists who 
wished to be identified as party members when contesting union elections. 
This idea would have produced the same effect as had the official 
recognition of the Industrial Groups in the 1940s - ALP-endorsed 
candidates in union elections - and thus was rejected by the Federal 
party. The unity ticket policy was a compromise whose viability depended 
on flexibility of enforcement. Perhaps the best compromise between anti­
communism and the independence of affiliated trade unions always had been 
to leave the election of Labor supporting union executives to committed 
party members in the unions. But parties subject to the complex of 
influences that affected the ALP of the 1950s often do not see matters 
with the clarity of hindsight.
We began this chapter with thirteen hypotheses. Which of them have 
been supported by our study of critical decisions regarding unity tickets 
in the years 1955 to 1961? By definition, the unity ticket problem 
concerns relationships with affiliated trade unions (HYPOTHESIS VI). Yet, 
unions influenced unity ticket decisions mainly through the presence of
131And earlier, in different forms, in the Federal Executive decisions of 
June and August 1958 and the Federal Conference decision of May 1959, 
which all, in turn, found their inspiration in the Hobart Conference's 
leaving anti-Communist industrial activity in unions to 'the sole 
determination of the members of the union concerned'.
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unionists in the controlling groups of State Branches. In Victoria,
where the bulk of unions opposed the unity ticket policy, this was
reflected in the approach of the VCE, with politicians like Kennelly
and Clarey (but not Holt) in the earlier period and Federal Executive
delegates like Brebner and Wyndham in the later period providing
moderating influences. To the self-interest or principle of the unionists
they added pragmatism based on electoral considerations or on recognition
of an occasional dangerous mood on the Federal Executive, which should be
appeased by some effort at enforcement. In New South Wales, on the other
hand, the dominant unions were less affected directly by enforcement,
being themselves free of unity ticket executives. But the knowledge that
some of the minority Steering Committee unions might have disaffiliated
may have tempered the actions of the New South Wales Executive. Generally,
then, the goals of affiliated unions regarding unity ticket policy were
132reflected in the approaches of the State Branches.
By definition, also, the unity ticket issue concerned the ALP’s
relationship with Communists (HYPOTHESIS VIII). Some critics saw this,
indeed, as the gist of the issue: Communist officials in affiliated
unions could influence union delegates to ALP Conferences to support
Communist policies. (This possibility did not depend on unity tickets,
of course, since it was a function of affiliated unions largely comprising
people who were not individual members of the party.) Whether this
133happened has been debated. Communist officials, like militant union
CLctivTW
officials who were members of the ALP, certainly protested about/unity
132This did not prevent unions reinforcing the point. See Victorian 
Conference agenda items opposing interference in union affairs e.g. 
Seamen, Meatworkers and Builders’ Laborers in 1961; Blacksmiths, ARU, 
Plumbers and Painters in 1965.
133See chapter 1, notes 90, 91.
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tickets, but without evidence there seems no reason to attribute these
protests solely to support for Communist united front tactics rather
than to militancy, anti-Grouperism and a belief in the independence of
unions from political interference. As long as the ALP accepted
Communists as members of affiliated unions it institutionalised the
possibility of influence by Communists on unity ticket policy just as
on other decisions. But union militancy would have existed regardless
134of the presence of Communists in affiliated unions.
HYPOTHESES VI and VIII are easily confirmed. Parts of the political 
system and developments in the environment also influenced critical 
decisions concerning unity tickets. The Liberal Federal Government and 
its backbenchers raised instances of unity tickets, especially at 
election times (HYPOTHESIS XIII). Clerics like Fox and Mannix argued 
that good Catholics could not support a party which consorted with 
Communists. We have observed the efforts of the DLP and the Industrial 
Groups to publicise unity tickets. There is ample evidence of the 
influence of Labor’s relations with these various manifestations of the 
Catholic role in politics (HYPOTHESES IX, X). We could also detect in 
relevant contributions to Dissent on the one side and Outlook and 
Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor News Letter on the other, some limited scope 
for our HYPOTHESIS XI, concerning the influence of 'friendly advisers'. 
Fitzpatrick had a number of subscribers among Labor decisionmakers.
135Perhaps his opposition to interference with unions influenced them.
For isolated discussions of the possibility of disaffiliating unions 
with Communist officials see: Arthur Cartwright, 'United We Tumble',
Dissent, 15 (Spring 1965), 20; Labor Comment, December 1966, 5;
E.G. Whitlam, 'Trade Unionists and Politics', Henry Mayer, ed., Australian 
Politics: A Reader, Melbourne, 1967, 257-9. The last was a speech 
given at Newcastle, June 1965. It is unclear from the text whether 
Whitlam actually advocated disaffiliation.
135For Fitzpatrick, see chapter 1, note 108 above and for his views on 
unity tickets: Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor News Letter, July 1959, 4-6;
September 1959, 4-5.
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We have suggested the Cold War thaw reduced the importance of the unity 
ticket issue. At its height it made Australians receptive to anti­
communist 'scares'. Perhaps, also, the growing material prosperity of 
Australians made them oppose Communists - and their alleged associates - 
because they threatened private property. The hypothesis about the 
influence of the environment and of changes in it should not be ignored 
(HYPOTHESIS VII). Finally, the media, especially the metropolitan press, 
radio and television, carried details of unity tickets and of criticism 
of them. When Labor politicians feared the electoral effects of unity 
tickets they really feared the effect of the media portrayal of them.
Most voters did not read editorials or political commentaries, which gave 
a generally unfavourable view of unity tickets, but these unfavourable 
opinions were read by Labor decisionmakers who, in the absence of 
significant extra-party, non-union support for the concept of independent 
trade unions, may have been made over-conscious of the need to appear 
anti-Communist. The press opposition to unity tickets never approached 
in intensity its opposition to, say, the alleged socialist tendencies of 
the Chifley Government but it served to reinforce a view of 'what the 
voter would bear' concerning Labor's relations with Communists. To that 
extent, HYPOTHESIS XII is supported.
George Crawford, VCE member, attributed the demands on the Victorian 
Branch for enforcement to 'pressure from a coalition of the DLP and the 
Groupers, politicians - who took notice of them out of considerations of 
political expediency - and the Victorian Right'. His colleague, Bill 
Brown, insisted unity tickets were 'a clever political gimmick "dreamed
136For some press opinions on unity tickets: Age, 19 October 1959,
22 March, 28 August 1961; SMH, 31 July, 2, 4 August 1958, 31 August 1959, 
29 August 1961. The articles commonly appeared when a Labor body was 
meeting to discuss the issue. They were less common in papers outside 
Melbourne and Sydney. On the press and Chifley, see David Stephens, 
Political Theory, History and the Australian Labor Governments, 1941-49, 
unpublished MA thesis, Monash University, 1974, 443-50, 490-2.
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up" by enemies of the ALP'. Another former ALP union militant told the
author that ’irrespective of what [Labor politicians] thought about
people who were on unity tickets they should have told the newspapers
137and the rest to mind their own business'. Nevertheless, some Labor
politicians did react. Evatt possibly saw suppression of unity tickets
as his last hope of electoral success. Some Federal Caucus members,
like Frank Stewart ('unity tickets - let's say Communism') saw unity
tickets as an expression of an alien philosophy which they genuinely
abhorred and staunchly opposed. Others, like Frank Crean, broadly
agreed with the views at the beginning of this paragraph or at least
denied unity tickets were an important issue. Still others, like
Kennelly, could see both sides of the question but went where the
138electoral 'numbers' seemed to be. The application of our HYPOTHESIS 
III, on the influence of the conflict between 'exclusive' and 'inclusive' 
approaches, is complicated because both anti-Communism, the motivating 
force of the pro-enforcement politicians, and union independence, could 
be seen as party principles. (Exclusivists, remember, set much store on 
party principles.) But many of the pro-enforcers pursued anti-Communisra 
for pragmatic rather than principled reasons, and their main argument 
was the inclusivist one that enforcement would win votes.
HYPOTHESIS I suggested that decisionmakers will be influenced by the 
goals of the controllers of State Branches. Since Federal unity ticket 
policy emerged from Federal Executive and Conference, which comprised 
delegates of these Branches, this hypothesis clearly is relevant. But
137W.W.C. Brown, G. Crawford, interviews; Fact, 8 February 1965. Similar 
remarks were made by J.D. Garland and J.B. Keeffe in interviews. Note 
also the cartoon, Labor, 22 June 1959, where 'Trade Unions' and 'ALP 
Branches' march together down 'path of principle', avoiding that of 
'political expediency' while dogs of 'DLP', 'Lib. Party' and 'Melb.
Herald' bark.
138F. Crean, P.J. Kennelly, F.E. Stewart, interviews.
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there are more specific applications. For instance, Calwell’s approach
to unity tickets may have been influenced by his reliance for preselection
on, and his need for support from the Victorian Branch. Then, we saw
the importance to the decision of August 1961 of the modification of
the goals of the South Australian Branch. Thirdly, the New South Wales
delegates throughout reflected the unfavourable view of unity tickets
held by the majority of the NSWCE. Indeed, divisions on the Federal
Executive over unity tickets tended to form around New South Wales on
the one side and Victoria on the other, although delegates from other
States, like Chamberlain and Dunstan, were crucial also. Decisions were
also influenced by the personalities and personal relationships of
delegates (HYPOTHESIS II). We have dwelt on the importance to the 1959
Conference decision of the relationship between Chamberlain and Evatt
and to the 1961 Executive decision of the personality of Calwell.
Perhaps also the enmity between Chamberlain and Colbourne, established
during the Split, may have influenced their approaches to an issue
intricately connected with that event. Kennelly’s VCE contacts with
Brebner and Stout may have affected his attitude. He may have seen
action against unity tickets and the VCE as a way of building a new
139Victorian Branch in which his own influence would be rejuvenated.
139Incidentally, in Kennelly’s final year on the VCE, his private 
secretary, P. Cullen, stood for the Branch Secretaryship. This may have 
been an attempt by Kennelly to extend his influence. Cullen, for his 
part, did not stand with this intention. He also remembers that 
Kennelly’s ill-health in 1960 influenced his departure from the VCE 
(P. Cullen, interview). The voting (Wyndham twelve, R. Balcombe, 
incumbent Assistant Secretary, six, Cullen five) also shows the extent 
of divisions on the VCE at the time. Wyndham was the choice of McNolty, 
Stout and the controlling group, but Balcombe, who became a supporter of 
the anti-VCE group later in the 1960s, and Cullen polled well: VCE
21 October 1960, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA 
mf G8740.
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HYPOTHESIS IV saw the perceived need to keep the coalition together 
as a possible influence on decisionmakers. We have doubted the 
likelihood of a party split over unity ticket enforcement, although we 
have noted evidence of threats to set up an Industrial Labor Party.
(There seems to have been no real suggestion of splits or union 
disaffiliations among those who believed the party was too lenient.
Such threats may have influenced the Federal Executive not to force 
State Branches into stronger enforcement but the atmosphere of many 
of the party discussions and the attacks on the Industrial Groups 
and other external forces trying to influence party policy suggest 
that a desire not to bow too readily to 'anti-Labor' influences was just 
as salient. To the extent that HYPOTHESIS IV applied, however, it helped 
produce compromise decisions which made concessions alike to those who 
opposed interference in unions and even threatened to disaffiliate or 
form a splinter party and those who wanted the party to prove its anti­
communism.
The search for compromise (HYPOTHESIS V) is shown, for example, in 
the alternative formulations of one critical decision concerning unity 
tickets, the Federal Executive resolution of August 1958. Evatt had 
failed to get stern action against unity ticketers but in deference to 
the approaching Federal election, the Victorian and South Australian 
delegates did not oppose the paragraph informing the Branches ’that it 
is imperative for them to guard the decision of 1957 Conference on unity 
tickets with the utmost vigilance'. The mere rhetoric of strong 
enforcement was unobjectionable. Debate focussed instead on the party's
One commentator claimed at one stage that the AWU was threatening 
to disaffiliate in States which winked at unity tickets (SMH, 12 April 
1961).
150
general attitude to ALP candidates in unions. The relevant parts of 
each formulation are set out in the table:
TABLE 2.1 Contending Formulations, August 1958: ALP and Affiliated
Unions
Officers' recommendation (Chamberlain, Schmella,
Toohey, Colbourne): this Executive calls upon ALP
members in the Unions concerned to stand as ALP 
candidates in complete opposition to the forces of 
the extreme left and the extreme right.
Amendment I (Davis [Vic.] - Lacey [Tas.]): we
call upon the traditional Labor Party support in 
the unions to do everything possible to preserve 
the integrity of the ALP against the continuing 
attacks from all Anti-Labor forces.
Amendment II (Webb [WA] - Stout [Vic.]): delete
the whole paragraph. (This amendment was carried 
and the motion stood without the paragraph).
Amendment III (Campbell [NSW]): this Executive ... 
calls upon ALP members in Unions to resist the 
forces of the extreme left and extreme right and 
in Union Elections to stand independently of 
members of all other political Parties. (This was 
ruled out of order).
Amendment IV (Colbourne [NSW] - Dittmer [Q1d]): 
this Executive calls upon ALP members to preserve 
the integrity of the ALP against continued 
attacks from all Anti-Labor forces. (This was 
carried as an amendment and then reinserted in 
the motion which was then carried as a whole.141
These clauses can be broken down into three questions and answers
provided as follows:
TABLE 2.2 Analysis of Contending Formulations
Rec'dn I II Ill IV (successful)
Who is called 
upon?
ALP
members
trad. ALP 
support
n . a. ALP
members
ALP
members
To do what? stand as 
ALP
candidates
preserve
ALP
integrity
n . a .
stand
independ­
ently
preserve
ALP
integrity
Against whom? extreme 
left and 
right
all Anti-
Labor
forces
n . a .
extreme 
left and 
right
all Anti-
Labor
forces
141FX 11-14 August 1958, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/123/55.
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Note, first, that Amendment II can be regarded as opposition to any
statement on the subject, on the grounds that the party should not
interfere at all in unions. Secondly, Amendment III was effectively the
same as the original recommendation, since there is no real difference
between standing ’as ALP candidates’ and 'independently'. Since
Amendment II had deleted the original recommendation Amendment III was
ruled out of order. Thus, thirdly, the alternative answers to the first
question were 'ALP members' or 'traditional ALP support'. The latter
answer was unsatisfactory to some since it could have included Communists
who allied with Labor members on unity tickets and supported affiliation
with the ALP. Coupled with Amendment I's equally vague second answer it
may have seemed to facilitate unity tickets provided unions continued to
support Labor. Fourthly, however, the alternative answer - 'ALP
candidates' - seemed too much like the condemned practices of the
Industrial Groups. Not for three years would the Executive give even
142tacit support to an ALP member in a union election. Fifthly, the 
alternative answers to the final question, 'extreme left and right' and 
'all anti-Labor forces' were not very different except that one was more 
comprehensive. Sixthly, since there is no real choice between the first 
pair of answers if the unity ticket policy is to be preserved, nor 
between the second pair if the party is not to seem to emulate the 
Groups, and since the third pair are semantically virtually interchange­
able, the fourth amendment succeeds. It is a reasonable assumption that 
those who opposed unity tickets settled for a resolution which 'called 
upon' ALP members only and were also prepared to make the concession of 
leaving out 'ALP candidates', while those who hated the methods of the 
Groups agreed to the words 'preserve ALP integrity' while foregoing an
See above pp.133-9 regarding the 'Fitzgibbon election'.
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appeal to the type of ’traditional Labor Party support' which joined in
unity tickets against the Groups.
Other decisions could be analysed in a similar way. The December
1960 Executive resolution on the question of negotiations with the DLP,
far from being a simple endorsement of Chamberlain’s rejection of the
approach, as the press suggested, emerged from a lengthy debate involving
143a motion, five amendments and an adjournment for lobbying. The Minutes
of the August 1961 Federal Executive meeting show that the unanimous
resolution concerning the WWF election emerged out of a motion and three
amendments. The unity ticket motion at the same meeting was passed
without amendment but emerged out of informal negotiations where other
delegates were seeking support for Federal action against Victoria. Both
144sides made concessions. Thirdly, in July 1962, when the Federal
Executive considered the Victorian investigations of the ARU elections,
harsh and moderate formulations were withdrawn in favour of one
expressing relatively mild disquiet at the actions of Brebner but
welcoming Victorian undertakings to adhere to unity ticket policy in 
145future. In each case, the differences between alternative formulations
can be analysed and reasons suggested. This is no mere semantic exercise,
for a Branch's approach to crucial phrases reflected its goals regarding
the issue. Labor, wrote Graham Freudenberg, was 'a Party which had
become obsessed with the nuances of the wording of policy declarations,
a Party which had conceived a passion for textual analysis worthy of
146mediaeval scholars’. An understandable obsession when the turn of a
See above note 80.
144See above pp. 131-3.
145FX 2-5 July 1962, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/238.
146Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 27-8. Note also: ’These people,
some of them come along to Conferences and don't know the meanings of 
words. They don’t understand semantics' (C.R. Cameron, interview); 
'There is an old saying that I'the ALP is a resolutionary movement, not 
a revolutionary movement"’ (Lloyd Ross, interview).
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word could align a Federal resolution with a State's dearest goals or
make it unacceptable, could ensure or avoid a stalemate. Nuances helped
build compromise decisions. From the beginning in 1956-57, through the
important reaffirmation of 1959 to a further reaffirmation at the Federal
Conference in 1965, via all the decisions in between, tinkering with
words helped refine the terms of the basic compromise between the
147independence of unions and opposition to Communism.
It is relatively simple to show that a decision is a compromise,
that it is less than what any single sub-coalition would have liked. It
is more difficult to show how the decision emerged. Writers in the field
of public policy have recognised this problem. 'A policy', writes Charles
Lindblom?'is sometimes the outcome of a political compromise among policy
makers' but the whole process is a complex and uncertain one. 'Somehow
a complex of forces that we call "policy making", all taken together,
148produces effects called "policies"'. Graham Allison recognises that
the aim is to discover 'who did what to whom that yielded the action in
question', that enabled collective decisions to emerge out of 'the
pulling and hauling that is politics'. The analyst tries to identify
'not simply the reasons that support a course of action, or the routines
of organizations that enact an alternative, but the power and skill' of 
149decisionmakers. We have discussed the arguments for and against 
alternative approaches to unity tickets. We have recognised structural 
characteristics of the ALP such as federalism and the division between, 
and respective formal powers of politicians and party office holders.
147For the 1965 resolution, see below p.160.
148Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 
1968, 4. For present purposes, 'policy making' and 'decision making' may 
be taken as synonymous.
149Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision, Boston, 1971, 7, 145.
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We have discussed the role of individual decisionmakers. But how did 
this combination of factors produce decisions?
Where power in an organisation is diffused, Lindblom and Allison 
agree, decisions tend to emerge from a process of ’bargaining’. All 
organisations, by definition, are coalitions comprising sub-coalitions 
whose goals conflict. Where it is not possible for one sub-coalition to 
have the whole coalition adopt, by fiat or naked force, the goals of the 
sub-coalition, there must be bargaining to arrive at a decision which is 
a compromise between sub-coalitional goals, 'a mixture of conflicting 
preferences and unequal power ... distinct from what any person or group 
intended’. Lindblom attempts both to classify types of bargaining or 
’mutual adjustment’, as he calls it, and to expound the virtues of one 
special type. Superficially, it seems possible to lump many examples of 
unity ticket decisionmaking under what Lindblom calls 'exchange of 
threats and promises', which is almost a ’lay’ definition of bargaining.“^  
'Unless you undertake to enforce the unity ticket policy', Chamberlain 
might have said to Brebner in August 1961, 'I shall vote for intervention 
in Victoria'. 'If you want us to make a show of enforcing that 
disagreeable policy', Brebner might have retorted, 'you can't expect us 
to enthusiastically support Fitzgibbon'. The New South Wales Branch may 
have said to the Federal Executive, 'unless you protect Labor's 
relationship with the unions by effectively banning unity tickets we 
shall seek the same end by running ALP candidates'.
This type of bargaining and the others which Lindblom lists are 
subsumed, in a way which he does not appear to recognise, by his concept 
of 'mutual adjustment by partisan analysis' or 'partisan mutual
"'‘"^Allison, Essence of Decision, 145.
'^“''Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, 96.
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adjustment'. Partisan mutual adjustment is decisionmakers (policy­
makers) simultaneously trying to persuade each other that ’a policy [one]
desires can serve the values of [the] policy maker to whom the persuasion 
152is directed’. Since it tries to identify one decision or policy with
differing values it is not frustrated by the variations in goals which
occur in all organisations. Decisionmakers seek not the 'best' policy
for achieving a unitary set of goals, but only a policy acceptable to all
decisionmakers. This process, settling for an acceptable or satisfactory,
rather than a perfect decision, had been christened 'satisficing' by the
153earlier writers, March and Simon. The total process of partisan mutual
adjustment, as the name implies, involves continual 'adjustment' of
goals to decisions. Decisionmakers match ends to means, asking questions
like 'is it worth it?' and 'can we (they, you) accept this or are
concessions required (goals needing to be foregone)?' and 'what will be
the costs of this policy in terms of these conflicting goals?' Partisan
mutual adjustment is an overarching concept because it is directed
towards a satisficing decision. It continually has in mind the need to
find something acceptable to the participants. It continues until a
formula is found which can become, by means of the formal processes of
154the organisation, the decision which bears the organisation's name.
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Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, 33.
James G. March & Herbert A. Simon, Organizations, New York & London, 
1958, 139-41; Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man, New York & London, 1957, 
204-5.
^~^The phrase 'formal processes' inspires the question: Is there any
difference between a decision that is supported by a majority (all that 
is required formally) and a unanimous decision? Unanimity could occur 
in a number of ways. First, all concerned might be totally 'of one mind' 
(cf. the Latin derivation) in support of a decision without needing to 
discuss its wording. Second, delegates might be asked 'is that 
unanimous?' as distinct from 'nem. con.' (no one opposing) because of a 
special need to show a united front. Third, where opponents of the 
majority formulation are persuaded, for the same reasons of unity, to 
give formal support rather than vote against when they have no chance of
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The other types of bargaining or mutual adjustment which Lindblom 
summarises are better seen as techniques or tactics to serve the basic 
aim of achieving a compromise decision.
There is a link between our HYPOTHESIS V , that decisionmakers will 
seek compromise between the goals of sub-coalitions; and the concept of 
partisan mutual adjustment. Partisan mutual adjustment describes the 
methods or techniques of searching for a compromise decision, a decision 
that satisfices participants because it achieves at least some of their 
goals. Individuals and sub-coalitions know their sets of goals conflict 
with those of other individuals and sub-coalitions in the party and they 
seek a method of decisionmaking that will produce a decision (Ln the name
154 (continued)
success. Fourth, what Eulau calls 'bargained unanimity', where 
bargaining has continued beyond the achievement of a majority in order to 
produce a compromise satisfactory to all. The main effect of this 
probably would be to produce a very vague decision. We shall accept that 
unanimous decisions differ from majority decisions only in the numbers 
who are party to the compromise. The process is the same regardless of 
the numbers for or against. See: Heinz Eulau, 'Logics of Rationality in
Unanimous Decision-Making', Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Nomos VII: Rational 
Decision, New York, 1964, 26-54.
Lindblom's list, apart from partisan mutual adjustment, comprises 
exchange of threats and promises, creation and discharge of obligations 
(IOUs), manipulation of the environment to close off options, use of 
third persons, mutual deference in areas of expertise, use of brokers: 
Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, 95-9. which is based on the longer 
exposition in Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy, New 
York, 1965. These, it seems to me, are techniques of persuasion which 
are meaningful only if the persuader has certain formulations at hand 
to present to the person(s) persuaded after the latter has recognised 
the weight of the threat or promise, the existence of an obligation, the 
lack of options, the persuader's superior knowledge - or any of these as 
conveyed by a third person. (A broker, the last in the list, as described 
by Lindblom, merely brings mutual persuaders together.) The formulation 
could be presented in conjunction with one or more of these devices of 
persuasion but in either case the desired reaction is: 'OK, I see your
point. Now, what's your plan ...'. The decisionmakers then settle down 
to a process of mutual persuasion where each will put forward alternative 
formulations designed to meet some of his own goals but presented to 
show how they can meqt the other's goals as well. Eventually an 
acceptable formulation emerges or the relationship ceases because common 
ground cannot be found .
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of the party) which represents the common ground between the participants. 
If one sub-coalition tries instead to force its views on others without 
making concessions, it risks internal dissension, even splitting, since 
the party is a voluntary association whose members can choose to stay or 
go.
It is time to introduce a new hypothesis, one that refers to the 
methods decisionmakers use to reconcile their own conflicting goals and 
to take account of other internal strivings and external pressures. 
HYPOTHESES I, II and III referred to strivings by individuals and sub­
coalitions in conflict. HYPOTHESES IV and _V introduced strivings in 
concert, towards unity. HYPOTHESES VI to XIII encapsulated the external 
pressures decisionmakers might feel. Three further hypotheses will be 
advanced regarding methods of decisionmaking. Here is the first of them. 
HYPOTHESIS XIV: DECISIONMAKERS WILL PRACTISE PARTISAN MUTUAL ADJUSTMENT
Lindblom also uses the concept of ’disjointed incrementalism’. 
Decisionmakers, singly and in groups dispersed through the organisation, 
start from their appreciation of existing conditions, policies and 
objectives and judge alternative proposals according to how much change 
they will produce from the present rather than towards an ideal future 
state. They ’are less concerned with pursuing a better world than with 
avoiding a worse’. They seek ’incremental alteration of existing 
social states'. The choice is 'how much change in A' (say, interference 
in trade unions) against 'how much change in B' (say, party unity). 
Appreciation is imperfect and changes are likely to produce unintended 
consequences requiring rectification. The result is 'a never-ending 
series of attacks on more or less permanent, though perhaps slowly 
changing, problems'. It is decisionmaking by 'continual nibbling’
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156rather than ’a good bite’. Looked at from this point of view, Labor's
approach changed as the problem changed - depending on one's point of
view - from how to destroy the Groups to how to preserve militant
unionism or from how to disown fellow travellers with Communists to how
to salvage political elections. Labor's problem of relations with
Communists had been 'permanent' since the founding of Australian
Communism in 1920. Unity tickets, one aspect of the relationship, still
exist in 1 9 7 9 . After one attack on the problem, the Federal Executive
decision of August 1961, Alan Reid wrote that the issue was 'still
unresolved'. Four years later, Bill Hartley, Secretary of the VCE,
looked at the Federal decisions on unity tickets and the related question
of the party's role in union elections and complained: 'There are no
less than 23 separate and distinct entries in this confused hotch-potch
of decisions and rules which, according to the convenience of the moment,
are sometimes read separately, sometimes together - in part or in full,
158and sometimes in juxtaposition to one another'. Table 2.3 analyses 
Federal decisions relevant to unity tickets during the years 1948-65.
156David Braybrooke & Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, Glencoe 
& London, 1963, 83-106; Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, 24-7. 
Incrementalism has to be 'disjointed' because of the same dispersal of 
power which compels bargaining rather than decision by fiat.
Disjointedness is expressed in a lack of coordination and a lack of 
consistency in the body of decisions taken as a whole.
^~^The 1924 Federal Conference forbade both affiliation by the Communist 
Party with the ALP and membership of the ALP by avowed Communists. The 
first unity tickets probably occurred in the 1930s (Rawson, Labor in 
Vain? 86, 89). After the 1965 reaffirmation of the 1957 ban there were 
allegations of unity tickets in, at least, 1966, 1967, 1969, 1970 and 
1977. While old 'offenders' like the Victorian ARU and WWF predominated 
there were others. The lack of evidence for the 1970s attests, as 
countless interviewees confirmed, not that unity tickets have died out but 
that few people care. In the national headquarters of Australia's 
largest union, the Amalgamated Metal Workers and Shipwrights Union, the 
commemorative plaque lists the union's officers and it is a classic unity 
ticket.
158Bulletin, 2 September 1961; Socialist and Industrial Labor, July 
1965, 5.
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TABLE 2.3 Incrementalism in Federal Unity Ticket Decisions, 1948-1965 
Date Body Relation to Previous Decision(s) Increment
159
1. 1948 Conf. Reaffirms decisions since 1924 
(Sept.) repudiating Communist Party and
proscribing cooperation with it
2. 1955 
(Mar.)
7.
Conf. Reaffirms anti-Communism.
3. 1956 Exec. Interpretation of 1. Provoked by 
(Sept.) State interpretations of 2.
4. 1957 
(Mar.)
5. 1957 
(Aug.)
6. 1958 
(June)
1958 
(Aug.)
8. 1959 
(May)
Conf. Approved 3., which thus became 
decision of Conf.
Exec.
Exec. Draws attention to 4.
Exec. States directed to enforce ’the 
decision of Conference on Unity 
Tickets'. ALP members called 
upon to preserve party's 
integrity against anti-Labor 
attacks.
Conf. Reaffirms 4. Declares principle 
of non-interference in unions.
9. 1961 
(Aug.)
Exec. Exec, is determined rule
'banning unity tickets in trade 
union elections' will be 
enforced.
10. 1961 Exec. 
(Sept.)
n . a.
Anti-Communist activity 
in unions is matter for 
unionists only.
Bans unity tickets. 
Directs States to 
enforce ban.
Asks States for inform­
ation on practice within 
State and for their vie^s
Ensure ALP influence in 
unions is maintained and 
expanded.
Fed. Exec, will act if 
evidence of State 
failure to enforce. 
Recognition of the 
consent problem.
Declares responsibility 
of all ALP members to 
ensure that unions 
remain controlled by 
executives sympathetic 
to ALP.
Automatic expulsion for 
those who do not produce 
statutory declaration 
and press advertisement 
denying consent. States 
to report all action to 
Fed. Exec.
Copies of reports to be 
sent to all Fed. Exec, 
members. Reimbursement 
for press adverts. 
Accuser and accused in 
all cases to appear 
before State Exec, and 
give evidence.
159Decisions are consolidated in ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth 
Conference, 1965, 35-6, 125-34.
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Date Body Relation to Previous Decision(s) Increment
11. 1963 Conf. Deplores external interference
(Aug.) in unions.
12. 1965 Conf. 'Conference reaffirms existing Unity Ticket defined
(Aug.) Party Policy on Unity Tickets'. to include how-to-
vote guide (previously 
implicit) and other 
material. Statutory 
declarations to be 
published in union 
press as well as daily 
press.
Like its predecessors, the 1965 decision emerged, as Calwell said,
because sub-coalitions 'were prepared to make concessions so that we
would all arrive at a commonly acceptable result on a difficult and 
160complex subject'. Afterwards, as before, 'the issue was left unre- 
161solved'. This was not merely because the policy was enforced badly, 
but because while the party was subject to complex influences, its 
approach to unity tickets would itself be complex, internally inconsistent 
and unsatisfactory as a whole to any single source of influence. Yet
each influence over the years had helped effect changes in the policy and 
its enforcement. Labor's approach to unity tickets had changed as it 
tried to cope with the basic contradiction between anti-Communism and the
independence of unions.
i finCalwell: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 253.
Calwell was referring specifically to the Victorians, who had come to the 
Conference with an item seeking rescission of all existing Federal 
resolutions on union elections in favour of a restatement of the old 
political collusion formula plus an absolute prohibition of the use of 
the party name in union elections, even by individuals. NSW, on the other 
hand, sought ALP certification (effectively, endorsement) on request of 
party members contesting union elections. Both items were withdrawn 
after pre-session lobbying.
161DT, 4 August 1965. In this article, Alan Reid showed the antecedents 
in earlier resolutions of each paragraph of the resolution, which was 
really a consolidation of earlier enforcement resolutions, with minor 
additions. See also: Nation, 7 August 1965.
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Use of the concept of incrementalism is not without its problems. 
First, in compiling a list such as Table 2.3 there is always the question 
’which decisions are relevant?’ The dozen decisions listed include 
neither some in the early 1960s, concerning particular cases and 
concerning Victoria’s enforcement performance, nor decisions more 
directly connected with the ALP's role in union elections such as the 
’Fitzgibbon election’. Yet the approach to individual cases and to 
Victoria guided both ALP members in unions and the Victorians themselves 
regarding the likely Federal reaction to future unity tickets. Further, 
ALP tickets, endorsed or tacitly supported, could be seen as the other 
side of the unity ticket coin. Banning unity tickets, winking at them, 
supporting ALP tickets and outlawing them were all ways of approaching 
Labor’s relations with the union movement. The party traced an even 
more tortuous path than that outlined in the Table. On the other hand, 
such a Table may read too much into nuances. For instance, did the 
recognition in August 1958 that some ALP members had been placed on 
unity tickets without their consent add anything to the September 1956 
formulation which referred only to an ALP member ’who agrees' to appear 
on such a ticket? The consent loophole was always there in some form. 
Then, was there any real difference between the four formulations of the 
duty of ALP members in unions (June and August 1958, May 1959 and 
August 1961 - Fitzgibbon resolution)? At what point does refinement 
become change, however incremental? The answer seems to be that even the 
smallest refinement is relevant. New formulations did not emerge without 
a reason. They indicated and registered changing relationships within 
the organisation and changing external pressures. The strengthening of 
the expression of the role of ALP members in unions from asking 'that 
Conference consider the practicability of taking appropriate steps - with
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adequate safeguards - to ensure that the influence of the Australian 
Labor Party is maintained and expanded’ (June 1958) to declaring ’it is the 
duty of all A.L.P. members of trade unions to seek to elect competent 
officers in their unions loyal to the principles and policies of the 
A.L.P.' (August 1961) occurred because the party needed to counter the 
impression created by publicity of unity tickets and because of the 
relative decline of extreme anti-Grouperism within the Executive. 
Simultaneously, the consent clause saved the party the embarrassment of 
wholesale expulsion, the financial loss of union affiliation fees and 
the trauma of intervention in Victoria. Some influences were present 
in 1955 and waned later, others emerged after the Split. Out of flux, 
decisions emerged, pursuing an uncertain course across the history of 
the post Split years. Federal enforcement decisions (elaboration of the 
consent clause, provision for statutory declarations and advertisements), 
their application by States to cases, the formulae that States developed 
for themselves (political collusion, ALP name) as well as the refinements 
of the basic compromise between anti-Communism and non-interference, all 
emerged from a similar set of circumstances inside and outside the party, 
although different influences were more salient in different Branches and 
Federally and at different times. In each State, the Executive pursued 
incrementalism - remember Victoria's oscillations between defiance, 
turning a blind eye, use of the political collusion formula and 
acceptance of the consent loophole - and the results regarding unity 
tickets were by no means alike. Theoretically, Federal Conference and 
Executive were supreme. In practice, the compromise decisions these 
bodies produced rested on leaving enforcement to the States, with 
Federal action only as a last resort. This gave the State Branches as 
significant a role as the Federal party in making decisions about unity
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tickets. ALP policy regarding unity tickets was produced by the action 
and inaction of State and Federal parties in combination but not in 
cooperation, by a process of disjointed incrementalism, a series of 
decisions emanating from a number of points within the organisation and 
reflecting the organisation's continually changing 'nature and nurture' - 
its internal structure and the influences upon it. The party made 
decisions by a process of 'moving compromise - ... a never-ending sequence 
of compromises, each successive one responding to a new alignment of 
preferences or interests' .
HYPOTHESIS XV: DECISIONMAKERS WILL PRACTISE DISJOINTED INCREMENTALISM.
This is the second of three hypotheses concerning methods of 
decisionmaking.
162Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, 105-6.
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Chapter 3: State Aid 1963-1966
On 9 June 1963 the Annual Conference of the New South Wales Branch
of the Australian Labor Party adopted an Education Committee report
which included this paragraph:
The Committee recommends, so that a continuous 
supply of students in this field be maintained at 
secondary school level, that the N.S.W. Labor 
Government be requested to provide or assist in 
the provision of science laboratories and teaching 
facilities in all schools where the Government is 
satisfied that laboratories and teaching facilities 
are either non-existent or inadequate for the 
proper training of children in this specialised 
field of education.1
When Conference delegates asked if the decision should not refer only to
state schools, the Chairman, C.T. Oliver, replied firmly that there had
been no mistake and that the recommendation covered 'all schools'.
Despite vocal opposition and cries of 'state aid by the back door' and
2'the thin end of the wedge' the report was adopted overwhelmingly.
This decision serves as the beginning of a case study of Labor's 
approach to the issue of state aid to denominational schools. This 
chapter takes a slice of history and analyses the political 'pulling and 
hauling' that produced ALP decisions regarding state aid during that 
period.
To place the study in context it is necessary to refer briefly to 
the background to this first decision. The Australian colonies had
^ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1963 Annual Conference, 70. My 
emphasis.
2SMH, 10 June 1963; W.G. Smith, S.J., 'Recent Education Developments', 
Social Survey, December 1963-January 1964, 332-3. For speculation about 
the genesis of the recommendation, see: Bulletin, 29 June 1963; Nation,
15 June 1963; Socialist and Industrial Labor, July 1963, 7. My own 
research confirms the central role of some members of the Government and 
of party officers (J.L. Armitage, W.R. Colbourne, R.R. Downing,
J.A. Mulvihill, C.T. Oliver, interviews).
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abolished state aid to religious education systems in the last decades 
of the nineteenth century but the Roman Catholics retained and expanded 
a system of primary or parish schools. This system formed the largest 
and most needy section of the private education sector. Intermittent 
requests for state aid came from the Catholic church and were directed 
especially towards State Labor Governments which were believed most 
favourable to Catholic demands because of the Catholic component of the 
ALP. But fear of arousing again the sectarian bitterness which had 
accompanied the nineteenth century debates over state aid meant that 
governments of all colours thereafter avoided 'direct' aid, that is, aid 
to the non-state systems, while gradually developing an array of measures 
which eased the burden of parents who chose to use these systems. State 
governments did not ignore the educational needs of Catholics and others 
outside the state systems but their efforts were piecemeal and 
circumspect.^
Hogan traces the history of these measures under the New South Wales 
Labor Government between 1950 and 1963. By the earlier date, New South 
Wales non-state school students benefitted, for example, from secondary
Usage has 'state aid' as the term for what could perhaps be termed 
Hirect state aid' (see below). 'Indirect state aid' came to be used for 
assistance to the parents of students at non-state schools. State aid is 
one of the most written about topics in Australian history and politics. 
Two general accounts which give considerable space to the early period 
are A.G. Austin, Australian Education 1788-1900, Melbourne, 1961 and 
Ronald Fogarty, Catholic Education in Australia 1806-1950, Carlton, Vic., 
1959. The range of the writing, including that in theses, is shown in 
bibliographies like those in G.S. Harman, The Politics of Education,
St Lucia, Qld , 1974, 102-6, and Michael Charles Hogan, The Catholic 
Campaign for State Aid, Sydney, 1978, 280-302. Harman (102) describes 
state aid as '[t]he most controversial issue related to education in 
recent years in Australia', yet the most detailed account of the ALP's 
approach to it (Henry S. Albinski, The Australian Labor Party and the 
Aid to Parochial Schools Controversy, University Park, Pa., 1966) is 
based mainly on press reports and intuition.
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bursaries (awarded to a few hundred students on the results of
competitive examinations), medical and dental inspections, vocational
guidance and free school bus travel in rural areas. Over the next
dozen years travel concessions were gradually extended and the number
of bursaries increased. Other measures, such as making the government
stores available to Catholic schools and ensuring that lotteries
legislation did not affect 'housie' games and other methods of gambling
used by the Catholics to finance parish schools, could be described as
'disguised' state aid since, while not contributing directly to the
coffers of the Catholic education system, they enabled diversion or
accumulation of funds. A similar end was served by exempting Catholic
and other non-state schools, like state schools, from the payment of
rates. Finally, the Commonwealth government provided such benefits as
free radio licenses, Australian flags, free milk and subsidies for 
4cadet corps.
While Labor in New South Wales had provided less indirect and 
disguised aid than had some other States (for example, Queensland, where 
scholarships had been non-competitive and virtually universal since 
1914“*) it was bound by three constraints. The first constraint was the 
feeling that the voters, three out of four non-Catholic, would not 
countenance measures of direct state aid which would benefit mainly the 
Catholic parish schools. However, there were distinct signs in the 
1950s that this public feeling was changing and public opinion polls
_
Hogan, The Catholic Campaign ..., 1-17 passim. Of such disguised aid, 
Hogan writes: 'Every major party, at State and Commonwealth level, was
prepared to give considerable aid to Catholic parents and to Catholic 
schools in ways which were administrative, incremental, and not 
perceived by the electorate as state aid' (27).
“*Hogan, The Catholic Campaign ..., 3.
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showed a clear, perhaps even gradually increasing majority in favour ofg
some form of direct aid.
New South Wales Labor politicians had always recognised the 
educational contribution of non-state, especially Catholic, schools.
They knew that the Catholic parish system, drawing its pupils from a 
section of the community with a higher than average birth rate, had been 
disproportionately affected by the post war 'baby boom' and that the 
influx of Catholic migrant families and the declining number of teaching 
nuns and brothers added to its problems.^
The New South Wales Government's awareness of Catholic difficulties 
was heightened by the contacts between the Government, senior members of 
the party organisation and the Catholic hierarchy of the Sydney
g
archdiocese. On the church side, Bishop James Carroll, Auxiliary to
Cardinal Gilroy since 1954, was the main contact. He took charge of a
Catholic campaign commenced in September 1961 to win some form of
9direct aid from the Government. This campaign was to be moderate,
£
P.N. Gill, 'The Federal Science Grant: An Episode in Church and State
Relations, 1963-1964', E.L. French, ed., Melbourne Studies in Education 
1964, Carlton, Vic., 1965, 352-3; Hogan, The Catholic Campaign ..., 5. 
The former shows that the 'pro-direct aid' figure (questions differed) 
was 51 per cent in 1955, 54 per cent in October 1960, and 55 per cent 
in September 1961.
^Gill, 'The Federal Science Grant', 275-6; Hogan, The Catholic 
Campaign ..., 4. Hogan (14) quotes Premier Cahill in 1954 wishing 'we 
were able to do more than pay a verbal tribute to their [Catholic 
schools'] work. Education is something that causes concern financially 
to this State. How much more concern it must be for the Catholic 
community'.
g
See chapter 1, pp. 57-8.
9Hogan, The Catholic Campaign ..., 29-77, is the definitive account of 
the events described in the following sentences. I have relied upon it. 
Bishop James Carroll, Independent Schools in a Free Society [n.p., 
Sydney, 1962], and James M. Kelleher, Roman Fever, Surry Hills, NSW, 
1962, were representative of moderate arguments while John P. Kelly, 
'Catholic Schools and Catholic Education 1962', Twentieth Century, 16 
(Winter 1962), 307-19, put a more militant or direct action line.
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unpublicised and based on patient persuasion of those senior ALP men to 
whom Carroll and a few lay colleagues had access. At the same time, a 
more militant Catholic section sought quicker success through such 
shock tactics as the Goulburn school boycott of July 1962, where 
Catholic parents withdrew their children from parish schools as a 
protest against the failure of governments of all complexions to provide 
direct aid. The Goulburn action helped encourage CWIrc^ fo imke 
a well-publicised call on Premier Heffron in September 1962. He carried 
a petition which requested of the Government, among other things, 
assistance for science laboratories and equipment.^
In responding to changing community attitudes and the arguments of 
Carroll and Gilroy, the Heffron Government faced a second constraint, 
Federal ALP policy. In a series of steps between 1951 and 1953 the 
Federal party had committed itself to the principle of direct aid.^^ But 
in the aftermath of the Split and before any State Labor Government had 
implemented this principle, the 1957 Federal Conference in Brisbane had 
removed it from the platform, replacing it with the words ’the promotion 
of secondary and higher education by way of Bursaries, Scholarships, 
Exhibitions and Benefits of a like nature, payable direct to students’. 
The words here emphasised were chosen deliberately to exclude pupils of 
the Catholic primary schools. The unity ticket compromise, discussed in
The other items sought were secondary scholarships, teacher training 
assistance, capital and loan interest repayment assistance and subsidies 
for teachers' salaries. The first was already in existence in the form 
of the bursaries but these were not yet universal, as the petition 
sought.
^The 1951 Federal Conference had resolved 'That financial aid be granted 
for the purpose of assisting all forms of education'. The Federal 
Executive had interpreted this to include, inter alia, 'education 
conducted by ... private authorities' and the 1953 Federal Conference 
had adopted this interpretation (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth 
Conference, 1951, 20-1; 1953, 17).
169
the previous chapter, was influenced by the desire not to bow to the
pressure of political Catholicism. The scholarships resolution
discriminated against the Catholic education system and the pupils of
its parish schools. The Brisbane Conference majority believed state
aid was a cherished goal of the hated Groupers and supported a
resolution which denied everything but the possibility - since no
concrete scheme was yet suggested - of scholarships for Catholic
secondary students. The 1957 policy came to be summarised as 'aid to
the scholar’ - except the Catholic primary scholar - ’but not the 
12school'. This did not seem to exclude the forms of disguised aid
developed in New South Wales and elsewhere, but it apparently excluded
such forms of direct aid as payment of teachers' salaries, capital
13grants and maintenance subsidies. Federal policy, as decided by the 
Federal Conference and interpreted by the Federal Executive, bound the 
New South Wales Labor Government.
12ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1957, 75. My emphasis. 
Brebner, moving the resolution on behalf of the Social Services Committee, 
referred to the exclusion of 'students of primary schools' but, since 
State primary students had the equivalent of 'direct aid' already, non­
state students were the sufferers and, specifically, those who used the 
vast Catholic parish school system. On the 'anti-Grouper' aspects of 
the change, see Albinski, The Australian Labor Party and the Aid to 
Parochial Schools Controversy, 11-12; S. Encel, .'Australian Political 
Chronicle, January-June 1957: The Commonwealth', AJPH, 3 (November
1957), 98-9; Nation, 10 September 1960. Although the Victorian,
Brebner, had the carriage of the motion, Chamberlain was believed to have 
influenced it.
13During the 1961 Federal election campaign Calwell circulated to his 
fellow candidates an interpretation - apparently his own - that the 
1957 Brisbane decision meant '[t]he Australian Labor Party is opposed 
to the payment of salaries or capital grants or maintenance charges 
for non-State Schools' (Calwell to fellow candidates, 7 November 1961, 
and attachment: Aid to Denominational Schools and Education, Vic. Rec.,
Parliamentarians A to G 1961). At the 1957 Conference itself, when 
moving a motion deploring the Commonwealth's failure to provide the 
States with adequate funds for 'their educational facilities', Brebner 
had said that his Social Services Committee had used this formulation 
deliberately to exclude non-state schools (ALP, Official Report, 
Commonwealth Conference, 1957, 75. My emphasis).
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The third constraint affecting the New South Wales Labor
Government was the fear of internal dissension within the State ALP
Branch. There were increasing grass roots pressures for some measure
of direct aid and at the 1963 State Conference there were eleven
agenda items supporting the concept. The ALP Youth Council, while
small in numbers, was a strong supporter of direct aid and vocal
enough to provoke resentment among the group, centred in the militant
unionists and branch members of the minority Steering Committee, who
14were staunch supporters of the Federal policy of 1957. Thus, while 
community opposition to direct aid seemed to be declining, any 
concessions to Catholic requests ran the risk both of contravening 
Federal policy and of disturbing the balance and unity developed in the 
New South Wales ALP since the Split.
1963-1964
A full account of state aid and the ALP before 1963 would be much 
more detailed than that given above. It would show the reasons leading 
to the decisions of the early 1950s, the reaction in the Catholic church 
to the 1957 decision and the reaction in the ALP to Catholic criticism.^ 
Our main concern, however, is the political activity which followed the 
New South Wales Conference decision of 1963, which was the first to 
accept the concept of direct aid. In studying this activity, we shall 
concentrate upon events within the party, while recognising that external 
pressures were also present. Case studies of politics can highlight
T4ALP (NSW Branch), Annual General Conference 1963 Agenda, 13-14; Nation, 
15 December 1962. For an example of minority reaction to the Youth 
Council, see Labor Forward, August-September 1962, 6-8. (This was a 
small magazine produced by I. Wyner, a leading anti-NSWCE figure.)
^Hogan, The Catholic Campaign ..., 9-17, provides a summary.
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different aspects of a period of history. This one will study state aid 
in terms of constraints similar to those which influenced the New South 
Wales Branch in 1963. These constraints were: the effect of changes in
community attitudes as perceived by decisionmakers in the party, the 
conflict between the desires of State ALP Governments, especially in New 
South Wales, and Federal policy, as expressed by the Federal Executive 
and Conference, and the possibility of awakening unrest within the 
party. The recurrence of these factors during the case study will 
provide support for our HYPOTHESIS VII about the environment and changes 
within it and - if it can be shown that the New South Wales Executive 
and the Branch’s Federal representatives stood alongside the State Labor 
Government - for HYPOTHESIS I about the goals of the controllers of 
State Branches. Further, if decisions reveal an attempt to prevent 
dissension between sub-coalitions (within State Branches and elsewhere) 
HYPOTHESES IV and V_ about keeping the coalition together and the search 
for compromise may be relevant. The two hypotheses about how the party 
makes decisions, by partisan mutual adjustment and incrementally or by 
’moving compromise' (HYPOTHESES XIV and XV) can then be tested. Other 
hypotheses may also be supported.
THE 1963 FEDERAL CONFERENCE
The 1963 Federal Conference, commencing in Perth on 29 July, was 
confronted with the New South Wales Conference decision. Developments 
prior to the Perth Conference showed that the Federal party was becoming 
aware of the education issue and of the likely pressure to alter the 
1957 policy of 'aid to the scholar but not the school'. The enemies of 
1955, now congregated in the Democratic Labor Party, had retained the 
pre-1957 ALP plank of aid for all forms of education and had made state
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aid an election promise. There were isolated signs that this innovation
was electorally significant and some uneasiness developed in Federal
Caucus after the Bendigo by-election of July 1960, where the Catholic
Bishops Fox and Stewart had criticised Labor’s Federal policy and Labor
politicians canvassing the area had detected dissatisfaction among
Catholic voters. Some members supported state aid in a Caucus debate
and details of the debate appeared in the press.^ Only a small minority
of both Federal Executive and Conference would have favoured state aid
in 1961 and few more would have welcomed such discussion. The main
concession to state aid demands was a backhanded one in a 1961 Federal
Conference resolution, where Labor urged the Federal Government to
provide funds '[t]o establish a system of secondary school scholarships
similar to the Commonwealth University Scholarships'. Since the
university scheme discriminated only on merit, there was a clear
implication here that secondary scholarships would be awarded to state
and non-state students alike, but it was left to Calwell, in his 1961
18policy speech, to specify this. The wariness continued through 1962,
Creighton Burns, Parties and People, Melbourne, 1961, 37-9; James 
Jupp, Victoria Votes, Sydney, 1961, 11-12; D.W. Rawson, Australia Votes, 
Melbourne, 1961, 82; SMH, 8 July 1957, 23 March 1959, 8, 9 November 1961.
"^Age, 14 July, 25 August, 9 September 1960; FX 5-8 September 1960, Fed. 
Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/26-9; Nation, 10 September 1960; SMH, 16 May,
11 July, 25, 30 August, 1, 13 September 1960. The Caucus debate began 
when D. Minogue, a NSW Catholic, asked Calwell if he (Minogue) could 
lead a delegation of Catholic constituents petitioning the Prime Minister 
for state aid. Another NSW Catholic, F. Stewart had suggested a Caucus 
committee should recommend to the next Federal Conference methods of 
aiding private schools.
18ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1961, 18; Arthur Calwell, 
Labor’s Policy - Blueprint for a Government, Canberra, 1961, 16. Some 
reporters were advised at the Conference that this was the 'interpretation' 
(Advertiser, SMH, 13 April 1961) but Calwell's policy speech seems to have 
been the first explicit reference to it. The Federal Executive during 
1961 discussed a large number of draft policy statements (see chapter 5, 
below) but there is no record of a discussion of education policy and 
education policy does not appear in a collection of policies adopted at
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when Chamberlain refused permission to hold a national conference of
Labor people interested in education since it ’could lead to difficulties
19and Party embarrassment’. Since ALP representatives long had been 
vocal supporters of improved education in general, Chamberlain's fear 
must have been that such a meeting would lead to a public party squabble 
over the narrower issue of state aid.
While avoiding the topic of direct aid, the Federal bodies of the 
party had not shirked producing a general education policy. The key to 
this policy was increased Commonwealth aid and, under the 1961 Federal 
Conference resolution, this aid was to be spent in a variety of ways.
people- ,
Like other /interested in Australian education since the Second World
War, the Conference believed the States could not cope with the
educational needs of the booming youth population without funds from the 
20Commonwealth. Federal Labor also supported establishing a Commonwealth 
Ministry of Education and Science and a Commonwealth inquiry into all
18 (continued)
these meetings. The only mention of education policy appears to be in a 
discussion at the July meeting of the unauthorised distribution of an 
education document written by Whitlam, but there is no indication of its 
contents. (Copies of policies inserted in Minute book; FX 3-7 July 
1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/106-7, 129-44, 168-76, 198-214).
19Correspondence between G. Bryant, MP, Chairman of FX Education Policy 
Committee, Chamberlain and Wyndham, October-November 1962, Fed. Rec.,
NLA MS 4985/13/F43. Also: Wyndham advises S. Benson, MP, not to
engage in press controversy over state aid with the DLP’s McManus 
(Benson to Wyndham, 18 March 1963; Wyndham to Benson, 26 March 1963,
Vic. Rec., Parliamentarians A - C 1963).
20For a detailed account of education agitation during this period, 
especially the demand for Commonwealth funds, see: Donald Smart, Federal
Aid to Australian Schools: Origins and Aspects of the Implementation of
the Commonwealth Science Laboratories and Libraries Scheme, unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 1975, 41-71, 86-97. The 
1961 Federal Conference endorsed the Education Committee's call for 
Commonwealth funds for physical, health and technical education, teacher 
training, science equipment, education of non-academic, slow learning 
and gifted children, to overcome overcrowded classes, for secondary and 
university scholarships and university buildings (ALP, Official Report, 
Commonwealth Conference, 1961, 18-21).
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forms of education, primary, secondary and technical. Federal Caucus
members were also increasingly interested in education, and by 1962 two
of them, G. Bryant from Victoria and L. Barnard from Tasmania, were
members of the Federal Executive's Education Committee.
During the Goulburn school boycott of July 1962, A. Fraser, Federal
Labor member for the local seat of Eden-Monaro, publicly had expressed
his support for state aid and said that the ALP was not opposed to state
aid as such. While present policy advocated a scholarship scheme,
22'other methods are not ruled out'. Technically, Fraser was correct,
since the 1957 decision had said merely that Labor supported 'aid to the
scholar’. The addition of 'and not the school' was an interpretation
based on the remarks of Brebner and on the mood of the Brisbane
Conference. The Federal Executive moved to clarify matters. In March
1963, after reprimanding Fraser for his public statement, the Executive
resolved to refer to the Education Committee
the question of the Party policy of opposition to 
church aid, having particular regard for the 
decisions reached by Federal Conferences in 1957 
and 1961, which will enable it to be stated in 
clear unequivocal terms.23
Responding to this instruction, the Committee first provided an 
interpretation that the secondary scholarships referred to in the 1961
21ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1961, 18, 21, 52.
22 SMH, 16 July 1962. My emphasis. See also script of the broadcast, 
correspondence relating to the episode: Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/11/F17.
23FX 21 March 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/125/57/25; Sie, 22 March 
1963. The Executive had studied the 1961 Conference report. Repeating 
this exercise, one can find at least four equivocal formulations: What
was meant by 'other purposes' in the recommendation of areas requiring 
funds from the Commonwealth? Apart from the specific areas (listed in 
note 20 above) this inclusive phrase was added. Was the inquiry into 
secondary, technical and primary education to include non-state efforts 
in these fields? Were these intended as loopholes for a Federal Labor 
Government to assist non-state schools? For the other two, see below.
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Conference decision should be awarded ’to all children, regardless of
school’, 'direct to the scholar' and 'on equal terms, regardless of the
24school which the student attends'. This formulation was the most
explicit expression so far of the 'aid to the scholar, not the school',
concept. It represented a further step in a process of 'disjointed
incrementalism' which began in 1957 (HYPOTHESIS XV). The Federal
Conference of that year supported the principle of promoting secondary
and higher education by bursaries, scholarships, exhibitions and like
benefits, all payable direct to the scholar. It made no concrete
proposal for implementing this principle. Four years later, the Federal
Conference endorsed a scheme of secondary scholarships 'similar to the
Commonwealth University Scholarships', but did not specify who could
receive them. Calwell's 1961 policy speech then promised the
scholarships would be available to non-state and state students alike.
Now the Education Committee wanted the 1963 Federal Conference in Perth
to indicate in a Conference resolution Labor's support for this form of
indirect aid. According to Bryant, its Secretary, the Committee had
tried 'to place a positive statement in the Platform as to what the
Party would do to help the scholar in the non-State school by way of
bursary or scholarship'. The Executive accepted Bryant's explanation
and allowed this formulation to go before the Conference as an 'immediate
objective' of Labor's education policy:
15(e) The establishment of a system of secondary 
school scholarships similar to the Commonwealth 
University scholarships. This to be consistent 
with the general principle of promoting secondary 
and higher education by way of bursaries, 
scholarships, exhibitions and benefits of a like 
nature, payable direct to the student, and
24Bryant to Chamberlain, 3 May 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/13/F43.
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available on equal terms to all students whether 
attending State or non-State schools.25
However, the Federal Conference unanimously supported an amendment 
to remove the words underlined in the above formulation. The 'incremental 
alteration' thus combined merely the principle of 1957 and the positive 
proposal of 1961. There was a change in Federal policy in recognition 
of the growing electoral significance of education, both state and non­
state, but the Conference avoided written commitment to something which 
could have been seen as a concession to Catholic pressures. It remained 
for Calwell to make clear in his 1963 policy speech, as he had in 1961,
that the scholarships would be provided for both state and non-state 
26pupils. In the unity ticket case, the contradiction between anti­
communism and non-interference in unions, and the near deadlock by 1961 
between the supporters of these two principle^ was resolved, after a 
fashion, by- leaving enforcement to the State Branches. In the state aid 
case, the need to seek votes on the education issue confronted the 
bitterness of 1955 against Catholics and the causes they cherished. The 
compromise solution adopted in 1957 was to continue to support only 
secondary scholarships. As electoral pressure increased, so did pressure 
to make this support concrete. But the offer to implement the policy in 
the area - the non-state sector - which would still arouse controversy in 
the Federal ALP bodies was left to Calwell. At various times between 
1957 and 1963 the 'attacks on ... [the] slowly changing problems' of 
education came from the Federal Conference and the Federal Executive, 
from the Education Committees which reported to the Federal Conferences 
of 1961 and 1963, from the Federal Caucus and from Calwell as Federal
25ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 35; FX 7-9 May, 
24-27 June 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/125/57/44, 69. My emphasis.
^SMH, 19 November 1963.
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Leader and presenter of the policy speech. These activities were less 
’disjointed' or uncoordinated than in the unity ticket case, where the 
party's approach rested on a lack of coordination between Federal and 
State levels. Nevertheless, the essence of incrementalism's 
'disjointedness', the contributions from dispersed parts of the 
organisation, is present. Formally, all the participants were subject 
to Federal Conference. In practice, the Conference facilitated the 
expression of the varying views of the State Branches regarding the 
balance between concessions to political Catholicism and assistance to 
education, the Committees provided a measure of expertise and Calwell, 
free of the need to avoid a Conference squabble, produced the specific
vote-attracting promise. 'What one center ignores', Lindblom suggests,
, , 27another does not .
Described thus, the 1963 Federal Conference's attitude to secondary
scholarships is an example of a desire to avoid dissension in a probable 
28election year. But the picture was more complex than that. The 
reluctant support for scholarships must be balanced against the
27David Braybrooke & Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, Glencoe 
& London, 1963, 100, 128, provide the quotations. Regarding some of the 
policy 'contributors' mentioned, the 1961 Education Committee comprised 
Conference delegates appointed at the commencement of the Conference, 
including M. Poulter, a university lecturer, and L. Barnard, MP (see 
below). By 1963, the Federal Executive had appointed a Standing 
Committee, whose members were R.H. Lacey, a former (until 1962) Executive 
member (Chairman); G. Bryant (Secretary) and L. Barnard, both Federal 
Members of Parliament, former school teachers and interested in 
education; J. Wood, a former union official and Assistant Secretary of 
the ALP (Victorian Branch) in 1955-56, office holder in state school 
organisations; M. McCarney, a NSW union official; S. Encel, a 
university lecturer. Secondly, eight Federal Caucus Executive members 
discussed the draft policy speech with Calwell, before leaving him to 
produce the final version (SMH, 2 November 1963). Presumably, education 
was one topic discussed.
2 8After the 1961 Federal election the position in the House of 
Representatives was: Government 62; ALP 60. Many Labor people were 
confident of victory at an early election. 'One delegate said the 
conference had leaned over backwards to see that it did nothing that 
would damage Mr. Calwell's prospects at the next Federal elections' 
(Sun-Herald, 4 August 1963).
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Conference's clarification of the party's attitude to direct state aid.
At the August 1961 meeting the Federal Executive balanced its approach 
to unity tickets, which heuf incufe concessions. h? Victoria, with a concession 
to the 'New South Wales' view on the Fitzgibbon candidature. In 1963 
the Conference laid more firmly the ground for Calwell to promise 
indirect aid while it also tried to close the door on the party offering 
direct aid. Taken together, the August 1961 decisions represent a 
compromise on the issue of Labor's relations with the unions; taken 
together, the decisions of August 1963 were a compromise on the issue 
of Labor's attitudes to non-state, especially Catholic education. We 
shall examine now the formulation and significance of the second part of 
the latter compromise, in order to provide support for HYPOTHESIS V .
While the 1963 Education Committee wanted to produce a positive 
statement on aid to the scholar it was, Bryant told the Federal
29Executive, 'unanimously opposed to any aid to non-State schools'. Yet 
the only explicit reference to state aid in its first report, apart from 
the recommendation about scholarships, was a recommendation that science
and other specialised facilities in state schools should be available to
30classes from non-state schools. The Committee, Bryant remembers, had
?q FX 7-9 May 1963, Red. Rec., NLA MS 4985/125/57/44.
30Remember that this recommendation was formulated at a meeting on 
24 April 1963, nearly seven weeks before the NSW decision about provision 
of science facilities (Bryant to Chamberlain, 3 May 1963 and enclosure, 
Australian Labor Party Standing Committee on Education: Recommendations
to Federal Conference, adopted at Committee Meeting, 24 April 1963, Fed. 
Rec., NLA MS 4985/13/F43). It is possible that the Committee could have 
known of the NSWmanoeuvres prior to the Conference, although these were 
secretive. (The NSW Education Committee was not to meet the Minister for 
Education, E. Wetherell, 'until other activities of which the Party 
Officers are aware have been developed to a further stage': Mulvihill to
J. Bale, Senior Vice President, NSWCE, 11 April 1963, NSW Rec., ML MSS 
2083/52/110/53-7). It is probable that part of the impetus for both the 
NSW ’provision’ resolution and the Federal Vise’ recommendation came from 
publicity surrounding Wetherell's refusal of a Catholic parents' group's 
request for use of state school science and other facilities (SMH, 26,
28 January 1963). Science education was a priority of education pressure 
groups after the Second World War (Smart, Federal Aid to Australian 
Schools ..., 41-71, 86-97).
179
regarded state aid in April 1963 as a peripheral issue for education
policy. The Executive disagreed. The Minutes record that Chamberlain
advised Bryant that the Executive felt some recommendations in the
report were ambiguous and required clarifying. Bryant simply recalls
that Chamberlain told the Committee to say the party was opposed to state 
31aid. We may surmise that Chamberlain and the majority of the Executive 
were dissatisfied with a report which recommended concessions on 
scholarships and use of science facilities but did not reiterate the 
basic principle of 1957. In any case, the Committee looked again at the 
state aid question. Meanwhile, the New South Wales Branch adopted the 
recommendations of its Education Committee for state assistance for the 
provision of science laboratories in all schools.
Paragraph 10 of the Federal Committee's next report, presented to 
the Federal Executive meeting, commencing 24 June 1963, gave citizens 
choosing not to use the state systems the ’absolute right' to develop 
their own systems within recognised standards but said that 'the 
financial responsibility of the State shall be limited to the State's 
services'. A supplementary statement, written by Bryant, served as an 
amplification of the earlier recommendation about use of science 
laboratories, adding the use of playing fields, gymnasia and bus services, 
all subject to the arrangements of the host state school, as well as 
scholarships, bursaries, travel allowances and text books. Probably the 
only one of these benefits not already provided somewhere in Australia
31Bryant was asked to attend the Executive after the Education Committee 
Chairman, Lacey, when submitting the report, had complained it was not 
specific enough. Lacey probably played only a small part in its 
formulation, as he was occupied by duties as Secretary of the Tasmanian 
Branch of the party. Bryant himself provided the structure of the 
report and Encel the philosophy (G.M. Bryant, interview; FX 7-9 May 
1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/125/57/31, 44). For a sample of Encel's 
views on education: Nation, 27 January, 11 August 1962.
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was the use of facilities in the state schools, and even this could be
seen as an increment of the type of 'disguised' aid that had been given
32during the 1950s and earlier.
Chamberlain was not satisfied. He moved to confine the state's
responsibility under paragraph 10 to the provision of scholarships as
outlined in the Committee's suggested paragraph 15(e). He also gave
notice he would seek to discharge Bryant's supplementary statement.
Disguised assistance, he argued, merely allowed direct state aid to
enter 'by the back door'. Votes should be sought instead by implementing
the concept of 1957. Brebner, however, argued that the party would be
accused of bigotry if it failed to make further concessions and J. Wood,
a member of the Federal Education Committee, addressed the Executive in
terms similar to Bryant's. Finally, Chamberlain's motion was lost by five 
33votes to seven. At the Conference five weeks later he tried again:
Citizens [he moved] who do not choose to use the 
school facilities provided by the State, whether 
for conscientious or other reasons, shall have the 
absolute right to develop an independent system of 
schools of recognised standard, provided they do 
so at their own cost.34
This formulation was put and adopted unanimously as part of the party's 
Federal education policy. As clause 4 of that policy it was to become 
the centre of ALP political activity regarding state aid over the next 
three years.
Bryant remembers seeking information about what assistance of this 
type was being given by the State and Commonwealth governments. 'It 
was difficult to find out but it was things like Australian flags, free 
milk, travel arrangements and so on' (G.M. Bryant, interview).
33For paragraph 15(e) at this stage, see pp.175-6, above. For the 
debate: Age, 9 July 1963; DT_, 2 August 1963; FX 24-27 June 1963, Fed. 
Rec., NLA MS 4985/125/57/69. Wood's views were contained in: 
Supplementary Statement of Policy on Aid to Non-State Schools,
Attachment F/l to Business Sheet, VCE 19 July 1963, ALP (Victorian 
Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8742.
34ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 31.
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Why was this formulation adopted so easily and what was its immediate
significance? The desire to avoid controversy in a probable election
year may have encouraged opponents of the formulation to hold their
peace. Recalling the events of 1963, Bryant concluded that ’Conferences
35are often attempts to avoid scars'. Secondly, the numbers had changed
since Chamberlain’s earlier attempt in the Executive. While the
Victorians, Brebner and Wyndham, had supported the Committee's approach
at the Executive, they accepted the broad lines of the 1957 policy, as
did the Victorian Conference delegation. Dunstan and Nicholls from South
Australia had diverged from Chamberlain's line at the Executive but their
Branch, as a whole, also accepted the concept of aid to the scholar but
not the school. The Conference delegation also included C.R. Cameron,
36whose attitude to state aid was close to Chamberlain's. Thirdly, and 
more importantly, those who sought concessions to state aid demands 
could rest their hopes of winning votes on the scholarship scheme. Even 
with the removal of the clause about equal availability to state and
non-state students, they could argue that the intention of paragraph 15(e)
was clear and that the policy could be promoted during an election
campaign. This group received a further bonus when the words 'benefits
of a like nature' in this paragraph were interpreted by Chamberlain to 
mean that Labor permitted 'fringe benefits' such as use of state school
35G.M. Bryant, interview.
36The Conference numbers were discussed in Age, 9 July 1963. The VCE 
had shown its support for the 'no direct aid' line in March 1963 by 
suspending for twelve months four ALP members of Oakleigh City Council 
for supporting the payment direct to schools, state and non-state, of 
money to be awarded to students as Council bursaries: ALP (Victorian
Branch), 1963 Central Executive Report, 21-7. Dunstan had opposed 
Chamberlain's motion at the Executive meeting while Nicholls had sought 
to permit at least travel allowances and text book issue. For Cameron 
and Chamberlain, see below.
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science laboratories. Fourthly, this group could point out that a
vague and negative item from Western Australia (’That the ALP should
oppose any State aid to private schools'), which could have been
interpreted to exclude even scholarships, had been discharged by the
38Conference without debate. Labor's 1963 education policy did not 
reject the claims of those who did not use the state systems; it 
merely preferred indirect and disguised, rather than direct means of 
assistance.
The 1963 state aid decisions provide strong support for HYPOTHESIS 
V_. They were an elaborate compromise: concessions in indirect and
disguised state aid in return for a restatement of opposition to direct 
aid. There is another aspect of the decisions. Here, according to one 
writer,
the A.L.P. became the first Australian political 
party to adopt a constructive education policy, 
which went beyond the usual election promises of 
more schools and more funds to basic social 
issues such as equality of education.39
The Education Committee asked the Conference to recognise 'that education
is a National responsibility which demands the enunciation of a National
Policy'. The policy adopted by the Conference contained nineteen
paragraphs covering all areas of education, primary, secondary,
technical, tertiary and special, teacher training, educational research
and cooperation between the Commonwealth and the States. But the key to
37SMH, 3 August 1963. Chamberlain merely read this vague phrase to cover 
a benefit which had been at the centre of recent party discussion (see 
above) and had not been rejected.
38ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 31. Chamberlain 
said this 'bald statement' could be 'misunderstood' (SMH, 3 August 1963).
39J.R. Lawry, 'Education', A.F. Davies & S. Encel, ed., Australian 
Society, Melbourne, 1965, 81.
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the proposals was the condemnation of the Federal government ’for its 
persistent refusal to recognise its obligations in the field of 
Education'. The report which Bryant presented was a charter for a 
massive Commonwealth role in education. The Commonwealth, through a 
new Commonwealth Department of Education, should ’administer educational
grants' under Section 96 of the Commonwealth Constitution for the wide
£ , 40range of purposes the report set out.
Commonwealth aid to education was seen differently by different
people. To Bryant, looking back in 1978, 'the issue was Federal aid to
education to get equality between States, regions, races and social
groups'. Five paragraphs of the Committee's report elaborated on 'the
application to Education of the democratic principles of freedom and
equality'. These principles led Bryant, Wood and others to reject
direct state aid because it fostered religious differences. State aid
also reduced the funds available for the state's own system. Massive
Commonwealth assistance to state education could make it 'so
overwhelmingly superior to the others, that they could not possibly 
41compete'. Such an argument would have appealed to Chamberlain, who
wrote privately after the Conference:
I believe ... that a free State secular system of 
education is the only one that should be accepted 
...,[T]he establishment and maintenance of church 
schools does, in fact, segregate the children of 
our community.... I shall always be strongly
40ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 31-6.
^Bryant to Chamberlain, 15 July 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/13/F43.
Also: Age, 27 April 1960, 26 September, 10 December 1962 (statements
by Wood as President of Victorian Council of State Schools Organisations); 
G.M. Bryant, interview; Fact, 20 May 1966 (Bryant and Wood); J.W. Wood, 
interview.
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opposed to moneys being paid from the public purse 
to perpetuate [the non-state system]. 2^
It is likely, however, that Chamberlain would have preferred not to offer
even the indirect and disguised aid permitted under the 1957 principle.
Both C.R. Cameron and J.M. Wheeldon, who were close to Chamberlain in
many attitudes, took this approach. They believed the state’s first and
exclusive responsibility was to its own system. The crux of the issue
was whether the Roman Catholic system should be assisted. It was
immoral, said Cameron, to use state funds to subsidise the teaching of
the Catholic catechism at the expense of the students of state schools.
If Catholic schools could not survive without money from the state they 
43should close. Bryant and Wood, on the other hand, were less concerned
42Chamberlain to J.V. Dolahenty, Drummoyne, NSW, 15 August 1963;
Chamberlain to S.T. Herriot, Mascot, NSW, 14 August 1963, Fed. Rec.,
NLA MS 4985/11/F14. Religious bigotry would be avoided, Chamberlain 
added, if all children received their secular education at state schools 
which allowed denominational religious instruction classes where desired.
43C.R. Cameron, J.M. Wheeldon, interviews. Cameron believed also that 
state aid was unconstitutional. Wheeldon believed that the responsibility 
to the state systems was unlimited, since there was always something to 
be done. The argument against a rival education system was the same as 
against a rival railway system. Cameron was a delegate at the 1963 
Conference, Wheeldon was not. Wheeldon was often regarded as a protege 
of Chamberlain. Chamberlain's own recollections are affected by time and 
his own reticence but he did summarise his own approach to the question 
as ’opposition to people for religious motives trying to influence the 
ALP's attitude on state aid' (F.E. Chamberlain, interview). Chamberlain 
was accused occasionally of bigotry or anti-Catholicism but K.E. Beazley, 
often his opponent, says he showed no sign of opposition to the direct 
aid concept when it was part of Labor's Federal platform before the Split. 
Beazley attributed Chamberlain's later position to the traumas of the 
Split (K.E. Beazley, interview). See also: Nation, 19 February 1966 and
note 12 above. Pro-state aid groups in the years after the Split pointed 
out that Chamberlain had not opposed the adoption of the 1951 plank 
('financial aid ... for the purpose of assisting all forms of education') 
nor the adoption in 1953 of the Federal Executive interpretation that this 
included aid to non-state systems. But majority opinion in the Western 
Australian Branch at this time favoured such aid and Chamberlain would 
have been constrained by this fact. Moreover, the 1951 plank was adopted 
on a Western Australian amendment. Chamberlain may have been bound to 
support it. The previous item from the Victorian Branch (item 39) 
favoured direct aid more explicitly and Chamberlain supported the Committee 
recommendation to discharge it (that is, he opposed the item) while 
Beazley and Senator Nash, the leading WA pro-aiders, opposed the
185
with the moral aspects than with those of wasteful duplication and
accountability for public money. These were at the same time arguments
which supported Commonwealth government aid to education and denied
state aid. Bryant was less concerned with forcing the private systems
out of existence than was Cameron. Being for or against state aid was
44less important to him than being for the state systems.
There were other participants to be considered. Keeffe, Federal 
President of the party, was a Catholic who sent his children to Catholic 
schools but did not believe the state should subsidise him to do so.
’It’s my business and I’m prepared to pay for it’. Calwell, who had the 
additional goal of an attractive, comprehensive education policy to 
present to the voters, agreed with Keeffe on the importance of 
Commonwealth aid but was more prepared to concede that it could be spent 
on scholarships for non-state students. 'If the parents wish their 
children to have, in addition to a sound, secular education, a particular
form of spiritual upbringing, there can be no valid objection to the
45scholarship being taken out at a school which provides it'. Among the
43 (continued)
recommendation (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1951, 20; 
1953, 17). The best interpretation seems to be that Chamberlain, like 
half his countrymen in the early 1950s, opposed direct aid but was in a 
minority in the WA State Executive on this question. His opposition was 
hardened by the events of the Split which also helped alter the numbers 
on the issue at the State and Federal levels of the ALP.
44G.M. Bryant, J.W. Wood, interviews. Bryant believed that granting 
direct aid would itself break down the autonomy of the private systems - 
that they were probably signing their own warrant for a gradual death or 
absorption - since governments would have to exert control over the 
expenditure of the money provided and, secondly, since the private systems 
would be asked to accept, as the price of aid, pupils from overcrowded 
state schools.
45J.B. Keeffe, interview; Sun (Melbourne), 8 August 1963 (Calwell). Neither 
Calwell nor Keeffe were Conference delegates but Keeffe was a member of 
the Federal Executive and had been involved in the discussions of the 
Education Committee report there. Calwell's role, as we have shown, was 
as interpreter and presenter of policy at election times. He would have 
been seeking to make this policy as attractive as possible and was present 
at the Conference venue in Perth to do just that. Keeffe's main direct 
contribution to the Conference education debate will be mentioned shortly.
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State delegations to the Conference, individuals like J. Duggan of
Queensland, Lacey of Tasmania and Dunstan of South Australia were
generally favourable to direct aid. Some of their colleagues would go
no further than scholarships or travel concessions. The Tasmanians
knew their State Labor Government was favourable to direct aid and that
it had introduced a wide range of disguised aid measures. The South
Australians knew the State ALP Branch had long supported free text
books and school requisites for all children. Both delegations were
aware that State Premiers were straining to find funds to fulfil
A 6existing commitments, let alone new ones. Labor’s Deputy Federal 
Leader, Whitlam, had recently remarked that no State could afford to 
assist church schools without Commonwealth funds.^
Many goals, then, could be fulfilled through Commonwealth finance 
for education. Labor people could support this proposal who wanted 
handouts to Catholic parish schools or a many-faceted education 
programme, who wanted to satisfy the demands of Catholic pressure groups 
or to evolve a universal education system which dissolved sectarian 
lines and made men equal, who wanted to augment State coffers or promote 
centralised government based on Canberra. There is in ALP support in 
1963 for greater Commonwealth finance for education much of Lindblom's
On Tasmanian measures by 1963: R.P. Davis, A Guide to the State Aid
Tangle in Tasmania, Hobart, 1974, 63, 107. In South Australia, the 
election policy of 1962 (Advertiser, 8 February 1962) can be traced back 
in party platforms to at least 1934.
^ D T , 4, 8 July 1963; Mercury, 8 July 1963; SMH, 8 July 1963.
Whitlam had based a speech on the need for greater Commonwealth 
initiatives in education but had pointed out that Canberra could not be 
expected to subsidise inefficiency and wasteful duplication of systems. 
Archbishop Mannix took offence at what he understood to be a gibe at 
the Catholic system but Whitlam insisted he had been referring to the 
lack of uniformity in syllabuses between the States.
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concept of 'partisan mutual adjustment' upon which we based our
HYPOTHESIS XIV. The one proposal is matched to multiple goals; money
from Canberra is at the root of the solution of all problems. While
almost every plank of the programme was carried unanimously, we have
little evidence of what, if any, 'adjusting' occurred to produce these
votes. It is probable that little face-to-face lobbying was needed;
all delegates knew the States were chronically short of money; since
1957 all State Branches except Tasmania had supported Commonwealth
finance for education in Conference agenda items and the 1957 and 1961
48Federal Conferences had endorsed the idea. But Commonwealth finance
and Commonwealth initiatives were more than panaceas for multiple ills.
In the context of 1963 unanimous support for an alternative education
policy enabled delegates to avoid confrontation over direct state aid.
It was true that the reaffirmation in paragraph 10 of 'no direct aid'
narrowed the intended scope of Commonwealth assistance but the intention
was to channel the energies of the direct aiders into support for massive
funds for education, including indirect aid. The brewing differences
within the party over state aid could be sunk in support for a
49constructive and comprehensive education policy.
48ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1957, 75-6; 1961, 18-21.
Evidence of decisionmakers 'partisan mutual adjusting' would be evidence 
of them actually seeking 'a way in which a policy [they desire] can serve 
the values of another ... to whom the persuasion is directed' (Charles E. 
Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, Englewood Cliffs, NJ., 1968, 33. See 
above, chapter 2, pp.153-7). But the existence of a decision which seems to 
satisfy multiple goals also serves as evidence that at least some 
partisan mutual adjustment has occurred.
49Bryant remembers that some of those who sought Commonwealth finance for 
education always had the nagging worry that it would lead to state aid 
(G.M. Bryant, interview). The adoption of paragraph 10 would have 
precluded this for a Labor Federal Government, at least. Note that 
L. Haylen, former MP, attributes to Calwell a fear similar to Bryant's. 
'Calwell's instinct was right here', said Haylen. 'The great new deal 
for education became a new deal for Catholic education'. (Australian,
11 January 1965).
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Yet agreement did not mean that the direct aiders had forgotten 
their cause. The New South Wales Conference decision of 1963 asked 
the State Government to provide direct aid in the form of science 
laboratories. How did this decision affect the Federal Conference? 
Obviously, the delegates could not ignore it. Anti-direct aid pressure 
groups sought to influence the Conference not to follow New South Wales; 
journalists speculated about the Conference's reaction to the changed 
circumstances."^ While in the decision which eventually emerged the 
panacea of Commonwealth assistance was meant to satisfy the direct aiders 
from New South Wales as much as the centralisers and the educational 
reformers, avoiding the battle did not solve the problem. Instead, the 
Conference majority tried to solve the problem by a combination of 
concession and threat. We have seen that the implicit promise of 
scholarships was repeated in return for the reaffirmation of 'no direct 
aid'. Commonwealth finance was to ensure the scholarships were adequately 
funded. Thirdly, since the Committee suggestion of use of science 
laboratories was a concession to the special needs of science education in 
the non-state schools, its adoption by the Conference (by way of ChamberLain's 
interpretation) could be seen as a 'face saver' for the New South Wales 
Branch. Fourthly, Keeffe ruled that Bryant's supplementary 'Suggested 
Statement on Aid to Private Schools' was 'out of order, as it did not 
represent part of the Committee's report'. This ruling may have been 
based on a judgment of the statement's relevance but there is evidence
"^Opposition from unions, state school parent and teacher organisations, 
Protestant churches, etc: Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/11/F14. Press
speculation: Age, 9 July 1963; Bulletin, 20 July 1963; Nation,
27 July 1963; SMH, 9, 29 July 1963.
^Bulletin, 20 July 1963 gave this interpretation after the suggestion 
had passed the Executive. A Conference delegate remembered it as a 
concession to NSW (J.P. Toohey, interview).
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that more than this consideration was involved. Chamberlain had told
the June Executive meeting that he would seek at the Conference to
discharge the supplementary statement, apparently because of its
amplification of fringe benefit concessions. By the end of the Conference,
Chamberlain and others had conceded the plank of fringe benefits, but
the supplementary statement was still objectionable to other people for
other reasons: it supported too positively Bryant’s idea of a universal
state education system. Bryant regarded the statement as one of the few
attempts made by the party to work out an honest, coherent attitude to
state aid in its proper context, 'but the issue was dodged'. He heard
another delegate mutter, 'they've sold the pass'. The reason for
discretion was exemplified in the final paragraph of the statement which
asserted that, since 'many non-State schools foster privilege and social
inequality', the goal of 'a society of free and equal citizens' could be
achieved 'only in the full development of a national system of 
52Education ...'. There was no question of suppressing the statement,
since it had already appeared in the press, but not discussing or
endorsing it avoided needlessly antagonising potential Labor voters or
provoking Conference delegates who favoured direct aid or at least
53resented slurs on the non-state schools.
52ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 36; G.M. Bryant, 
interview; Suggested Statement on Aid to Private Schools, Fed. Rec.,
NLA MS 4985/13/F43. For Chamberlain at the Federal Executive, see above.
53In the press: Age, 1 August 1963; SMH, 25 July 1963. Other parts of
the statement argued that direct aid 'would tend to widen the gap in 
society' and resented imputations of the 'moral and ethical insufficiency' 
of state schools. Bryant saw the statement as a battle cry for the 
state system. He regretted the Committee had lacked the time 'to put 
more teeth into the proposals' and hoped the statement or something like 
it could be publicised, 'perhaps as a direct answer to Dr Mannix, who is 
on the rampage again' (Bryant to Chamberlain, 15 July 1963, Fed. Rec.,
NLA MS 4985/13/F43). On Mannix' recent remarks, see note 47 above.
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These concessions were accompanied by a veiled threat which led to
the only lengthy debate on the Education Committee report. The Committee
had recommended, as early as April 1963, that '[a]11 State Branches ...
should re-examine their policies on Education, in order to harmonize
them with Federal Policy’. The Conference, aware of the New South Wales
resolution supporting direct aid for science facilities, changed ’should’
to 'shall'. This change was not made without a struggle, for it was
rightly regarded by New South Wales delegates as an indication that the
Branch's approach was unsatisfactory to the Federal Conference majority.
Still, the majority resisted any temptation to make an example of New
South Wales, giving it instead the opportunity to rest on the concessions
gained. Fulfilment of the veiled threat would depend on how the Branch
54reacted to the Federal decisions.
NEW SOUTH WALES, THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE AND MENZIES 1963-1964
The implementation of the New South Wales Conference science blocks 
decision depended first on the New South Wales Labor Government.
Financial considerations seemed to influence its first reaction. Wetherell, 
the Education minister, wrote to Colbourne on 8 August that science 
facilities in state schools were inadequate, let alone those elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, a cryptic sentence suggested that the Cabinet was not 
deterred by the Federal Conference decision: 'The question of state aid
to non-departmental schools is entirely in the field of Government 
policy' .^J If this was defiance of the Perth Conference it was supported
54ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 32-3. Two NSW 
amendments were defeated 8-28 and 15-21. The pro-direct aid strength 
at the Conference was somewhere between these two losing votes, comprising 
probably the NSW delegation, all or most of the Tasmanians and individual 
delegates from other States.
"^Wetherell to Colbourne, 8 August 1963, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/123/133-5.
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by the attitudes of the returning New South Wales delegates who claimed,
according to one report, that the paragraph 10 formulation, 'provided
they do so at their own cost', was a mere platitude and not meant to
restrict State Labor Governments.^ This interpretation was followed by
a unanimous State Executive resolution that the science laboratories
resolution 'in no way conflicts with Federal Policy'. The Premier,
Heffron, was advised accordingly.^ Matters then developed rapidly.
Chamberlain repeated his interpretation that the Federal decision allowed
only use, not provision of science facilities; the New South Wales
Executive officers accused him of misinterpreting the decision; Calwell
and Whitlam, fearing a public battle between New South Wales and the
Federal Executive, conferred with State Cabinet ministers to find a
formula to satisfy both the State Executive officers urging a measure of
direct aid and the Federal Executive opposing it; the Cabinet, claiming
it was short of money and of time before the State Budget to introduce
a costly laboratory building programme, provided willing listeners
although Heffron assured the NSWCE officers that science laboratories
58for all schools remained part of State party policy.
The formula appeared in the State Budget of 25 September: means-
tested allowances of £21 per annum to twenty thousand senior secondary
DT, 2 August 1963. Chamberlain's interpretation about fringe benefits 
was provoked by such comments but press observers noted that the party 
still did not say 'no Labor Government may offer direct state aid'.
'The motions ... are so ambiguous', wrote Alan Reid (DT, 2 August 1963) 
'that the Right and Left wings are interpreting them as endorsing both 
their opposed policies'. Similarly: Age, 5, 6 August 1963; Bulletin,
10 August 1963; West Australian, 2, 5 August 1963.
^Circular 63/135, 30/8/63 Officers Report 'A', enclosure, J.D. Garland 
to Chamberlain, 6 September 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/11/F14 
(Garland, a minority representative on the NSWCE,was complaining of 
developments in NSW regarding state aid); SMH, 31 August 1963.
S8W.R. Colbourne, R.R. Downing, J.B. Renshaw, interviews; SMH, 2-4,
24-6 September 1963; Sunday Telegraph, 1 September 1963.
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students, provided they lived away from home if they attended state
schools, but with no such proviso if they attended non-state schools.
The Budget did not mention science laboratories but the Federal 
Executive, meeting a few days later, resolved by eight votes to four, 
with Oliver speaking in opposition, that the allowances scheme, too, was 
against Federal policy, that the NSWCE deserved great censure for its 
contrary advice, which had 'grossly misled' the Government, and that 
future initiatives in this area by State Branches must be submitted for 
Federal Executive consideration.*^ What led to this decision? Commentators 
pointed out that while the allowances scheme was technically indirect aid, 
in that it was paid to the parent rather than the school, it was available 
to all non-state students who passed the means test but only to those 
state students who lived away from home. This element of discrimination 
may have annoyed some Federal Executive delegates. Further, while not 
direct aid in the strict sense, the allowances scheme was much more 
comprehensive than the existing bursaries scheme and was thus worth far 
more to non-state education. Executive delegates knew that a type of 
allowance scheme had been one of Cardinal Gilroy's requests of September 
1962 and they may have been aware of the hierarchy's argument that the 
form of aid was less important than the amount. Since Catholic spokesmen
59
59New South Wales Parliamentary Debates (NSWPD), Third series, 47, Assembly, 
25 September 1963, 5300-01 (J.B. Renshaw, Treasurer). Incidentally, the 
estimated cost of the allowances in a full year, £400,000,casts doubt on 
the argument that the State lacked money for science blocks. According 
to one report the NSWCE officers were seeking for the latter scheme an 
initial outlay of £100,000 or less (SMH, 24 September 1963). The 
Electoral effects of a fight between the State Branch and the Federal 
Executive over science blocks may have been important for the Government, too.
*^C-M, 5 October 1963; D/T, 4, 7 October 1963; FX 30 September-3 October 
1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/125/57/188-91; Nation, 5 October 1953; SMH,
3-5 October 1963. The meeting was in Adelaide and press reports had the 
final vote as 7-4 with Dunstan absent in Parliament. However, the Minutes 
show that G.T. Virgo replaced Dunstan and the final vote was 8-4. The 
minority was Colbourne, Oliver, Lacey and C.H. Webb, MP, of Western 
Australia.
193
welcomed the Budget some Federal delegates could have seen the scheme as 
an outcome of religious pressure. New South Wales Cabinet members and 
State Executive officers, recalling the events of 1963, drew little 
distinction between direct and indirect aid, defining the issue rather as 
the needs of non-state, especially Catholic education and the need to win 
Catholic votes. Perhaps this attitude came through to the Federal 
Executive majority which felt that, somehow, the spirit of the Brisbane 
Conference decision, which could be distilled as 'opposition to 
subsidies for religion', if not the letter of Federal policy had been 
flouted. ^ ^
Those who opposed the Federal Executive leaned towards other
explanations. There was some suggestion that heated arguments at the
Federal Executive andCooire v e b e t w e e n  Chamberlain and Colbourne and,
to a lesser extent, Oliver, had aroused old enmities bred at the time
of the Split. From this viewpoint, the Federal censure of New South
6 2Wales was a personal vendetta by Chamberlain. More broadly, according 
to New South Wales sources, the Federal action arose from a desire to 
'get' or 'score against' New South Wales, whatever the ostensible cause. 
The desire of the New South Wales Branch and Government to provide direct
By 1963 less than a thousand non-state students received bursaries. 
Gilroy had suggested 'scholarship allowances' of £30 per annum available 
to all students. On the 'amount versus type' argument, see Hogan, The 
Catholic Campaign ..., 247. For the Catholic reaction: SMH,
26 September 1963. ALP views: W.R. Colbourne, R.R. Downing, C.T. Oliver,
J.B. Renshaw, interviews.
f. 9
DT, 4 October 1963; SMH, 2 August, 4 October 1963. At the Executive 
meeting Chamberlain presented a report on the New South Wales position 
and suggested it should be investigated in relation to Federal policy.
The successful motion was moved as an amendment by Brebner and Virgo 
but allegedly drafted by Chamberlain. Earlier Chamberlain had seconded 
a rather milder motion. Chamberlain was thus involved in three approaches 
to the problem, suggesting his close personal interest.
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state aid may have been seen by the ’principled’ Chamberlain and his
supporters as mere vote-seeking, especially since the issue was so
redolent of the Split. But the New South Welshmen denied it was
reprehensible either to seek to maintain power or to benefit a deserving
and Labor-supporting element of the electorate. Some of them also
6 3reciprocated the personal bitterness of Chamberlain.
The Federal Executive had directed its President, Keeffe, and
outgoing and incoming Secretaries, Chamberlain and Wyndham, to confer
with NSWCE officers and Government ministers ’to ensure the Federal
policy will be rigidly adhered to’. The outcome of the Federal officers'
visit to Sydney was a finding that the allowances scheme 'was not in
keeping with Federal policy' but had been proposed in the 'firm belief’
that it was. No action was taken but the whole state aid issue was
referred to the 1965 Federal Conference. Meanwhile, the allowances
scheme could go ahead. State Branches were reminded, nevertheless, that
under the Federal Executive decision, any future proposals to introduce
or support new legislation or to extend existing ’aid to private schools'
64must be referred to the Executive for 'consideration and advice'.
The 'get NSW' motive was suggested by Colbourne, Oliver and Renshaw 
(interviews). Chamberlain's memory of events is clouded but Keeffe 
genuinely believed the allowances scheme was 'dicey' in relation to 
Federal policy (interview). Colbourne took little part in the 
discussions (below) with the Federal representatives because, as he 
recalled (with some passion) telling Oliver after the October Federal 
Executive meeting, 'they've painted me as being a vindictive state 
aider and sectarianist'. He remembers being disappointed at the 
outcome of the Federal visit to Sydney because Chamberlain had been 
'let off' too easily. Renshaw, on the other hand, recalls Chamberlain 
was 'not as unreasonable as people thought' over this issue and 
generally.
64Agenda Attachment D: State Aid to Private Schools. Report of the
General Secretary [C.S. Wyndham] on the Visit of the Federal Executive 
Delegation to New South Wales, October 1963; FX 3-5 March 1964, Fed. 
Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/35, 37.
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The details of this visit are ignored in the present study.^ It is 
necessary, instead, to give a brief account of subsequent events to 
provide a link to the events of 1965-66.
We have concentrated so far on the formulation of the education 
decisions at the 1963 Perth Federal Conference, finding support there for 
our HYPOTHESES V (the search for compromise) and XIV (the process of 
partisan mutual adjustment). Labor’s state aid decisions over the period 
1957 to 1963 exemplify also the phenomenon of ’disjointed incrementalism' 
(HYPOTHESIS XV). Throughout these years the party sought a balance 
between the potentially conflicting considerations of preserving the 
principle of 'no direct aid’ and winning Catholic votes. HYPOTHESIS III, 
the conflict between exclusive and inclusive approaches to the electorate, 
seems central. HYPOTHESIS IX (relations with Catholics) is also relevant 
since the strongest demands for state aid came from Catholics and one of 
the strongest reasons for resisting direct aid was the memory of the 
activities _of Catholics in the ALP prior to the Split of 1955. Catholic 
votes were apparently at risk and the Catholic hierarchy had access to 
the New South Wales Branch, which by 1963 was assuming the leadership of 
the pro-aid forces within the party. Federal Conference and Executive 
decisions on state aid emerged out of the conflicting views of the New 
South Wales Branch and other Branches (HYPOTHESIS I). For the moment, New 
South Wales was in the minority.
We have said little yet about the ALP's relationship with the Federal 
Liberal-Country Party Government (HYPOTHESIS XIII). This relationship
f) sThe details are covered in Age, 4, 9, 10 October 1963; DT, 5,
12 October 1963; Nation, 19 October 1963; SMH, 9, 12 October 1963;
Sunday Telegraph, 6 October 1963. These versions are receioiruaibly accurate, 
to judge by the document in note 64 and the recollections of participants. 
The brief account of Graham Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, South 
Melbourne, 1977, 28-9, is inaccurate in details and unfair in 
interpretation.
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was to lie at the base of Labor’s approach to state aid after late 1963.
Ten days after the Federal visit to New South Wales, Prime Minister
Menzies announced that an election for the House of Representatives
would be held on 30 November. In his policy speech for that election
Menzies promised to provide, if re-elected, £5 million per annum for
science buildings and facilities in secondary schools. The money was to
be distributed, on the basis of the overall populations in the different
systems, 'to all secondary schools, Government or independent, without
66discrimination’. Although modest, this proposal was clearly direct aid
and was, equally clearly, exactly what the New South Wales Conference of
the ALP had sought five months earlier. The innovation was not
trumpeted, perhaps because of the danger of arousing dissension within
the Liberal Party, but it was a new direction for the Liberals for all 
6 7that. Against it, Calwell set Labor’s education policy, far more
Liberal Party of Australia, Federal Election 1963 Policy Speech (Prime 
Minister, Sir Robert Menzies), Melbourne, November 12, 1963, Canberra, 
1963, 21-2. My emphasis.
6 7Federal Liberals had been even more wary of state aid than was the ALP. 
When asked in August 1960 if his Government favoured state aid, Menzies 
replied that 'the honourable member puts to me a question that is 
outside the jurisdiction of this Government'. When the Anglican Bishop 
Loane claimed late in 1962 that the Cabinet was considering direct aid 
the Prime Minister replied scathingly. The New South Wales Branch of 
the Country Party had decided in favour of state aid in 1961 and some 
elements of the Liberal Party wished to follow suit. These non-Labor 
moves probably encouraged the State Labor Government to become more 
amenable to Catholic requests. But the internal unrest they provoked 
within the Liberal and Country Parties as well as their apparent failure 
to attract votes at the 1962 New South Wales election seemed to have set 
back state aid in these parties. The main exception was in the 
Australian Capital Territory, where since 1956 the Government had 
provided some direct aid. But this was seen as a special case because 
the non-state schools were providing a 'public service' in helping to 
absorb the rapid growth of Canberra's school age population. There 
were also subventions to mission schools in the Northern Territory and 
Papua New Guinea, again in a special category, and to some denominational 
colleges at universities. These developments are summarised in:
Albinski, The Australian Labor Party and the Aid to Parochial Schools 
Controversy, 5-9; Hogan, The Catholic Campaign ..., 20-6.
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comprehensive but lacking any direct state aid. When the results were 
posted, Menzies' majority had grown from two to twenty-two and Labor had 
lost ten seats, seven of them in New South Wales, where its vote slumped 
by five per cent.^
This defeat had at least four consequences for the ALP. First, it 
added to pressures already existing within the party for some 
organisational reform which would reduce the relative influence of the 
Federal machine in making and protecting decisions with electoral 
consequences. The image of the Federal 'enforcers' intimidating the 
New South Wales Government over state aid may have helped reinforce the 
bogey of outside control of the ALP. The fact that the 'intimidation' 
was less than completely successful was relatively unimportant.^
Secondly, the 1963 election marked an important change in the 
relationship between Calwell and his Deputy Leader, Whitlam. In a 
report to the New South Wales Executive after the election Whitlam
68SMH, 19 November 1963. Based on the 1963 Conference decisions, the 
promises included: 500,000 secondary scholarships for state and non­
state pupils, emergency educational grant to the States, Commonwealth 
Education ministry, extended child endowment, Commonwealth education 
inquiry, use of science and other facilities at state schools by non­
state pupils.
69Malcolm Mackerras, Australian General Elections, Sydney, 1972, 220, 
229-30.
^This issue will be discussed further in chapter 5 of the thesis. It 
is worth noting here that there was possibly more scope for the 
intimidation argument in the events (largely behind the scenes) which 
led to the change from science blocks to allowances than in the Federal 
visit. But the latter was public and thus provided more electoral 
kudos for the Liberals. It may also have provided the occasion for 
the election itself. Menzies may have hoped to capitalise on Labor's 
discomfiture. For discussion of why the election came when it did 
and, more importantly, of the complex of reasons which may have lain 
behind Menzies' direct aid offer, see: Albinski, The Australian Labor
Party and the Aid to Parochial Schools Controversy, 22-3; Gill, 'The 
Federal Science Grant', 275-86; Hogan, The Catholic Campaign ..., 83- 
91; Smart, Federal Aid to Australian Schools ..., 72-118.
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mentioned, among many factors which might have contributed to Labor's
performance, that Calwell, after the near victory in 1961, 'did not
speak or act as impressively as Sir Robert Menzies'.7  ^The report
became public and was interpreted by Calwell as evidence that Whitlam
sought to replace him as Leader. Other Caucus members also discussed
the possibility of Calwell stepping down. It was not unreasonable for
his colleagues to assume that Calwell would soon retire gracefully,
since he was almost sixty-eight years old, but Calwell resolved to
72remain in his position. Some observers saw Calwell's election to the
Victorian Central Executive in June 1964 as part of an attempt to
establish a power base against Whitlam's challenge in return for Calwell
giving his support to the Victorian Branch on issues such as unity 
73tickets. While Whitlam preferred to wait for the Leadership rather
71Age, DT, SMH, 14 April 1964.
72The two main protagonists' versions are given in A.A. Calwell, Be Just 
and Fear Not, Hawthorn, Vic., 1972, 226-7; Freudenberg, A Certain 
Grandeur, 21-3. There was considerable speculation as to how the report 
became public. Some suspected Calwell, others Whitlam. The report was 
one of about seventy requested by the NSWCE from Federal candidates and 
local party organisations. (There was a similar fact-finding exercise 
in Victoria and probably in other States as well.) Calwell and seventeen 
branches in Whitlam's electorate, as well as the NSWCE, apparently 
received copies of the Whitlam document, so it is not surprising that it 
'leaked'. But if it had remained private, there may have been less 
pressure on Calwell to guard his flank, already vulnerable in view of 
press speculation about his future: Age, 18 February, 21 April 1964;
CT, 3 March 1964; DT^ , 30 January 1964; Nation, 18 April 1964.
73Australian, DT, 23 July 1964; S. Encel, 'The Labor Party and the 
Future', AQ, 36, 3 (September 1964), 21-3; James Jupp, 'Victoriana', 
Dissent, 13 (Spring 1964), 37; SMH, 23, 28 July 1964. The initiative 
for Calwell standing seems to have come from J. Cairns, MP, and it serves 
as a minor example of partisan mutual adjustment: Cairns argued to the
controllers of the Victorian Branch that the possibility of Federal 
intervention, then rumoured, could be forestalled by introducing an 
element of balance or representativeness to the VCE. To Calwell, the 
proposal seemed attractive for the power base reasons although his 
publicly expressed reasons included improving the ALP vote in Victoria 
and opposing those who wished to truckle with the DLP. (Cairns drafted 
the press release.) Cairns himself was elected with Calwell: J.F. Cairns,
F. Crean, interviews; Hartley to Calwell, 16 July 1964, enclosing draft 
press release, Vic. Rec., Parliamentarians A - C 1964.
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than press Calwell in 1964, the relationship between the two men became 
increasingly strained. At crucial points in the next two years the issue 
of who would lead the party, Calwell, a successor bearing his imprimatur, 
Whitlam or someone else, became entangled with Labor’s approach to state 
aid.
Thirdly, the New South Wales Labor Government, perceiving the
apparent electoral effects of state aid, became more eager allies of the
controlling group in the NSWCE in seeking a change in Federal Labor
policy or at least in extending the boundaries of the existing policy as
far as they could stretch. When the New South Wales Branch Annual
Conference met in June 1964, J.B. Renshaw, the new Premier, told delegates
that education policy should be the concern of State Branches alone,
since it involved expenditure of State government funds. Both he and
74Oliver criticised the Federal visit to New South Wales. The Conference 
itself endorsed an Education Committee recommendation for subsidies 
towards the purchase by secondary schools, both state and non-state, of 
text books for hiring out to pupils. This decision provoked the Federal 
Executive, by a vote of seven to five, with Oliver and Colbourne opposed, 
to remind New South Wales that any extension of state aid had to be 
submitted to it for approval.^ The New South Wales Committee had denied
74ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1964 Annual Conference, 1-4; Premier 
Renshaw Suggests Alteration of ALP Structure, June 13 1964, Fed. Rec., NLA 
MS 4985/59/ALP - Federal Organisation; J.B. Renshaw, interview; SMH,
15 June 1964.
^ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1964 Annual Conference, 27-8; FX 
4-6 August 1964, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/35; SMH, 16 June, 7 August 
1964. After the passage of the FX motion, Oliver and Colbourne moved:
'That the Federal Executive convene a Conference of Federal Party officers, 
Federal Parliamentary Labor Party Leaders and the Leaders of all State 
Parliamentary Labor Parties for the purpose of defining the rights and 
authority of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party and the State 
Parliamentary Labor Parties under the Federal [ALP] Constitution and 
State Constitutions'. This was an expression of New South Wales distaste 
at recent Federal activities. But Cameron, a proxy delegate from South 
Australia, pointed out that the words '"defining the rights and authority" 
give a body other than the Federal Executive or Federal Conference a power 
not provided for in the Constitution'. Cameron's point of order was 
upheld and the motion ruled out of order.
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they intended aid to the school, since they envisaged the school acting
merely as administrator of a scheme designed for the benefit of pupils
7 6and the financial relief of their parents’. In any event, after a 
discussion between Keeffe, Wyndham and the NSWCE officers the scheme 
was allowed to proceed. Nevertheless, there remained the resentment of 
the New South Wales Branch and Government at their inability to offer 
clearcut direct aid.^
’ Fourthly, the 1963 election left among many Federal Labor
politicians, as well as in New South Wales, a feeling that the ALP must
make an attractive counter offer if it were not to lose Catholic votes
to the Liberals - or the DLP, which assiduously claimed the credit for
78Menzies' reversal. Many Labor men, from Calwell down, believed that
state aid had won the Liberals many votes. 'I have no doubt', the
Leader wrote, 'that the State Aid issue did weigh heavily against us,
79particularly in New South Wales'. While it is notoriously difficult
Education Committee. Re Conference Decisions-on Textbook Subsidy [n.d. 
but bears pencil note: 'Stencil done 23/6/64'] NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/123/
281/85-7.
^ Australian, 17, 18, 31 August 1964; correspondence and reports of 
discussion between NSWCE and FX representatives, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/ 
112/256/441-77; CT, 26-29 August 1964; SMH, 3, 18, 26-28 August 1964; 
Sun-Herald, 16 August 1964.
78Albinski, The Australian Labor Party and the Aid to Parochial Schools 
Controversy, 23; Frank McManus, The Tumult and the Shouting, Adelaide, 
1977, 153, 161-3.
79Calwell to [addressee unknown], 4 February 1964, Vic. Rec., packet of 
letters, 1964-67,’Mr Calwell - Personal'. Also: J.L. Armitage,
F. Crean, interviews; Maurice Isaacs, 'Federal Election Report - North 
Sydney Electorate, 1963', A.P.SA.News, 9, 1 (March 1964), 12-13. Mulvihill 
to James Callaghan, MP, London, 14 January 1964, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/ 
58/125/433; post mortems from campaign workers, etc., Vic. Rec.,
Hon. R.W. Holt, Federal Election Survey Committee 1964. Such evidence 
shows that state aid was by no means the only factor seen to have 
contributed. Others were Labor's foreign policy, the 'Communist scare', 
doubts about the independence of ALP politicians from outside control, 
the assassination of President Kennedy and so on. Chagrin in NSW over 
science blocks was increased because the Branch had 'thought of it first', 
while general disappointment at the result was enhanced because many in 
the ALP were extremely confident of victory.
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to discover voters' motives, a politician's perception of reasons
provides just as good a determinant of his future actions as do
objective data. In which direction his actions are bent is quite
another matter. For some Caucus members evidence of state aid's
electoral significance was a message to Labor to follow the Liberals,
for others a spur to promote a comprehensive alternative policy, for
others an occasion to cry a plague on aggressive pressure groups and
turncoat Liberal governments. When Menzies' science block legislation
came before Parliament, therefore, a Caucus meeting divided forty-four
votes to twenty-eight in deciding not to oppose the legislation while
moving an amendment to it. Speakers on both sides admitted that the
legislation was against existing Labor policy but those Caucus members
80prevailed who believed it political folly to oppose the bill.
1965-1966
All four resultants of the 1963 election, the controversies over the 
Leadership and organisation of the party, the exasperation of the New 
South Wales Branch at its inability to offer direct aid and the feeling 
in Caucus that Labor was being left behind on the education issue, 
underlay events in the ALP concerning state aid during 1965 and 1966. 
Indeed, these issues and others were inextricably intertwined with 
Labor's approach to the state aid question.
80The minority believed the fact that the legislation was against ALP 
policy required Caucus to oppose it automatically but the Federal 
Executive, despite Western Australian attempts to convene a Special 
Federal Conference to determine the party's approach, had allowed 
Caucus to determine its own attitude to the legisation. The amendment 
incorporated parts of ALP education policy as adopted at the 1963 
Conference: CPD H. of R. 42, 14, 19 May 1964, 1929, 2030-2; DT_, 5,
12 March, 14 May 1964; FX 3-5 March, 4-6 August 1964, Fed. Rec., NLA 
MS 4985/119/35; SMH, 4-6 March, 14 May 1964.
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THE 1965 FEDERAL CONFERENCE
The Federal Executive had referred state aid to the 1965 Federal
Conference, due to meet in Sydney on 2 August. Meanwhile, Labor in
New South Wales suffered further electoral setbacks. In December 1964
Labor's vote in New South Wales in the Senate election fell again and to
a greater extent than in any other State. Then, on 1 May 1965, Labor
81lost power in New South Wales after twenty-four years. State aid was
not a conspicuous issue during the Senate campaign and even in the case
of the State poll one should be wary of attributing the loss of power
82'principally to State aid'. As in all elections, multiple issues may
have assisted to swing votes. Voters may have been influenced, too, by
the feeling that Labor had grown tired in office and lost touch with the 
8 3electorate. Nevertheless, state aid was a conspicuous issue in this 
campaign, especially in its closing stages, and conspicuous issues tend 
to be remembered in party post mortems. The Liberal Opposition promised 
direct aid in the form of loan interest subsidies for non-state school 
building programmes. The DLP, itself offering direct aid, urged Catholic 
parents and clerics to give their preferences to the Liberals. To 
counter the Liberal plan, Renshaw promised the text book hiring subsidy
The Labor vote declined by 5 per cent and the party lost nine of the 
fifty-four seats it held in the old Legislative Assembly. The Senate 
figures showed the Labor vote in NSW had declined 1.6 per cent on the 
1961 figures while the Labor vote throughout Australia remained stable. 
The Liberal-Country Party vote rose 7.0 per cent in NSW against 3.6 per 
cent nationally. But Labor still performed better for the Senate in NSW 
than in the nation as a whole (46.0 to 44.7 per cent): Colin A. Hughes,
A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1965-1974, Canberra, 
1977, 105-6; Colin A. Hughes & B.D. Graham, A Handbook of Australian 
Government and Politics 1890-1964, Canberra, 1968, 410, 416, 419-20, 
459-60.
^Colin A. Hughes, 'Political Review', AQ, 37, 3 (September 1965), 109.
8 3Some post mortems cataloguing reasons: Don Aitkin, The Country Party
in New South Wales, Canberra, 1972, 67 ; Australian, 12 May 1965; DT,
3 May 1965; Socialist and Industrial Labor, July 1965, 4.
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scheme and an expanded secondary bursary scheme. Anything further, he
said, was precluded by financial considerations. Privately, he might
84have blamed Federal Labor policy.
The New South Wales election provoked some Labor men into action
on the education question. Two days after the election, when the result
was still uncertain, the Federal Education Committee, with Deputy Leader
Whitlam in attendance, resolved to ask the State Committees 'to examine
the position of non-State schools in order to determine the size of the
problem' and to seek for itself information on the subject 'from all
possible sources'. The Committee also decided to recommend the deletion
of the words 'at their own cost' from clause 4 of the Education platform,
8Cwhich had been paragraph 10 when adopted at the 1963 Federal Conference.
A week later, with the election clearly lost, Whitlam told the
Queensland Branch that state aid had come to stay. It was 'ironical',
he said, that Labor 'should now repeatedly be defeated on a policy which
86it initiated at the 1951 Federal Conference'. The following week, 
Whitlam, supported by McKenna and Kennelly, the two Senate Leaders, 
challenged Calwell's attempt to have Labor oppose the second reading of
84Albinski, The Australian Labor Party and the Aid to Parochial Schools 
Controversy, 29-32; Trevor Matthews, 'The Campaign in the State', John 
Power, ed., Politics in a Suburban Community, Sydney, 1968, 5-31 
(Matthews' account underlines the many other issues beside state aid); 
J.B. Renshaw, Labor - 24 Years Trusted Leadership, [Sydney, 1965], 112- 
17; SMH, 9-30 April 1965. As in 1963, there is some doubt about the 
financial argument: Labor's text book scheme alone was costed at £1 
million while the Liberals only felt it necessary to offer £200,000 
worth of direct aid. Would Labor have offered more than the Liberals 
if it had been able to under Federal policy?
85Education Standing Committee, Minutes, 3 May 1965, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 
4985/2 envelope labelled 'Education Committee Minutes, 3rd May 1965'. 
The Federal Leader and his Deputy had the right to attend all Federal 
Committee meetings.
86SMH, 11 May 1965. Whitlam also circulated to the Western Australian 
Fabian Society a pamphlet in similar vein but written before the 
election (West Australian, 15 May 1965).
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a bill to extend the Commonwealth science laboratories scheme. Calwell 
argued that, regardless of its action in 1964 (when he had agreed Labor 
should move an amendment rather than oppose the second reading) Caucus 
should now oppose legislation so clearly against ALP policy. Whitlam 
replied that, just as in 1964, opposition was electoral madness.
Calwell's motion was lost 32-34 and Labor did not oppose the second 
reading, moving instead, as in 1964, an amendment incorporating parts of 
ALP education policy. The Parliamentary tactic had not changed in 
twelve months but the relative position of Calwell and his Deputy had 
changed: Calwell had joined the anti-aid side led by Chamberlain and
the Victorian Central Executive; Whitlam, convinced of the need for 
direct aid, was becoming a central participant in the manoeuvres to 
change Labor's policy.^
When the Federal Conference met in August, Wyndham moved the Education
Committee's recommendation that clause 4 of the existing policy be amended
88by deleting the words 'provided they do so at their own cost. The
O *7Bulletin, 29 May 1965; CPI) H. of R. 46, 20 May 1965, 1732-61; SMH,
20 May 1965. The only difference of substance in the 1965 motion was to 
say explicitly that Labor did not oppose the second reading of the bill. 
As in 1964, the amendment was moved on the second reading, the second 
reading was not opposed and there was no attempt to move the amendment 
in the committee stage. Despite the disclaimer in 1965, the effect of 
passing the Labor amendment would have been to defeat the bill, but on 
both occasions this was glossed over. In 1964, Whitlam and a handful of 
others had sought not to oppose the legislation at any stage (even by 
an amendment) but this group had then supported the tactical move (DT, 
SMH, 14 May 1964). The account of the 1965 skirmish in Albinski, The 
Australian Labor Party and the Aid to Parochial Schools Controversy, 35, 
is inaccurate.
88Wyndham had replaced Encel on the Committee. For the report and the 
debate, see ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 87-8, 
96-7, 231-3. The Committee also recommended guidelines on use of state 
school facilities by non-state students and on provision of indirect and 
disguised aid. These were based on Bryant's supplementary statement of 
1963. Like it, they were not put to the Conference.
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Federal Executive had asked the Conference to reject the new 
recommendation since, according to Chamberlain, it would leave 
'loopholes' for direct state aid. Without the proviso, clause 4 
would merely affirm citizens' rights to establish their own education 
systems and some Labor people could interpret it as an invitation for 
subsidies to these systems. Bryant, on the other hand, recalls the 
Committee sought only to remove part of the clause which could have 
been seen as offensive. The original intent of the clause had been 
to assure the private systems there was no intention to destroy them 
and this intention had been weakened by the final few words. 'This [the 
proviso] is the sort of thing you have in the secret treaty', Bryant 
concluded.^
Put immediately, the Committee recommendation received the support 
only of the six New South Wales delegates. Senator McKenna and 
G. Duthie, MP, delegates from Tasmania, then sought to protect existing 
direct and indirect aid in the States. Three amendments followed.
First, E. Adsett and F. Nolan from Queensland wished the Conference to 
state that Labor 'is unequivocally opposed to State Aid in any form' 
and that all reference to it be removed from party platforms. Secondly, 
Chamberlain and Senator Cant (Western Australia) urged, on behalf of 
their Branch, the holding of a referendum on state aid. Labor should 
campaign for 'no State Aid' but would adopt the people's verdict as its 
own policy. Thirdly, Calwell, a delegate from Victoria, and Cameron 
(South Australia) supported a rather less definite commitment to a 
referendum in which Labor members were not bound to campaign or vote in
89G.M. Bryant, interview. Bryant had seconded the change at the Education 
Committee in May 1965. It will be remembered that he was not responsible 
for this wording in 1963 (above pp.178-80). For the FX debate: FX 28-
30 July 1965, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/38.
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a particular way. Calwell's speech revealed his own and the party’s 
dilemma. State aid, even of an indirect kind, had made too many inroads 
in fifty years to reverse the process in one stroke, as Adsett's amendment 
envisaged. Even a referendum where Labor opposed direct aid, as 
Chamberlain suggested, would be 'electoral dynamite’ when Liberal direct 
aid initiatives seemed to be gaining community acceptance. While Calwell 
himself believed Labor's total education policy was more beneficial to the 
community he agreed Labor had lost votes in the last two years over the 
issue. 'On this issue’, he concluded,'I am carrying more lead in the 
saddle than any jockey has carried in any race in Australia, including 
bush meetings'. ^
Calwell's solution was not to lend his influence to help change
policy but to avoid the issue by seeking a referendum. In 1963 he had
supported Commonwealth aid for education to avoid having to choose on
state aid. Now he left the choice to the people at some vague time in
the future. Calwell's personal attitudes probably were genuinely divided.
One commentator saw the 'lead in the saddle' remarks as a private plea to
91the delegates for a measure of direct aid. Others, taking a longer view,
believed Calwell was opposed to aid to the Catholic system because of the
92personal hurts he had suffered from his Church during the Split.
90DT, 7 August 1965. This was the first Federal Conference open to the 
press and some newspapers had detailed reports of the debates. I have drawn 
on these reports in what follows. See also: Age, SMH, 7 August 1965.
91CT, 9 August 1965 (J. Jupp). Another report said Calwell's amendment 
had disappointed some associates, who believed he privately favoured direct 
aid (Australian, 11 August 1965).
92Colm Kiernan, Calwell, West Melbourne, 1978, 218, 238-9, 242. Kiernan 
admits, however, that this influence on Calwell was accompanied during the 
1960s by a firming of his alliance with the VCE. Oliver, too, while 
agreeing that Calwell was influenced by his experiences during the Split, 
added that Calwell on this issue 'was basically following the left line in 
Victoria'. Oliver could not see how Calwell, as a Catholic, could not 
have supported state aid in his heart of hearts (C.T. Oliver, interview). 
While Oliver is not a witness sympathetic to Calwell, it is interesting to 
note with Kiernan that L. Haylen, later a close colleague of Calwell, did
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Occasionally he had argued that direct state aid was unconstitutional
under Section 116 of the Commonwealth Constitution (prohibiting laws
establishing a religion) but most of his public remarks about education
93were in support of the positive parts of Labor education policy. When
faced with Caucus unrest in 1960 after the Bendigo by-election he
admonished members who sought policy revision to ’accept the rough with 
94the smooth’. Any private feelings he may have harboured on the subject
were overshadowed by his desire to protect Federal policy until it might
be altered by a later Conference. At the Federal elections of 1961,
1963 and 1964 he had stood on Labor’s alternative policy, which
was also the substance of his amendments to the bills of 1964 and 1965.
That he would have preferred on the second occasion to oppose the bill
outright could be attributed to his need to maintain his support in
Victoria, a centre of opposition to state aid. His wistful remarks at
the 1965 Conference recognised that Labor’s comprehensive education
policy was not preventing loss of votes. His idea of a referendum in
which Labor would not take a side showed his own inability, buffeted by
his own past, his own limited conception of leadership and the demands
of his ties with the Victorian Branch, to make a clear choice between
95the status quo and a revised policy. The referendum idea was an attempt,
92 (continued)
not support him for the Leadership in 1960 partly because he believed 
Calwell, as a Catholic, would favour state aid. Either Calwell changed 
his views in the 1960s or, more likely, his conflicting emotions on the 
subject led him to keep his own counsels - leading to misconceptions 
among his colleagues. Calwell himself remembered voting with a small 
minority at his first Victorian Conference in 1917 in favour of state 
aid for primary schools (Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, 38).
93Age, 21 November 1961, Fact, 10 October 1963, SMH, 8 July 1963 
provide evidence of Calwell and Section 116.
94SMH, 25, 30 August 1960.
95The most recent Victorian Branch attitude to state aid was ’unequivocal 
opposition': ALP (Victorian Branch), Record of Annual Conference,
June 1965, 4.
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said W. Hayden, MP, a Queensland delegate, 'to evade our responsibility
as a Party and the alternative Government'.
Yet the other amendments were equally unsatisfactory. The Adsett
amendment carried the same difficulties that attended the Western
Australian item two years earlier: it could be interpreted to mean either
no aid at all or merely no direct aid. In either case the clock had gone
too far to be wound back. Further, the amendment was purely negative
and Labor had never had nothing to say about this section of the 
96electorate. Chamberlain's referendum amendment, while more definite
than Calwell's, committed Labor to public support of 'no direct aid' in
a context where it might be difficult to promote at the same time
Labor's attractive alternative policy.
The immediate question for the Conference, however, was the status
of existing forms of aid, the nub of the Tasmanian motion. McKenna had
tried to ensure that State Labor Governments in Tasmania and elsewhere
would be able to continue existing indirect and disguised aid and fulfil
promises of future aid of these types. The South Australian Branch had
recently come to power on a platform of free text books and school
requisites for all children. Other State Branches might be forced to
dismantle direct aid schemes implemented by their opponents. Menzies had
already argued that a Labor Senate majority would be obliged to curtail
97science blocks assistance under Federal legislation. The McKenna
96Press reports of the debate suggest the amendment was moved by Adsett 
in anger and to cut the knot of state aid in decisive fashion. It did 
not reflect the Queensland Branch position (ALP, Official Report, 
Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 232-3) which was the same as the Federal 
policy of 1957.
97For Menzies at the 1964 Senate election: Albinski, The Australian
Labor Party and the Aid to Parochial Schools Controversy, 28-9. Gill,
'The Federal Science Grant', 310-49, shows, moreover, that this type of 
direct aid was so well-established even by late 1964 that any attempt 
to remove it would have upset church education authorities as well as 
parents.
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argument ran: if voters were attracted by assistance promised they
would be enraged by assistance removed.
After a luncheon adjournment spent fruitlessly discussing
alternatives, delegates agreed to a suggestion from Keeffe that an ad
hoc committee of one representative from each State should work out a
compromise decision. The committee returned after eighty-five minutes
and Chamberlain and Calwell moved on its behalf:
In view of the decision of Conference to re-affirm 
policy of State Aid under Clause 4, the question 
of new benefits which may conflict with this basic 
principle shall be referred to the Federal 
Executive for examination. No benefit which is 
currently established shall be disturbed. State 
representatives shall be invited to make their 
submissions to the Federal Executive on such new 
matters and the Executive shall have authority to 
approve any benefit in this category, and further 
that the motion of Senator McKenna and all 
amendments thereto be discharged.98
Chamberlain had reported that Downing, the New South Wales member 
of the committee, had 'reservations' about this recommendation. Oliver 
and Downing now moved to delete all words in the recommendation after 
'disturbed' but only their New South Wales colleagues supported them.
The original motion was carried by thirty votes to six.
A number of points emerge from this debate and the lobbying which 
surrounded it. First, it produced a further increment in the process 
of disjointed incrementalism (HYPOTHESIS XV) which can be traced in 
Labor's state aid decisions. The first participants, the Education 
Committee, hoped to remove the 'at own cost' proviso from clause 4 and 
to include explicit provision for the 'co-operation' between the state and
98ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 96-7. My emphasis. 
The committee's members were Calwell, Chamberlain, McKenna, R. Downing, 
MLC, former Attorney-General of New South Wales, C. Jones (Queensland) 
and G. Virgo (South Australia).
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non-state systems and for the indirect and disguised aid which Labor
supported. For Bryant, this change would have removed offensive words
and accentuated the positive aspects of the education policy. For his
Committee colleague, Wyndham, removal of the proviso was a bridgehead
99for revision of the 1957 policy and provision of direct aid. The 
Federal Executive then participated by recommending that the Conference 
reject the Education Committee's first recommendation and by sending 
on the second recommendation (the suggested statement about indirect 
and disguised aid) without decision. Thirdly, the Conference participated 
in two distinct stages. It rejected the Education Committee recommendation 
for deletion of the proviso. Then, it recognised the problem of existing 
benefits, which the first Conference decision had disclosed, by adopting 
the ad hoc committee resolution. This was seen by some observers as a 
concession a/vdL a*v_ innovation. It was another increment in Labor's 
policy on state aid. How the new sentence should be interpreted was 
left for the future.
This concession was not extracted without a price. Under the Federal 
Executive decision of October 1963, State Parliamentary Labor Parties were
This is another example of a partisan mutually adjusted decision on a 
small scale: Bryant and Wyndham supported the Committee proposal for
different reasons. The Committee meeting would have involved Bryant and 
Wyndham working out a resolution which matched their differing goals.
^^For example, SMH, 7 August 1965. Alan Reid, in a not uncharacteristic 
lapse, failed to mention the crucial sentence (DT, 7 August 1965;
Sunday Telegraph, 8 August 1965) .
^^See below pp.218 ff. McKenna's original motion, later discharged, 
had included existing travel allowances and text book supply, the Labor 
promise of secondary scholarships (the Menzies Government had commenced 
such a scheme in 1964), government assistance existing at 6 August 1965 
and 'commitments already made [by non-Labor Governments] to meet 
interest charges or the provision of science facilities' (both forms of 
direct aid) as assistance that should be protected.
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told that
prior to the introduction and/or support of 
legislation or any decision to extend aid to 
private schools, they shall submit such proposals 
to the Federal Secretary for consideration and 
advice.
The Federal Conference now adopted the ad hoc committee resolution that
’the question of new benefits which may conflict with [clause 4] shall
be referred to the Federal Executive for examination'. The Conference
also agreed that the Executive 'shall have authority to approve any
102benefit in this category'. The increment regarding existing benefits 
was thus balanced by increments regarding the powers of the Executive.
The Executive's review function became more explicit ('authority to 
approve' rather than consider and advise) and, secondly, the proposals 
which had to be referred were those which 'may' conflict with clause 4. 
This was a wider category than the 'aid to private schools' of 1963, 
since the earlier category had been shown by the Federal-New South Wales 
discussions of 1963-64 to exclude both allowances to parents and subsidies 
for text books. These discussions had occurred because the Federal 
Executive believed New South Wales had breached Federal policy; they 
had turned on whether aid to the non-state system was intended. The new 
decision gave the Federal Executive a watching brief not only to prevent 
aid to schools but to study 'new benefits which may conflict' with the 
principle of clause 4 that citizens wishing to establish and maintain 
private education systems should do so at their own cost. Chamberlain 
had reminded the Conference of previous disputes over interpretation.
This increment reveals he was able to persuade the ad hoc committee and 
the Conference that the Executive, rather than 'members of the higher
1Ö2See above p.209.
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echelons of the party' in the States, should have the effective, as well 
as formal power of interpretation.
The decisions regarding the protection of clause 4 can thus be seen 
as part of a compromise (HYPOTHESIS V): delegates seeking to protect the
concept of aid to the scholar but not the school were prepared to concede 
to the State parties, led by Tasmania, the stability of existing benefits 
The Federal Executive, in return, was conceded a stronger right of 
oversight. The 1963 expression of the 1957 principle, clause 4 itself, 
remained unaltered. We know insufficient details of the lobbying process 
to ascertain if this was how the issues were put by delegates to each 
other. That compromise was the outcome can be seen from the decisions 
themselves. Is the concept of partisan mutual adjustment (HYPOTHESIS 
XIV) then relevant? The different delegations had different goals which 
only partly overlapped. Chamberlain's referendum amendment had been 
sent to the Conference as an agenda item from Western Australia.
Although it was expressed in terms unfavourable to direct aid and it 
required Labor to campaign for 'no State Aid', it at least suggested the 
party should abide by the people's decision, whatever it was. A
103Alan Reid, Sunday Telegraph, 8 August 1965, believed Chamberlain was 
'settling a score' with New South Wales. Reid also believed that the 
new formulation required 'fringe benefits' (disguised aid) to be 
referred. This interpretation is further supported by the use of the 
same word, 'benefit', to apply to aid 'currently established' (which 
included direct, indirect and disguised aid) and new aid. Chamberlain 
and his supporters had tried to exercise a general supervision under 
the October 1963 resolution and been criticised for their intervention 
because the aid was shown to be not for schools (although the Federal 
Executive did not admit this in the 1963 case). The new resolution 
allowed a Federal role in virtually any case of aid. Further, the 
failure once again of the Conference to adopt an explicit statement of 
what disguised and indirect aid the party supported (see note 88), 
meant the Federal platform still did not admit the party allowed such 
assistance. This fact gave further interpretative power to the Federal 
Executive.
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Victorian item, on the other hand, expressed ’unequivocal opposition' 
to state aid and a reference to Commonwealth scholarship payments 
discriminating against state school students suggested the Branch might 
be wary even of indirect aid.^^ Queensland sent an item supporting 'aid 
to the parent rather than the school' but its delegates Adsett and Nolan 
seemed to wish to concede even less than this. Tasmania, through McKenna, 
sought to protect its system of disguised aid and might have assumed 
that South Australia might take a similar attitude given its support for 
universal free text books. Yet Cameron of South Australia supported 
Calwell's referendum amendment rather than McKenna's motion. Another 
South Australian, M. Nicholls, MP, had supported Chamberlain in the 
Executive. The South Australian Branch had recommended that its 
delegates support existing state aid policy. ^  ^
Despite these differing goals, some expressing the views of the 
controllers of State Branches (HYPOTHESIS I), some the opinions of 
individual delegates (HYPOTHESIS II), each part of the compromise, the 
protection of existing benefits and the new provision for Executive 
oversight, was able to be supported by thirty votes to six. During the 
eighty-five minutes of the ad hoc committee's deliberations, five 
representatives of thirty delegates had been able to persuade each
104This and other items appear at ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth 
Conference, 1965, 232-3. The Victorian Branch Conference had adopted a 
report of its Education Committee which included a recommendation for an 
inquiry into the needs of non-state education. The Committee chairman, 
however, advised that it 'felt that any detailed examination of the 
"state aid" issue would serve to expose both the weakness and 
inconsistency in current arguments for state assistance': Age, 18, 20,
27 July 1964; ALP (Victorian Branch), Looking to the Future: Labor's
Plan for Education, Melbourne, 1964, 41; Australian, 18, 27 July 1964; 
C. Holding, MLA, to Hartley, 5 June 1964, Vic. Rec., Parliamentarians 
D - N 1964.
105FX 28-30 July 1965, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/38; SASE 15 July 
1965, SA Rec., Minute Book 1964-69.
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other that the formulation which eventually evolved could meet some
106goals of each of them. Partisan mutual adjustment had occurred.
But what of the other six delegates? The New South Wales delegation 
had been the only ones to support Wyndham's motion from the Committee 
that the clause 4 proviso be deleted. (Wyndham himself, as Secretary, had 
no vote.) Colbourne, in seconding the motion, had spoken with conviction 
of the injustice to Catholic parents and the contribution of the Catholic 
system to education.There was no need for any adjusting process to 
defeat this motion, since only New South Wales was prepared to overturn 
the basic principle of 1957. Only Wyndham and Colbourne spoke to the 
motion. All delegates, including those from New South Wales, seemed to 
be saving themselves for the later debate. Yet the merits of state aid 
as a method of education finance came to be overshadowed in that debate 
by questions of the electoral significance of aid and of the proper 
relationship between the Federal Executive and State Labor Governments. 
For there was more involved for New South Wales - and thus for the 
Conference - than the justice of the Catholic case or even the status of 
assistance already given. After the defeat of the Education Committee’s 
recommendation, Downing, for New South Wales, acknowledged the need to 
protect existing benefits. ’The parents of half a million children are
The only evidence we have of how the adjusting was done is Virgo’s 
memory of a bitter argument between Calwell and McKenna. Virgo saw the 
ad hoc committee as broadly divided between Calwell, Chamberlain and 
himself, opposed to direct aid, and McKenna, Jones and Downing, 
favouring some concessions (G.T. Virgo, interview). Yet McKenna was 
committed by the Tasmanian Branch to oppose direct aid and Jones’ 
Queensland Branch supported only aid to the scholar.
^^Whitlam remembers trying to persuade Colbourne at one time that the 
state aid argument should be couched in terms of the impending collapse 
of the Catholic system and the consequent pressure on state schools.
But Colbourne's main argument was always from justice (W.R. Colbourne, 
E.G. Whitlam, interviews).
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getting state aid in some form or other', he said. If this had been the
only consideration in the subsequent debate, the New South Welshmen
might have been satisfied with a resolution protecting existing benefits.
However, they believed their recent electoral setbacks had shown the
need to overturn the principle of 1957. Tasmania and South Australia,
rather differently, were prepared to strike a balance between principle
and pragmatism, between catering for Labor's core supporters and seeking
votes more widely (HYPOTHESIS III), merely by offering indirect and
disguised aid and protecting existing benefits. New South Wales instead
believed an 'inclusive' approach required an offer of direct aid. To
do otherwise, said Downing, was 'political suicide'. For years the New
South Wales Branch and Labor Caucus had conceived its main task to be
108the retention of an ALP Government. Removed from office it sought to 
return as quickly as possible since, said Oliver sarcastically, the 
party in New South Wales, unlike other Branches, was not indifferent to 
political power.
The 1965 defeat was doubly bitter for New South Wales because of
the apparent contribution to it of the Federal 'interference' in the
State over state aid policy in 1963 and 1964. Renshaw developed
consequently the idea of State Branch autonomy in policy areas financed
by State governments. He put this view again in his address to Federal
109Conference delegates. Oliver and Downing tried vainly to remove from 
the ad hoc committee recommendation the provisions for Federal oversight,
108This emerged clearly in the author's interviews with Colbourne,
Oliver and Mulvihill. For evidence of the close relationship between 
Executive and Government, see the litany of Government achievements in 
the Executive's reports to State Annual Conferences and in the party 
publications A.L.P. Journal, A.L.P. News and A.L.P. Newsletter.
i 09Age, 6 August 1965; Bulletin, 14 August 1965. See also: ALP (NSW
Branch), Official Report, 1965 Annual Conference, 12 and above, notes 
74 and 75.
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knowing that the best hope for New South Wales, in the face of continuing
Federal support for the principle of 1957, was to manoeuvre within clause
4. The apparent confusion in the Conference, confronted with a motion
and three amendments, as well as the failure to reach agreement during
the lunchtime discussions,perhaps gave the New South Welshmen some hope
that the delegates would be content with the status quo. The appointment
of a committee had been itself an indication of the extent of
disagreement among the six delegations. Oliver pleaded with the
Conference to 'leave the thing alone', to retain existing policy without
such oversight provisions. Downing agreed that the provisions would
make State Labor Governments a laughing stock.
These faceless men - everyone realises they lost 
the State elections and Federal elections but that 
will be nothing to the effect they will have in 
the elections in the other States .... Whenever 
a matter of this character is introduced our 
opponents will say "You had better run away and 
see your masters to find out where you stand.
Run away and see Mr Chamberlain in Western 
Australia to find out what your policy is".
Chamberlain retorted that New South Wales 'apparently finds extreme
difficulty in observing the decision of the national body'. Colbourne
insisted that New South Wales had no intention of defying Federal
policy but, privately, he and his colleagues saw the adoption of the
ad hoc committee recommendation as another example of the desire of the
Federal bodies, led by Chamberlain, to 'get New South Wales' over the
.J . Ill state aid issue.
On the other hand, the appointment of the committee may have been 
influenced by the lateness of the hour. This was the last session of 
the Conference and some delegates were anxious to get away (DT,
7 August 1965; G.T. Virgo, interview).
^"^Note Downing's remark to the Conference: 'go ahead and rub our
noses in the dirt' (SMH, 7 August 1965).
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A Victorian delegate to Federal ALP meetings remarked to the author
that 'the usual form' in formulating a resolution involved delegation
representatives meeting privately to try to reconcile their disagreements.
Sometimes 'someone might break off, saying "No, we can't accept that" and
112the others would carry on to try to work something out'. Downing's 
failure to agree in the ad hoc committee was an example of such an 
occurrence. It represented, as did the subsequent vote, the 
unacceptability of the Federal supervision procedures to New South Wales.
New South Wales could not reconcile its goal of autonomy with the decision
taken. The process of partisan mutual adjustment had stopped short of
. 113unanimity.
Delegates had expected and endured a bitter debate on state aid. It
was a measure of the depth of feeling that the bitterness was shown even
114in a public Conference - the first in Federal Labor's history.
W.W.C. Brown, interview.112 
113Rules providing for voting on decisions, together with the criteria of 
majority rule, act as devices to halt the process of partisan mutual 
adjustment at any point beyond 50 per cent plus one vote. The more 
participants to whose goals the decision is adjusted, the more vague or 
self-contradictory the decision. But there may be considerations, such 
as the need to show a united front to the world and the need to keep the 
coalition together, which require adjustment beyond a bare majority. For 
an excellent discussion of the latter point, sea: Heinz Eulau, 'Logics
of Rationality in Unanimous Decision-Making', Carl J. Friedrich, ed.,
Nomos VII: Rational Decision, New York, 1964, 26-54.
^^Virgo, attending his first Federal Conference remembered the 'bitterness' 
above all. He suggested that the education debate was left till the last 
session because of fears of a public battle over state aid (G.T. Virgo, 
interview). Press reports concentrated mainly on the exchanges between 
Calwell and Oliver and Chamberlain and Downing as evidence of this 
bitterness. Toohey, an experienced delegate, suggested the bitterness 
at least of the New South Welshmen may have been superficial (J.P. Toohey, 
interview). There may have been an element of 'playing to the gallery' 
for some delegates. The best evidence of the irreconcilability of New 
South Wales remains its voting behaviour on the two crucial decisions. In 
this connection one can draw a contrast between the ability of the 
Conference to reach a unanimous decision on unity tickets, after 
negotiations between Calwell, Chamberlain and delegates from New South 
Wales and Victoria, and their efforts regarding state aid: Bulletin, 7,
14 August 1965; C7T, 9 August 1965; Nation, 7 August 1965; SMH, 13 August 
1965. The unity ticket decision, codifying and slightly augmenting 
enforcement procedures, followed the withdrawal of two drastically 
diverging resolutions from New South Wales and Victoria. See above p.160.
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THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE MEETING OF FEBRUARY 1966 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The 1965 Federal Conference provides evidence of an attempt to
reach a compromise decision by partisan mutual adjustment (protection
of clause 4), the lack of an attempt at partisan mutual adjustment
regarding another decision (clause 4 itself), the importance of factors
(electoral success and failure and the relative roles of Statfe and
Federal parties) not connected with the merits of state aid as a purely
educational policy and, finally, the continuation of a process of
disjointed incrementalism. The incremental process continued. In
September 1965, the Victorian Central Executive faced a change in the
nature of the state aid problem in its State and reacted accordingly.
The Victorian Liberal Government budgeted for a small (£25,000)
allocation of direct aid in the form of interest subsidies for capital
works. Under the surveillance of the VCE, the State Parliamentary Labor
115Party opposed the legislation at all stages. The VCE then asked the
Federal Executive if a reference to the latter, under the clause 4
11 5Age, 16 September 1965; VCE 24 September 1965, ALP (Victorian Branch), 
State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8142. In 1964, the VCE had prevented 
the State Leader, C.P. Stoneham, from promising that a Labor Government 
would build schools for the private systems, even if buildings and land 
remained the property of the State. (The proposal came from J. Galbally, 
Leader in the Legislative Council, but had been discussed by the SPLP 
Executive). Instead, the VCE officers recommended Stoneham promise 
’free text books and exercise books for all students, irrespective of 
attendance at State or independent schools’,and science facilities, to 
be built by the State for the use of all children. The second 
recommendation was later withdrawn and another, free uniforms, also 
disappeared during the discussions. Finally, reminiscent of examples of 
coyness at the Federal level, the. underlined words (my emphasis) in the 
quotation from Stoneham's printed policy speech were left out of the 
television version: ALP (Victoria), Victorian Conjoint State Elections
1964 Labor Party Policy Speech delivered by the Honourable C.P. Stoneham, 
M.L.A., Leader of the Parliamentary Labor Party at the Town Hall, Richmond, 
Thursday, 11th June, 1964, 19; Television and Radio, 8; VCEO 26 May 
1964, VCE 5 June 1964, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, 
NLA mf G8742; VCEO 5 June 1964, Vic. Rec., unlabelled folder of Minutes, 
1964.
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protection decision of the Federal Conference, was necessary if the
proposed benefit was already given in another State or Territory, as it
was in this case. The VCE also asked if the Federal decision applied
both to benefits introduced by Labor and by non-Labor governments.
'Specifically, is there an obligation on Labor Oppositions to OPPOSE
new benefits unless a clearance is obtained from the Federal Executive
116which would make it possible to support them?' While this question
awaited an answer, the Federal Liberal Government further altered the
nature of the problem by deciding to subsidise capital borrowings for
building by non-state schools in the Australian Capital Territory and
Northern Territory. The innovation provoked the Western Australian
Branch of the ALP to ask the Federal Executive whether capital assistance
infringed Section 116 of the Commonwealth Constitution, which prohibited
1X8the establishment of a religion.
The Victorian and Western Australian resolutions came before the 
Federal Executive meeting of 9-11 February 1966. Wyndham's remarks in 
support of the Victorian approach provide further evidence that Labor 
decisions on state aid never finalised the party's position. 'The 
adoption of the 1965 Federal Conference decision did not clarify the 
situation, in my opinion at least', wrote Wyndham. 'If anything it has 
created new problems ...'. In particular, did the sentence
116Agenda Attachment J: State Aid to Private Schools, Victorian State
Executive Request for an Interpretation, FX 9-11 February 1966, Fed.
Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/43; VCE 22 October 1965, ALP (Victorian Branch), 
State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8742.
^^Albinski, The Australian Labor Party and the Aid to Parochial Schools 
Controversy, 45.
118Agenda Attachment K: State Aid - Commonwealth Constitution West
Australian Item, FX 9-11 February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/43. 
Direct aid had been given in the Territories for nearly a decade in the 
form of interest subsidies but this was the first Commonwealth aid for 
capital borrowings.
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'No benefit which is currently established shall be disturbed' mean a
benefit should remain undisturbed only in the State or Territory where
119it existed or elsewhere as well? The Executive answered that the 
benefits not to be disturbed were 'those benefits in each of the 
respective States or Territories currently applying at the time of the 
carriage of the 1965 Federal Conference decision'. Further, answering 
the second Victorian question, the Executive confirmed that Labor 
Oppositions were obliged to oppose new benefits (that is, those 
introduced after the 1965 decision) unless they received Federal 
Executive clearance. Thirdly, the Executive resolved that, in view of 
this interpretation, Calwell should be advised 'that future extensions 
of the Science Laboratory Grants by the Commonwealth Government be 
opposed by all Federal Labor members'. Fourthly, the Executive advised 
the Federal Parliamentary Party that Labor politicians should campaign 
on the basis of aid to the student, utilising a schedule of proposed 
payments to show how scholars and their parents would benefit. Finally, 
the Executive endorsed the Western Australian request to examine the 
constitutionality of state aid and asked its Legal Advisory Committee to 
undertake the task.^^
All five decisions, except the first, became the subject of 
argument in subsequent weeks. It was reasonable of Victoria to ask for
119Agenda Attachment L: State Aid to Private Schools. Memorandum by
the General Secretary, FX 9-11 February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/ 
120/43.
1 20 FX 9-11 February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/40. The decision 
on the Western Australian request actually came before the two decisions 
directed towards the Federal Caucus. My arrangement sacrifices evidence 
of incrementalism- the implications of the first two decisions were not 
immediately recognised and acted upon - for ease of presentation. 
Discussion of all five matters followed a general discussion to which 
eight Executive members contributed, as well as Calwell and Whitlam.
Pres reports: Australian, CT, 11 February 1966; DT, SMH, 10,
11 February 1966.
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an interpretation of the crucial sentence. The interpretation provided
apparently meant - though this was not stated explicitly - that the
existence of a benefit in one State or Territory did not sanction it in
121another. ’Border hopping' was barred. Even the idea of an examination
122of the constitutional status of direct aid was not new. But it was 
the decisions taken about the attitudes of Parliamentary Labor Parties 
to new benefits and the beginning of an actual process of legal scrutiny 
which not only indicated a hardening of mood on the Executive but also 
provoked other party members.
The most senior party member provoked was Whitlam, the Deputy
Federal Leader. He was present during the Executive's discussions of
the Western Australian item and had said he did not believe the High
Court would invalidate direct aid. Writing to Wyndham, Whitlam went on
to assert his conviction that
there will never be enough trained teachers and 
facilities and equipment in State or private 
schools in this country until the Commonwealth 
does the same and as much for teacher training 
and technical and secondary and even primary 
education as it does for universities and until
There are four pieces of evidence for this conclusion: first,
McKenna's original motion at the 1965 Conference, which mentioned 
existing benefits 'in a particular State or Territory' (my emphasis) 
rather than any State or Territory. This motion was later discharged 
by the Conference but the ad hoc committee would have had it in mind 
when producing the resolution. Secondly, the question from Victoria 
was phrased in a particular way (above p. 219). Thirdly, an amendment 
at the Executive meeting from Webb (WA) which conceded the 'border 
hopping' point, was ruled out of order as a direct negative to the 
motion finally adopted. Fourthly, at least two commentators saw the 
decision as a rebuff to Whitlam, who had interpreted the 1965 decision 
to allow border hopping (DT, SMH, 10 February 1966).
122See Gill, 'The Federal Science Grant', 338-41, for suggestions in 
1964 that a High Court challenge might be mounted by anti-state aid 
groups. VCE President R.W. Holt advised his fellow officers that 
donations to this end would be welcome (VCEO 29 September 1964, Vic. 
Rec., E.O's & C.E. Minutes & Agenda 1964). Calwell occasionally doubted 
the legality of aid (note 93 above) but had not suggested a challenge.
it does so irrespective of whether the teachers and 
pupils are at State or private institutions.123
This paragraph confirmed the fears of Bryant and others that Commonwealth
aid to education would come to mean state aid. Whitlam himself believed
the former was the issue and what followed regarding state aid was
enjoined by principles of equality between children. Others wondered if
124his motives were more expedient. Whatever the truth, Whitlam in this 
statement in effect supported direct aid when the party did not. To 
show why that point tended to be overlooked we must place the February 
Executive meeting in context.
Since the 1963 election, Whitlam?s status as heir apparent to 
Calwell had become a growing source of frustration in the former and 
resentment in the latter. Whitlam knew that the party had never removed 
an incumbent Leader and, thus, that his accession depended upon Calwell 
leaving voluntarily. But Calwell clung to office, enjoying the status
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1 2 3Whitlam to Wyndham, 11 February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/31/ 
F.P.L.P. - Deputy Leader Correspondence - F.P.L.P./2 1964, 1965, 1966.
The full text of the letter was released by Whitlam to appear in most 
metropolitan newspapers on 12 February. It also appears in ALP, Report 
of the Special Commonwealth Conference, March, 1966, 58-9 and Laurie 
Oakes, Whitlam PM, Sydney, 1973, 131-2. There is a division of opinion 
over whether the referral to the Legal Committee would have been 
followed by a High Court challenge. Cameron believed the referral 
amounted to an instruction to organise a challenge unless it had no 
chance of success but Calwell (at the time), Keeffe and the VCE unions 
were more circumspect about the possibility of an actual challenge:
C.R. Cameron, interview; Fact, 25 February 1966 (Calwell); J.B. Keeffe, 
interview; Scope, 23 February 1966.
124The best interpretation of Whitlam's approach to state aid is that he 
at first was little interested in it as an issue separate from 
Commonwealth aid to education, that when the latter issue became 
increasingly important, Whitlam saw no reason why Catholic children were 
not entitled to equality of opportunity but that aid should be dispensed 
at all times on the basis of need. The apparent evidence of the electoral 
significance of direct aid by 1963 made the 'aid to Catholics' part of 
the issue more urgent but did not separate it from the more fundamental 
goal of quality education, universally available and funded by the 
Commonwealth. This interpretation is based on evidence from C.R. Cameron, 
W.R. Colbourne, F. Crean, interviews; Hogan, The Catholic Campaign ..., 
15; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 125; F.E. Stewart, E.G. Whitlam, interviews.
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that came with the post of Leader of the Opposition and hopeful of
besting any successor to Menzies or, at least, of ensuring that his
125own successor would not be Whitlam. Increasingly, both men were on
opposite sides in important questions in the party. Thus, when the 
1963 election provoked party debate between those who sought a greater 
role for Parliamentarians in party decisionmaking and those who feared 
sundering the links between party and unions, ’to a considerable extent 
Mr. Whitlam appeared the champion of the first school and Mr. Calwell the 
leading spokesman of the second’. Fifteen months later, the same 
writer suggested observation of Labor affairs ’is today a matter of
12 <scoring points for and against Mr. Whitlam, against and for Mr. Calwell.
The Federal Caucus meeting of May 1965, where Whitlam led the 
narrow majority in favour of mere token opposition to the science 
laboratories legislation, stood out as an occasion when the Deputy had 
successfully opposed the Leader. Some of his supporters previously had 
complained that Whitlam was unwilling to fight; his success encouraged 
outside observers at least, and possibly some Caucus colleagues, to hope
The most notable incident in this connection was in January 1965, when 
Whitlam’s private comments to a New Zealand reporter became public. 
Whitlam said that the Australian people were unlikely to elect Calwell 
Prime Minister at the age of seventy and that Calwell had on occasion 
shown a lack of leadership. In subsequent months Whitlam, while not 
challenging Calwell directly, began to establish more forcefully his 
credentials as a modern, radical Labor Leader of the near future. There 
were suggestions that Calwell was starting to promote Cairns, or perhaps 
Crean, as his successor although he, too, did not publicly confront his 
rival. For some of these events, including F. Daly, MP’s, suggestion 
that Calwell enjoyed being Opposition Leader for status reasons: Agenda
Appendix J: Statements made by or attributed to Mr. E.G. Whitlam, M.P.:
Report by the General Secretary; FX 24-27 May 1965, Fed. Rec., NLA 
MS 4985/119/38, 39; Australian, 16-18 December 1964, 14-16 January 1965; 
Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, 227-9; Fred Daly, From Curtin to Kerr, 
South Melbourne, 1977, 165-9; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 116-19; SMH,
6-18 March 1965.
^^Colin A. Hughes, ’Political Review', AQ_, 36, 2 (June 1964), 89; 37,
3 (September 1965), 104.
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127that he could win other battles. At the 1965 Federal Conference,
while the two Leaders found common ground on many issues and while they
avoided confrontation on state aid, they were on opposite sides in the
manoeuvring regarding unity tickets. Whitlam sought, by walking out of
the Executive meeting before the Conference, to force the party to
stronger enforcement of the unity ticket ban. One of the considerations
behind the search by others for a compromise on this issue was to save
Calwell from having to support, as a Victorian delegate, the Victorian
128item which sought removal of the ban. At this Conference, too, the
two men revealed their different views of the nature and role of the
Labor Party. Calwell attacked the press and dedicated the party to the
construction of a democratic socialist and nationalist Australia;
Whitlam praised the Conference for revising and expanding party policy
and called for a more broadly representative party. Calwell defended
the performance of the Victorian Branch while Whitlam advised he would
continue to investigate the election tickets of the Victorian Branch of
the Australian Railways Union, which had provoked his anger at the
Executive meeting. Calwell insisted also that he would lead Labor at the 
129next elections. Calwell's failure to provide positive leadership at 
the Conference in issues such as unity tickets and state aid again 
brought press speculation that his position might be insecure. But an 
attempt by two Whitlam supporters to mount a challenge to the
127Age, 25 May 1965; Bulletin, 29 May 1965; Mercury, 22 May 1965.
I O O
Age, 4, 9 August 1965; Bulletin, 7, 14 August 1965; Nation,
24 July, 7 August 1965; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 125-7; SMH, 13 August 1965. 
129ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 249-60.
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Leader failed, as much because of lack of support for Whitlam as
130because of support for Calwell.
It is difficult to establish how well the press speculation
reflected unease in the party over Calwell's leadership. To the extent
that the press provided information for party decisionmakers it may have
helped create a mood of 'we can't win with Calwell', without necessarily
131establishing that Whitlam must succeed him. In any event, Calwell 
felt other intimations of his insecurity. While Calwell had received 
after the 1964 Senate elections expressions of confidence in his 
leadership from each State Branch, Cairns recalls his Leader was shaken 
to find that some of his oldest Caucus friends agreed with Whitlam in 
early 1965 that Calwell should give up the Leadership. Uncertain of his
130Bulletin, 11 December 1965 and Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 86, 
refer to this attempt. The former says one of the instigators was a left­
winger and the latter names the two as L. Barnard and R. Davies, both 
Tasmanian members. For press speculation at the time of the Conference 
that Whitlam would seek to challenge Calwell for the Leadership, probably 
on the issue of unity tickets and the Victorian Branch, see: Age, 2, 7,
9 August 1965; Australian, 2 August 1965, Bulletin, 14 August 1965;
CT, 7, 9 August 1965; ITT, 1 August 1965; SMH, 2 August 1965.
131An impression - no more than that - gained from interviews is that the 
1965 increment in unity ticket policy (and thus presumably its 
ramifications regarding the party Leadership) was accorded less 
significance by the participants than by the press. In this connection 
note the speculation in Victoria that Whitlam had 'leaked' details and 
interpretations of events to the press: Agenda Attachment B: Leakages
of Confidential Information; FX 9-11 February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 
4985/120/40, 43; correspondence between Calwell and Hartley, October- 
November 1965, Vic. Rec., packet of letters, labelled 'Mr Calwell - 
Personal', 1964-67. As early as 1961 T. Uren, MP, had accused Whitlam . 
of leaking details regarding party affairs (SMH, 31 August 1961).
Cairns believed Whitlam's remarks in New Zealand regarding Calwell (above 
note 125) were 'carefully leaked' (J.F. Cairns interview). Whitlam 
denied this but there is considerable evidence around early 1965 of an 
orchestrated press campaign, especially in the Australian and SMH, to 
promote Whitlam as an alternative to Calwell. Throughout his career, 
Whitlam used public platforms, including the press, in combination with 
or in preference to the councils of the party, to the extent that one 
can often see a 'Whitlam-press alliance' at work to bring about changes 
in the party. Whitlam was by no means unique in the ALP in using the 
press in this way but he was better at it than most. His skill makes 
one cautious in accepting press versions of events like those of 
August 1965 as accurate depictions of the state of the ALP.
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support in this section of Caucus, Calwell increasingly sought Caucus
allies in the Victorian group and among opponents of the New South Wales 
132Executive. Partly in return for their support, partly to deny
Whitlam the succession, Calwell began quietly to promote Cairns or
133Crean as future Leaders. Still, his efforts could not prevent his
134narrow loss (two votes) over state aid in May. By August, observers
at the Federal Conference described him as surviving rather than
dominating, forced to accept unpalatable positions, notably over state
aid, to preserve support in the machine to counter his shaky hold on
the Caucus, his role in back room negotiations overshadowed by
135Whitlam's confident presence on the Conference floor.
The Federal Executive faced just as much pressure as Calwell. The 
Caucus decision of May 1965 seemed to show that those who broadly 
agreed with the 1957 principle regarding state aid were in a minority in 
the Parliamentary party. In 1964, the Caucus decision regarding 
Menzies' legislation might have seemed tactically wise to the majority 
of the Federal Executive. In 1965, Calwell's failure to carry the Caucus
For the State Branch expressions of support: Agenda Appendix D: Hon.
Arthur Calwell, M.H.R.; FX 24-27 May 1965, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/ 
38, 39. Cairns says that Calwell canvassed 'his old friends on the 
Right', such as Kennelly and the New South Welshmen, D. Minogue and 
W. O'Connor, who always voted for him, and found they agreed with 
Whitlam. This forced him to the 'Left' of Caucus seeking support. 
Stewart, while not as close to Calwell, believed 'he resolved to placate 
his enemies and insult his friends' while Toohey, somewhere near the 
'Centre' of Caucus detected a decline in the Leader's conciliatory style 
after 1963 as he sought support from a particular section of his 
colleagues (J.F. Cairns, F.E. Stewart, J.P. Toohey, interviews). While 
not all Caucus members believed, with Daly (From Curtin to Kerr, 165) 
that Calwell was 'finished' after 1963, far fewer were prepared to 
support him on grounds other than their rejection of Whitlam as an 
alternative.
133Australian, 26 November 1965; Daly, From Curtin to Kerr, 168.
134This loss was despite assiduous telephone canvassing of Caucus 
colleagues (Bulletin, 11 December 1965).
135Age, 4, 9 August 1965; Bulletin, 14 August 1965; CTT, 7 9 August 1965
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showed the Executive that the pcWHci'ccs motives were more than tactical.
The Executive's own Education Committee, led by Wyndham but influenced
by Whitlam, had agreed effectively with the Caucus majority. Whitlam
had allied himself with the New South Wales Branch against existing 
136state aid policy. By the August Conference, the principle of 1957, as
expressed at the 1963 Conference, had become Tnon-negotiable', not
subject to partisan mutual adjustment. Debate centred on how to protect
the status quo; pressure led to consolidation of defences rather than a
mood for concessions. Whitlam's interest in organisational reform and
enforcement of the unity ticket policy, both unpopular with the Federal
machine controllers, probably reduced further the chances of other
concessions regarding state aid, also identified as a 'Whitlam issue'.
The threat Whitlam seemed to pose to Calwell, the ally of the machine,
cemented the desire to avoid decisions which could benefit Whitlam. The
137anti-direct aid front was consolidating.
136Thus he brought upon himself the anti-New South Wales feelings of 
Chamberlain and others. We shall concentrate in the following pages on 
aspects other than State Branch rivalries but one suspects that the strong 
inter-State feelings evident at the 1965 Federal Conference added a 
further dimension to the grounds for conflict outlined. Whitlam and the 
NSW Branch led a sub-coalition seeking change in party education policy. 
Whitlam sought change on the grounds of equality and votes; the State 
Branch sought the same goal for reasons of justice and votes. This 
contrast is, of course, simplified, but it shows again how the same goal 
can be sought for different reasons. Calwell, the VCE and Chamberlain 
led the opposing sub-coalition. Calwell may have been more concerned to 
retain his position than thwart a new policy. The difference in the two 
coalitions was that Whitlam was able to maintain more independence on 
issues other than state aid than was Calwell. Whitlam's alliance with 
New South Wales was governed by geography (it was his Branch) and some 
common interests in winning votes and promoting policies; Calwell's 
with Victoria rather by geography, his desire for survival and a common 
dislike of the DLP.
137One observer believed most delegates were 'past the stage of considering 
fresh Labor approaches' and that the ALP 'is irretrievably set on a 
positively anti-Catholic course': Bulletin, 14 August 1965 (B. Johns).
For organisational reform, see chapter 5, below.
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Consolidation might have satisfied the defenders of the 1957 line
but for the actions of VThitlam's Caucus colleague, Allan Fraser, MP.
In television and radio broadcasts in mid November 1965, Fraser
expressed his agreement with the Federal Government’s direct aid
initiatives in the Territories and argued that what was 'just and fair’
there was the same elsewhere. He congratulated those who had worked to
achieve this concession from the Government. Keeffe then moved in
Caucus that Fraser's statements be investigated but Fraser convinced
Caucus that his remarks did not contravene party policy. Caucus members
were already anxious about state aid's electoral effects and possibly
resentful at Keeffe's attempt to enforce Federal policy. The easy
defeat of Keeffe's motion suggested this anxiety was increasing and that
138pressure on the Federal Executive would continue. 'The proponents of
State Aid', wrote Hartley of Victoria, now a Federal Executive member,
'have forced the Party into a corner on the question with the result
that a number of individual members, particularly Parliamentarians, are
showing signs of weakening and are not even prepared' - he added with
some understatement - 'to advocate the policy of the Party as determined
139by Federal Conferences'.
Advertiser, 20 November 1965; Age, 22, 23 November 1965; Australian, 
19, 22, 25 November 1965; DT, 15 November 1965; SMH, 18, 19, 23,
25 November 1965. Whitlam played little or no part in the Caucus debate, 
although he had made remarks similar to Fraser's in Parliament some 
weeks earlier (CPD H. of R. 48, 14 October 1965, 1848).
139Hartley to E. Chick, President, Maribyrnong Federal Electorate 
Assembly, 29 November 1965, Vic. Rec., Central Executive 1966-1967. 
Hartley advised that he broadly agreed with the sentiments in Chick's 
letter to him. Chick had blamed the press for pressure on Labor, 
praised the state education system, argued that ALP resistance to state 
aid demands would force out of the party its lingering DLP elements and 
insisted that Labor should not forsake its principles for 'dangerous 
expediency'.
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Frustrated in Caucus, Keeffe took the Fraser case to the February
meeting of the Federal Executive which decided to take no further 
140action. The issue was too important to be resolved by disciplining
an individual member. Fraser was only the most vocal member of a
Caucus whose majority sought to overturn existing policy because they
believed in state aid, because they yearned for electoral success or for
both or other reasons. The majority of the Federal Executive - at least
eight of its twelve members at the February meeting - also had different
141sets of reasons for supporting its decisions. The party sub-coalition 
supporting the principle of 1957 rested on a number of bases, not all of 
them held in common. Chamberlain possessed probably the strongest 
ideological and personal feelings against state aid; Keeffe’s opposition 
to state aid may have been less important to him in February 1966 than 
his desire to retaliate against his Caucus colleagues; the two South 
Australian delegates, Nicholls and Virgo, had suffered less at the hands 
of Catholics during the Split than had Chamberlain, but both opposed 
state aid for other reasons. The Victorians, McNolty and Hartley, 
resented Whitlam’s pursuit of unity tickets in the Victorian Branch. 
Delegates had worked hard in August to achieve a compromise based on 
flexible enforcement, yet Whitlam persisted in seeking harsh enforcement. 
Now the Executive, while taking minimal action in response to Whitlam's 
complaint in one area, unity tickets, tightened its defence against his
^ ^ Australian, CT, 8 February 1966; FX 9-11 February 1966, Fed. Rec.,
NLA MS 4985/120/40.
^^The only decision showing voting figures was that for the legal 
examination. The vote in favour of this decision was 8-4. This debate 
also drew the most speakers and amendments (nine and three respectively) 
of all those on state aid at the meeting. The brief survey of delegates' 
goals is based on press reports, especially Nation, 19 February 1966, 
earlier sections of this chapter and interviews with participants.
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demands in another. Some delegates may have been influenced by the
142connection between the two issues. The Victorian delegates, further­
more, represented the State with the greatest commitment to an 
alternative education policy. Their support for consolidating
opposition to direct aid may have been influenced by a desire to clear
143the field for a new approach.
Most delegates' attitudes were fairly well established by February
1966, yet partisan mutual adjustment could have helped convince
waverers that their differing sets of goals were still served by
protection of the 1957 principle. Calwell was also wavering. He was
not a delegate but had he expressed more forcefully to delegates his
doubts about existing policy some aspects of the decisions might have
differed. In December 1965, Calwell told Caucus that he 'would examine
the possibility of finding a new formula for assistance to scholars in
accordance with existing Labour policy'. Some reports, which he denied,
144claimed he had admitted that Labor must offer direct aid. When he 
arrived at the February Executive meeting, Calwell bore a submission 
based on a letter from Bishop Carroll setting out Carroll's idea of the
Details regarding unity tickets at this meeting: Agenda Attachments
D, E & F; FX 9-11 February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/40, 43. One 
of four cases was referred back to the VCE on the technical ground that a 
statutory declaration had not been provided as required; another ARU 
member was advised that future offences (he had signed a letter 
supporting the unity ticket) 'would be treated much more seriously'.
143The Victorian delegates had been directed to support existing policy 
and the Federal decision directing Caucus members to campaign on the 
basis of aid to the scholar originated in the VCE and was moved at the 
Federal Executive by Hartley: VCE 28 January 1966, ALP (Victorian Branch),
State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8142. The Victorian Branch had produced 
the most comprehensive education policy document of any Branch, without 
calling for direct aid, in Looking to the Future: Labor's Plan for
Education.
144CPD H. of R. 49, 10 December 1965, 3919 (Calwell's personal 
explanation, denying some press reports - quoted); CT_, 10 December 1965, 
11 February 1966.
231
minimum state aid demands Labor could concede to Catholics if it were
to hold the Catholic vote. Given Carroll's personal views, this letter
145certainly requested a measure of direct aid. But Calwell, detecting
the mood of the Executive, withheld his submission and lent himself
instead to a scheme to make the most of indirect aid. The Executive had
directed Labor politicians to campaign on the basis of aid to the scholar.
Two days later, Calwell outlined 'an educational endowment scheme ...
[which would] give a direct benefit of £26 ($52) a year to every child in
a primary school everywhere'. The scheme would be worth £40 million per
annum, far more than the Liberals' science blocks scheme and would
benefit all primary school children, instead of a select few secondary
students at wealthy schools. The money could pay for 'school fees or
146anything of a like kind'.
The authorship of this scheme is less important than its 
147significance. First, it confirmed that Calwell stood with the sub­
coalition led by Chamberlain and the Victorians, which wished to resist 
demands for direct aid. Like the concession in 1963 regarding use of 
facilities, like the progressive elaborations of scholarship schemes for 
secondary students, the scheme was an attempt to balance a reaffirmation 
of the 1957 principle with an increment of indirect aid. Chamberlain was 
always more interested in denying aid to Catholics than in positive
145Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 30-1; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 130-1;
SMH, 24 February 1966. For Carroll's views, see the first section of 
this chapter.
146Fact, 25 February 1966; SMH, 14 February 1966.
147The scheme appeared at the VCE in January but there is no indication 
of its authorship (note 143). Calwell had given indications that he 
would seek new methods (note 144). Calwell's broadcast used the costing 
Hartley had given the Federal Executive and Freudenberg says Hartley 
drafted Calwell's broadcast as a whole (Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 
32). However, another source gives Cairns the credit for the idea 
(Alan Reid, Bulletin, 26 February 1966).
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alternatives; the Victorian Branch, influenced by Bryant and Wood and
an active Education Committee, had worked on schemes to replace direct
aid; Calwell hoped to compensate for the electoral ’lead’ in his
saddle, without giving ground to the Church from which he had grown 
148estranged. The 'dollar a week' scheme was meant as part of a 
compromise: reaffirmation and consolidation balanced by concession.
Instead, it provided fuel for the opposing intra-party sub-coalition, 
led by Whitlam.
Whitlam's letter of 11 February had concentrated upon the substance 
of one of the Executive's decisions. It supported, in fairly guarded 
terms, direct aid to non-state schools within the context of Commonwealth 
aid to education. It contained only a veiled reference to the party's 
internal differences, to personalities and to the validity of the 
Executive's decision. It was•primarily an expression of exasperation at 
the decision to examine the legality of state aid. It was written after
But there were indications in Calwell's broadcast that he was appealing 
particularly to Catholics. First, he emphasised that 'not one single 
child in any Catholic primary school' had benefited from the science 
blocks legislation. Second, Calwell's only indication of the meaning 
of 'a like kind' was his last sentence, which was ambiguous and had 
little relation to the sentences preceding it: 'I believe our proposals
are the best and soundest for helping those who need help most in the 
payment of teachers' salaries'. In a later television broadcast, Calwell 
said again: 'The intention is to assist in the payment of teachers ...'
and said there was nothing in the scheme to prevent Catholic schools 
refusing admission to children not accompanied by their educational 
endowment money (Fact, 25 February 1966. My emphasis. See also: Age,
21 February 1966). Assistance for teachers' salaries was a longtime 
Catholic direct aid demand ('I understand [from Carroll's letter?] ... 
this is the main problem', said Calwell) and Calwell was permitting a 
clear administrative role to the schools to ensure endowments could be 
used for this purpose. Here was a clear loophole.for aid to the 
Catholic system, but no one seems to have noticed/m the rush of events. 
Many critics of the direct-indirect distinction argued that the latter 
category always carried this loophole. Calwell certainly knew the 
implication of this category.
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the other state aid decisions but did not refer to them. After 
Calwell's broadcast Whitlam made further statements which canvassed a 
far wider range of issues. First, he alleged that the Executive’s 
decisions instituting the legal examination and directing politicians 
to oppose future direct aid, especially extensions of the Commonwealth 
science block scheme, breached the Federal Conference decision 
protecting existing benefits. A legal challenge could overturn all 
benefits, he argued, and it was politically absurd, as well as a 
usurpation of the role of Caucus to force Parliamentarians to oppose 
benefits they had previously supported. The 1965 Conference had 
recognised the latter point; the Executive had ignored it and was 
attempting to change, rather than interpret policy. Secondly, Whitlam 
suggested that the Executive had sought to further humiliate Federal 
Caucus by replacing independent minded Parliamentarians on the Executive’s 
Policy Committees with more pliable politicians. Nor were Caucus members 
properly consulted over the 'dollar a week' scheme. Thirdly, Whitlam 
argued that the issue was 'between those who want a broadly based 
socialist and radical party and petty men who want to reduce it to their 
personal plaything'. The Executive was dominated by an 'extremist ...
See above note 123. The decisions were made on 9 and 10 February. 
The letter was drafted in the morning of 11 February and arrived just 
after the Executive meeting concluded (SMH, 12 February 1966, Sun- 
Herald, 13 February 1966. The veiled reference: 'The Federal
conference would have given as short shrift to this proposal and 
related interpretations as it gave to the referendum proposal which 
emanated from the same source' (i.e. Chamberlain and the Western 
Australian Branch). Whitlam also said later he meant the 'accumulated 
deadwood' (preventing the Chifley Government's education legislation 
from bearing fruit and needing to be cleared away) in the letter to 
refer to 'policy decisions, as well as some of the people that don't 
seem to be able to understand policy such as the people on the Federal 
Executive': ALP, Report of the Special Commonwealth Conference, March
1966, 66 (ATN-7 interview, 15 February 1966). But this elaboration 
came after the further developments referred to in the following 
paragraphs.
234
factional and unrepresentative' group. The party should be reorganised 
on the basis of a Federal Conference drawn from the party in Federal 
electorates and from Federal unions. Finally, without explicitly 
linking Calwell with the controlling group on the Executive, Whitlam 
suggested his Leader's views on education were vague and that Calwell 
should 'be the champion of his [Caucus] colleagues, who up to this 
stage have elected him to his present high post'. While Whitlam 
scrupulously avoided attacking Calwell directly there was enough implied 
in his public remarks for observers to interpret them as a challenge to 
Calwell's Leadership
A number of reasons may be suggested for Whitlam’s activities in 
the second half of February. His sympathetic biographer, Graham 
Freudenberg, uses Whitlam's conduct in these weeks as an example of the 
style of political work or leadership that came to be known, following 
Whitlam's own ctescfiptCsiv, as 'crash through or crash'. The ingredients 
of this style were, firstly, careful definition and extension of the 
issue. (Note the contrast between Whitlam's first and subsequent 
statements, extending the issue from education policy - not state aid as 
such, given Whitlam's priorities - to broader considerations.) Secondly, 
'he deliberately provoked his opponents' and took enormous risks.
Thirdly, he secured support from rank and file party members and 
supporters and from decisionmakers, the latter 'not necessarily in basic 
sympathy with him or [his] views, but who accepted his value to the
^^All the relevant documents are printed in ALP, Report of the Special 
Commonwealth Conference, March, 1966, 58-108. Whitlam's letters and 
statements were as follows (58-77): letter to Wyndham (11 February);
ATN-7 (Sydney) interview recorded 14 February and shown 15 February; 
statement 14 February; telegram to Queensland State Secretary 
(14 February); telegram to NSW Branch officers (22 February); letters 
to Queensland Federal members and candidates and to Tasmanian members 
(17 and 23 February). Apart from the first, the documents all make 
similar points.
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Party'. Fourthly, he benefited from the powers and status of his
position and from his reputation as a vote winner, from his own mental
151and physical efforts and from strokes of fortune.
There are great elements of truth in this analysis but also elements
of post hoc glamourisation. Freudenberg makes Whitlam far more the
calculating, initiating actor than close analysis of the events of 1966
suggest he was. Whitlam’s extension of the issue, for instance, was
influenced by the activities of others. Whitlam made no published
statements on the Executive decisions between 11 and 14 February 1966.
In the closing hours of the Executive meeting on Friday, 11 February,
telegrams arrived from party members protesting at the decisions
regarding state aid and from Caucus members protesting against the
restrictions the Executive had placed upon them. Whitlam's letter,
arriving at much the same time, referred to the Caucus only to
state the writer's belief that his Parliamentary colleagues 'would not
152approve my aiding or condoning' a legal challenge. On 11 February, 
also, before Whitlam's letter became public, Allan Fraser recorded a 
talk for broadcast on 13 February, which made the 'extension' which 
Whitlam did not make publicly until 14 February. Both the 
broadcast and a signed article in similar terms appeared in the Sydney 
Morning Herald on 14 February.
'I have', said Fraser, 'always rejected as fatal to the 
parliamentary system that the outside organisation should be able to 
direct the parliamentarian in detail on how he should vote in particular 
parliamentary divisions .... The issue is that the executive shall be
151Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 36-8. I have compressed and re­
arranged the original without destroying its sense.
152There were reports that Caucus members were seeking a special Caucus 
meeting; SMH, 12 February 1966; Sun-Herald, 13 February 1966.
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the servant and not the master of the membership'. Policy should be
made by Federal Conference, not 'by the edicts of a handful of 
153officials'. It is making Whitlam'appear obtuse to say that h<2 did 
not see these implications of the Executive d e c i s i o n s . I t  is true 
nevertheless that Fraser was the first publicly to extend the issue and 
turn it in the direction Whitlam was to follow. Whitlam did not 
immediately 'stake all', as Freudenberg puts it. He 'provoked his 
opponents' after Fraser had tested the water. Once he had taken the 
plunge on 14-15 February he gathered more media attention, as the heir
153SMH, 14 February 1966; also reproduced in ALP, Report of the Special 
Commonwealth Conference, March, 1966, 83-7, 94-8. The article for the 
SMH, as distinct from the broadcast, spent much space to show that the 
party's written policy was open as to whether direct aid could be 
offered: there was no explicit prohibition of direct aid. This had
been Fraser's argument to the Caucus in November 1965.
154Alan Reid, Sunday Telegraph, 13 February 1966 and later in Bulletin, 
26 February 1966 suggests Whitlam did not grasp the significance of 
the Executive's decisions until Fraser had acted. But note the veiled 
reference in Whitlam's 11 February letter (note 149) as evidence that 
Whitlam was well aware of the implications, even if he was more prudent 
than Fraser. Whitlam had only to read Reid's article in DT, 11 February 
1966 to discover that the Executive had asserted 'complete authority' 
over the Caucus - but Whitlam's letter was drafted before the DT hit 
the streets. SMH, 12 February 1966 and Sun-Herald, 13 February 1966 
(Peter Bowers) drew similar lessons from the decisions but by then 
Whitlam had flown to Rockhampton to campaign in the Dawson by-election 
and might have missed the Sydney press. Generally, to suggest that the 
implications dawned on Whitlam after Fraser had spoken is about as 
plausible as to suggest that Whitlam needed to read it in the press. 
Fraser was merely more forthright. Finally, there is evidence of rival 
politician-press alliances in these parallel reports. Bowers tends to 
see the ..weekend' s events in terms of Whitlam and his Caucus supporters 
and attempts to paint Whitlam as the leading actor. Reid says Caucus 
members were awaiting a lead from Fraser and that Calwell had pleaded 
with Fraser not to make his broadcast (Sunday Telegraph, 13 February 
1966). Reid was a confidant of Fraser (conversation with Fraser's 
niece, Helen Fraser, who is researching a biography of him) and his 
article shows obvious prior knowledge of the contents of Fraser's 
broadcast. In subsequent weeks R.eid's accounts consistently played down 
Whitlam's role.
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apparent to the party Leadership, than did Fraser. Because of his 
position he assumed the leadership of a sub-coalition of forces, some
pcwtlj
seeking state aid, others a change in/Leadership, others diminution of 
the power of the Executive, others more private goals.
Most overt support came from New South Wales, still smarting over 
the events of 1965. Renshaw repeated his argument that State Branches 
should control State policies. His Caucus supported him but avoided 
mentioning the Federal Leadership issue. New South Wales Federal Caucus 
members overwhelmingly opposed the Executive’s decision, although some 
were critical of the personal attacks contained in Whitlam’s television 
broadcast and most refused to commit themselves to support Whitlam in 
any Leadership contest. The New South Wales Branch Executive rejected 
coercion of the Federal Caucus by ’outside bodies' and appealed against 
the Federal Executive interpretation of policy, ’which was not a correct 
interpretation and is in fact a change of policy’. The Queensland Caucus 
Executive supported direct aid, as did A. Hawke, Leader of the party in 
Western Australia. Individual members and local branches sent Whitlam 
telegrams of support. Significant individuals like Senator Kennelly,
J.R. Fraser, MP (Allan's brother), G.W.A. Duthie, MP, R. Patterson, the 
campaigning candidate for the Dawson by-election, Freudenberg, who resigned 
as Calwell’s press secretary, and G. Walsh, who resigned from the Victorian 
Central Executive, were counted in the anti-Federal Executive camp. Fraser 
continued his broadcasts, stressing not state aid, nor the Leadership, 
but ’membership control’ of ALP policy. The South Australian Labor
To the extent that Whitlam hoped to use the crisis to mount a 
Leadership challenge, there may have been an element of calculation in 
his statements in this way: Fraser was a possible Leadership contender,
at least in the first few days after the Executive meeting, and may have 
been more popular in Caucus than Whitlam. Whitlam may have feared that 
Fraser would come to be seen as an alternative Leader to Calwell. For 
speculation about Fraser and the Leadership: Australian, 18 February 1966;
CT, 21 February 1966; SMH, 17 February 1966.
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Cabinet said its Attorney-General, Duns tan, would initiate no High Court
challenge against state aid. But it did not dispute the Executive’s
156decisions as such. Press commentators and Catholic spokesmen
criticised the Executive and praised Whitlam and Fraser.
Whitlam did not direct these diverse forces, although obviously he
158had contacts with some of them. Rather he fed off and fuelled them.
The reaction gave him the public platform upon which he performed best.
He did not wish to come to the Leadership on the back of a faction, nor
did he possess the tactical skills to build up and maintain a sub-
159coalition of forces within the party. The wave of press and party 
resentment provided an alternative power base. There may have been, too, 
an element of temper in Whitlam's initial reaction: the Executive had
shown scant interest in his efforts regarding unity tickets and 
Freudenberg writes that Whitlam was 'outraged' by the 'vindictiveness,
156Based on press reports, especially Age, Australian, CT, SMH, 14-26 
February 1966 and the documents in ALP, Report of Special Commonwealth 
Conference, March, 1966, 78-82, 88-93, 99-108.
157Press: Age, Australian, 15 February 1966; DT, 16 February 1966*, SMH,
15 February 1966. Catholic statements came from Archbishop O'Brien of 
Canberra-Goulburn and from the Sydney diocese through the Catholic 
Weekly (SMH, 14, 16 February 1966).
1 C O
Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 33-4 and Oakes, Whitlam PM, 133-4, 
give an impression of Whitlam's highly charged mood and the relationship 
between him and other elements of his sub-coalition, the media and rank 
and file party members. Note particularly how, according to Freudenberg, 
Whitlam's 'fighting mood had been given a sharp boost by a demonstration 
by party supporters at Brisbane airport' on 13 February. Whitlam himself 
said: 'I didn't realise until I went to Brisbane ... that there were so
many hundreds of people strongly feeling resentment and contempt for our 
Federal executive'.
159Caucus colleagues contrasted this characteristic of Whitlam with 
Calwell's style of leadership (C.R. Cameron, F. Crean, F.E. Stewart,
J.M. Wheeldon, interviews). Note also: 'The essence of [Whitlam's]
style and technique is openness; in the game of back-room intrigue, 
he is not a good politician at all' (Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 
291). On Whitlam's lack of a solid power base within Caucus at this 
time, see Bulletin, 11 December 1965 (Brian Johns); Nation, 1 May 1965 
(Maxwell Newton); SMH, 22 February 1966 (Ian Fitchett).
recklessness and prejudice’ accompanying the state aid decisions.
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Whitlam himself has suggested there may be too much determinism in the
analyses of his style of political work; there is ample evidence of
the rashness in his temperament. But skill in using and manipulating
situations can be just as effective in politics as facility in creating
them. Whitlam was to show this amply.
The activities of the sub-coalition headed by Whitlam produced an
immediate reaction from those who sought to protect the principle of
1957, the power of the Federal Executive in relation to Caucus, the
Leadership of Calwell, or all of these. While the South Australian
Branch initiated the special Federal Executive meeting held early in
March, the Western Australian, Victorian and parts of the Queensland
Branch, as well as militant unions in New South Wales, were also
162restless, especially over the activities of Whitlam. Calwell, while
Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 31.
161Asked by David Frost whether instances of his ’crashing through’ were 
deliberate or out of temper, Whitlam replied: ’I suppose it was a bit of 
both': Anonymous, Whitlam and Frost, London, 1974, 42 (Television
interview, August 1972). All the biographical studies of Whitlam mention 
examples of his impetuosity in small matters and large.
~^^Age, 16, 17, 19, 23, 24 February 1966: C-M, DT, 23 February 1966;
Oakes, Whitlam PM, 135-6; SMH, 16, 17, 23 February 1966. Three pieces 
of evidence show how the three most committed 'anti-aid' States saw the 
issue. The South Australian Executive directed its Federal delegates 
’to ensure that no Member shall be permitted to violate his pledge or 
the rules of the Party’; Chamberlain told the Western Australian 
Executive that the ALP faced a grave situation due to 'the public 
attacks on constituted authority by Mr. E.G. Whitlam .... What the Party 
is fundamentally confronted with ... is not whether the interpretation 
[by the Executive of party policy] is sound or not, but with the vicious 
public attack on, and repudiation of, the Federal Executive of the Party’ 
the VCE asked the Federal Executive to ensure Federal authority was 
upheld: Agenda Attachment, FX 2-4 March 1966: Convening of Special
Meeting, Report of the General Secretary, 1 March 1966; Report of 
F.E. Chamberlain to W.A. State Executive on the Proceedings of the 
Federal Executive meeting 9th-llth February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 
4985/120/41; VCE 25 February 1966, ALP (Victorian Branch), State 
Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8142.
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trying publicly to confine the issue to state aid, privately hoped that
163Whitlam might be expelled. When the Federal Executive met on 2 March,
it agreed by seven votes to five that Whitlam's reported statements, 'if
true, constitute gross disloyalty and a very serious threat to the
general welfare of the Australian Labor Party'. Answering the
allegations, Whitlam repeated that the Executive had purported to make
new policy in its decisions about the legal challenge and the attitude
Parliamentary parties should take to extensions of direct aid. He
denied that it could be disruptive to draw attention to breaches of
policy. Most of the questions asked of Whitlam avoided both the
educational merits of state aid and the issues of party organisation.
The issue was the propriety of his public criticism of the Executive and
the possible outcome was his expulsion.
This outcome was avoided, first, by members of the inner Executive
of the Queensland Branch advising their Federal delegates, Keeffe and
Whitby, not to support expulsion and, secondly, by Whitlam's agreement
164to abide by the rules of the party. The Executive referred the
'Asked if the controversy had gone beyond state aid, Calwell replied:
'No, not for me'. He also believed that the Executive had correctly 
interpreted the party's policy (Age, SMH, 21 February 1966). However, 
both Whitlam's biographers suggest that Calwell was eager for Whitlam's 
expulsion and a party rally at Broadmeadows on 27 February was clearly 
designed to confirm Calwell in the Leadership, and, probably, to promote 
Cairns as his chosen successor. This event shows how the Victorians and 
Calwell saw the issue in late February-early March: Age, 23, 26 February,
1 March 1966; (TT, 26 February 1966; Fact, 11 March 1966; Freudenberg,
A Certain Grandeur, 35; Nation, 19 February 1966; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 139. 
164Age, 1-4 March 1966; ALP, Report of the Special Commonwealth 
Conference, March, 1966, 36, 54-7; Australian, 1-4 March 1966; Bulletin, 
12, 19 March 1966; CT, 1-4 March 1966; FX 2-4 March 1966, Fed. Rec.,
NLA MS 4985/120/40, 41 (the meeting considered virtually all the public 
statements by senior party members in the previous three weeks, noting 
some, referring some back to State Branches and most of the others, 
including those by Fraser, to the Special Conference); J.B. Keeffe, interview 
Nation, 19 March 1966; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 138-42; Laurie Oakes, 'The 
Years of Preparation', Anon., Whitlam and Frost, 22-4; SASE 7, 10 March 
1966, SA Rec., Minute Book 1964-69; SMH, 1-4, 11 March 1966. Whitlam's
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transgressions of Whitlam and other party members to a Special Federal
Conference late in March but this meeting merely reprimanded the Deputy
Leader and imposed minor punishments on other critics of the Executive.
It also decided not to proceed further with the investigation of the
constitutionality of state aid. Instead, all matters regarding state aid
were referred to the National Advisory Committee on Education, a committee
165of the Executive, chaired by Chamberlain.
The Leadership issue was settled for the time being when Calwell
survived easily a motion in Caucus on 27 April to declare all Leadership
166positions vacant. Yet, after this meeting one observer wrote:
164 (continued)
campaigning in the Dawson, Queensland, by-election, which Labor won with 
a 12 per cent swing, probably helped persuade the Queensland Branch 
controllers that he should be protected. Note Freudenberg's remark (A 
Certain Grandeur, 37) that Whitlam was able to use an electoral success 
and a reputation as a vote winner as resources. This election was held 
on 26 February and while Calwell and Keeffe avoided praising Whitlam 
for Labor's success, others took notice. For this election, see:
Colin A. Hughes, 'The Dawson By-election, 1966', AJPH, 12 (April 1966), 
12-23.
165 ALP, Report of the Special Commonwealth Conference, March, 1966; 
Australian, CT, 24-28 March 1966; Richard Hall, 'How Labor Confers'1,
Dissent, 17 (Winter 1966), 28-33; SMH, 24-28 March 1966. The establishment 
of the National Advisory Committee on Education (NACE) had been recommended 
by the old Education Committee in 1963 'to provide a more representative 
body' and one better qualified to advise the party's policymaking bodies 
on a wide range of educational matters: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth
Conference, 1963, 32; 1965, 97; G.M. Bryant, interview; FX 21-23
October 1964, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/35. While the party concentrated 
on the state aid question there was little interest in a committee of this 
type and there was even some uncertainty as to whether the NACE was 
intended to replace the existing Committee. One could argue also that 
the NACE finally came into existence as a means of protecting the 1957 
line, rather than of producing broad education policy, since its 
membership was not settled until the February 1966 Executive meeting.
The election of Chamberlain as Chairman also can be seen as part of the 
anti-state aid mood of that meeting. The Executive was allowed four 
nominees beside Chamberlain. Virgo, Mrs J. Guyatt, a university librarian 
from Queensland, W. Neilson, Tasmanian Education minister and Wood, of 
the old Committee, were elected. Bryant, however, received only three 
votes, perhaps because the anti-aid group on the Executive believed he 
could no longer be trusted after the old Committee's recommendation to 
the 1965 Conference.
^^J.B. Keeffe, interview; Kiernan, Calwell, 259; J.A. Mulvihill, 
interview; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 144-6. The 'spill' motion, moved by 
Mulvihill, was lost 24-49. Calwell announced after the meeting that he 
would not stand for re-election should Labor lose the 1966 Federal election.
242
Internal strife within the A.L.P. is rarely about 
any one thing: it is a peculiar amalgam of passion,
principle and personality .... Meshed together were 
a contest for the leadership, a disputation about 
state aid, and a test of strength between the 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary organs of the 
party. Mr. Calwell's retention of the leadership 
has not resolved the other disputes, which remain 
ready to provide the occasion for further trouble 
in this the most long-lived and factious of 
Australian coalitions.167
That the state aid issue was not solved for Labor in February-April 1966 
can be attributed largely to the efforts of the sub-coalition of which 
WhitLam was the most conspicuous member. Like the Victorian Branch when 
confronted by pressure to enforce unity ticket rules, the Federal 
Executive majority in February, under pressure to change state aid 
policy, consolidated the defence of the 1957 line as it had been 
expressed in the Conference of 1963. The weeks after the February 
meeting produced, first, the nullifying of the most objectionable of the 
February decisions, the legal examination of state aid, and, secondly, 
the referral of the whole state aid question to the NACE. The February 
Executive tried to close the door to Labor offering direct aid. The 
anti-Executive, pro-aid group forced the door open again and returned 
the party approximately to the position at the 1965 Federal Conference. 
The February Executive produced anti-aid increments in Labor's state aid 
policy. The reaction to that meeting's efforts produced further 
increments which at least revived the possibility of the party's 
accepting state aid.
Don Aitkin, 'Political Review', AQ^ , 38, 2 (June 1966), 101. There had 
been similar comments after the March Conference, when even the Leadership 
remained unsettled: Hall, 'How Labor Confers', 28; SMH, 26 March 1966.
Even earlier, after the Caucus debate between Fraser and Keeffe, one 
journalist wrote: 'The party has such a flair for quick compromise that
almost inevitably the solution it produces for one crisis paves the way 
for another' (M.C. Uren, West Australian, 27 November 1965).
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How much did Whitlam contribute to this result? HYPOTHESIS II,
concerning the effect of individual goals and personalities on decisions,
clearly is relevant when examining the events of early 1966. Whitlam
was not bound by the goals of a particular Branch or sub-coalition
within the party, other than the sub-coalition which formed in his wake
over the complex of issues in question at this time. The controlling
group of the New South Wales Branch formed part of that sub-coalition
but Whitlam did not act primarily as a representative of his Branch.
Nor did Caucus give him the support which would have made plausible his
pretensions to be acting as their representative against a predatory
Federal Executive. Whitlam acted essentially as an individual. While
he overstates Whitlam’s centrality, Freudenberg’s summary is essentially
accurate: ’Whitlam*s response determined the shape and pace of the
crisis. Essentially, his actions gave form and coherence to what
168otherwise would have been incoherent'. Freudenberg goes on to suggest
that 'Whitlam ensured that the issues were clearly defined, and by doing
169that he helped control and contain the crisis’. Whitlam was not the
first to extend the issue and even if we agree with Whitlam that the
issue involved the Executive’s attempt to make.new state aid policy, the
humiliation of Caucus, the unrepresentative nature of the Executive and
Calwell's failure to protect the Caucus, there is considerable evidence
170that this definition was not accepted by his allies. The centre of
Whitlam's sub-coalition, the New South Wales Branch, had reason enough 
to act in the humiliation suffered in recent months on the state aid 
question. They supported the reasonable independence of Federal Caucus 
but had little reason to be satisfied with even the decisions of the 1965
168
169
170
Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 36. 
Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 37. 
See above p.237, and below, pp.244-6.
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Conference, which Whitlam sought to defend. Other supporters, like 
Kennelly, Duthie and Hawke, extracted different significances from the 
meeting. 'It appears', said Kennelly, 'that the Federal Executive wants 
to become a policy-making body and decide policy instead of being the 
administrative authority which carries out conference decisions as the 
Rules lay down'. Duthie made similar comments publicly but recognised 
privately that the Leadership was at stake. Hawke, the Opposition 
Leader in Western Australia, suggested Labor had to choose 'whether it 
will stick to its policy of no State aid to church schools and thereby 
make a gift of most elections in future to the Liberal Party'.
These examples show the different reactions to the decisions of
February. Many wanted those decisions to be changed. Most of the people
probably saw Whitlam as the spearhead of change. But reasons for wanting
such a change differed. In other words, people saw the issue in different
ways. Some would have agreed with all that was stated or implied in
Whitlam's remarks of 14 and 15 February, containing his definition of
the issue; others would have rejected parts of it. The least acceptable
part was that which Whitlam had stated least explicitly: the need for a
change of leadership. For instance, only eleven of the twenty-two New
South Wales members of Federal Caucus supported the Caucus spill in
April - that is, effectively supported Whitlam - although eighteen of
them had given broad support to Whitlam's criticisms of the Federal
172Executive in February. Fraser, while opposed to the Executive and in
Kennelly is quoted from ALP, Report of Special Commonwealth Conference, 
March,1966, 101, and Hawke from West Australian, 17 February 1966;
Duthie's private views were contained in a letter, Duthie to Wyndham,
22 February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/30/Federal Executive Committees - 
National Fuel Policy - FXC/19.
172Australian, SMH, 28 April 1966 provide State-by-State breakdowns of 
voting at the Caucus meeting. Whitlam's supporters had tried 
unsuccessfully for a secret ballot on the assumption that this would 
increase the numbers voting in favour, free of retaliation from their
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favour of state aid, did little to prevent the Deputy Leader's 
173expulsion. If Whitlam hoped to use the events of early 1966 to win
the Leadership he failed notably. If he hoped to encourage party
thinking about the unrepresentative nature of the Federal Executive he
174also failed, at least in the short term. If one agrees with Oakes 
that Whitlam’s critics, by painting his efforts as a bid purely for the 
Leadership, ignored the principles of party policy and organisation he 
espoused, one must reiterate that even his allies within the party were 
not eager to define the issues as he d e s i r e d . S o m e  press observers
172 (continued)
State Executives. But the New South Wales Branch was in favour of the 
spill motion, so this consideration would not have applied to the New 
South Welshmen. Some Caucus members may have been deterred from 
supporting Whitlam by his intemperate remarks over previous weeks. He 
had referred, inter alia, to the ’witless men’ of the Federal Executive, 
'Chamberlain’s champions’, and Executive members who battened on the 
party as paid officials or were unknown outside their own States. He 
apologised for these and other remarks at the March Conference.
173Oakes, Whitlam PM, 139, notes that Fraser mentioned to R. Patterson, 
the new member for Dawson, that Calwell believed he had ’the numbers' to 
expel Whitlam. Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 35, describes Fraser as 
'privy to the plot’. These pieces of evidence do not necessarily mean 
that Fraser supported Calwell's desire to remove Whitlam, but it was 
Patterson, not Fraser, who made use of Calwell's indiscretion to protect 
Whitlam. Fraser certainly did not support the April spill.
174 In his statement of 14 February, for instance, Whitlam had referred 
to the 'factional and unrepresentative controlling group' on the Federal 
Executive and called for a 'widely representative' party based on a 
Federal Conference of delegates from Federal electorates and unions 
(ALP, Report of Special Commonwealth Conference, March, 1966, 70). This 
point rarely taken up in the following weeks by Whitlam or anyone 
else, although the issue of reform of the party had been discussed in 
the party for two years and the Executive had deferred action on it at 
the February meeting. See chapter 5, below. Note, too, the remark of 
one observer at the March special Conference: 'There was not one single
reference, direct or indirect, to the General Secretary's plans for 
re-organising the structure of the Party' (Hall, 'How Labor Confers', 33).
^^Oakes, Whitlam PM, 137-8, writes: 'It was Whitlam's basic problem
that wide sections of the Labor Party were prepared to believe he had 
been motivated simply by a frantic ambition to overthrow Calwell and 
grab the leadership; the principle he was espousing was ignored'.
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were more willing to make the connections he urged than were his party 
176colleagues. Thus, after receiving Whitlam's letter agreeing to work
within party rules, the South Australian Executive settled for
reprimanding, rather than expelling him. In the circumstances this was
a concession to Whitlam. Yet the Executive insisted the February
decisions were ’properly made and strictly in accordance with the Rules
of the P a r t y S o u t h  Australia supported Whitlam on strictly limited
terms. Even New South Wales, through Oliver, told the Special Conference
that the Branch did not dispute the right of the Federal Executive to
interpret. ’If we do not agree with its interpretations, we have the
machinery to dispute them’ - that is, through an appeal to Federal
178Conference - not, he implied, the methods Whitlam had used.
Although they differed on other matters, the Whitlam sub-coalition 
agreed that Whitlam should not be expelled or suspended. On the other 
side, Calwell, Chamberlain, the Victorians and, possibly, Cairns and 
Allan Fraser, while they differed over state aid - the Victorians 
believing it was a minor issue, Calwell looking for an alternative,
'It is a question of who is going to control the party': SMH, 12 February 
1966. See also: Age, 15 February, 2 March 1966; CTT, 2 March 1966;
Nation, 19 February 1966; SMH, 19, 22 February, 2 March 1966 and 
especially Brian Johns' remark about the meeting of New South Wales 
Federal Caucus members (SMH, 18 February 1966): ' [T]he two issues -
opposition to the executive's ruling junta and the A.L.P. leadership - 
still failed to coalesce' (my emphasis).
^^SASE 7, 10 March 1966, endorsed by SASC 10 March 1966, SA Rec., Minute 
Book 1964-69; State Council Minutes 1964-77.
1 70
CT, 26 March 1966. Hall, 'How Labor Confers', 28, misses the point: 
Oliver's remark did not destroy Whitlam's 'fundamental criticism', since 
the latter had not disputed the right to interpret, but the right to 
make policy under the guise of interpretation. Oliver's remarks, I 
suggest, touched Whitlam in the way outlined in the text, rather than as 
Hall has it. Another Executive delegate says his own approach was 
influenced by Whitlam's offensive and public attacks on the members 
of the Executive. The February Executive meeting, which Whitlam attended, 
had seemed harmonious and most delegates had agreed with Oliver's remark 
afterwards about the 'good atmosphere' at the meeting (G.T. Virgo, 
interview).
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Chamberlain implacably opposed, Cairns indifferent, Fraser supporting
it - and over the relative roles of Caucus and the Executive, at least
179agreed that Whitlam should be punished. Further, just as the Whitlam
sub-coalition differed over whether Whitlam should lead the party, so
the opposing sub-coalition had mixed feelings about Calwell.
Theoretically, the Special Conference of March met to consider ’the
actions taken by the Federal Executive [at the meeting of 2-4 March] to
protect the Federal authority of the Party following upon the public
statements attributed to the Deputy Leader of the Federal Parliamentary
Labor Party, Mr E.G. Whitlam, which followed upon the meeting of the
180Federal Executive in February, 1966’. In fact, Whitlam and the other
transgressors were not dealt with until the Conference, having heard
Wyndham's report on the February Executive meeting, and having discussed
the issues over a long luncheon adjournment, had decided to refer ’all
the issues involved in State Aid' to the NACE. The NACE was to report
to the Executive, which would circulate the report to State Branches,
prior to a further Special Conference in July 1966 to deal with the
report. For the price of a reprimand or two, Whitlam and his allies had
ensured the door to state aid remained open.
But how firmly closed had the door been? Only the Victorians voted
181against the referral motion. One could argue that Chamberlain and
1 79The view of Cairns is based on Bulletin, 12 March 1966, J.F. Cairns, 
interview, and Nation, 19 February 1966; Hartley told the Special 
Conference that state aid was a 'relatively minor' issue (Hall, 'How 
Labor Confers', 29). Of course, the Victorians still opposed direct 
aid but were more likely to place this opposition in the context of a 
general education policy than was, say, Chamberlain. The above brief 
summary is to show points of difference, not common ground.
180ALP, Report of the Special Conference, March, 1966, 52.
^^Some reports (Hall, 'How Labor Confers', 30; SMH, 26 March 1966) 
give the vote as 29-7, with Wheeldon (WA) joining the Victorians, but 
the Report says 30-6.
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others who supported the motion hoped that the NACE could do what the 
Executive had failed to do in February. Was this so?
There is evidence, instead, that the cracks that had begun to
appear in the defences of the 1957 principle by the 1965 Education
Committee report were beginning to spread through the party. Both South
Australian and Queensland spokesmen seemed to accept that Labor might
soon change its stance. Virgo, the South Australian Branch Secretary,
supporting the referral motion, averred that it was ’no good adopting
the attitude that State Aid can be wiped out’. His colleague, Dunstan,
was hopeful that a South Australian State Council meeting later in the
year would reverse that Branch’s opposition to direct aid. The
Queensland Opposition Leader, J. Duggan, asked if anyone would deny him
the right to offer free text books to all children in his policy speech
for theimminent Queensland election. This was just the category of aid
that the Federal Executive majority believed should be referred to it,
but no one contested Duggan's point. The Queensland Central Executive
itself believed 'all school children' were entitled to the best possible
education and that the Federal Government 'must contribute towards
182providing facilities to realise this objective'. That this avenue, 
renowned in anti-aid mythology as a roundabout route to direct aid, 
could still be pursued, despite the Federal Executive's attempts to 
consolidate, suggests that doubts were growing in sections of the party 
which had previously helped defend the principle of 1957. Some 
Conference delegates disowned the methods the Executive had used to
1 82Age, 29 March 1966; (TT, 26 March 1966; Hall, 'How Labor Confers', 
28-30; SMH, 26, 29 March 1966. The QCE resolution (28 February 1966) 
was one of the documents before the Federal Executive meeting of 
2-4 March and formed the substance of an unsuccessful amendment moved 
by Duggan at the Conference. Chamberlain argued that the words quoted 
in the text would commit Labor to direct state aid.
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defend that principle. Others wished to overturn the principle. Others
defended it. All were prepared to commence yet another attempt to solve
184the ALP's state aid problem.
A FURTHER HYPOTHESIS
The events of February to April 1966 provide evidence for a number 
of our hypotheses. We have said enough to suggest the relevance of our 
HYPOTHESIS II. We have dwelt on the activities of Whitlam, as one 
individual who seemed to influence outcomes. We could have said more 
about Calwell, Chamberlain, Fraser and others who pursued personal 
convictions through the party machinery. We have noted also the interest 
taken by the metropolitan press. It is not too fanciful to see the 
journalists and leader writers who gave generally favourable coverage to 
the activities of Whitlam as part of an alliance to alter Labor policy. 
There is certainly more than an inkling here of the relevance of our
I O C
HYPOTHESIS XII regarding the media. The events of late 1965 and 
early 1966 were triggered by a decision of the Liberal Federal Government 
to provide new direct aid, showing again the relevance of another of our 
hypotheses about external influences on the ALP (HYPOTHESIS XIII). In 
Labor's reaction to this pressure there was still evident the divergence
One observer saw an 'important, but subtle, implication ... that the 
Federal Executive ... has been rebuffed by the conference' (Harold Cox, 
Sunday Mail, 27 March 1966) . Another detected an elaborate attempt to 
'save face' (of the Executive) in the passage of the motion rejecting a 
legal challenge: 'it had to be pretended that no legal appeal was ever
intended' (Hall, 'How Labor Confers', 31. But see note 123 above).
184Victoria voted against the motion but a Victorian amendment 
(unsuccessful) had not opposed the referral as such but the circulation 
of the NACE report to the States and the holding thereafter of a 
Special Conference. Victoria was not opposed to 'another look' but to 
the possibility of change in basic policy. The latter was more likely 
to follow a Special Conference than to follow another Executive meeting
185 See above, note 154.
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between those who wished to seek votes by offering direct aid and those 
who believed any response should follow the principle of 1957. Labor 
should not accept, the latter group argued, the votes of those who 
would not accept Labor principles. The ’inclusivists' replied that 
society was changing and Labor could ill afford to lose the votes of those 
whose new outlooks caused them to reject such outdated ideas as 'aid to 
the scholar but not the school’ (HYPOTHESIS III).
We have said little explicitly about the differing goals of State 
Branches (HYPOTHESIS I), although the New South Wales Branch was 
especially favourable to Whitlam's activities, perhaps partly because 
the Branch goal of direct state aid would thus be served. We noted the 
suggestion that the Queensland and South Australian Branches might soon 
change their attitudes to direct aid. We could have discussed all the 
events of February-April in terms of the goals of State Branches but 
this approach would have concealed the important role of Whitlam. At 
the last, in the decision to refer the state aid issue to the NACE, the 
differing goals of the Branches were submerged in a common desire for 
’another look’. This decision ensured that the incremental process 
confcürvued (HYPOTHESIS XV) . Whitlam, Calwell, Fraser, the Caucus, the 
Federal Executive, the Federal Conference, all made their ’disjointed' 
contributions to this process in February, March and April. Now it was 
the NACE's turn.
In earlier parts of this case study we have looked for evidence of 
compromise decisions by partisan mutual adjustment and for decisions 
which sought to keep the Labor coalition in one piece (HYPOTHESES V, XIV 
and IV). We could see the events of early 1966 as a search for 
compromise. For example, perhaps, Whitlam withdrawing his personally 
offensive remarks in exchange for the anti-state aiders agreeing to stop
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the legal examination. We have seen that members of the Whitlam sub­
coalition had differing goals and we can imagine that a process of 
compromise was necessary to keep this sub-coalition together. Perhaps 
Whitlam played down his interest in the Leadership and reform of the 
party organisation as the price of alliance with those more interested 
in changing state aid policy. On the other side, some observers
believed one of the main aims of the Calwell-Chamberlain sub-coalition
186was to ensure that Cairns, rather than Whitlam, succeeded Calwell.
'The possibility of joining the opposition to Gough Whitlam with a ban
187on State Aid was the essence of Joe Chamberlain's plan.' Within this 
sub-coalition Calwell led those most interested in destroying Whitlam, 
Chamberlain those who wished to close finally the door on direct state 
aid.
These themes could be drawn out of the events we have considered.
We have concentrated instead on how state aid became entangled with
other issues, the meshing together, as Aitkin puts it, of 'a contest
for the leadership, a disputation about state aid, and a test of
strength between the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary organs of 
188the party'. Our description provides the justification for a further 
hypothesis which can be tested Lv the remaining chapters of the thesis
^ ^ Bulletin, 12 March 1966; Nation, 19 February 1966.
^ ^ Nation, 19 February 1966.
"''^Aitkin, 'Political Review' (June 1966), 101. See also, Albinski,
The Australian Labor Party and the Aid to Parochial Schools Controversy, 
49: 'not just a problem in substance, but a problem in party
organization, in decision-making,and in leadership'; Graham Freudenberg, 
Labor Comment, May 1966, 4: while the ultimate outcome was Calwell's
re-election the crisis 'did not begin as a leadership contest .... The 
leadership became the direct issue only because the public stance of the 
Leader and his Deputy had become so diametrically opposed'; Louise 
Overacker, Australian Parties in a Changing Society, 1945-67, Melbourne, 
1968, 112: 'State aid was the catalyst which brought to a head basic
disagreements over policy and leadership'.
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and which indicates how decisionmaking in the ALP can be similar to that 
in other organisations.
In their book Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, a group of
writers led by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen set out and apply a
189model of ’garbage can decision processes'. One further hypothesis
derives from a combination of insights in this book and what we have
learnt from the events just described. March and Olsen argue that
standard conceptions of organisational choice posit 'a closed cycle of
connections' between individual goals, individual behaviour,
organisational decisions, effects on the world outside the organisation
and outside effects on individual goals. On the second page of the
first chapter of this thesis appears a version of this cycle:
Individuals with goals (or 'desires' or interests') 
combine with other individuals to produce a group 
decision. Groups combine with other groups to 
produce decisions bearing the name of the larger 
group. Organisations are coalitions comprising 
sub-coalitions. They are all permeable by 
influences from other organisations and from the 
broader setting or 'environment' in which they 
operate. Political parties are organisations 
and, as such, they are permeable coalitions.
March and Olsen show how this cycle is modified in practice. The 
evidence of this thesis confirms the importance of these modifications. 
For instance, we have seen and March and Olsen suggest that individuals 
act in organisations both as holders of offices in the organisation and 
as individuals affected by other influences than the positions they hold. 
We have seen Calwell as party leader and aged stalwart resentful of 
criticism; Chamberlain as committee chairman and anti-Catholic; Whitlam
James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, 
Bergen, 1976. The summary in the following paragraphs is drawn mainly 
from pp.10-19, 26-37, 243-6. The main contributing author is Michael 
D. Cohen. The organisations studied are school boards, universities and 
other organisations connected with education.
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as New South Wales member of Federal Caucus and ambitious individual;
all of them and others acting from a combination of their goals as
individuals and their roles as office holders. Then, suggest March and
Olsen, individual attitudes may develop out of action as part of a
group. Attitudes may change as action continues. Thus Oakes writes of
Whitlam's developing attitudes to state aid:
In his first ten years in Parliament Whitlam, in 
private conversation, had been ... against the 
State aid concept .... The events of 1963 changed 
Whitlam's mind .... Once he had become interested 
in the issue, Whitlam convinced himself that there 
was justice in the case .... When he took up the 
cause he believed in it, and - along with the NSW 
ALP branch - he was convinced it was essential for 
the 1965 Federal Conference to alter the party
policy.190
The development of Whitlam's attitudes was part cause, part effect of his 
action within the party, of his alliance with different sub-coalitions: 
first, the anti-aid majority, then those who sought Commonwealth 
assistance to education, then those who believed this assistance should 
not discriminate between state and non-state students, then the New 
South Wales Branch, which wanted the narrow innovation of direct aid, 
then, finally, those who saw the state aid struggle as a lever for 
changing the party Leadership. Each alliance affected Whitlam's views.
Secondly, March and Olsen suggest there is only a loose connection 
between the reconciling of individual and sub-coalitional goals and 
outcomes. Often the outcome is directed towards 'the maintenance or 
change of the organization as a social unit', that is, towards the aim 
we have encapsulated in our fourth hypothesis, 'keeping the coalition 
together'. Events like those of early 1966 were not uncommon in ALP 
history. The Sydney Morning Herald's editorialist suggested before the
190Oakes, Whitlam PM, 125.
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March Special Conference that many Labor decisionmakers would be content
191if ’the party does not further lacerate itself in public view’. The 
emotion was probably widely held at the time but it was not new.
Thirdly, the link between organisational decision and the response
in the world outside clearly is absent in many circumstances: consumers
buy even if the firm does not seek their custom; voters vote other than
in response to party action; Catholics deserted Labor for other reasons,
say, upward social mobility, than because Labor failed to offer state
aid. Activity outside a political party must often ’be understood in
terms of relationships among events, actors and structures’ outside the
party but it affects the party nevertheless. Finally, if individuals in
organisations form goals in response to external events, much depends
’upon the efficiency of the channels through which interpretations are
transmitted'. Information is imperfect and interpretations of it (of
the interpretations) differ. Some sections of the press had 'barrows
to push' in support of Whitlam early in 1966; their interpretations
were influenced accordingly. At other times, almost as many Labor
decisionmakers interpreted the same voting figures as evidence that
Labor was suffering for the attempts of sections of the party to have
it support direct aid as detected in the figures condemnation of
existing policy. This phenomenon March and Olsen describe as 'ambiguity'
192in the understanding of the world outside the organisation.
191SMH, 23 March 1966.
192The authors actually refer to ambiguity of the 'environment'. I have 
preferred to use this term to apply to the locus of the political system 
as a whole: the party is part of a 'political system' located in an
environment comprising economic, social, cultural, religious and other 
systems. The loose term 'the world outside the party' includes both the 
other parts of the political system and what I call 'the environment'.
It is equivalent to what March and Olsen call 'the environment'. See 
chapter 1, above.
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March, Olsen and their associates were not the first to recognise
193the limitations of the 'cycle of choice'. But they make complexity 
and 'ambiguity' the base for a model of how organisations often make 
decisions. While decision situations or 'choice opportunities' are, 
in theory, occasions for producing a decision out of a 'decisionmaking 
process' and, again in theory, the decision produced bears a 'label' 
describing its content, in practice,decision situations may involve 
other activities that 'are neither mutually exclusive nor mutually 
inconsistent .... Decisions are a stage for many dramas'. February, 
March and April 1966 witnessed simultaneous dramas entitled 'Labor and 
State Aid', 'Calwell and Whitlam', and 'Caucus, Conference and the 
Executive'.
To make sense of such periods of the history of organisations, 
March and Olsen provide the concept of 'garbage can decision processes'. 
In this concept, choice opportunities, or decision opportunities, 'are 
occasions when an organization is expected to produce behavior that can 
be called a decision'. But they also can be 'garbage can[s] into which 
various problems and solutions are dumped by participants'. Problems 
concern people inside and outside the organisation, they have myriad
March & Olsen overstate the extent to which the cycle of choice still 
dominates the theories they criticise, which include 'theories of 
negotiation and bargaining' , (10). They acknowledge their debt to a long 
list of previous writers in the field, including March himself, Cyert, 
Simon, Lindblom and Allison, all of whom we have referred to in this 
thesis. For instance, Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision, Boston, 
1971, 145-6, 167-8, 171, notes that decisionmakers may be involved 
simultaneously in many decisions and that attitudes to some issues may 
affect attitudes to others. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, 4, 
observes: 'A policy is sometimes the outcome of a political compromise
among policy makers,'none of whom had in mind [as a result of his own 
goals and the effect upon him of the world outside] quite the problem 
to which the agreed policy is the solution. Sometimes policies spring 
from new opportunities, not from "problems" at all'.
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contents reflecting the varying goals of individuals and they are 
dumped in decision garbage cans partly, but only partly, on the basis 
of what the decision is supposed to be ’about’. They are not the same 
as decisions or choices and decisions may not resolve them. Solutions 
are produced by individuals and groups independently of problems; 
they are answers seeking questions. Organisations try to regulate the 
flow of problems and solutions (carried by participants) into garbage 
cans by imposing rules for participation and access, by selecting 
information and by setting priorities.
Let us look at the ALP in early 1966 in terms of the garbage can
concept. The reference to organisational regulation of flow need not
detail us long. The authors' explication shows it is another way of
saying organisations have rules and procedures, formal structures and
informal relationships, and means of providing and denying access to
194the decisionmaking process. The 'choice opportunities’ were, at 
least, the February Executive meeting, the two March Executive meetings 
(one immediately before the Special Conference), the Special Conference 
and the 27 April Caucus meeting. Other possible 'garbage cans' were 
meetings of State Executives during this period, other Federal Caucus 
meetings and, since individual and group decisionmaking may also show 
garbage can characteristics, the making of the decisions by Whitlam to 
criticise the Executive, by some members of the Queensland Central 
Executive to save Whitlam from expulsion and by Calwell, Hartley and 
Cairns to produce the 'dollar a week' scheme could also be examined in 
this light. The. 'participants' in decisions, in theory, could be all to 
whom the structure and the informal ways of operating the party give 
access but our story has focussed on senior office holders in the ALP,
March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 27-32, 38-53.194
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on the Liberal Government and on the press, because these seem to have
195been important contributors to the decisions that emerged.
What 'problems’ did participants carry to the garbage cans? Let 
us take a few participants as examples. Calwell had the problems, inter 
alia, of retaining the Leadership and of evolving an aid policy which 
would be acceptable to the party but still win votes. Whitlam those of 
winning the Leadership, protecting Caucus against the Executive, re­
organising the structure of the party, ending the party's opposition to 
direct aid and promoting the concept of Commonwealth finance for 
education controlled by the States. Chamberlain's main problem may 
have been the protection of the 1957 line but he also carried the 
problem of the authority of the Executive in the party, especially over
politicians, and, perhaps, the problem of a decline in his personal
196influence in the party since he ceased to be Federal Secretary. The 
main problem of the New South Wales Branch was its inability to offer 
direct aid, of the Victorian Branch its inability to divert the party 
from the obsession with state aid to a comprehensive, alternative 
education policy; The Tasmanian and South Australian Branch delegates 
carried the problems of Branches hopeful of, or ensconced in power and 
committed to modest forms of indirect or disguised aid whose future
195Whitlam, it was said, sought to set against the Federal Executive a 
groundswell of opinion aroused by his media appearances. If this 
groundswell emerged (and evidence is difficult to find, although it 
may exist) it had no existence for the decisionmakers other than as 
the media presented it. A press coverage was more important than a 
few dozen telegrams.
196Cf. the comment of one journalist on the February Executive meeting: 
'Mr Chamberlain splashed and revelled in his comeback to power' (Nation, 
19 February 1966). The following month, another observer noted that 
Chamberlain's view prevailed rarely at the Special Conference (Hall,
'How Labor Confers', 33). If Chamberlain carried a problem of how to 
maintain his personal influence, it was attached to a solution at the 
first meeting but not at the second.
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seemed threatened by the Federal Executive. Problems such as these 
were not emptied into every decision opportunity or garbage can. March 
and Olsen suggest that problems differ in their 'latency'. 'A problem 
may be active but not attached to any choice. It may be recognized and 
accepted by some part of the organization but may not be considered
• 197germane to any available choice opportunity. Thus Whitlam urged the
February Executive meeting not to disturb the Conference decision, which
he believed could be interpreted to give the party a satisfactory state
aid policy, that is, solve the problem he carried to the Executive.
There is considerable evidence that Whitlam at this time was worried
about (carried problems concerning) the decisionmaking structure of the
party, especially the balance between Caucus and the Executive, and that
he was ambitious for the Leadership. Yet he did not attempt to find
solutions for these problems until after the February Executive meeting,
until other garbage cans appeared.
What were some of the 'solutions' to which participants tried to
attach their problems? 'A solution is somebody's product', produced not
necessarily with all the possible questions in mind to which it might
provide an answer. In political parties rules provide answers and some
Labor rules dealt with expulsion of party members judged to have infringed
other rules. Expulsion of Whitlam was one solution which participants,
aware of party rules, dumped in decision opportunity garbage cans early
in 1966. Many participants sought to link their problems (some jointly 
198carried ) to this solution. Freudenberg describes graphically how 
Calwell put aside Bishop Carroll's assessment of Catholic educational
197March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 33-4.
198The garbage can concept allows participants to carry the same problem, 
although each participant perceives the problem differently.
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needs: 'Suddenly, bigger, better game was afoot - not State aid, not
199education, not the next election, but Gough Whitlam’. Early in 
March, Calwell and others carried both the problem of protecting his 
Leadership and the solution of expelling the main threat to it. But 
the activities of the Queensland Central Executive meant Calwell's 
Leadership protection problem could find no solution in March 1966.
The meetings of March attached to the problem of curbing Whitlam's 
attacks on the Executive the solution of a reprimand, rather than 
expulsion, as Calwell hoped, and to the problem of changing the February 
state aid decisions the solutions of prevention of a High Court challenge 
and, secondly, referral to the NACE, rather than the alternative 
solutions of immediate direct aid or the 'dollar a week' proposal.
(There are always a number of alternative solutions in garbage cans.)
For March and Olsen, the reprimand of Whitlam would be a decision made 
by 'resolution'; it resolved the Executive's problem of Whitlam's 
attacks on them. But it did not resolve Calwell's Leadership problem, 
which found another decision opportunity garbage can, in the Caucus 
meeting of 27 April where the problem was resolved by attachment to the 
solution provided in the rules, an unsuccessful spill motion. Decisions 
are often made, say March and Olsen, by 'flight', where 'choices are 
associated with problems (unsuccessfully) for some time until a choice 
"more attractive" to the problems comes along. The problems leave the 
choice, and thereby make it possible to make the decision' - in this 
case, the decision to reprimand Whitlam. Similarly, the problem of 
finding a state aid policy fled the garbage can of the March Special 
Conference. That garbage can produced decisions changing the decisions 
of February, solving that problem but not the problem of finding a
Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 31.199
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state aid policy. This problem was carried to the garbage cans of the
NACE.200
Solutions are not always contained in the rules. To its problem 
of how to close the door on state aid, the Federal Executive tried to 
attach, according to Whitlam, the solution of ’making new policy', which 
was outside its constitutional power. The Executive insisted its 
solution was merely the constitutional one of ’interpretation’. The 
pressure of the Queensland Central Executive on its Federal delegates 
provided the solution for the problem of preventing Whitlam's expulsion. 
Calwell, Cairns and Hartley provided the 'dollar a week' solution to 
attach to the problems of finding an alternative to direct aid and of 
countering adverse publicity over the legal examination decision. (The 
garbage can allows one stone to kill two problem birds,) Finally, some 
observers saw the decision of the Federal Liberal Government to send 
conscript troops to Vietnam (8 March 1966) as a diversion from Labor's 
state aid troubles. Calwell could have used this to help resolve his
March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 33, suggest there are three 
'styles' of decisionmaking: by 'oversight', when a decision arises out
of the 'dumping' of problems in other choice opportunities (i.e. garbage 
cans 'spin off' decisions), by flight and by resolution. The authors 
admit that some decisions involved both flight and resolution '(i.e. 
some problems leave, the remainder are solved)' and they define these as 
decisions by resolution, which allows the three styles to be 'mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive with respect to any one choice'. This rather 
unsatisfactory device can be avoided but the mutually exclusive aspect 
retained in the following way: a garbage can or decision opportunity is
an opportunity for a number of decisions; a decision is defined as the 
removal of a problem or problems from the garbage can in one of three 
ways, oversight, flight or resolution; in the case of decision by 
oversight or resolution, the departing problem or problems is attached 
to a solution or solutions. In the case of decision by flight, the 
departing problem or problems is not attached to a solution or solutions 
(note that one problem can be attached to a number of partial solutions 
making up a total solution and that a number of problems may be attached 
to the one solution or an amalgam of solutions); thus, the correct 
description is not 'some decisions involve both flight and resolution' 
but 'the output of decision opportunity garbage cans comprises decisions 
made either by flight or resolution - or oversight'.
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Leadership protection problem - by leading a crusade he made up for his
failure to assist changes in state aid policy. He showed that problems
may be solved in garbage cans by means of a number of solutions (here,
by a combination of forcing Whitlam to the unsuccessful Caucus motion
201and, secondly, by the Vietnam diversion).
The concept of the garbage can turns on the relationship between
decision opportunities, participants, problems and solutions. There is
a lot more to it than these four 'streams' and some aspects of it are
202unclear even in the original formulation. But since we have found 
evidence in the events of early 1966, where garbage cans were labelled 
'state aid', that important characteristics of the garbage can 
were present, it is reasonable to assume that the concept will be 
relevant at other points of our study. To give two brief examples: in
the study of unity tickets in the previous chapter some problems were 
Evatt's Prime Ministerial ambitions, the unrepresentativeness of the
201Cf.’ Brian Johns, SMH, 29 March 1966: 'perhaps the major obstacle
which has arisen since Mr. Whitlam made his forward run for leadership is 
the rising confidence in the Federal Labor Party over Vietnam and 
conscription'. Another writer (Hall, 'How Labor Confers', 33) was less 
convinced of the existence of this confidence but believed that the 
Vietnam crusade might strengthen party unity - which, in practice, meant 
unity behind Calwell. Note also Hartley's radio attack on Whitlam 
(before the Leadership problem was solved) for his disruptive tactics 
when Labor was taking a courageous stand on conscription: Age, 4 April
1966. Victoria opposed holding the July Special Conference because it 
would be a distraction from the Vietnam issue: Fact, 22 April,
15 July 1966.
202See the generally favourable review by Lawrence B. Mohr, APSR, 72 
(September 1978), 1033-4. One obscurity is whether participants enter 
garbage cans, that is, assist to link problems and solutions. March & 
Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 26-7, say participants dump problems 
and solutions into garbage cans and that 'organizational choice 
[linking of problems and solutions] is a somewhat fortuitous confluence' 
but then one has to ask in what do participants participate? The 
answer is, presumably, decision opportunities, that is, garbage cans, 
and it seems to be leaving too much to 'fortune' to limit their 
participation to dumping.
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Victorian Branch and Labor's loss of votes; some solutions were 
enforcement of unity tickets policy, intervention in Victoria and 
support for Fitzgibbon and ALP-endorsed tickets. In state aid matters 
in 1963, some problems, on one hand, were the plight of Catholic 
schools and Labor's need for votes.and, on the other, the desire for 
revenge against Catholics and to 'get New South Wales'; some solutions 
were direct aid, scholarships, Commonwealth finance, intervention in 
New South Wales and increasing the power of the Federal Executive 
against State Labor Governments. Let us then state another hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS XVI: DECISIONMAKING WILL SHOW EVIDENCE OF 'GARBAGE CAN
CHARACTERISTICS'
THE INCREMENTAL PROCESS CONTINUES
Our detailed study of state aid is almost complete. We looked first 
at how the ALP made compromise decisions, sometimes through a process of 
partisan mutual adjustment, and then at how state aid decisions became 
entangled with many other issues. Throughout we found evidence in support 
of other hypotheses set up in the first two chapters. HYPOTHESIS XV, that 
decisionmakers will practice disjointed incrementalism, has underpinned 
the whole chapter. From 1957 state aid decisions were small bites at 
the problem rather than sweeping changes. The bites involved 
interpretation, clarification and modification, but never an attempt to 
put state aid policy in the context of desirable education goals. The 
decisionmakers sought to move away from short term evils, in particular, 
electoral unpopularity for Labor and educational injustice for Catholics, 
rather than towards an educational utopia upon whose features all 
decisionmakers could agree. When comprehensive education programmes 
were adopted, as at the 1963 Federal Conference, they hedged on the 
aspects likely to provoke dissension in the party. All delegates could
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accept that more Commonwealth money was required for education; they
differed over whether that money should be spent on non-state education.
The 1963 programme for many delegates was a means of avoiding a decision
on state aid, not a picture of a desirable future.
The nature of the state aid problem changed with successive Federal
Government initiatives. We have suggested the importance in Labor state
aid decisionmaking of HYPOTHESIS XIII, Labor's relationship with the
Federal Government. Some analysts would class this as the most important
influence on Labor's approach.
After 1964 many in the Labor Party accepted as a 
fait accompli that state aid was here to stay.
This situation shaped the changes in Labor's 
attitudes towards the private schools, despite 
the veneer of arguments about needs and educational 
opportunity.203
Was Labor approval of state aid then inevitable? Labor decisionmakers 
certainly recognised the existence of external pressures for direct 
state aid, but as late as March 1966 a majority of the party's supreme 
body would concede only measures of indirect and disguised aid and the 
protection of existing aid. The report of the NACE majority provided 
further increments by tinkering with clause 4 of the existing education 
platform, the 'at their own cost' clause. Firstly, the majority 
recommended that the private systems should still be responsible for 
their capital, maintenance and salary costs 'subject to review by the 
Federal Conference following a full enquiry by the Commonwealth into 
primary, secondary and technical education into both government and non­
government schools, and the appointment of an appropriate body to 
determine conditions under which assistance should be provided in meeting
203A.D. Spaull, 'Educational Policies of Australian Political Parties', 
D.A. Jecks, ed., Influences in Australian Education, Perth, 1974, 100.
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this responsibility'. This formulation was to replace the 'at own 
cost' proviso. It was a slight advance in that it linked the long­
standing Labor promise of an inquiry into education and the needs of 
non-state schools more specifically than previously. But the timing 
of the review was vague and there was no undertaking that direct aid 
would ever be provided.
Secondly, the Committee recommended that, pending the review by
Federal Conference, 'any forms of benefit existing in a State or Territory
at the time of this [July Special] Conference may be supported in that
State or Territory'. This formulation was to replace the part of the
existing platform (Section XXVII) produced by the 1965 ad hoc committee.
It was a reformulation of the concept that 'no benefit which is currently
established shall be disturbed' but it made a further concession by
removing the requirement for Federal Executive approval of new benefits.
206The decision was to be one for State Labor Oppositions themselves.
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ALP, Special Commonwealth Conference, July 1966: Report, Findings and
Documents, 14. All references to the majority report are from pp.14-16 
of the Conference report.
This implication was recognised by members of the NACE minority, who 
tried unsuccessfully first to delete the proviso without replacing it 
(this would have left the way open for direct aid) and, secondly, to 
replace 'should'with 'shall be provided' (my emphasis). That the second 
amendment was ruled out of order as a direct negative to the original 
motion suggests there was no certainty the procedure in the motion would 
ensure the party would accept direct aid. References to the NACE 
meetings are drawn from: National Advisory Committee on Education:
Minutes of First (1966) Meeting, 29 April-1 May 1966, Sydney; Minutes 
of Second (1966) Meeting, 29 May 1966, Melbourne, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 
4985/126/60.
206These increments did not occur without a struggle. The first NACE 
meeting, after lengthy debate and informal discussion, had agreed that 
'Existing or incoming Labor Governments may continue forms of assistance 
to non-government schools currently applying in that State or Territory' 
(my emphasis shows one point of difference from the motion eventually 
adopted. The other was the non-deletion of Section XXVII, which 
overlapped this formulation.) This motion was rescinded at the second 
meeting and the formulation in the text adopted instead. Presumably 
private discussion between meetings had revealed the difficulties of 
the first formulation.
265
Thirdly, while State Labor Governments still could not offer direct aid, 
the Committee recommended that their ability to dispense Commonwealth 
direct aid should be stated explicitly. Fourthly, the NACE majority 
supported Commonwealth aid to the States for teacher training facilities, 
including for non-state trainees, a long-standing request of Catholic 
education authorities.
The NACE majority report bore the names of Nicholls (Acting
Chairman), Virgo, Wood, Bryant, Mrs.J. Guyatt, B. Lourigan (both from
Queensland) and R. Loveday, MHA, the South Australian Minister for
Education. It was intended, remembers Virgo, ’to pour oil on the
207troubled waters’ of the state aid question. The NACE minority, on the
other hand, believed the majority's desire to soften the policy without
conceding direct aid merely led it into contradictions. The minority,
Whitlam, Barnard, L. Reynolds, a Federal member from New South Wales,
J. Tonkin, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in Western Australia, and
W. Neilson, MHA, Tasmanian Minister for Education, argued religious
prejudice was preventing a positive, uniform Labor education policy.
The new formulation of clause 4, by allowing interim support for existing
benefits ('Pending review by Federal Conference' following the
Commonwealth inquiry) contradicted the 1957 principle and allowed those
State Branches where direct aid already existed to support it. They
could already support something which the first majority recommendation
suggested they might be able to do after the Commonwealth inquiry and
20 8Conference review. Labor in States where direct aid was not already 
provided could not support it in the future. Further, Labor Oppositions 
could support non-Labor initiatives but Labor Governments could not
207G.T. Virgo, interview.
ono Australian, 2 June 1966; CT, 8 June 1966; SMH, 2, 7 June 1966.
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introduce identical direct aid schemes. These consequences of Labor’s 
policy made laughable its aim of equality in education and made fools 
of the politicians who had to sell the policy to voters.
The NACE minority argued that Labor should cut the tangle produced
by years of small changes by clearly and consistently rejecting direct
aid or by positively accepting it and setting out a plan for its
implementation. The latter alternative was ultimately that chosen by
Labor but not before ’chance’ had taken a hand. March and Olsen suggest
that decisionmaking 'is often the almost fortuitous result of the
intermeshing of loosely-coupled processes .... Substantial differences
in final outcomes are sometimes produced by small (and essentially
unpredictable) differences in intermediate events leading to the outcomes.
209Lawful processes operate subject to essentially chance variation.* In 
other words, chance and unpredictability are characteristics of garbage 
can processes of decisionmaking, the subject of our HYPOTHESIS XVI.
Three instances of chance affected Labor's approach to state aid 
between April and July 1966. First, Chamberlain, elected Chairman of 
the NACE, became seriously ill in April 1966 and took no part in the 
deliberations of this Committee or the Special Federal Conference at 
Surfers Paradise in July. More importantly, his absence from the scene 
in Western Australia helped others in that Branch, led by Tonkin,
J. Berinson, a protege of Whitlam, and J. Coleman, Secretary of the 
Trades and Labour Council, to change the Branch's position regarding
209March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 20, 26. See also 132-4.
My emphasis.
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direct aid from opposition to support. The Western Australian
reversal meant New South Wales, Tasmania and Western Australia would
provide eighteen votes in favour of direct aid, that is, against the
NACE majority report’s combination of confirmation and concession.
Since Victoria, South Australia and Queensland seemed likely to vote
solidly the other way, the Special Conference would deadlock eighteen
211votes all on crucial recommendations. Chance intervened again. The
Conference began with Nicholls moving the NACE majority's first
recommendation, to replace the old proviso in clause 4 with the formulation 
212outlined above. Tonkin, who had replaced Chamberlain as delegate, 
moved the Western Australian resolution as an amendment, using arguments 
based on those in the NACE minority report. The Victorian delegates,
Specifically, the decision of a Special Conference of the Branch bound 
its Federal delegates to support an amendment to clause 4 which allowed 
State and Federal Labor Governments to aid non-state schools 'insofar as 
is compatible with due efficiency in education and the avoidance of 
unreasonable expenditure'. Further, until conditions for such aid were 
determined, 'any forms of benefit existing in a State or Territory at 
the time of this [July Special Federal] Conference may be supported in 
any State or Territory'. For details of this decision and the events 
behind it: K.E. Beazley, interview; Calwell to Hartley, 18 October 1967,
Vic. Rec., 1966, 1967, 1968 Members Personal A to C; F.E. Chamberlain, 
interview; F.E. Chamberlain, NLA interview transcripts, 2:1/32; SMH,
West Australian, 27 June 1966; Western Sun, July 1966, 1; J.M. Wheeldon, 
interview. Nicholls acted as Temporary Chairman of the NACE in 
Chamberlain's absence.
The State Branch positions are summarised in ALP, Special Commonwealth 
Conference, July 1966 ..., 18-20. The two States which showed signs of 
wavering in March were now solid for the main recommendations, South 
Australia as the result of a vote at the State Convention which bound 
delegates, Queensland after a caucus at the Conference had agreed to 
follow the Queensland Central Executive's support for the NACE 
recommendations: Advertiser, 13 June 1966; Don Aitkin, 'Political
Review', AQ, 38, 3 (September 1966), 108; ALP (SA Branch), Official 
Report, Sixty-third Annual State Convention, 1966, 16-17; C-M, 25,
29 July 1966; J.B. Keeffe, interview; SMH, 28 June 1966; Socialist 
and Industrial Labor, July 1966, 5.
212For this recommendation see p.263 above. The main debate is in ALP, 
Special Commonwealth Conference, July 1966 ..., 32-40, 43-4. There were 
nine NACE recommendations but we are concerned only with the first two.
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Hartley and Brebner, then moved an amendment which altered the 'at own
cost' proviso to read 'provided that the cost of the capital development
of this system is not a charge on any government'. The Victorians
believed the NACE recommendation could be interpreted to allow capital
payments and wished to prevent this possibility. Keeffe, the Chairman,
had privately advised he would disallow this amendment since it was a
direct negative to the NACE motion and the Victorians had been forced to
compose another version. In their haste they omitted to specify that
other costs, for instance, 'maintenance of buildings and salaries of
staff' - which the NACE recommendation had excluded - also should not be
charged against governments. Others were quicker to see the implications
of the amendment and the Victorians, to their surprise, received the
support of New South Wales, Tasmania and Western Australia. By twenty-
four votes to twelve the Conference had supported, not the NACE's first
recommendation, but a formulation which deleted the old proviso and
explicitly excluded only one form of direct aid from being a charge on 
_ 213governments.
But where did this new permissive clause apply? Again chance, or 
at least unpredictability, intervened. The second NACE recommendation
This version of events is based upon: W.W.C. Brown, C.R. Cameron,
W.H. Hartley, interviews; Hartley to D.R. MacSween, Secretary, Clothing 
Trades Union, 10 October 1966, Vic. Rec., Unions A-C 1966; J.B. Keeffe, 
C.T. Oliver, interviews; press reports, especially Age, DT, SMH,
30 July-1 August 1966; Special Federal Conference held at Surfers 
Paradise, 29 and 30 July 1966. Reports by J.P. Brebner, Victorian 
Delegate, Vic. Rec., E.O's Minutes & Business Sheets, 1966-1967. Two 
minor questions on which evidence differs are whether Keeffe made the 
ruling referred to (Brown and Hartley recall it; Keeffe did not mention 
it; Oliver did not recall it but said it might have been private; it 
does not appear in the Conference report) and, secondly, whether the 
Victorians realised their mistake afterwards (they were reluctant to do 
so at the time but are less so now, while insisting that the Calwell 
vote - to be discussed next - was more important than their mistake in 
changing Labor policy).
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was a reformulation of the 1965 Conference resolution that currently
214established benefits should not be disturbed. Tonkin now moved as
an amendment the Western Australian proposal that the existence of a
benefit in one State or Territory justified it being granted in others.
Since the 1965 Conference 'border hopping' of this type had been
recognised as one way of breaking down Labor's opposition to direct 
215aid. The NACE minority had pointed up the absurdity of the party
offering different policies in different States. Tonkin, by providing
evidence to the present Conference that every type of benefit existed
somewhere in Australia, showed that passage of his amendment would
remove the barriers to Labor's offering all types of direct aid, except
capital aid, which the earlier motion had excluded. But rather than
the logic of Tonkin's case, it was the solitary vote of Calwell,
deserting his fellow Victorians, much to their surprise, which gave
216Tonkin's amendment its nineteen-seventeen majority. Considerable
debate followed outside the Conference over whether Calwell knew what
217he was doing when he cast the crucial vote. Whatever the answer to
For this recommendation, see above p.264.
215For example, Whitlam had interpreted the 1965 Conference decision in 
this way (CPD H. of R. 48, 14 October 1965, 1848) and Webb had moved 
unsuccessfully for such a policy at the February 1966, Federal Executive 
meeting (FX 9-11 February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/40).
216The debate was much more complex than this brief account reveals: 
there were five competing formulations, five points of order and four 
procedural motions: ALP, Special Commonwealth Conference July 1966 ...,
37-40.
217There are two related issues: whether Calwell knew that the motion
meant direct aid could be offered all over Australia and whether he knew 
which motion he was voting for. Brown, Cameron, Downing, Hartley and 
Keeffe, all of whom were present, were all fairly sure that Calwell was 
clear on both points although Cameron and Keeffe suggested he 'feigned 
ignorance' (interviews). Press reports show that Calwell disputed 
Cameron's claim in later debate that the Tonkin motion allowed direct 
aid everywhere. One journalist suggested that any later claims by 
Calwell to have misunderstood the motion were to protect himself against 
revenge from Victoria (Alan Ramsey, Australian, 5 August 1966). Brown,
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this question, the important point is that an ’essentially unpredictable’ 
act by Calwell provided the vital vote. For the third time, chance or 
unpredictability, a characteristic of garbage can decision processes, 
the subject of our HYPOTHESIS XVI, had jolted the incremental process 
along.
Did chance merely hasten the inevitable? The 'border hopping' 
approach might have prevailed eventually without the assistance of 
Chamberlain's illness, Hartley's drafting or Calwell's desertion. 
Commonwealth financial aid to ensure educational 'equality' was an 
umbrella to spread over all children, regardless of school. Perhaps 
this approach would have led to direct aid eventually. Speaking to the 
Conference, Calwell had suggested distinctions between direct and 
indirect aid were part of the 'hair-splitting past'. Labor politicians 
had consistently offered more in money terms in indirect aid than their 
opponents had in direct aid. Memories of the Split were the strongest
217 (continued)
leader of the Victorian delegation, pointed out that Calwell had asked 
to sit at the officers' table rather than with the State delegation.
He took no part in the Victorian discussions during the debate although 
he had told Brown he was well aware of the Victorian attitude 
(W.W.C. Brown, interview). On the other hand, Virgo believed Calwell 
had become very confused by the end and did not know what he was doing 
(G.T. Virgo, interview). Freudenberg records that Wyndham, counting 
the votes, had to ask Calwell if his hand was up or down (A Certain 
Grandeur, 36). Freudenberg uses this as evidence that Calwell was voting 
hesitantly but knowingly, but it may have signified uncertainty as to 
the motion before the Conference. Nicholls had withdrawn the NACE 
recommendation in favour of an amendment from Queensland which was 
basically similar to the recommendation. Tonkin's amendment thus became 
the motion and it is possible that Calwell became confused. However, 
the hands were counted only after a voice vote had been declared carried 
and Brown had called for a show of hands (W.W.C. Brown, interview). 
Calwell had time to correct his mistake when he saw the other 
Victorians were not supporting the motion. Finally, although the 
Victorians were surprised at Calwell's vote, some of the New South 
Welshmen were not. One recalls that New South Wales delegates had put 
pressure on Calwell before the Conference, while another says Calwell 
told him in advance of his intention.
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force against offering aid to the Catholic church as such. As these
memories faded the feeling against direct aid may have dissipated. After
all, as many people pointed out, the school received the money eventually.
The 'dollar a week' scheme recognised this fact. Perhaps, in time, a
modus operandi would have emerged. But chance helped cut the knot in
1966 rather earlier than most people had expected.
One final slash remained to be made. On the second day of the
Special Conference, C.R. Cameron pointed out that the first, Hartley,
motion excluded capital aid from the permissible types of direct aid,
while the second, Tonkin, motion in effect allowed every type of aid
everywhere, since every type existed somewhere. 'It is better to have
clarification', Cameron said, 'even if you are on the losing end, as I
218am, than to have a muddled situation'. The Conference then agreed,
by twenty-nine votes to seven, to Cameron's motion:
Pending determination of conditions under which 
assistance may be given the prohibition against 
providing the cost of capital development to 
private schools as contained in Clause 4(a) shall 
not operate ±f_ in fact capital grants are being 
made to private schools in any State or Territory 
at this date.
My added emphasis shows how the losers like Cameron were still reluctant 
to admit defeat in print: everyone knew capital aid was being given in
some States. But the winners did not press the point.
219Labor had 'stumbled incoherently into acceptance of State Aid'.
The party's six months of state aid activity in 1966, which began with
^^Oakes, Whit lam PM, 144.
219Nation, 6 August 1966. Many observers referred not only to the 
contradictory motions but to the air of confusion at the Conference: 
see the details in notes 216, 217 (the plethora of motions added to 
this confusion); Bulletin, 6 August 1966; Labor Comment, August- 
September 1966, 3; letter^. Guyatt to the author, 24 November 1978; 
the references in note 213 above.
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the bang of February,ended with the whimper of July. The July Special
Conference did not mark the end of Labor's attacks on the problem of
state aid. The decisions removed the barriers to the ALP offering
direct aid but said nothing about what aid should be offered and how.
Not until the 1969 Federal Conference and after did the party evolve
the concept of an Australian Schools Commission dispensing aid to all
schools, state and non-state, on the basis of need. In the Schools
Commission those whose main concern was aid to fellow Catholics, those
who wished to extend the role of the Commonwealth by means of largesse
from Canberra, those who sought educational equality and quality and
those who admitted the justice of the state aid case but did not wish
to exacerbate sectarianism, all found common ground. Only the few
bitter anti-state aiders resented the scheme. But they had long since
220lost their chance to close the state aid door. In Victoria, the State
most opposed to state aid, elements of the party after 1966 still
insisted the Special Conference decisions allowed the Branch to oppose
state aid and even phase it out. This recalcitrance eventually provided
a pretext for the Federal party to intervene and reconstruct the
221Branch. But that is another story.
Labor's debates over state aid never reached quite the same 
intensity after July 1966 as before that date but these few details 
illustrate, in a conclusion that is not really a conclusion, the 
relevance of Lindblom's remark that disjointed incrementalism involves
220These developments are summarised in Hogan, The Catholic Campaign ...,
200-2.
221See J.D. Fitzgerald, Federal Intervention in the Victorian Branch of 
the Australian Labor Party, 1970, unpublished MA thesis, La Trobe 
University, 1975, for a full account of the intervention and events 
leading to it.
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’a never-ending series of attacks on more or less permanent, though
222perhaps slowly changing, problems . ..'.
222Braybrooke & Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, 100. In 1978, the 
Labor Opposition spokesman on education, Senator J. Button, said that 
the Fraser Liberal Government's attempts to influence the Schools 
Commission to increase the proportion of funds going to wealthy schools 
could re-open community divisions over state aid (CT, 6 June 1978) .
The problem for the ALP in 1978 was less to do with religious and 
intra-party divisions than with the accentuation of class divisions but 
its solutions were basically the same as those of the 1960s: Commonwealth 
finance and the needs concept.
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Chapter 4: Foreign and Defence Policy: Vietnam 1966-1967
Of their nature, the foreign and defence policies of a political 
party will be influenced as much by events in the world outside the 
party as by the preferences of individual decisionmakers or the goals 
of party sub-coalitions. In particular, changes in the 'international 
political environment' and - if the party is in opposition - in 
government policy, are likely to affect the decisions made. The 
Australian Labor Party in 1966 and 1967 reacted to changes in South 
East Asia and the world beyond and to the actions of Liberal-Country 
Party Governments - which also were influenced by environmental changes. 
Much of this case study should provide support for HYPOTHESES VII and 
XIII. Influences summarised in other hypotheses may also be important.
Background
The detailed study covers the period from March 1966 until late 
1967. To place that period in context it is necessary to trace 
developments from August 1964. In the reactions of Labor decisionmakers 
to successive events in this period can be seen tendencies which became 
more pronounced in the heightened atmosphere of 1966 and 1967.
In August 1964, the United States reacted to alleged North Vietnamese 
attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin by bombing the North. Australia's military 
commitment to South Vietnam then stood at one hundred advisers but Labor 
criticism of successive small increases in assistance had been muted.
Labor had been painted by its opponents during the 1963 election campaign 
as irresponsible in defence matters and most of its Parliamentary 
spokesmen were wary of criticising aid to a small Asian state, especially 
when Indonesian posturing closer to home made the electorate defence-
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conscious. Thus, in August 1964, Calwell agreed it was impossible to 
abandon military methods but he also called for political, economic and 
social solutions, recognition that the war was a civil one and recourse
to the United Nations and the Geneva Conference to procure a settlement.
This would have represented the majority view of Caucus at the time.
Three months after the Tonkin Gulf incident, on 10 November 1964,
Menzies announced 'selective compulsory service' for twenty-year old men
at the rate of 6,900 men in a full year. Conscripts would be integrated
with regular units and 'under an obligation to serve overseas as 
3necessary'. The Labor Caucus immediately resolved unanimously against 
conscription for overseas service in peacetime but most Labor critics of 
the Menzies scheme concentrated upon the Government's inadequate defence 
planning, the economics of conscription and the unfairness of the 
selective method, rather than the possible use of conscripts in specific 
theatres.^
2
Tor Calwell's comments, especially his complaint that Australia was 
acquiring a policy 'in a fit of absence of mind': Arthur Calwell,
The Challenge Before Us, Canberra, 1964, 10-11 (speech at ALP, NSW 
Branch Conference in June); CPD H. of R. 41, 19 March 1964, 678-9. The 
Vietnam intervention commenced in 1962 with thirty advisers: CPD H. of
R. 45, 29 April 1965, 1060-1. •
2CPP H. of R. 43, 13 August 1964, 177-82. Also: 209-11 (P. Galvin),
226-8 (Whitlam), 241 (Pollard). Outside the House: ALP Federal
Secretariat Information Release No.18, 10 August 1964: Statement by the
Leader of the Federal Opposition (The Hon. A.A. Calwell, MP) on the 
Statement by President Johnson concerning the Vietnamese Crisis, Fed.
Rec., NLA MS 4985/49/Information Releases 1964.
3CPD H. of R. 44, 10 November 1964, 2715-24. See also Menzies' Senate 
election policy speech: CT, SMH, 20 November 1964. For the conscription
issue generally, see: Roy Forward & Bob Reece, ed., Conscription in
Australia, St Lucia, Qld, 1968.
4Those who did cover the point assumed the most likely destinations were 
Vietnam and Malaysia, where small contingents of regulars were then 
serving. For references to the Parliamentary debate and the subsequent 
Senate election campaign: Age, 9, 23, 24, 28 November, 2, 3 December
1964; Australian, 30 November 1964; [A.A. Calwell], Protest! 'The
Australian Labor Party asks the People to Elect a Watchdog Senate ...' 
Labor's Leader (Hon. A.A. Calwell, M.H.R.) Opening Speech, Senate Elections, 
1964,^Canberra, 1964, 4-9; CPD H. of R. 44, 12, 16, 17 November 1964, 
2920-8, 2932-4, 2946-8, 3012-4, 3022, 3097-9; DT, 12 November 1964;
SMH, 12, 13, 26 November 1964; J.M. Wheeldon, interview.
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The juxtaposition of conscription and Vietnam came a step closer on
29 April 1965 when Menzies announced that Australia's Vietnam commitment
would be expanded from the adviser group to eight hundred regular
infantry with support units and equipment.^ This Government decision
produced, according to J.F. Cairns, 'the deepest and strongest unity in
the Labor movement in living memory'. To analyse the nature of this
unity it is necessary first to outline ten years of history.
The 1955 Federal Conference had opposed the despatch of troops to
the then Malaya and had resolved instead that Australia's defence should
be confined to 'the northern areas of the continent and the territories'/
By 1963, the issue had become not Communist insurgency in Malaya but
Indonesian confrontation against Malaysia, which was established on
31 August of that year. After an inconclusive vote at the March 1963
Special Conference, the Federal Conference of July 1963 resolved:
Labor does not believe that Australian forces 
should be committed overseas, except subject to 
a clear and public Treaty, which accords with 
the principles of the declaration which gives 
Australia an effective voice in the common 
decision of the Treaty Powers.^
No such treaty then covered the Australian troops in Malaysia but 
Calwell made clear after the Conference that this would not make a 
Labor Government withdraw the troops nor fail to defend Malaysia in an 
emergency. Clear and public treaties would be necessary only for new
5CPI) H. of R. 45, 29 April 1965, 1060-1.
6CT, 24 May 1965.
^ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1955, 45-7, 52-4, 58-9.
g
ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 7, 23-4. The 
resolution is badly transcribed. When moved unsuccessfully at the 
March 1963 Special Conference, it read '... the principles of this 
declaration, and which gives ...' (ALP, Official Report, Special 
Commonwealth Conference, March, 1963, 12-13). The declaration referred 
to is the general foreign affairs and defence resolution adopted at 
the Hobart Conference of 1955 and reaffirmed since.
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troop commitments to countries other than Malaysia. Twelve months 
later, however, after Labor’s general election defeat of 1963 and before 
the Senate election of 1964, Calwell sought from the Federal Executive a 
clearer interpretation of Labor’s policy on expeditionary forces. 
Accordingly, Wyndham recommended, in effect, that the Executive support 
Calwell’s interpretation of the previous year regarding the Malaysia 
force and, secondly, that the despatch of troops to South Vietnam, Laos 
and Cambodia was in accordance with Labor policy, since these were 
protocol States of the clear and public SEATO treaty, of which Australia 
was a signatory.Instead, the Executive adopted a Victorian item which 
mentioned, inter alia,
the principles inherent in Labor policy that clear 
and public treaties should cover the presence and 
operation of Australian troops overseas, and 
deplores, the lack of any formal agreement to cover 
the presence of the Australian contingent in South 
Vietnam.H
This resolution, it should be noted, was adopted six months before 
the April 1965 decision to greatly enlarge the contingent. It may have 
reflected uneasiness among Executive members a-te developments in Vietnam 
since the Tonkin incident. There were signs ©f- unrest, too, in the 
Federal Caucus although, here, views more favourable to American 
intentions prevailed. In February 1965, the Caucus endorsed, by 
majority vote, a Caucus Executive statement which argued that American
C-M, 9 August 1963; CPD H. of R. 40, 25 September 1963, 1367-8; SMH,
1 August, 10 September, 21 October 1963. A Labor Government would seek 
such a treaty with Malaysia to cover the troops already there.
"^Agenda Appendix HH: Stationing of Troops Overseas. Report by the
General Secretary, FX 21-23 October 1964, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/37.
^ F X  21-23 October 1964, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/35. My emphasis.
The Wyndham formulation was not considered by the Executive because 
Calwell was influenced by Caucus members (described in the press as 
'left wing’) to have it passed over. Wyndham complained that the 
document was leaked to the press: Australian, 22, 26 October 1964.
278
bombing of North Vietnam 'deserves sympathetic Australian understanding'.
Caucus rejected arguments for the withdrawal of all foreign troops.
Withdrawal would mean 'a Communist take-over of South Vietnam ... and
extending the area of Communist control closer to this country. The
presence of these troops is justified as a holding operation provided
12that all efforts are bent towards [a peaceful settlement]'. Yet Caucus
members Crean, Pollard and Cameron complained of the statement's
leniency towards the United States and Caucus misgivings grew as
American operations intensified. Calwell and the Caucus Executive were
criticised for releasing the statement before its endorsement by the
full Caucus, but the February resolution was eventually reaffirmed
13overwhelmingly in March.
The Government decision of April 1965 may have prevented a dispute 
within the Labor Party over American actions in Vietnam and the presence 
of Australian advisers there. The sending of combat troops changed the 
nature of Labor's internal debate. It had been one between critics of 
American bombing and of the presence of Australian advisers without treaty
12Age, SMH, 17-19 February 1965. Another resolution referred to the 
Malaysia crisis. According to Kim C. Beazley, son of Kim E. Beazley, the 
resolutions were drafted by A.D. Fraser and J.F. Cairns. While Fraser 
opposed the American escalation he drafted the resolution in these terms 
because otherwise American resolve to remain in South East Asia and her 
diplomatic efforts to end the war would be weakened. Cairns suffered 
some criticisms from the Caucus 'Left' - in this context those less 
disposed to be sympathetic to the United States - for his drafting role. 
Beazley gives an interview with Fraser in February 1973 as his source:
Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes to the 
United States Alliance, unpublished MA thesis, University of 
Western Australia, 1974, 121, 167, 319. Graham Freudenberg, Calwell's 
press secretary at the time, suggests instead that Beazley (senior) 
drafted the statement and the Caucus Foreign Affairs Committee, of which 
Beazley and Cairns were members and Fraser Chairman, passed it on to the 
Executive: Graham Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, South Melbourne, 1977,
55.
^^Age, 19 February 1965; ITT, 26 March 1965; SMH, 19 February, 25,
26 March 1965.
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justification - this broad position was represented by the Federal
Executive majority and the Federal Caucus minority - and those who gave
qualified support to the Americans and avoided the issue of the
14advisers - the Caucus majority. The debate now came to turn, instead, 
on differing emphases beneath a broad umbrella of opposition to the 
decision of April. This opposition, in fact, was the only common 
element across the ranks of Labor’s Parliamentarians.
Calwell’s speech in the House on 6 May set the tone. Labor's 
opposition to the decision was clearly stated: 'we oppose the Government's
decision to send 800 men to fight in Vietnam. We oppose it firmly and 
completely.1 What followed from that fact was rather more obscure.
Calwell carefully avoided attacking the United States as such, while 
allowing himself misgivings about its military tactics. 'We believe that 
America must not be humiliated and must not be forced to withdraw. 1 
Calwell opposed the Australian decision but not basic American war aims.
The expeditionary force would do little to oppose Communism, contain 
China, help South Vietnam or defend Australia. Similarly, Whitlam said 
Australia's presence would make little military difference while lowering 
Australia's reputation in Asia. However, he added, '[w]e badly need the 
American alliance'. Beazley was content to deplore the imposition of
14At the 25 March Caucus meeting, Whitlam and Calwell had supported an 
unsuccessful amendment to have 'consultation' between the Caucus 
Executive, the officers of the Caucus Foreign Affairs Committee and of 
the Federal Executive. They knew that the Federal Executive had adopted 
the Victorian position on the Vietnam contingent in October 1964, and 
might take a similar line again. There was a need to harmonise the 
Caucus and Executive views. The problem was underlined on 26 March, 
when the VCE asked the Federal Executive to rule if the Caucus statements 
of February regarding Malaysia and Vietnam were consistent with Federal 
policy: VCE 26 March 1965, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive
Minutes, NLA mf G8142.
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Western solutions on Asia and to complain of the low standard of foreign 
affairs debates.
Some Caucus members since 1965 have questioned how intense was their
Leader’s and colleagues’ opposition to the decision of April 1965. Cairns
insists that Calwell’s speech of 6 May included the words ’we shall do
our best to have that decision reversed’ only on Cairns’ own urging.
Wheeldon wondered if Whitlam might privately have supported Menzies’
decision. Beazley’s measured speech and his opposition in Caucus to
radical stances on the war itself may suggest his uneasiness about
16opposing the enlarged Australian commitment to it. Freudenberg's
CPD H. of R. 46, 4, 6 May 1965, 1102-7 (Calwell), 1251-5 (Whitlam),
1284-7 (Beazley); CT, 24 May 1965. Since the content of Calwell's speech 
is important for the argument of the following pages, here is a summary of 
its main points: Labor opposes the decision to send troops; the decision
will not help the fight against Communism nor contain China, nor help 
South Vietnam; it is not in Australia's strategic interest, since it 
divides already weak forces between home defence, Malaysia and Vietnam; 
it will harm Australia's reputation in Asia; it is based on refusal to 
accept this is a civil war with one side aided by the North, rather than 
mere outside aggression; based on a misconception of Chinese intentions; 
it commits Australia to supporting unpopular regimes; the West has 
failed to support genuine nationalism, except when it supported the West, 
and has thus pushed nationalism and Communism closer together; collapse 
of the nationalist Communist regime in the North would leave a vacuum 
which China would fill; Australia has done nothing to promote 
negotiations to end the war and has now deprived itself of the chance to 
do so; Australia continues to trade with China, allegedly the main threat; 
how long before conscripts will be sent to Vietnam?; America must not be 
humiliated or forced to withdraw; an Australian Labor Government would 
participate in a United Nations force; Labor will not desert the fighting 
man in the field though it opposes the decision to send him and will work 
to reverse it; Labor is patriotic but does not expect popularity from 
its ' stand'.
16J.F. Cairns, T. Uren, J.M. Wheeldon, interviews. The words Cairns 
referred to came in the midst of paragraphs which assured fighting men 
of Labor prayers and protested Labor's patriotism. The complete sentence 
ran: 'Our minds and reason cannot support those who have made the
decision to send you to this war, and we shall do our best to have that 
decision reversed' (CPD H. of R. 46, 4 May 1965, 1107. My emphasis).
Cairns recalled the details of the speech's composition to the present 
author. The speech, he said, had everything in it but lacked anything 
definite. He told Calwell, 'we should say something definite. We should 
say we'll pull the troops out'. Calwell replied: 'No. If we say that 
we'll offend too many people'. Cairns countered: 'Well, at least say
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remarks that there was never the ’slightest doubt' of Labor opposition
and no 'significant member' of the party ever suggested any other stand
are true literally but there is evidence of great caution and careful
choice of words in many Labor contributions to the Parliamentary debated
The feelings of February did not evaporate overnight, despite Caucus'
18unanimous advance endorsement of Calwell's position. Conference 
decisions precluded support for the decision in the absence of a 'clear 
and public treaty'; they did not require each Caucus member to oppose 
the decision with the same intensity. The rhetoric of Freudenberg, 
delivered by Calwell, served not only as a catalogue of reasons for 
opposition to the decision but also to disguise the uneasiness felt by 
many Caucus members, Calwell included, at opposing it at all. Freudenberg 
writes that Calwell provided a preliminary statement calling for a Caucus 
meeting to be followed by a Parliamentary debate on Menzies' announcement. 
'The effect and the intended purpose of this [Calwell's] statement was to
16 (continued)
"we'll work to reverse"'. According to Cairns, Calwell accepted this 
formula easily because there was room for manoeuvre within it. Whitlam, 
too, according to Cairns and Uren, was fearful of offending voters by 
seeming anti-American. Another comment critical of Whitlam at this 
time: 'Mr Whitlam seems to be trying to talk the problem out of
existence. The meeting in the Sydney Domain (23 May) ... was treated 
to some amusing and satirical comment on the Prime Minister, plenty of 
criticism of the Government's procedures, but very little criticism of 
its policies. Whitlam's is a dangerous course which must cast doubt on 
the genuineness of whatever Labor opposition to Government policy he 
represents': Anonymous, 'The War Nobody Wants', Outlook, 9, 3 (June
1965), 5. Beazley confirmed that the danger of appearing anti-American 
was a consideration for the cautious ones in Caucus (K.E. Beazley, 
interview).
"^Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 50-1. Freudenberg confirms that 
Cairns and John Menadue, Whitlam's private secretary, were consulted.
18Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes ..., 170-1, 
quoting Caucus Minutes, says the endorsing motion was moved by J. Cope 
(NSW) and Senator Cavanagh (SA) and discussed by Pollard, Beazley,
Cairns, Calwell and A.S. Luchetti and F.M. Daly (both NSW). This 
represented a reasonable cross-section of Caucus opinion on the Vietnam 
conflict.
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preclude any meaningful discussion within the Party about its attitude.
For there was no need for discussion. The only question was how Labor’s
,19opposition should be expressed. But 'opposition' was so expressed
either
that all who read might/run or ’run dead’ on the issue. Beyond bare 
opposition there were countless nuances and emphases for Caucus members 
to develop: for the Whitlams and Beazleys who feared the anti-American
label, the Stewarts and Luchettis, who suggested a reference in Calwell’s 
speech to Labor's support for Australian participation in any United 
Nations contingent, the Cairns and Haydens, who felt the evidence of 
Northern incursions had been greatly exaggerated, to the Mclvors and 
Pollards who muttered that the Australian commitment was in exchange for 
a dollar loan.^
Calwell's speech was similarly received in the extra-Parliamentary 
party. The Federal Executive, meeting late in May, gave it 'complete 
support', after minimal discussion. Brown remembered seizing on the 'do
Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 50.
20CPD H. of R. 46, 4, 6 May 1965, 1112-5 (Cairns), 1230-1 (Mclvor),
1261-2 (Pollard); Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 51. Kim C. Beazley, 
Post-Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes ..., 171, agrees with this 
conclusion: opposition did not imply anything else, such as support
for withdrawal or using the commitment as a bargaining weapon with the 
Americans. The Cope-Cavanagh motion was deliberately vague. 'What the 
decision did make difficult was the continuation of the type of support 
given the American involvement by some members of the A.L.P. right. It 
was difficult to appear convinced of the need for an increasing American 
military effort, while at the same time opposing an increased Australian 
commitment.' It remains a matter for opinion how close the stances of 
some Caucus members after 29 April came to support for the increased 
Australian commitment. See again note 15, above, for the scope 
Freudenberg, Calwell and the Caucus endorsement provided. Inconsistency 
between its February and April positions remained a problem for the 
party as a whole. According to one observer, encapsulating the 
Government's main attack, Labor could not 'explain why, if it supported 
the presence of American troops in Viet Nam, it objected to the principle 
of Australian troops serving there also': T.B. Millar, 'Problems of
Australian Foreign Policy January-June 1965', AJPH, 11 (December 1965), 
274.
t
283
our best to have that decision reversed' clause as support for troop
withdrawal; others took comfort in the relatively pro-American passages.
By supporting Calwell's grab-bag speech, the Executive - and later the
Conference - enshrined as official party policy a document whose meaning
21rested entirely on the interpretation placed upon it by its readers.
The divergence of view between party sub-coalitions was underlined
by the attitudes of delegates to the 1965 Federal Conference. Ultimately
the Conference supported and applauded the Caucus' opposition to the
expeditionary force 'in accordance with the principles stated by the
22Federal Leader in the House of Representatives on 4th May, 1965'. The
importance of not saying what these principles were or, at least, which
were more important than others, is. shown in two comparisons. 'The
committal of Australian troops ...', said Keeffe, Federal President and
now a Senator, 'has done tremendous damage to the prestige of this
country .... The decent people in the community ... expect us to
condemn Australia's participation in the Vietnam conflict with all its
side effects.' On the other hand, Oliver, Chairman of the Federal
Foreign Affairs Committee, claimed in June:
We are preoccupied with the military threat of 
Chinese Communism.... I know [the United States'] 
motive is resistance to the spread of Communism 
and resistance to Communist aggression in any 
form ....China has a plan for every country in 
Asia. Vietnam is on her doorstep.23
Secondly, the resolution of the Annual Conference of Oliver's New 
South Wales Branch may be compared with its Victorian equivalent. The
21W.W.C. Brown, T. Uren, interviews. For the Executive discussions:
FX 24-27 May 1965, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/38.
22ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 81-2.
23ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 24; ALP (NSW 
Branch), Official Report, 1965 Annual Conference, 5-6.
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former resolution said nothing at all about opposing the decision of 
29 April.
There is a crisis in Vietnam [it ran in part] and 
Australia is involved .... Recriminations on past 
policies, for which Labor was not responsible, are 
of no assistance in formulating a constructive 
approach toward a solution to the South-East Asia 
crisis based on non-military motives and with 
priority to the welfare of the people living in 
that region .... Australian Labor, whether in or 
out of Government, must work to this end .... On 
the Vietnam crisis, Labor’s policy - strongly 
presented by the Federal Labor Leader, Mr Calwell - 
is to seek mediation by the United Nations for a 
permanent settlement.,...
This resolution may have been written before 29 April. But there was no
attempt at the Branch Conference in June to alter its terms to take
24account of recent developments. The Victorian Branch, on the other
hand, condemned the Australian Government for ’continually involving
Australia in military action in South-East Asia', called for withdrawal
of all foreign troops and bases from all countries, opposed all
expeditionary forces and interference in the internal affairs of other
25countries and called for an end to all hostilities in South Vietnam.
Individuals of such divergent opinions as Keeffe and Oliver and 
delegates from Branches whose priorities differed as radically as did 
Victoria and New South Wales could agree to the Conference endorsing 
Calwell’s Parliamentary remarks because each saw different meanings in 
them. Graham Allison, extrapolating from his study of the Cuban missile
24ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1965 Annual Conference, 20. The 
Committee report covered twenty-eight relevant items from unions and 
branches, some of which specifically demanded the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops from Vietnam: ALP (NSW Branch), Annual General Conference
1965 Agenda, 12-16. Of course, most of these items would have been 
adopted before the 29 April announcement, but presumably those who 
opposed the presence of advisers would also have opposed the larger 
force.
25ALP (Victorian Branch), Record of Annual Conference, June, 1965, 7-8.
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crisis of 1962, has suggested this is a characteristic of organisational 
decisionmaking. Decisionmakers see issues differently because of their 
own personal backgrounds, their own goals and their positions in
2 ß
organisations. Furthermore, each decisionmaker reads different meanings 
into decisions.
Considerable misperception is a standard part of 
the functioning of each government. Any proposal 
that is widely accepted is perceived by different 
men to do quite different things and to meet 
quite different needs. Misperception is in a 
sense the grease that allows cooperation among 
people whose differences otherwise would hardly 
allow them to co-exist.27
In terms of our hypotheses, both the New South Wales and Victorian Branches 
could see their goals as State Branches (HYPOTHESIS I), as expressed in 
their Branch Conference decisions of June 1965, served by the Federal 
Conference decision of August 1965. Similarly, both Keeffe and Oliver 
could find in the August decision something to satisfy their own 
personal preferences (HYPOTHESIS II). Both Branches and individuals 
pursued their own goals in the decisionmaking process; both Branches and 
individuals had their goals at least partly satisfied by the decision 
which emerged. The intended purpose of Calwell's speech was not to 
prevent discussion by laying down a definite policy but to accommodate 
the various party views about the war and the nature of Australian 
involvement in it. As Allison suggests, the capacity for interpretation 
was deliberately provided.
2 g
Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, Boston, 1971, 166-8, 175-6, 178, 
180-1.
27Allison, Essence of Decision, 178. Reticence may also assist in this 
regard: 'Reticence permits other players to interpret an outcome in
the way in which the shoe pinches least' (Allison, Essence of Decision, 
179) .
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March and Olsen's book, titled Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations,
28expands on the role of interpretation. Ambiguity7incteecl, Cs at the base
of decisions in what they call 'organized anarchies'; the production of
ambiguous decisions is one of the characteristics of 'garbage can
decision processes', the subject of our HYPOTHESIS XVI.
March and Olsen commence from a depiction of the complexity of
decision situations. Associated with this complexity is 'ambiguity'.
Decisions, the authors believe,
are fundamentally ambiguous. An organization is a 
set of procedures for argumentation and interpretation 
as well as for solving problems and making decisions.
A [decision] situation is a meeting place for issues 
and feelings looking for decision situations in which 
they may be aired, solutions looking for issues to 
which they may be an answer, and participants looking 
for problems or pleasure.29
Here are the four components - decision situations or opportunities, 
issues (problems), solutions and participants - of the garbage can model. 
The suggestion is that the 'something which can be called a "decision"' 
which emerges from the garbage can bears that indeterminate title 
because it is ambiguous. It follows that '[w]hat is being decided is 
itself to be determined through the course of deciding it'. Decision­
makers commence with different goals and different views of the issue
and both goals and perceptions change during the decisionmaking process.
30At any time, decisionmakers differ over what they are doing. These
a,
differences do not disappear once'decision has been reached. Indeed, the 
decision itself may be less important than the process and the varied
2 8James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, 
Bergen, 1976. See above, chapter 3.
29March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 25.
30March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 84-5.
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opportunities it provides. Here is Kare Rommetveit, one of the 
contributors to Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, applying the
t-he1
garbage can concept to a study of/politics of locating a new 
university in Norway:
Consider the decision ambiguity, the partial 
irrelevance of the immediate substantive outcome 
of the process for many central participants, and 
the competitive activation of participants. The 
content of the decision was not always clear.
The interpretation changed over time and from one 
set of participants to another. Different 
participants emphasized different aspects of a 
specific decision - depending on which aspects 
were relevant for the respective areas of primary 
interest .... For at least some (perhaps most) of 
the key groups the explicit decision seemed to be 
of little importance '’per se". While interested 
in certain aspects of the decision, the relevance 
of the decision otherwise largely disappeared once 
the decision was made. The outcome of the battle 
was important less for the immediate outcome that 
resulted than for the implications this outcome 
had for contemporary battles within other arenas ^  
or future battles involving the same participants.
The decision in Rommetveit’s case was important for battles on other 
issues. If we regard these battles as garbage cans, the decision in 
question becomes a solution to be dumped in the garbage cans by 
participants. For example, the 1965 Federal Conference decision on the 
expeditionary force could have been dumped in a state aid garbage can 
(a decision opportunity which had to produce ’something which could be 
called a decision' on state aid) and become attached to such problems as 
the need for a Federal Leadership change or the need to discipline the 
New South Wales Branch. Whether foreign policy decisions were used in 
this way is one question for this chapter. Another question is whether 
foreign policy decisions themselves emerged from garbage cans full of
31March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 150. My emphasis.
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problems and solutions concerned with matters other than foreign 
affairs. The 'dumping’ into decision opportunity garbage cans of 
strictly 'irrelevant' problems and solutions is one characteristic of 
the garbage can model; ambiguity is another. Thirdly, and most 
importantly, this chapter will look for evidence of ambiguity.
Ambiguity seems particularly likely to occur in foreign policy
decisions made by a party in opposition: 'it seems to characterize a
wide variety of organizations when they are young or when their
32environments are changing'. Change in the international political 
environment, part of the subject of our HYPOTHESIS VII, is a crucial 
dynamic of foreign policy decisions. Most decisions involve reactions 
to changes over which the party can exercise little control. Opposition 
parties react to the reactions of governments to environmental changes 
(HYPOTHESIS XIII). The Vietnam War passed through a number of stages 
between 1964 and 1968 - and afterwards. Setbacks for the Western allies 
followed victories. There were rapid build-ups of troop strengths, 
halts and resumptions of bombing, diplomatic initiatives and hopeful 
claims. Uncertainty about the future often provides an incentive to 
hedging and opacity in decisions. Prima facie, Labor's approach to the 
Vietnam issue in 1966 and 1967 seems a fruitful field for evidence of 
ambiguity and interpretation.
We may expect to find a particular type of ambiguity, that of 
organisation. 'At any point in time, individuals vary in the attention
32March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 12. My emphasis. The authors 
detect four types of ambiguity: of intention, where goals are unclear;
of understanding of the environment and of the technology of action; of 
history, of what has happened in the past, including in the organisation's 
past, that is, the decisions it has made; of organisation, for which 
see below. In practice, as the quotations on the previous pages suggest, 
different types of ambiguity are likely to occur at different times 
during the making of any one decision.
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they provide to different decisions; they vary from one time to another.
33As a result, the pattern of participation is uncertain and changing.'
The main arena for Federal ALP foreign policy statements in 1964-65 was
the Federal Parliament and the forums outside it addressed by Caucus
members. While the Federal Conference of 1965 made a number of decisions
on foreign policy, on the main current issue, the despatch of eight
hundred Australian troops to Vietnam, delegates endorsed Calwell's
speech. They made no attempt to clarify the party’s attitude or arrange
in order of priority the multiple arguments in Calwell's speech. In
34other areas they confirmed previous stances. Endorsing Calwell's remarks
March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 12.
34Relevant decisions were (1) condemnation of the Government decision of 
November 1964, introducing conscription for overseas service in peacetime;
(2) discharge of the Victorian Branch resolution of June 1965;
(3) adoption of parts of the New South Wales Branch resolution of June
1965; (4) clarification of the wording of the clear and public treaty
clause relating to expeditionary forces; (5) adoption of a new preamble: 
ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 74-86. The second 
and third decisions provide evidence of the willingness of the extreme 
Branches, Victoria and New South Wales, to compromise. Victoria did not 
oppose the Committee recommendation to discharge the resolution, which 
embodied the Branch's approach to a wide range of foreign policy issues, 
since it knew its most important goals, opposition to conscription and to 
the expeditionary force, were covered by other decisions. New South Wales, 
through Oliver as Chairman of the Federal Committee, put up only some 
relatively innocuous paragraphs of the State policy and forgot about the 
paragraphs which seemed to recognise the fact of Australian involvement
in Vietnam and could have been interpreted as critical of those who 
opposed that involvement. However, the fourth and fifth decisions saw 
unsuccessful attempts to change policy in ways not acceptable to a majority 
of delegates. The Foreign Affairs Committee tried to include in the 
preamble a clause that Australia 'cannot be neutral in the face of 
aggression' against other countries. The Conference rejected this by 
twenty-three votes to thirteen, apparently because it could have been 
used to justify the Vietnam force. On the other hand, the Conference 
rejected by twenty-one votes to fifteen an amendment that Australian 
forces should not be sent overseas except in a United Nations force or 
subject to a clear and public treaty approved by Parliament and that 
Labor would 'work to reverse' any non-Labor decision that contravened this 
principle. Both these proposals, one cautious, the other radical, laid 
too much emphasis on specific parts of Calwell's grab-bag speech and 
gained the support only of the partisans of the specific viewpoint they 
emphasised. A process of mutual adjustment between partisans stopped
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was in itself a decision but it was one where the delegates deprived
themselves of the possibility of an independent position on the issue
and to which they devoted little time. They were, in effect, subsidiary
participants to Calwell and his speech writer in a way that did not
occur with, say, state aid at the same Conference, where the delegates
were the leading actors. Participants carry problems and solutions to
garbage cans differentially; the main actors in one drama are often
supporting players in another.
Participation is often fluid. Participants vary 
in the amount of time and effort they devote to 
different domains; involvement varies from one 
time to another .... Since every entrance is an 
exit somewhere else, the distribution of 
’entrances' depends on the attributes of the new 
choice. Substantial variation in participation 
stems from other demands on the participants' 
time (rather than from features of the decision 
under study).35
We shall find further support for HYPOTHESIS XVI if we find evidence of 
variable participation and if we confirm that participation varies for 
the reasons suggested.
1966
THE GOVERNMENT DECISION OF MARCH 1966 AND LABOR'S REACTION
During the Vietnam debate of 1965, the possibility that conscripts 
might be sent there was an undertone rather than a central issue for
34 (continued)
short of a majority. On the other hand, partisan mutual adjustment 
produced the second and third of the five decisions listed and the 
endorsement of Calwell's speech on Vietnam. In these cases, discharge, 
endorsement of the need for a United Nations role and endorsement of 
Calwell's grab-bag speech were courses which no one could oppose, 
despite their differing goals and priorities. There is evidence in these 
five decisions not only of a search for compromise (HYPOTHESIS V) but 
also of partisan mutual adjustment to achieve it (HYPOTHESIS XIV).
35March 6 Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 25, 27.
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Labor. Generally, the different attitudes to the war itself within the
party seemed to produce unwillingness to draw any more attention to it
than necessary to distinguish Labor's broad approach from that of the
Government. When Cairns spoke at Ballarat in February 1966, one
journalist described the speech as 'the first broadly definitive outline
of Labor foreign policy' since the Federal Conference six months 
37-earlier. Cairns pointed out that while ALP policy did not require
immediate Australian withdrawal, there was nothing in it to say the
party would not withdraw immediately on taking office. Labor's view had
never been 'dogmatic or inflexible'. Calwell, too, argued in February
that a Labor Government would decide in accordance with then existing
circumstances, although all troops would be withdrawn 'after a peaceful
settlement'. Meanwhile, the Victorian Central Executive instructed its
Federal delegates, Brown and Hartley, to 'fully support a complete
38withdrawal of troops from Vietnam'. Each of these interpretations of 
existing policy, that is, of the resolutions of the 1965 Federal 
Conference, was hypothetical, depending on a Labor Government coming to 
power at the end of 1966. However, as in 1964 and 1965, Labor's next 
action would be a reaction to a decision of the Federal Liberal 
Government, itself responding to its perceptions of progress in the war 
in Vietnam (HYPOTHESES XIII, VII).
36ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 23 (Keeffe);
CPD H. of R. 4 May 1965, 1098 (A.J. Forbes, Minister for the Army), 
1107 (Calwell), 1121 (Galvin).
~^SMH, 7 February 1966.
~^Cairns: Fact, 11 February 1966; SMH, 7 February 1966. Calwell:
Age, 3 February 1966; Agenda Attachment, FX 2-4 March 1966: Document
No.14, Transcript of Television Interview given by Hon. A.A. Calwell, 
M.P., on B.T.V. 6 - 2 3  February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/41; 
Bulletin, 26 February 1966; VCE: 28 January 1966, ALP (Victorian
Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8142.
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On 8 March 1966, the new Prime Minister, H.E. Holt, announced that
Australia's Vietnam force would be trebled and would include conscripts.
How did Labor react? In 1965 Labor men had buried their differences
over the nature of the war, the threat of Communism and the importance
of the American alliance, in opposition to the despatch of the
expeditionary force. In 1966, differences over the war and over the
presence of Australian troops were buried in opposition to conscripts
being part of the force. There was no public party disagreement on this
question; disagreement within the party arose over what followed from
opposition to the original decision. Should Labor withdraw the force?
Which parts of it, conscripts or the lot? How soon after the accession
of a Labor Government and by what procedure? As during 1965, the
manner of answering these questions reflected the strength of the
opposition to the original decision and led to doubts about the sincerity
of the opposition of some Labor spokesmen.
Speeches in March and April reveal the shades of Labor opinion.
Declaring Labor's opposition to the decision, Calwell said: 'We will
never support the use of conscripts in overseas wars for the defence of
40any part of Asia'. Supporting him, some Labor men pointed to the
injustice of conscription, which fell most heavily on the less privileged,
which depended on the luck of the ballot, and which meant 'voteless boys'
could be 'dragged from their homes under the lash of conscription and
41forced to die in a war that has not yet been declared'. Holt's 
~39CPD H. of R. 50, 8 March 1966, 25-8.
40CPD H. of R. 50, 15 March 1966, 242.
41CPP H. of R. 50, 16, 17 March 1966, 287-8 (Coutts), 293 (Webb), 312 
(Galvin), 334 (Cameron - quoted), 378 (Reynolds), 399 (Daly). See also 
Calwell's opening speech at the Kooyong by-election: Age, CT, 22 March
1966. Speech delivered at Launceston on Wednesday, 13 April, by the 
Leader of the Opposition, Hon. Arthur A. Calwell to the Annual Conference 
of the Tasmanian Branch of the Australian Labor Party, Vic. Rec., packet 
'Mr. Calwell - Personal'. For the Kooyong by-election: Michelle Grattan, 
'The Kooyong By-election', Politics, 1 (November 1966), supplement, 3-18.
39
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announcement revived for many Labor men, including Calwell, memories of
previous Labor battles over conscription for overseas service, in 1916-
17 and 1942-43. The particular nature of the Vietnam war, apparently
even more ’unwinnable, filthy and cruel’ than most, heightened these
feelings. But others took a narrower view, confining their arguments
to the specific circumstances, criticising the government for its
bungling of voluntary recruitment and arguing that a real threat to
42Australia would not find its young men slow to volunteer. Some Caucus
members suggested or implied that the original commitment was no longer
a central question. Australia should seek negotiations to end the war,
argued Whitlam, 'now that we are a belligerent - whether we should have
been or not'. Barnard, while pointing out that events had vindicated
Labor's opposition to the original decision to send troops and its
continued opposition to Australian participation, avoided saying that
43the troops should be withdrawn. A few speakers demanded that the
Government should hold a referendum on whether conscripts should be 
44sent overseas. Yet others had no doubt that what was wrong in 1965 
was still wrong in 1966 and should be remedied. They were 'intent on 
seeing that Australia withdraw from its military commitment in Vietnam'.
42CPD H. of R., 50, 17, 22 March 1966, 326 (Devine), 442 (Stewart),
447-8 (Whitlam); H. of R. 51, 19 April 1966, 923 (Hayden); Speech 
delivered by the Leader of the Opposition (Hon. Arthur A. Calwell) at 
an A.L.P. Rally on Vietnam and Conscription, Adelaide, April 17,1966,
Vic. Rec., packet, 'Mr. Calwell - Personal'.
43CPD H. of R. 50, 24 March 1966, 632, 635 (Barnard); H. of R. 51,
10 May 1966, 1645 (Whitlam - my emphasis). See also: H. of R. 50, 22,
31 March 1966, 440-1 (Stewart: 'Australians generally appreciate the
importance of our active participation in assisting South Vietnam to 
defeat the Communist plan to take over that country'); 851 
(E.W. Harding: 'I have said before that if the Government was determined
to send troops to Vietnam it should have sent regulars').
44CPD H. of R. 50, 15, 16, 22 March 1966, 240 (Calwell), 334 (Cameron), 
620 (Sexton).
45CPD H. of R. 50, 16, 22, 29 March 1966, 302 (Johnson), 432, 435 
(Uren), 468-9 (Bryant - quoted), 710 (Uren).
294
In their initial reactions, then, members of Caucus stressed
different things although all expressed generalised opposition to the
new decision. In the weeks after the initial debate they tried to
determine what a Federal Labor Government would do instead. By mid
April, Calwell was promising that Labor would bring home immediately
all conscripts in Vietnam, Malaysia and elsewhere overseas. Regulars
would be regrouped without endangering Australian lives. The
Government and the press retorted that withdrawal of conscripts would
cripple the Vietnam force. Some Caucus members were said to be alarmed
that Calwell unilaterally had changed Labor policy from the flexible
position enunciated in February. Whitlam, pressed, gave another
interpretation. A Labor Government, 'if the facts were the same as
now', would give conscripts in Vietnam 'a free opportunity of
withdrawing from active service' and would send no more conscripts there.
Calwell then said a Labor administration would work for a peaceful
solution to the war so that the troops of all nations could come home.
46Meanwhile, Labor would not desert the Americans. By early May,
Calwell was claiming that his first speech (Launceston, 13 April) had 
been malevolently misquoted. His language became even more circumspect: 
Labor would work to reverse the expeditionary force decision of April 
1965, would examine the position in the light of the circumstances 
existing when Labor came to power and would not endanger soldiers' lives. 
Australian troops would be withdrawn as soon as possible after Labor took 
office, but not without consultation with her allies. With cooperation
46Age, 14, 16 April 1966; Australian, 25 April 1966; SMH, 14, 16, 18, 
19, 25 April 1966; Speech delivered at Launceston on Wednesday,
13 April [Calwell] ...
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from the Americans, all Australian troops could be withdrawn in six to 
nine months.47
What occurred in the two months after the announcement of
8 March was a process of partisan mutual adjustment, whereby Calwell's
first statements (most notably in Launceston on 13 April but, before
that, in the campaign for the Kooyong by-election of 2 April) were
modified and qualified in response to pressures from Caucus members,
Whitlam, the leading party proponent of caution over withdrawal, and
the press, whose main complaint was the difference between the Calwell
and Whitlam versions and between successive Calwell versions. Calwell’s
response to these pressures was to seek a complex formula which would
partly satisfy everyone, while leaving some leeway for a Labor
Government. Calwell, according to one observer employing only a slight
amount of hyperbole, 'spells out new variations in his particular brand
of Labor policy in such a way that a Labor Government could in all
48conscience take any action it considered expedient'.
Labor lacked a formal policy made by Federal Conference to apply 
to the circumstances after 8 March 1966. In interpreting decisions of 
the 1965 Federal Conference, Calwell was making new policies, making 
critical decisions which, unless a new Conference was held, would be 
carried into the Federal elections at the end of the year. His action
47Age, 10 May 1966; CPD H. of R. 51, 10 May 1966, 1637; CT, 2, 3 May 
1966; SMH, 3, 10 May 1966. Calwell's complaints brought forth 
transcripts of the speech and extracts were published. Meanwhile, 
party Branches, like Western Australia and Victoria, who supported a 
radical line on the troop decisions, had also published the Launceston 
speech: Fact, 22 April 1966; Western Sun, April 1966, 1. If
misquotation had occurred, they, too, were guilty.
48Age, 11 May 1966. Other press reports and comments: Advertiser,
3 May 1966; Age, 10 May 1966; C-M, 26 April 1966; GT, 2 May 1966;
DT, 3 May 1966; SMH, 26 April, 10 May 1966.
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was perfectly within Federal rule 5(d) in all but one regard, the lack
of a Caucus decision supporting him. Calwell used the 'work to reverse’
formula of his speech of May 1965, which had been endorsed by the
Federal Conference of that year. His attack on conscription for overseas
service could be justified by the Conference decision condemning the
Liberals for introducing the scheme itself. If Conference condemned
conscription for overseas service it seemed to Calwell a reasonable
extrapolation that conscripts now overseas should be withdrawn. Saying
this and setting a time-table for withdrawal could certainly not be
'contrary to the provisions of the Party Platform or any other decision
49of Federal Conference or Federal Executive’. Without a Caucus decision,
however, Calwell could be accused of making policy unilaterally. More
accurately, one could say that Calwell was making policy in reaction to
newspaper and Government criticism. There is considerable evidence in
these few weeks to support our HYPOTHESES XII and XIII. The mutual
adjustment which produced the Calwell position of May involved partisans
in the press as much as in the ALP.“*^
The Caucus resolution of 12 May 1966 confirmed the position Calwell
had reached by that date:
The Australian Labor Party opposes the sending of 
Australian troops to Vietnam and is especially 
opposed to the sending of conscript troops. An
49ALP, Federal Platform, Constitution and Rules, 1965, 40. My emphasis.
“^ Calwell showed his awareness of the press reaction: ’If all the
newspaper offices which get all these documents cannot make up their 
minds on what I said, I am not going to help them’ (Age, 10 May 1966). 
Note also, in rather different vein, the Tasmanian Executive's concern 
at the apparent ambiguity in Labor policy, giving as evidence 'the 
attached leading article from the Mercury 3.5.66' which criticised 
Labor's policymaking efforts (Agenda, FX 27-31 July 1966, Fed. Rec.,
NLA MS 4985/120/42.
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Australian Labor Government will direct the Army 
to bring home without delay the conscripted men 
who are already there, acting with full regard to 
the safety and security of the Australian forces 
.... For all other Australian forces in Vietnam 
the Government will have regard to the situation 
in Vietnam as it exists at the time and to the 
importance of maintaining future co-operation 
with the United States. Whilst it will take no 
action without consultation with the United States 
it will work for, and insist upon, the return of 
all Australian forces from Vietnam as soon as 
practicable.
The resolution went on that the United States should cease bombing, the 
war should become a holding operation, Australia should seek a negotiated 
settlement to which the National Liberation Front should be a party and 
should support the Geneva accords for withdrawal of all foreign forces, 
contribute to a United Nations or other peace keeping force and support 
self-determination in Vietnam and social and economic development in 
South East Asia.~^ The resolution was seen by observers as an attempt to 
quell the confusion surrounding Calwell's earlier remarks. It did so by 
gathering in one statement the gist of all his statements of the previous 
month and so expressing them as to allow room for continuing interpretation. 
By including references to a negotiated settlement and a role for the 
United Nations it also recognised the most widely held goals of those who 
were more cautious of advocating withdrawal of Australian troops.
The Caucus resolution registered the public (and presumably private) 
discussion over Labor policy in the preceding weeks without establishing 
priorities or closing loopholes. Debate could still ensue, should a 
Labor Government take office, over the meaning of 'without delay', 
'consultation' and 'as soon as practicable'. When Calwell said, 'this is 
A.L.P. policy for the next Federal election', he left unstated the 
interpretative process that would precede and follow the election of an
51SMH, 13 May 1966.
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52ALP Government. We already knew, wrote one observer, that Labor
opposed conscription for service overseas. 'All that has happened [in
the resolution] is that ambiguities in policy, that previously were
found by industrious searching through a number of documents, have been
53brought together in one document.'
Labor statements on Vietnam and conscription between 12 May and the
election of 26 November were all based technically on the Caucus
resolution. Some spokesmen concentrated upon Labor's objections to the
war and expounded the resolution's procedures for disengagement of
54Australian troops. On the other hand, apparent evidence in public 
opinion polls and State elections in Queensland that these aspects of 
the policy were unpopular, because they seemed anti-American and likely, 
if implemented, to deprive Australia of American protection, encouraged 
some Caucus members to seek a change in the May decision. Further, 
Caucus members who had been to Vietnam argued that it could be 
militarily impossible to extract conscripts from the forces there. 
Calwell himself insisted that Labor was loyal to the American alliance 
without being uncritical of every American policy.'3'*
52SMH, 13 May 1966.
^Robert Cooksey, 'Foreign Policy Review', AQ_, 38,3 (June 1966), 114-15.
~*^Age, 25 July 1966 (Senator Cohen); ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report,
1966 Annual Conference, 9-10; ALP (SA Branch), Official Report, Annual 
State Convention, 1966, 8-9 (Calwell); CPD H. of R. 52, 18, 23,
30 August 1966, 233-5 (A.D. Fraser), 305-6 (Calwell), 545-50 (Cairns);
H. of R. 53, 28 October 1966, 2381-3, 2387 (Calwell), 2397-9 (Uren);
SMH, 23 May 1966 (Whitlam); Sunday Telegraph, 14 August 1966 (Fraser).
“^ On the evidence from two private polls by Queensland members, R. Patterscn 
and G. Gray, on the implication of the Queensland elections, on the Caucus 
delegation to Vietnam (July) and its conclusions: Age, 18 July 1966;
A.L.P. News, 23 August 1966, 5, 7; Australian, 31 May 1966; C-M, 18 July 
1966; EfT, 18 October 1966; Mercury, 20 June 1966. On Labor's attitude 
to the American alliance and on the public's attitude to Labor foreign 
policy: Don Aitkin, Stability and Change in Australian Politics, Canberra,
1977, 214, 231-5; Henry S. Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy in
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Despite these misgivings the May resolution was easily reaffirmed
56at the Caucus meeting of 31 August. Meanwhile, Whitlam, the Deputy
Leader of the party, tried a different approach. First, he tried to
broaden Labor’s attack by emphasising the need for civil aid and,
secondly, he tried to modify the troop withdrawal programme. In both
cases, if pressed, he could claim to be interpreting the May resolution.
Thus he took up the reference in that resolution to social and economic
aid, arguing that Australia should increase its civil aid to Vietnam,
provided only that military security had been established in the area
receiving aid. When Calwell expressed reservations about such activity
while the war continued, Whitlam insisted that it could not wait."*^
Whitlam’s remarks implied, writes Henry Albinski, 'that an armed presence
would need to be maintained in the area if civil reconstruction were to
58make sense in the face of Viet Cong operations'. In Saigon on 14 August,
55 (continued)
Australia, Durham, N.C., 1970, 194-209; Anthony Clunies-Ross, 'Foreign 
Policy on the Left', Overland, 36 (May 1967), 34; Robert Cooksey, 
'Australian Public Opinion and Vietnam Policy', Dissent, 22 (Autumn 1968), 
5-11; D.W. Rawson, 'Foreign Policy and the Political Parties', Max 
Teichmann, ed., New Directions in Australian Foreign Policy,
Harmondsworth, 1969, 41-2; Max Teichmann, 'A Course for Labor', Arena,
14 (Spring 1967), 8; Cyril S. Wyndham, Democratic Socialism Today,
Sydney, 1966? 18-19.
c r
Age, 15 August 1966; Australian, 25 August 1966; C7T, 15 August 1966;
SMH, 15, 18, 25 August, 1, 2 September 1966; Socialist and Industrial 
Labor, October 1966, 2. Due to the efforts of Beazley and C. Jones 
(NSW), Caucus heard the reports of all its members who had visited 
Vietnam recently (Cairns, Bryant, M. Cross, Senator Fitzgerald, L. Reynolds 
and Whitlam), who gave varying opinions on the possibility of withdrawing 
conscripts. Jones then moved to refer the whole question back to the 
Caucus Foreign Affairs Committee for report. The Committee Chairman,
A.D. Fraser, agreed, provided there was no attempt to alter the May 
decision. Jones' motion was defeated heavily and the May resolution 
reaffirmed.
~*^ Age, 15 August 1966; CPD H. of R. 52, 25 August 1966, 482-3; Fact,
21 October 1966; SMH, 15, 25 August, 3, 17 September 1966; E.G. Whitlam, 
'Australia - Base or Bridge?': Evatt Memorial Lecture 1966, Sydney, n.d., 
8-14 (delivered 16 September 1966) .
58Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy ..., 80.
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Whitlam 'avoided direct answers to questions as to whether the presence
59of Australian troops was right or wrong in the present circumstances' 
and, on his return to Australia he agreed with those members of Caucus 
who advised against splitting the Vietnam force by withdrawing 
conscripts. This advice, too, could have been justified by the May 
references to the security of Australian forces and to the status of 
the American alliance.
Whitlam was not a leading figure among those in Caucus who tried
to reverse the May resolution as it related to the Australian force. He
recognised instead that, just as the resolution could be interpreted to
place more emphasis on civil matters and to prevent force-splitting, it
allowed scope for interpretation on the far more volatile issue of the
expeditionary force. In the 'military' clauses of the resolution, as
one journalist pointed out, 'without delay', 'acting with full regard to
the safety and security of the Australian forces' and 'as soon as
practicable' left considerable room for taking account of public opinion,
military advice and American requests.^ The statement tried
to lay down limits within which individual members 
may speak according to their personal views and to 
discourage extreme divergences of opinion on the 
side of pacifism or wholehearted support of the 
American war effort. It is broad enough to 
accommodate many bedfellows and is clearly designed 
to discourage public dispute between members of the 
party.61
59Age, SMH, 15 August 1966.
^ Australian, 13 May 1966 (Alan Ramsey).
£  -]
Age, 14 May 1966. See also: Australian, 25 August 1966; Kim C.
Beazley, Post-Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes ..., 136; SMH, 
14 May 1966. Other comments, however, seized on parts of the 
resolution as a repudiation of the American alliance: Australian,
18 May 1966 (Douglas Brass). Parliamentary Liberals seized on both 
extremism and alleged internal contradiction: CPD H. of R. 52,
23 August 1966, 307; H. of R. 53, 27, 29 September, 11 October 1966, 
1255-8, 1494, 1568.
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Given this, it was possible for Whitlam in September to develop the 
resolution's themes of a ceasefire, a negotiated settlement, withdrawal 
of all foreign forces and the initiation of a role for the United Nations. 
He said:
[T]he central issue in Vietnam today - How do we 
stop the war? Compared to that, other issues ...
[are] secondary .... What is urgently required is 
that the West must state its terms for a ceasefire, 
political solution and military withdrawal with 
some particularity. Without this there can be no 
hope of negotiations .... No country has a better 
opportunity to influence United States decisions in 
Vietnam than Australia. It is essential that we 
counsel restraint and de-escalation as a preliminary 
to negotiations with a timetable for the withdrawal 
of foreign troops and the implementation of free 
elections by the United Nations.
Whitlam's references to the Australian force in Vietnam were muted in 
contrast.
The circumstances leading up to this war, the 
mistakes by Australian and Western Governments 
since Geneva and the present conduct of the war in 
both Saigon and Washington lead the Labor Party to 
the certain conclusion that Australian troops 
should not have been sent to Vietnam .... The two 
[Australian] battalions are due to be withdrawn 
between March and June next. The debate will rage 
around programs for the size, composition and 
duration of their replacements.62
The careful reader could judge from this that Whitlam, at least, did not 
necessarily believe Australian troops should be withdrawn, although they 
should not have been sent in the first place. Secondly, the future 
commitment was left vague in size, composition and duration. Whitlam, 
at least, was not committing a possible Labor Government. But then 
neither was the May resolution.
Whitlam, 'Australia - Base or Bridge?', 1, 8. My emphasis.
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THE GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN
Calwell's interpretation of the resolution, as presented in his
election policy speech of 10 November, was somewhat more definite.
Commencing his speech with the assertion that ’[t]he most important
issue in this campaign is conscription', he promised that a Labor
Government would immediately act in consultation with the Americans to
withdraw all conscripts in Vietnam and would bring home the rest of
the force 'at the earliest practicable moment' after consulting the
allies and without endangering any Australian or allied soldiers.
6 3Conscription would be abolished. Later, Calwell emphasised that
consultation applied only to the details of withdrawal, not withdrawal
itself. 'I didn't say that after consultation we would withdraw them.
We would withdraw them. We will not be taking part in a dialogue with
64the Americans as to whether we should or should not withdraw.'
Against this interpretation, Whitlam set an article under his own
name in the Daily Mirror of 17 November. The article said, in part:
The Labor Party opposes the sending of conscripts 
to Vietnam. It will recall the conscripts from 
Vietnam as soon as possible. It will send no more 
conscripts to Vietnam. If, after consultation 
with the American and Vietnamese governments or 
after the reconvening of the Geneva Conference or 
after a resolution by the United Nations the Labor 
Government judges that there should be Australian 
troops in Vietnam, it would send regular troops.65
Four days latdr in Adelaide Whitlam repeated the Daily Mirror
interpretation and the press took it up, contrasting it with Calwell's
6 3A.A. Calwell, Policy Speech for the 1966 Federal Election delivered by
the Hon. A.A. Calwell, M.H.R. Leader of the Australian Labor Party on
Thursday, 10th November, 1966, [Canberra 1966?] 1-2._
Age, 18 November 1966. Twelve months later, Calwell said that, had he 
won, all Australian troops would have been home by Easter 1967 (Age,
2 January 1968).
^DM, 17 November 1966.
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version. Calwell's policy might be unrealistic and naive but it was
reasonably clear, wrote the Age editorialist. On the other hand, '[n]o
66cheque could be blanker and no promise emptier’ than Whitlam's.
During the campaign Calwell dismissed the difference between his
own and Whitlam's interpretations as a matter of detail. ^  However,
some years later, he wrote that some Caucus members had tried to distort
the May resolution almost as soon as it was made, 'to soft-pedal on one
point, to alter the emphasis on others, and to equivocate when they
thought this to be desirable'. Whitlam's version, Calwell insisted,
68'was not the policy decided upon'.
Had Whitlam kept within the May resolution? Was Calwell merely
condemning an interpretation which he personally disliked? When
Whitlam's private secretary, P. Cullen, had feared that the Whitlam
interpretation might be seen as unacceptable in the party, Whitlam had
written the Daily Mirror piece himself. The lack of immediate reaction,
69Oakes suggests, convinced Whitlam there was no problem in his version. 
When the reaction came, Whitlam said only that his version 'was 
completely in accord with Mr Calwell's policy speech'.^ One presumes 
he meant the flexible phrase 'at the earliest practicable moment', which 
could have allowed for an intervening period when regulars might remain.
^ Age, 22 November 1966; CjT, ITT, 23 November 1966; Herald, 22 November 
1966; Mercury, 23 November 1966; SMH, 22, 23 November 1966; West 
Australian, 22 November 1966. The Daily Mirror article was not taken 
up by journalists following the campaign. There is also one report of 
Whitlam making remarks in Sydney the previous day similar to those made 
in Adelaide (CT, 21 November 1966) .
^ C T , SMH, 24 November 1966. 
f) RA.A. Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, Hawthorn, Vic., 1972, 231-2.
69P. Cullen, interview; Laurie Oakes, Whitlam PM, Sydney, 1973, 149. 
^ West Australian, 23 November 1966.
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Oakes and Cullen both refer to Whitlam's desire for flexibility and his
distaste for sloganeering in foreign policy. Cullen recalls that 'he
didn't want to be locked into an impossible p o s i t i o n O t h e r s  have
suggested that Whitlam saw votes slipping away and made a last minute
72effort to retrieve them. The implausibility of the last explanation,
at least, is shown by the evidence of Whitlam's earlier efforts to
interpret the May resolution. His stress on civil aid and his
evasiveness about troop withdrawal and replacement had been evident well
before the election campaign but, as Calwell pointed out later, the
press had not emphasised them until the hectic days of the campaign,
73when such nuances became the subject of microscopic examination.
But were Whitlam's emphases mere nuances? On a number of occasions
before the election campaign, Whitlam pointed out that all troops at
present in Vietnam would be out by June, that is, their tours of duty
would end. The only difference between the government parties and
Labor was whether these troops would be replaced. The government wanted
a blank cheque to send as many conscripts as it liked; Labor would send
74no conscripts but might send regulars. This was the gist of Whitlam's 
remarks during the campaign. They redefined the issue to cause least 
electoral offence (the only issue being troop replacement rather than
^Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy ..., 91; P. Cullen, interview; 
Oakes, Whitlam PM, 168.
^ Age, 22 November 1966; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 148; SMH, 23 November 1966. 
73Of course, the press had reported and often commented upon remarks by 
Whitlam and Calwell and others on these subjects but had never had such 
an apparently clear contrast of views expressed in such a highly charged 
atmosphere.
^ Age, 14 November 1966; CPD H. of R. 53, 27 September, 12 October 1966, 
1255-8, 1607-8; CT, 21 November 1966; Whitlam, 'Australia - Base or 
Bridge?', 1.
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presence or withdrawal) and to imply that the circumstances surrounding 
a decision to replace troops fighting in a war might be different from 
those surrounding the original decision. But if Labor was opposed to 
the original commitment of regulars it was hardly likely to commit 
regulars itself as a government, unless the war situation changed 
drastically. Probably the only relevant change would have been a direct 
threat to Australia, which never seemed likely. Labor had always been 
prepared to send regulars to a United Nations peace keeping force after 
a cease fire but Whitlam, in his campaign remarks, expanded the 
circumstances where regulars could be sent to include 'after consultation 
with the allies' (the main point of difference with Calwell) and 'after 
reconvening of the Geneva Conference'. This expansion could not be 
supported by the May resolution or by any party decision since the 
beginning of the Vietnam War. It was an individual, unauthorised 
undertaking by Whitlam, although it was put forward as an interpretation 
of the May resolution.^  Then, to underline the image of caution he was 
projecting, Whitlam substituted the words 'as soon as possible' for the
The relevant paragraphs of the May resolution were: 'Whilst it will
take no action without consultation with the United States, it will work 
for, and insist upon the return of all Australian forces from Vietnam as 
soon as practicable .... The Australian Government should support the 
Geneva accords for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and non­
intervention in the affairs of the area as a basis for peace. Upon the 
cessation of hostilities the Australian Government would stand ready to 
provide forces for peace-keeping operations in South Vietnam under the 
auspices of the United Nations or such other agency as is established for 
this purpose' (SMH, 13 May 1966. My emphasis). A future presence under 
the United Nations is clearly possible. The last clause, further, could 
justify a presence under a Geneva agreement, although the only explicit 
reference to Geneva concerns troop withdrawal. But the reference to 
consultation with the United States, the chief ally, is clearly subsidiary 
to the insistence on the return of troops, which is the subject, too, of 
the resolution's first sentence: 'The Australian Labor Party opposes
the sending of Australian troops to Vietnam ...'.
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timing of conscript withdrawal, where Calwell's speech had said
'immediately we become the Government' and the May resolution 'without 
7 6delay*. In May 'as soon as practicable' had been deliberately chosen
for regulars' withdrawal to allow for some leeway for consultation with
allies. Whitlam's use of a similar formula for conscripts' withdrawal -
always the most urgent issue for most of his colleagues - along with
his references to tours of duty ending in June 1967, suggests that
Whitlam's 'most favoured interpretation', if he had made it explicit,
would have been: conscripts out in June and no more to be sent;
regulars to stay on, augmented by fresh regulars depending on the state
77of the war and the outcome of consultations with the Americans.
Whitlam's interpretation of the May resolution in the succeeding 
months to the election defeat of 26 November involved, first, broadening 
the issue by stressing civil aid, in order to deaden the impact of what 
seemed the most electorally unpopular aspect of Labor's policy - 
'leaving the Americans in the lurch' by withdrawing the Vietnam force. 
The logistic problems of extracting only conscripts led to the emphasis 
on the date for the end of the tour of duty, when such a change would 
be less upsetting. Secondly, the obfuscation about the future presence 
of regulars served the same basic purpose of proving Labor's - and 
Whitlam's - pro-American credentials where Calwell's version risked 
being branded anti-American. In the second area Whitlam transgressed 
at least the spirit of the May resolution and probably its letter ('The 
Australian Labor Party opposes the sending of Australian troops to 
Vietnam ...', according to the resolution; ' [i]f ... the Labor
7 ftAge, 14 November 1966; DM, 17 November 1966.
Of course, had the Calwell version been implemented, it might have 
taken this long after the elections to arrange withdrawal of conscripts 
in any case. Though cf. note 64 above.
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Government judges that there should be Australian troops in Vietnam, i_t
78would send regular troops', according to Whitlam.
The New South Wales Branch Conference of 1966 endorsed a Committee
report which, in the view of the Branch Assistant Secretary, J.L. Armitage -
who opposed its general tenor - in effect sanctioned a continuing role
79for Australia in the Vietnam conflict. The lengthy report endorsed 'the 
principles contained in' the Caucus resolution of May but the closest it 
came to taking a position on conscription was to 'point to the hypocrisy 
of the Holt Government ... in that they send troops, including conscripts, 
to Vietnam, warn against the danger of China to Australia's security and 
yet continue to trade with North Vietnam and China and supports [sic] the 
exclusion of Mainland China from recognised international discussions'. 
Elsewhere, the resolution suggested the need for 'a neutralist bloc facing 
the outer perimeter of mainland China', suggesting that protection against 
Australia's largest neighbour was a higher priority for this Branch than 
the withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam. Like Whitlam's 
interpretations of the May resolution this resolution infringed the spirit 
of the May resolution, ’interpreting' out of existence even its few 
definite statements.^
Others continued to interpret the May resolution to their own ends.
The VCE had applauded the resolution but then advised its public relations
78SMH, 13 May 1966 cf. DM, 17 November 1966. My emphasis.
79J.L. Armitage, interview.
80ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1966 Annual Conference, 20-1. Oliver, 
as Branch President, would probably have taken part in the deliberations 
of a Committee whose Federal equivalent he chaired. He expressed his own 
views about China - and Vietnam - early in 1967: 'I believe it is quite
wrong to bomb any people. But what are you going to do when people who 
want freedom and people who love freedom need your help to defend 
themselves'. Why have people got to be communised; why have they got 
to accept that form of life?': Australian Worker, 22 March 1967. See
also above p.283.
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consultants that the party's overall Vietnam policy would be played down
during the campaign. Instead, it pointed to demographic figures showing
the high proportion of young voters and of women, both groups to whom
conscription was the key issue. Hence, the anti-conscription aspects of
81party policy should be emphasised. Cairns believed instead that the
strength of the May resolution was its comprehensiveness and the
possibilities it provided at crucial points for manoeuvre by a Labor
Government. Calwell, he said later, went much further than was necessary.
He was goaded into specific undertakings and he 'became more and more
82left, while Whitlam became more and more technical'. Whitlam, rather
than Calwell, was Labor's chief television personality during the campaign
and he concentrated on the need for civil aid in Vietnam and for better
defence planning at home. He hardly mentioned conscription. Calwell's
television advertisements, though fewer in number, stressed opposition to
conscription, while insisting on Labor's loyalty to the American alliance
8 3as a bulwark against Asian Communism.
"Resolutions from the Branches were contained in Agenda, FX 27-31 July 
1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/42. The VCE interpretation was contained 
in Hartley's brief to a committee of public relations advisers, preparing 
a report on Labor's election prospects, based on an opinion survey 
(Australian, 10 October 1966).
82J.F. Cairns, interview.
8 3On Whitlam's prominence see CT_, 25 November 1966 (J. Gaul) and material 
containing records of discussions between Wyndham and the ALP advertising 
agency, Hansen Rubensohn-McCann Erickson: Confidential Federal A.L.P.
28.9.66 Discussions with Messrs. Wyndham & Courtenay, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 
4985/60/Radio/T.V . A.B.C.: 'Documentaries to ... feature Whitlam 
(preferably on location) . . . ' . These notes also suggest that those 
present hoped to suggest that conscription was not too bad since only 
twelve per cent of those eligible were called up. The scripts, draft and 
final, show that the approach to conscription finally adopted was a little 
more positive than this (Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/60/Scripts). During the 
election campaign, apart from these advertisements, Whitlam tried to 
avoid the Vietnam issue. 'In Western Australia ... Whitlam concentrated 
on local issues such as the government's failure to press on with the Ord 
River project. He tried to stay away from the Vietnam issue as much as 
possible ...' (Laurie Oakes, 'The Years of Preparation', Anonymous, ed.,
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In each case, if necessary, the May resolution could have been 
quoted as authority. The Caucus resolution was designed to be interpreted. 
It set out a comprehensive set of attitudes to the Vietnam War and 
Australian participation in it and virtually invited Labor decisionmakers 
and spokesmen to extract from it the parts which they preferred.
Selective interpretation was not in itself contravention of the 
resolution although its effect could be the same. When did stressing 
the importance of the American alliance become support for a military 
commitment in association with the Americans? When did emphasis on 
civil aid and ignoring the issue of conscript soldiers become tacit 
' support for conscripts remaining in Vietnam? On the other hand, did
imposing unacceptable conditions on the Americans deny the spirit of the 
Australian-American alliance, despite protestations to the contrary?
Did rejection of conscription for overseas service undercut Labor’s 
alleged concern for better defence planning? Such questions could have 
been asked of any of the interpreters of the May resolution.
But a concern for consistency misses the point of processes like 
the making of Labor foreign policy during the latter months of 1966.
March and Olsen and other observers of 'garbage can’ decisionmaking 
processes in organisations have suggested that decisions are fundamentally 
ambiguous since, among other things, different participants see decisions 
differently.
Different participants emphasized different aspects 
of a specific decision - depending on which aspects 
were relevant for the respective areas of primary
83 (continued)
Whitlam and Frost, London, 1974, 25). Wheeldon remembers the resentment 
at a West Australian meeting when Whitlam chose to talk about sewerage 
rather than the war (J.M. Wheeldon, interview). Whitlam also avoided 
committing himself against the presence in Australia in January 1967 of 
Prime Minister Ky of South Vietnam. Calwell led demonstrations against 
Ky (Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy ..., 80-2).
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interest .... For at least some (perhaps most) of 
the key groups the explicit decision seemed to be 
of little importance ’per se'. While interested 
in certain aspects of the decision, the relevance 
of the decision otherwise largely disappeared once 
the decision was made.84
The May decision registered the balance then obtaining between a number 
of influences on ALP policy - Calwell, Whitlam, other members of Caucus, 
State Branches, led by Victoria on one side and New South Wales on the 
other, media commentators, the Federal Liberal Government and its 
backbenchers, the changes in the international environment centred on 
Vietnam. The decision reconciled the conflicting influences by partly 
satisfying all of them; it was a compromise decision containing a 
number of parts. Once the decision was made the process of politicians 
and others saying what Labor policy was continued, with each spokesman - 
and critic - emphasising what he liked and glossing over what he 
disliked. This process would have occurred even if the May decision 
had not been made. That decision served two limited purposes. First, 
it could be shown to those who said 'Labor has no policy on this crucial 
issue'. Second, it allowed the many interpreters to justify their 
interpretations, if need be, by selective reference to an authoritative 
decision of the party. It curbed neither criticism nor internal 
anomalies. Critics extrapolated from parts of the resolution which they 
disliked in order to show that Labor was cowardly, anti-American or 
irresponsible. Party members continued to speak with different voices, 
and made little attempt to reconcile their differing views into an 
internally consistent defence and foreign policy.
84March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice .... 150.
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1967 and After
WHITLAM AND VIETNAM
Ambiguity and the prevalence of interpretation are characteristics 
of the garbage can concept, the subject of our HYPOTHESIS XVI. The 
study of the ALP, Vietnam and conscription during 1966 has provided 
evidence to support this hypothesis. Is there in the events of 1967 
further support for it?
85Federal Labor suffered one of its worst defeats in 1966. After
the election, on 8 February 1967, Whitlam was elected Federal Leader of
86the party. Once elected Leader, Whitlam hoped for more scope to mould 
Labor's foreign policy into a more electorally acceptable, internally 
consistent and responsible form. The scene for this remoulding, he 
hoped, would be the Federal Conference to be held late in July 1967.
Meanwhile, Whitlam began to prepare the ground. In a Four Corners 
interview two weeks after becoming Leader, he suggested reasons for the 
1966 election debacle.
Whitlam: I think our trouble was, putting it
briefly, that we highlighted too few issues, and 
in too negative and narrow a way ....
Moore: Will the Labor Party advocate the recalling
of Australian troops from Vietnam?
Whitlam: Now, the only way troops can come back
now is if there's a settlement, if there's an 
armistice. Now, one would hope that by the time 
the next House of Representatives elections come 
around, there will certainly have been that. If 
there's not ....
Moore: Could I ask you what you think now? Are
you in favour of Australian troops being in 
Vietnam now?
Labor's share of first preference votes for the House of Representatives 
fell from 45.5 per cent to 40 per cent and the anti-Labor majority grew 
from twenty-two to forty-one seats: Malcolm Mackerras, Australian General
Elections, Sydney, 1972, 220-1, 230-1.
86For details: Oakes, Whitlam PM, 150-2; Louise Overacker, Australian
Parties in a Changing Society, 1945-67, Melbourne, 1968, 123-6.
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Whitlam: They are now committed - there's no
question about this, but what we'll ...
Moore: But you don't want to bring them back?
Whitlam: What we'll press to get is a
settlement ...87
Troop withdrawal, Whitlam argued, was an academic question for Labor at 
that time.
Q. Mr Whitlam, will you campaign for a return of 
Australian troops from Vietnam?
A. This is something that we could determine 
closer to the next elections. I would hope that 
the war there would be over within three years.88
Whitlam argued that changing circumstances in Vietnam might make
irrelevant any specific policy and that any future Labor Government
should have maximum room to manoeuvre. More importantly, he believed
Labor's existing policy emphases provided a distorted and inadequate
approach to Australia's environment. Withdrawal of Australian troops
from Vietnam would not end war and suffering there nor assist the
development of Asia. When Whitlam produced in 1968 a comprehensive
statement of his own foreign policy preferences, the section headed
'Labor's Policy on Vietnam' occupied less than one-sixth of the text,
which was crowded instead with suggestions about international aid
schemes and a non-military role for Australia in Asia. Under the heading
'The Distraction of Vietnam', Whitlam wrote: 'The decade of development
and all its hopes are the most serious casualty of the war in Vietnam.
Tens of thousands have died in Vietnam; millions are dying and millions
89unborn may die because of our failures in development in this decade.'
87Four Corners - 25th February 1967. Interview with the Hon. E.G. Whitlam, 
Leader of the Opposition, Vic. Rec., M.P. S to W 1965-1968.
88ALP Federal Secretariat Information Release No. A/67, Press Conference - 
Mr. E.G. Whitlam, Q.C. 9/2/67. See also: CT, 27 February 1967; Four
Corners - 25 February 1967.
89E.G. Whitlam, Beyond Vietnam, Melbourne, 1968, AO. This pamphlet also 
includes references to the need for flexibility in foreign policy 
resolutions (3, 13, 20).
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Was Whitlam's redefinition of the Vietnam issue in these terms
mere ’debating club stuff’ to distract attention from Labor's divisions 
90over withdrawal? 'It made political sense , writes Whitlam's sympathetic
biographer, 'while the Vietnam controversy remained an albatross around
the neck of the Labor Party, to play down foreign affairs as a political
91issue, and Whitlam disciplined himself to do so'. The 1966 election 
result had shown, Whitlam believed, the dangers of going out on a limb 
unnecessarily in support of an electorally unpopular - and logically 
insupportable - policy.
The Liberals were always throwing dead cats into 
the ring for Labor to jump on. In March 1966 
it was conscription for overseas service and 
Arthur seized on it. But I wasn't going to play 
the game by their rules or stick within their 
parameters.92
The proportions of Beyond Vietnam devoted to various aspects of 
foreign and defence policy reflected Whitlam's success in the first 
eighteen months of his Leadership in changing the emphases of Labor's 
policy. This shift of emphases reflected not only changes in the 
environment but also changes in the locus of foreign policymaking in the
This was the label given and the conclusion drawn by J.M. Wheeldon 
(interview).
91Oakes, Whitlam PM, 207. See also: Australian, 9 May, Examiner,
9 May 1967 (J. Allsopp: 'Mr Whitlam is gradually removing foreign
affairs from the list of Labour's vulnerable points ...'); Michelle 
Grattan, 'The Australian Labor Party', Henry Mayer & Helen Nelson, ed., 
Australian Politics: A Third Reader, Melbourne, 1973, 389 ('Whitlam
had never been happy with Vietnam as an electoral issue ...').
J.L. Armitage, J.B. Keeffe, and A.G. Poyser all supported this conclusion 
(interviews).
92E.G. Whitlam, interview. Note also Oliver's contemporary comment:
'Mr. Holt invited us to take him on on Vietnam, and our leader did take 
him on on Vietnam and your great social programme of progress was 
forgotten. You got the results and you got slaughtered ...' (Australian 
Worker, 22 March 1967). Finally, see Defence minister Fairhall's reply 
to Calwell's challenge to fight the Kooyong by-election and the Federal 
election on the issue of conscripts for Vietnam: 'We will be delighted
to see the Labor Party once again tilt at a windmill' (CPD H. of R. 50,
15 March 1966, 245).
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ALP. Some of these changes built on earlier developments. First, given 
that under Calwell politicians already enjoyed a fairly independent role 
in foreign and defence policy, more of this independent role devolved on 
the two leaders, Whitlam and Barnard. Secondly, this devolution was 
accompanied by the broadening of policy concerns already mentioned. 
Thirdly, Whitlam's attempts to rewrite policy on Vietnam were resisted 
by Federal bodies more than had been the case under Calwell, whose 
desires on this issue closely approximated those of the Federal Executive 
majority. Fourthly, conflict was largely avoided by compromise decisions 
capable of varying interpretation. Whitlam could still interpret 
Vietnam policy fairly much as he liked because it was reasonably 
flexibly formulated. So could those who resisted him. These points will 
be taken up in turn.
First, the devolution of responsibility to Whitlam and Barnard.
Writing of this period, Kim C. Beazley, son of a Caucus member, detects
'a desire in the F.P.L.P. to leave Whitlam free to deal with the foreign
policy matters which had been electorally damaging to the Party'. My
own Caucus interviewees recognised the size of the defeat in 1966 and
93sympathised with Whitlam's desire to 'defuse' the Vietnam issue.
Whitlam himself showed his intention to oversee foreign and defence
policy by appointing himself shadow spokesman on foreign affairs and
94allocating defence to Barnard. Caucus supported Whitlam. When Wheeldon 
moved on 1 March 1967 that the Caucus Executive provide Caucus with a
93Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes ..., 189; 
interviews with J.L. Armitage, J.B. Keeffe, A.G. Poyser. Armitage 
returned to Parliament in 1969.
94AFR, 2 March 1967; Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt Australian Labor Party 
Attitudes ..., 78; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 167; SMH, 6 October 1967.
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recommendation defining party policy on Australian troops in Vietnam,
Whitlam was confident enough of his own support to push the matter to
a vote and defeat with only a handful of dissenting voices. The vote
95was seen as an endorsement of his recent interpretations of policy.
Then,in April 1967, Caucus elected to its Foreign Affairs and Defence
Committee a solid majority of members who would have been expected to
support Whitlam's interpretations or, at least, oppose perpetuation of 
96Calwell's. Then, soon after, Caucus voted thirty-six to twenty-two
to end its sixteen year boycott of the Joint Parliamentary Foreign
Affairs Committee, a symbol of bipartisanship in foreign policy. Labor's
criticism of the Committee's methods and powerlessness could not disguise
97the search for a 'responsible' image that this act indicated. Finally, 
when university students' attempts to send money to the Vietnamese 
National Liberation Front were met in August 1967 with the Defence 
Forces Protection Bill, Caucus members confirmed their respectability by
95Australian, 2 March 1967; Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt Australian Labor 
Party Attitudes ..., 189, referring to FPLP Minutes, 1 March 1967;
Mercury, 2 March 1967; SMH, 2, 3 March 1967; West Australian, 4 March 
1967. Bryant, who supported Wheeldon in Caucus, had written to Caucus 
members criticising Whitlam's Four Corners broadcast (DT, 1 March 1967).
96SMH, 7 April 1967. Elected: Beazley (appointed Chairman), Senators
Drury and Willesee, R. Davies, Cross, Cairns, Bryant, Senator Mulvihill, 
polling votes in that order. Appointed by Caucus Executive: Barnard.
Of those elected only Cairns and Bryant were identified as opponents of 
the Whitlam-Barnard line and others of this ilk (Uren, Keeffe, Cavanagh, 
O'Byrne and James) failed to be elected. None of these five losers had 
been members of the equivalent Committees in the previous Parliament. 
Comparing the Committee lists over the two Parliaments the factional 
balance alters very little; the point of the April 1967 election is 
that it shows Whitlam's obvious attempts to change the line of policy 
emphasis did not lead to a reaction. Lists: Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt
Australian Labor Party Attitudes ..., 348.
9Australian, 21 April 1967; CT, SMH, 12, 20-22 April, 4, 11 May 1967. 
Labor nominees were Drury, Mulvihill, Willesee, Barnard, Beazley, Cross, 
Costa, Davies. Bryant, Uren and others boycotted the nominations but 
observers suggested they would have suffered the same failure as in the 
elections for the Caucus committee anyway.
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deploring this action and supporting the Bill, merely criticising the 
government for over-reacting.^
Secondly, the shift to Whitlam and Barnard also meant a shift to
a broader view of policy, to lengthy statements of desirable futures
rather than ad hoc reactions to crises, to comprehensive plans which
recognised realities rather than slogans which ignored them. To
Whitlam’s Beyond Vietnam can be added the 1969 pamphlet bearing Barnard's
99name, Australian Defence - Policy and Programmes. Calwell had enjoyed 
considerable independence in foreign and defence policy but he exercised 
it in narrow ways. When Caucus came to rely on Whitlam and Barnard - 
and their staffs'*"^ - it facilitated a more rounded foreign and defence 
policy.
98Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy ..., 72-6; CPD H. of R. 56,
31 August 1967, 673-80 (Whitlam), 699-700 (Connor), 708 (Hayden). From 
the beginning Calwell had said Labor would do nothing to endanger 
Australian troops in the field and in 1966 had dissociated Labor from 
union boycotts on Vietnam supply ships. Whitlam confirmed the line on 
supply ships when the issue arose again early in 1967 (Albinski,
Politics and Foreign Policy ..., 84-5; CPD H. of R. 46, 4 May 1965,
11 (Calwell); CT, 19 May 1966 (Calwell).
99L.H. Barnard, Australian Defence - Policy and Programmes, Melbourne, 
1969. Written by C.J. Lloyd, Barnard's private secretary (C.J. Lloyd, 
interview). For the early development of Whitlam's views on foreign 
policy see Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 56-8; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 
111-14. Whitlam and Barnard were not alone. Cairns, too, had a 
comprehensive approach to foreign policy, with ideas on defence 
reorganisation similar to those provided for Barnard; J.F. Cairns, 
Economics and Foreign Policy, Melbourne, 1966; 'Foreign Policy after 
Vietnam', Anonymous, ed.,The Asian Revolution and Australia, Sydney, 
1969, 175-89, especially 183 on defence matters; Living with Asia, 
Melbourne, 1965, especially 100-3 on defence. Finally, we have remarked 
in the text on the broad view taken by Beazley, another foreign policy 
specialist, in his Parliamentary speeches on the subject.
10°Cf. Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes ..., 
47, based on an interview with C.J. Lloyd of Barnard's staff: 'A major
preoccupation of the staff [Whitlam's, Barnard's and later Willesee's] 
was devising policies which, whilst not offending electoral opinion - 
perceived as highly favourable to the American alliance - at the same 
time attempted a justification of such policies within a traditional 
framework of Party principles'.
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But Whitlam and Barnard also sought a Vietnam policy different from
that espoused by Calwell in 1966. Did they find it? The Federal
Executive had left foreign policy largely to Calwell and his Caucus
colleagues during 1966. Much of its time - and that of the two Special
Conferences during early 1966 was occupied with other matters, state aid
and related issues, party reform and other internal matters. The States
sent up items on foreign affairs but the Federal bodies passed over them.
Thus a substantial motion from Chamberlain and Hartley at the February
meeting was superseded by an amendment to refer the matter to the
Federal Leader 'with a view to his making a statement along the lines
proposed’. Then, at the July 1966 meeting, although the public
debate over Vietnam was at its height, the Executive referred to Caucus
102nine State Branch items regarding the war and conscription. Did this
tendency to avoid discussion arise from the nature of the issues involved,
from trust in Calwell, from lack of interest or simply from lack of time?
'Time for decision activity is a scarce resource’, write March and Olsen.
’Potential participants face a continuous and heterogeneous stream of
demands for their attention . * 1 They move from choice to choice depending
103on the competing claims upon their attention. But participation 
depends also on interest in a subject or on a belief that one’s 
participation can make a difference. March and Olsen suggest that 
participants will mostly be those ’(a) for whom the outcome makes a 
difference, (b) who anticipate that their attention will make a
101FX 9-11 February 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/40.
1 07FX 27-31 July 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/40, 42. Note also 
Oliver early in 1967: the Vietnam question 'has never been an issue 
discussed by any A.L.P. Conference at which I have attended in recent 
years' (Australian Worker, 22 March 1967). Compared to the deep and 
lengthy discussions on, say, state aid, this was true and it applied 
to the Executive during 1966 as well.
March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 45-7.103
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104difference'. If Executive members during 1966 did place a high value 
on particular outcomes in Labor's internal foreign policy discussions,
a majority of them also believed that Calwell, the most authoritative
/
'interpreter' of party policy, broadly agreed with them in this area.
They did not see that their intervention would make a difference to the
policies being put forward in Labor's name by Calwell. What would
happen in 1967, when the Executive had less competing demands on its
time and when there was a greater gap between the views of the Executive
majority and the new Leader on foreign policy? An answer to this
question may also show how deep was the interest in foreign and defence
policy among Executive members.
The recently retired Federal Leader, Arthur Calwell, wrote to
Hartley on 20 February 1967, complaining of an Australian Workers' Union
convention resolution condemning conscription alone, leaving the
implication that volunteers for Vietnam might be acceptable.
This issue [warned Calwell] will have to be watched 
very closely and carefully, because I would not be 
surprised if certain reactionary elements in our 
Party were not already trying to lay the ground for 
some new look version of what was, after all, a 
policy that was unanimously supported by the
Federal Conference.105
Given the context of his letter, Calwell probably referred to Oliver 
and the AWU. However, within two weeks Hartley himself was writing about
March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 46.
‘^ “’Calwell to Hartley, 20 February 1967, Vic. Rec. , 1966, 1967, 1968 
Members Personal A to C. The AWU Australian convention adopted by 
thirty-two votes to six a New South Wales amendment to a South Australian 
motion. Oliver supported the New South Wales amendment, saying it had 
never been ALP policy to do all the things set out in the South 
Australian motion (a bombing halt, withdrawing conscripts, total 
withdrawal as soon as possible) (Australian Worker, 22 March 1967) . Yet 
both the motion and the amendment claimed to be supporting ALP policy, 
showing yet again the capacity of the May resolution for interpretation.
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Whitlam's early foreign policy statements. ’While it could not be fairly
said that he [Whitlam] has as yet somersaulted on Vietnam policy, I think
that there is a very considerable danger that such a somersault will be
106attempted in the near future'. By April, Whitlam's plans to revise
policy were well under way. Wyndham wrote advising him:
Last night we discussed whether or not it was a 
Conference decision which determined our policy 
of withdrawing troops from Vietnam. You will 
recall that the 1965 Conference adopted a 
resolution applauding the stand taken by the 
F.P.L.P. in opposing the sending of troops to 
Vietnam 'in accordance with the principles stated 
by [Calwell]' in his speech of 4th May, 1965. In 
that speech A.A.C. said: 'Our minds and reason
cannot support those who have made the decision 
to send you to this war, and we shall do our best 
to have that decision reversed'. Does not the 
question hinge on the interpretation of the phrase
underlined?107
Both Whitlam and Wyndham knew that the succession of decisions by 
Conference and Caucus over nearly two years had provided room for 
manoeuvre, but often manoeuvre with some difficulty. Now Whitlam hoped 
to establish by a new Conference decision a new, more congenial policy.
THE 1967 FEDERAL CONFERENCE
The Federal Conference was to meet late in July 1967. Late in May, 
Barnard, visiting South Vietnam, said that, in view of the clear evidence
1 DfiHartley to D. MacSween, 3 March 1967, Vic. Rec., Unions A-S, S 
continued 1967. MacSween, Secretary of the Clothing Trades Union and 
a leader of the Trade Unionists' Defence Committee, had urged the 
Federal Executive to announce that ALP policy did not mean leaving 
Australian troops in Vietnam until after a settlement, as Whitlam seemed 
to imply. Keeffe spoke to Hartley by telephone and told MacSween that, 
although action in Caucus had failed (above note 95) 'you may be assured 
that our policies on Vietnam will be closely watched' (Telegram 
MacSween to Hartley, 1 March 1967; MacSween to Hartley, 3 April 1967, 
Vic. Rec., Unions A-S, S continued 1967).
^^Wyndham to Whitlam, 20 April 1967, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/31/Federal 
Parliamentary Labor Party - Leader (E.G. Whitlam) Correspondence 1967 - 
FPLP/4.
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of a Northern invasion, ’the inevitable influence of the United States
in this area' and the certain British withdrawal east of Suez, Labor
might need to take 'a hard look at its defence and foreign policies'. uo
While Barnard insisted he referred to Labor's South East Asian policy
as a whole, his remarks provoked much discussion inside and outside the
party. Calwell and Chamberlain sprang to defend the radical line of
May 1966, which, said Calwell, 'is still valid and needs no change'.
(Barnard could have said that he was also defending the May resolution,
as h£ interpreted it.) Chamberlain said, if there was to be a
reassessment of policy it should produce 'a more determined attitude ...
a policy which expresses complete opposition to the presence of any
109foreign troops in Vietnam'. Replying to Calwell and Chamberlain,
Whitlam quoted a telecast by Calwell on 23 February 1966, before the
conscripts decision had drastically altered the issue for the then
Leader, where Calwell said Labor did not believe in unilateral troop
withdrawal by Australia or anyone else on either side.
The defence and diplomatic shortcomings of the 
Holt Government sent Australian conscripts to 
Vietnam. The rancorous ramblings of men like 
Mr Chamberlain have kept them there. The 
Australian Government should be striving for
1 08Australian, 2 June 1967; CT, 27 May, 8 June 1967; Mercury, 10 June 
1967; SMI, 27 May, 8 June 1967.
109Calwell and other Victorians: Age, Australian, 29 May 1967; Calwell
to Hartley, 31 May 1967, Hartley to Calwell, 7 June 1967, Vic. Rec., 1966, 
1967, 1968 Members Personal A to C; SMH, 29 May, 16 June 1967; VCE 
30 June 1967, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive Minutes, NLA 
mf G8142. Chamberlain: SMH, West Australian, 3 June 1967. Ten years
later Chamberlain remembered that he had written to Barnard before making 
the public criticism. He also remembered his own view at the time: 'Oh
well the Party attitude was my attitude, one of complete opposition to 
our troops being in Vietnam, and that they should be brought out 
immediately' (F.E. Chamberlain, NLA interview transcripts, 3: 1/26-27). 
Again, policy was interpreted according to individual preference.
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an armistice and amnesty in Vietnam. While I lead 
it, the A.L.P. will strive for those objectives.H O
But there were men of narrow vision on the other side of the ALP,
too. Whitlam sought also to dampen the anti-Communist fires in New South
Wales. Oliver, President of this Branch, had read Mao on the extent of
the old Chinese Empire and modern China’s right to a sphere of influence
at least as large. Oliver thus could justify the Vietnam intervention
as holding the line against Communism and as insurance on the United
States alliance. While he opposed conscription for overseas service, 
he believed that 'the defence of Australia might be anywhere' . As 
Branch President, Oliver could attend all New South Wales ALP Committees 
and he took special interest in that on Foreign Affairs and Defence. 
Since the Committee's report was invariably adopted by the Conference, 
any influence Oliver exerted on the Committee was reflected in the New
South Wales foreign and defence policy items sent to the Federal party.
Australian, SMH, 9 June 1967. My emphasis. Barnard, too, while 
especially stressing the need to end bombing and to reduce the scale of 
the war, echoed Whitlam's call for negotiations and increased civil aid. 
Labor 'was opposed to the sending of Australian troops. The policy had 
been and still was that conscripts should not be sent' (Barnard, West 
Australian, 24 June 1967. My emphasis). The careful stress on past and 
future seems important: Labor opposed the original expeditionary force;
it still opposed sending conscripts to be part of it, but not its 
presence there? In Bangkok, Barnard had said Labor 'continued to oppose 
the sending of Australian troops to Vietnam’ (Age, 22 May 1967). Adding 
'and presence in' before Vietnam'would have strengthened the statement. 
Finally, on the intended application of Barnard's remarks about a 'hard 
look', note the slip in Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 93: 'Returning
from a tour of South Vietnam, Barnard stated that Labor policy on troop 
withdrawal should be reviewed' (my emphasis). Publicly, Barnard denied 
he meant this narrow focus but private conversations at the time 
probably influenced Freudenberg's recollection.
^^C.T. Oliver, interview. See also: ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report
of Proceedings, 1964 Annual Conference, 6; 1966 Annual Conference, 7.
Note also the views of Oliver's union journal that Labor's defeat in 
1966 could be attributed to the voters' reaction to the pro-Communist 
tinge of a section of the ALP or their refusal 'to sanction the 
endangering of our strong alliance with America; they could not support 
the Labor Party's unrealistic and dangerous policy of isolationism' 
(Australian Worker, 30 November 1966).
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Nevertheless, those in New South Wales who supported Whitlam's 
approach to the Vietnam issue were able in 1967, with his support, to 
move the Branch closer to his view, ending the last remnants of 
support for the war in party resolutions. The Assistant Secretary of 
the Branch, J.L. Armitage, piloted through the New South Wales 
Committee and Conference a policy whose essential parts were extracts 
from Whitlam’s Parliamentary speeches, especially that of 28 February 
1967:
How can we assist in stopping the war and opening 
negotiations as soon as possible? We should never 
have made the commitment in the form the Government 
made it. The Labor Party opposed that commitment.
We particularly oppose the use of conscription to 
make up the numbers in the expeditionary force ....
It is the government's responsibility to strive to 
end the fighting so that all foreign troops can be 
withdrawn.112
Whitlam had seen the draft report before its presentation and made 
only minor suggestions. It may be taken therefore as a summary of his 
preferred policy of early to mid 1967. Its keynote, says Armitage, was 
gradualism, a steady move toward withdrawal. Beside endorsing Whitlam's 
remarks, which implied that total withdrawal of Australian troops would 
not occur until the fighting ended, the report said that 'an Australian 
Labor Government would instruct R.A.A.F. and R.A.N. forces not to take 
part in any bombing or shelling of North Vietnam, and would inform its 
Allies that no more National Servicemen would be sent to Vietnam'. This, 
Armitage suggests, was as far as the report could go and still get through 
a New South Wales Conference where views like Oliver's were influential. 
Anything more than the Whitlam formula on troop withdrawal would not have 
been accepted. The outcome was not greatly dissimilar to Oliver's views,
11?ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report of Proceedings, 1967 Annual 
Conference, 23-4; J.L. Armitage, interview.
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for he disliked conscription and had admitted bombing was unpleasant.
But the difference was that the 1965 and 1966 Branch statements had 
eschewed virtually all specific statements. The 1967 version made 
specific statements in two areas, which Oliver perhaps could have 
accepted, and made a less specific statement about troop withdrawal.
The question remained whether the Federal Conference would adopt it or 
whether Whitlam would have to continue to interpret a policy which was 
not really what he wanted.
The Federal Executive Foreign Policy Committee in 1967 comprised
Oliver (Chairman), Cairns, Beazley, Uren, Wheeldon, Cohen, Mulvihill,
Cavanagh and Whitlam with Wyndham as Secretary. It thus contained five
members (Cairns, Uren, Wheeldon, Cohen and Cavanagh) who had tended to
113follow closely the Calwell line on foreign policy. But the Committee 
contained a range of views and alliances. Mulvihill had had close 
contacts with Whitlam in foreign policy matters and Beazley was probably 
closer in his views to Whitlam than to anyone else on the Committee. In 
general, Oliver said his idea as Chairman was to take a line from 
Beazley and one from Cairns on the other side and aim for something in 
between which would get unanimous support. Because of the Committee’s 
diversity, Oliver probably realised a unanimous decision would not be 
obtained easily. As early as 24 February, when Whitlam had already 
shown his desire for a new direction, Wyndham wrote to Oliver, the
Wheeldon possibly was the most radical. He told the author he 
favoured immediate withdrawal, presumably even without consultation. He 
believed his views were more extreme than, say, Uren's (interview).
114Oliver remembers that he used to rely on Beazley for a balanced view. 
He was more 'realistic' than Whitlam though Whitlam made important 
contributions, as did Wheeldon (C.T. Oliver, interview). Uren also 
remembered that Cairns and Beazley, rather than Whitlam, played key 
roles in drafting Committee recommendations (interview).
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Committee Chairman, asking when a meeting might be arranged. 'We
cannot put it off forever, and I am sure pressure will call for a
meeting. Perhaps you would like to discuss it with G o u g h . O l i v e r
possibly hoped that stalling would give Whitlam time to prepare the
ground, by public speeches and private lobbying, for a change in
policy. While Oliver would not have been completely pleased with
Whitlam's version, he certainly preferred it to Calwell's. The delay
1.16gave Whitlam three months grace.
When the Foreign Affairs Committee eventually met on 26 May, 
observers and members detected in its deliberations a moderation and 
willingness to compromise which augured well both for a revision of 
policy in the direction favoured by Whitlam and Barnard and for party 
satisfaction with such a revision. The recommendations on Vietnam were 
framed to allow a Labor Government maximum freedom to manoeuvre, while 
satisfying those who wanted a radical and distinctive approach. The 
draft policy, wrote a journalist who saw a leaked copy, 'can mean all 
things to all points of view. It simply depends on individual 
interpretation of the fine p r i n t . B u t  while admitting that the draft
Wyndham to Oliver, 24 February 1967, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/29/ 
Committees - Foreign Affairs and Defence - FXC/11. Note also: 'It is
useless stalling the Committee, as Charlie intends. What we do with it 
is the question!' (Wyndham to Whitlam, 15 February 1967, Fed. Rec., NLA 
MS 4985/31/Federal Parliamentary Labor Party - Leader (E.G. Whitlam) 
Correspondence 1967-FPLP/4).
116Delay might have had other reasons. Committees often did not meet 
until the last weeks before a Conference, especially when there was little 
to discuss. But it seems unlikely in the circumstances that this 
Committee was surrounded by apathy.
Alan Ramsey, Australian, 19 June 1967. Ramsey's comments were based 
on the Minutes of the first meeting including the draft statement on 
Vietnam to be circulated to Committee members for consideration at the 
next meeting. This differed in some respects from the version which 
went to Conference, although its general tenor was similar. For other 
press comments arising out of this leaked document, see: Australian,
17 June 1967; Bulletin, 5 August 1967; CT, 22 June 1967; Mercury,
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gave leeway to both sides, resisters of the Whitlam approach feared that
the new formulation too easily relieved a future Labor Government of the
need to take immediate positive action. Uren believed Cairns compromised
too much while Wheeldon felt inclined to wash his hands of a Committee
which so prevaricated. But, neither on the Committee nor at the Federal
118Executive could the resisters stiffen the document.’
What did the Committee present to the Federal Conference? The 
crucial part was the policy declaration headed 'Vietnam’. Its key 
sentences ran:
The Labor Party is opposed to the continuation of 
the war in Vietnam, and to Australian participation 
in it. The Party will work to end the war and to 
end Australian participation in it .... With the 
cessation of bombing of the north, with an end to 
the use of horror weapons which must alienate the 
people of Vietnam, and with recognition of those 
actually involved in the conflict as parties to 
negotiations Labor believes an atmosphere could 
develop in which conferences to end the war could 
take place.
While this statement had a tenuous link with Calwell's 'do our best 
to reverse' clause of 1965 and while it set out ways in which the war's 
conduct should be changed to lead to negotiations, it made no attempt to
117 (continued)
20 June 1967; SMH, 17, 19 June 1967. For the original, see: Fed. Rec.^ 
NLA MS 4985/126/68. It was suggested the draft had been leaked to allow 
the resisters to organise, but it is just as plausible to suggest the 
other side benefited by building up press support for the new line - or 
at least for the increased realism or flexibility. The leak may have 
encouraged the Victorian Branch Conference on 12 June, on Calwell's 
motion, to adopt a radical motion on Vietnam which included the significant 
lines that Labor should clearly state its troop withdrawal policy and 
should not emphasise the technicalities of withdrawal 'to such an extent 
that it casts doubt ... as to our intentions': ALP, Official Reports,
Commonwealth Conference and Special Conference, 1967 and Commonwealth 
Conference, 1969, 74.
1 J O
The Executive adjourned to discuss the report informally, then passed 
it to the Conference without amendment: Advertiser, 28 July 1967; Age,
28, 29 July 1967; Australian, 29 July 1967; CT, 30 July 1967; DT,
28 July 1967; FX 26-29 July 1967, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/44; T. Uren, 
J.M. Wheeldon, interviews.
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link changes in the conduct of the war to Australia’s future 
participation. Ramsey had commented that the earlier draft's phrasing 
'the war ... should be brought to an end so that Australian and other 
troops can be withdrawn' (my emphasis) clearly inferred troops would 
remain until the war ended. This connection was obscured somewhat in 
the final version but the removal in the final version also of this 
passing reference to withdrawal underlined the Committee's wariness 
about following the Calwell line and its inclination to seek decisions 
which all viewpoints in the party could accept and, especially, within 
which Labor Governments could manoeuvre.
The statement said much about the war but little about Australia's 
participation in it. It claimed that no ANZUS or SEATO obligations were 
involved, so those inclined could invoke Labor's plank about not 
committing forces overseas unless subject to clear and public treaties. 
Others could reply that opposition to the commitment in Vietnam had 
never been questioned in the ALP; the problem was how to disengage.
On this the statement was open-ended. Whitlam's views clearly influenced 
the Committee. The section in the first draft on ending the war before 
withdrawing Australian troops was almost identical to his House speech 
of 28 February. The first draft reflected Whitlam's desire to shift the 
focus from Labor's vulnerable areas to civil aid programmes and the 
logistical aspects of troop withdrawal. Even the final draft enshrined 
Whitlam's goal of flexibility for governments to manoeuvre. The whole 
Committee process reflected Whitlam's attempt to avoid the electorally 
disastrous consequences of Calwell's line by changing the issue to one 
of ending the war. If pressed, Whitlam admitted that a Labor Government 
would send no more conscripts to Vietnam.But it was politically even 
safer to be 'against war'. That Whitlam's new line on Vietnam came to
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be encased in a more comprehensive, intellectually consistent foreign 
and defence policy was far less significant in the short term than that 
it lacked the electorally offensive appearance of the Calwell 
formulation of 1966.
What was the reaction of Conference? Oliver was to move for the 
adoption of the report section by section. He remembers Cairns approaching 
him before the report came on to say his position had changed. This was 
much to Oliver's chagrin, since Cairns had seemed content with the 
formulation in the Committee and had helped produce the desired unanimous 
decision. But those who believed the Committee formulation was not 
strong enough had since persuaded Cairns to help them strengthen it from 
the floor of the Conference. Closely involved in drafting the Committee 
recommendation, Cairns now drafted an amendment to it. Neil Batt of
119Tasmania moved the amendment, seconded by Brown and supported by Cairns.
119ALP, Official Reports, Commonwealth Conference and Special Conference, 
1967 and Commonwealth Conference, 1969, 72; Australian, 19 June 1967;
Fact, 11 August 1967; C.T. Oliver, interview. Colbourne also criticised 
Cairns, saying he should have produced a minority report expressing his 
real feelings. Some press reports referred to Cairns as the architect of 
the Committee report, though Lloyd, a close observer, says Cohen was 
crucial, Dixson refers to Uren and Cairns himself remembers Beazley and 
Whitlam brought drafts to the Committee. Cairns referred publicly to the 
Committee draft before the debate without expressing opposition to it.
'The aim', he said, 'is to change [Australia's] role from one of 
increasing military involvement to one of even more increasing trade aid 
and cultural associations with.a reduction of the military involvement' 
(Herald, 31 July 1967). There is evidence that the Victorian Branch and 
other party radicals, in Hartley's words, 'saw red' when they knew the 
contents of the Committee report and made sure that Cairns became a 
Victorian delegate to the Conference (ostensibly due to Brebner's illness) 
to ensure the passage of the amendment. Cairns had written most of the 
Victorian Branch Federal Conference item, which was much closer to the 
Batt amendment than to the Committee recommendation. References to a 
bombing halt, recognition of the NLF and conversion to a holding operation 
had also appeared in the May 1966 Caucus resolution but in a less definite 
context than in the Batt amendment (Advertiser, 3 August 1967; Age,
29 July, 3 August 1967; Australian, 3 August 1967; K.E. Beazley,
W.W.C. Brown, J.F. Cairns, interviews; (FT, 3 August 1967; Miriam Dixson, 
draft article, c.April 1968, Vic. Rec., Fabian Society, Country Party,
DLP, Consumers' Protection Council, Internal Controversy Replies 1966- 
1968; W.H. Hartley, part of reply to Dixson, c. April 1968, Vic. Rec., 
Cent. Exec. 1965-1968; W.H. Hartley, interview; Herald, 29 July 1967; 
C.J. Lloyd, interview; VCE 28 July 1967, ALP (Victorian Branch), State 
Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8142).
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The amendment was in the form of an addition to the Committee
recommendation. '[T]he A.L.P.', it ran,
seeks primarily to bring the war to a conclusion.
To do so, the A.L.P. on achieving office, will 
submit to our allies that they should immediately
(a) cease bombing North Vietnam
(b) recognise the National Liberation Front as a 
principal party to negotiations
(c) transform operations in South Vietnam into 
holding operations ...„
Should our allies fail to take this action, the 
Australian Government would then consider that it 
had no alternative other than to withdraw our 
armed forces ....
Another amendment, from Chamberlain, called for the unconditional
withdrawal of all Australian troops and supported the Geneva accord for
the withdrawal of all foreign troops. After only three speakers beside
the movers and seconders the time for debate expired, the Batt
amendment was put and carried, the Chamberlain amendment put and lost
and the Committee recommendation was adopted with the addition of the 
120Batt amendment.
TO 1972
The intention of the Batt amendment seems to have been to add 
positive undertakings to the vague Committee declarationjyebcuhen, printed 
as one resolution the two make an untidy document. References in the 
amendment to the lack of Australian obligations in Vietnam under ANZUS, 
SEATO or the United Nations, to the lack of a threat from China and to 
the need for civil aid overlap parts of the recommendation, making the 
complete document repetitive and loose. The first two of the 
amendment's conditions concerning the presence or withdrawal of 
Australian troops appear also in the recommendation, but as preconditions
120ALP, Official Reports, Commonwealth Conference, 1967 ..., 18. My 
emphasis.
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to creating 'an atmosphere ... in which conferences to end the war can 
take place'. There was no attempt to resolve this potential 
contradiction.
More importantly, however, the complete resolution, like the
Calwell speech of May 1965 and the Caucus resolution of May 1966,
contained shades of emphasis and scope for interpretation which was to
be fully exploited in the coming months. Interpretation commenced
almost immediately, inside and outside the party. Cairns, who had seen
the decisionmaking process from both 'sides' of the fence believed the
new policy had three main essentials: that the war was wrong and
unnecessary, that it should be ended and that Labor should fully support
the search for negotiations. This was the Cairns of the Foreign Affairs
Committee speaking. But Cairns' Victorian colleague, Bill Brown,
believed the existing policy had been strengthened, since an ALP
122Government would not allow troops to remain in Vietnam. Hartley tried 
to link an end to the war with the removal of troops, but in a rather 
different way from that earlier attempted by Whitlam:
Neither the Conference report nor the successful amendment actually 
say the amendment is an addition but the press reports show it as such, 
as does ALP, Platform, Constitution and Rules as approved by the 27th 
Commonwealth Conference, Adelaide, 1967, 32-3. However, the unsuccessful 
amendment, Chamberlain's, exactly duplicated in its first sentence the 
first sentence of the Committee recommendation, suggesting that this 
amendment, at least, was to substitute, rather than add. Of course, 
substituting, rather than adding, would have lacked majority support.
122Age, 14 August 1967. Later comments by Cairns also stressed the need 
to end the war, to influence the Americans to negotiations to this end 
and only then to seek withdrawal of Australian troops. 'No one says we 
should immediately withdraw' - but nor did Cairns stress the three 
Adelaide conditions (Australian, 12 September 1967; J.F. Cairns, 'Foreign 
Policy after Vietnam', 183; SMH, 2 February 1968). Cairns' heart may 
not have been in such remarks. He told the author that about 1967 he 
began to feel the ALP could do little worthwhile on controversial issues 
like Vietnam. He moved outside the ALP on this issue and held one 
thousand public meetings in three years (J.F. Cairns, interview).
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Basically, the new policy underpends [sic] the 
'troops out' position which we took beforehand and 
also attaches a set of meaningful foreign policy 
objectives to that statement. It cannot be argued 
other than to accept that, if the conditions 
contained in A.L.P. policy were fulfilled, the war 
would be at an end.123
The three conditions - a bombing halt, recognition of the NLF, conversion
to holding operations - had all appeared in the May 1966 Caucus
resolution as preconditions to ending the war. Now they appeared also
as conditions for the continuing presence of Australian troops. They
were parts of the May resolution that Calwell had not stressed in the
election campaign. Yet participants and party observers were acutely
aware of the events of 1966. Even Armitage, then New South Wales
Assistant Secretary, regarded the new policy as merely less extravagantly
124expressed than the Calwell line. Keeffe believed the main concern had
been to distinguish Labor from Government policy, to make clear that
Labor opposed the war, but to avoid losing votes by seeming anti-American,
especially through imposing impossible conditions on the presence of
125Australian troops in Vietnam. The Western Sun, edited by Chamberlain,
was less circumspect, printing the Batt amendment, including the
conditions, ahead of the Committee recommendation and printing the
126Chamberlain amendment without making clear that it had failed. Calwell 
believed, on the other hand, that the conditions were of only academic 
interest since the Americans would withdraw within two years anyway - or 
escalate the conflict into a nuclear war. The policy showed, Calwell
123Hartley to D.R. MacSween, 18 August 1967 , Vic. Rec., Unions A-S, S 
continued 1967. See also Fact, 11 August 1967.
124J.L. Armitage, interview.
125J.B. Keeffe, interview.
126Western Sun, August 1967, 1, 2.
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believed, 'no weakening of Labor opposition to the continuation of the
127war and Australia's participation in it'.
Outsiders and more recent observers tended to stress the new
aspects of the resolution rather than its elements of continuity. There
was, according to Albinski, 'some dilution of established practice and
policy, but less than Whitlam had sought' during his pre-Conference
manoeuvres'. The conditions, according to Millar, 'represent a
128substantial move away from Labor's previous policy'. But these 
observers and some of the participants when reminiscing, point also to 
the flexibility of a resolution which, rather than trying to choose 
between two alternative approaches to the Vietnam issue, adopted both.
'It was still too inflexible a policy for Whitlam's liking', writes
129Oakes, 'but it was one he could live with'. He could live with it 
simply because he could interpret it as he preferred while occasionally 
cocking an anxious eye at those whose interpretations differed.
'Throughout the rest of the year [1967], the leader emphasized this
decision's novelty, and the ALP traditionalists its continuity with the
130policy of Mr Calwell's days of leadership.'
Whitlam continued to concentrate on the need to end the war and 
when pressed on what Labor would do in office, he emphasised, in the
131words of one young critic, 'the conditions rather than the withdrawal'.
127Fact, 25 August 1967.
178Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy ..., 93; T.B. Millar, 
Australia's Foreign Policy, Sydney, 1968, 248-9.
129Oakes, Whitlam PM, 168.
130A.L. Burns, 'Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July-December 
1967', AJPH, 14 (April 1968), 2-3.
131Bob Catley, 'A Resilient Perspective', John Playford & Douglas 
Kirsner, ed., Australian Capitalism, Ringwood, Vic., 1972, 341. Whitlam: 
Australian, 7 August 1967; CPD H. of R. 56, 17 August 1967, 222-5; 57,
17 October, 2 November 1967, 1938-40, 2676-81.
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He was far less willing to make the connection between failure to fulfil
these conditbns (bombing halt, NLF at negotiations, holding operation)
132and troop withdrawal than were Barnard and others. During the 1967
Senate campaign Whitlam’s main planks were domestic rather than to do
with Vietnam. The latter was not ignored, but Whitlam tried to turn
the argument into one about the Government's miltarism rather than
Labor's policy. He stressed Labor's loyalty to the American alliance
and its willingness to influence America to negotiate. He used the
Adelaide conditions as ways in which the war's conduct might be changed
and the war ended rather than as conditions for withdrawal. In other
words, he stressed the first, general part of the Adelaide declaration,
the part he preferred, rather than the second, restrictive part. He
agreed the war was 'the most agonising of all the problems we face' but
he said nothing at all about withdrawal of Australian troops. That was
133'not relevant to this election', where Labor could not win office.
1B2Age, 11 September 1967 (A.D. Fraser); CPD H. of R. 56, 17, 31 August 
1967, 246, 684 (Barnard); 57, 2 November 1967, 2689-90 (Barnard), 2703- 
4 (M.D. Cross). ITT, 23 November 1967 (Daly urges Whitlam in Caucus to 
tell people where Labor stood and not to be evasive).
133E.G. Whitlam, Opening Address, 1967 Senate Election (Blacktown address), 
7-9; (media address), 6-8.Original emphasis. For short summaries of 
this election campaign: Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy ..., 94-5;
Robert Cooksey, 'Foreign Policy Review, October-December, 1967', AQ, 40,
2 (June 1968), 108; Colin A. Hughes, 'Australian Political Chronicle: 
September-December 1967 ...', 104. Other elements of the party, notably 
the VCE, were less circumspect than Whitlam. The VCE organised a 
'Vietnam mobilisation' (Fact, 6 September, 3 November 1967) and Whitlam 
complained that the initial VCE arrangements for his Victorian campaign 
concentrated upon Vietnam as a campaign issue (Whitlam to Hartley,
20 September 1967, Vic. Rec., loose in bundle of Minutes, VCEO meetings 
1967). In Parliament on the eve of the election, Whitlam had been 
reluctant to take up the challenge to debate the Government decision to 
increase the Australian force in Vietnam. He produced a press statement 
critical of the Liberals for intensifying a war to which they saw no end, 
but he persuaded Caucus not to oppose the troop increase as such 
(Australian, 18, 19 October 1967; C-M, 21 October 1967; CPD H. of R. 57, 
17, 18 October 1967, 1855-8, 1938-40; DT, 19 October 1967; Oakes,
Whitlam PM, 168-9; SMH, 18 October 1967). For press remarks on Labor's 
campaign evasiveness on Vietnam policy: Age, 23, 27 November 1967;
Australian, 24, 27 November 1967; (7T, 24, 27 November 1967; DT,
19 November 1967.
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'As you feared', wrote Hartley to Calwell, 'during the Senate
campaign we suffered further attempts to qualify our Vietnam policy
134out of existence'. Despite such comments, the parts which Whitlam 
stressed were just as much part of policy as those which hardliners 
like Hartley and Calwell cherished. Some Conference delegates had tried 
to ensure, within the limits of electoral realism (which precluded the 
unvarnished formulation of Calwell), that Whitlam would be controlled, 
but by making withdrawal of troops conditional on changes in the conduct 
of the war, they allowed Whitlam to concentrate on the wider question of 
the future of the war. Whitlam failed to defuse Labor's Vietnam policy 
at Adelaide in the way he had hoped - the adoption of the flexible and 
relatively innocuous Committee recommendation alone - but defused it 
instead by making use of the potential for interpretation of the combined 
recommendation and amendment.
Whitlam's ability to do this depended partly on his own skill as 
an interpreter, which he had displayed and perfected over two years of 
coping with policies he disliked. It partly depended also on changes 
in the environment and in the political system which on balance were 
favourable to Labor rather than its opponents becc_use skLlrecC Vietnam 
from the centre of the political stage. These changes were under way 
in 1967 and gathered strength in subsequent years. First was the British 
announcement in July 1967 that it would gradually withdraw its forces in 
South East Asia. Indications of this change had influenced Barnard's
134Hartley to Calwell, 4 December 1967, Vic. Rec., 1966, 1967, 1968 
Members Personal A to C. For Calwell at this time: SMH, 30 November,
2 December 1967.
135Liberals still attempted to paint Whitlam as 'the artful dodger' 
and to point out Labor's alleged confusion over Vietnam: Age, 17,
23 November 1967; CPD H. of R. 56, 17, 22 August 1967, 233-6, 289-91;
57, 18 October, 2 November 1967, 1925-6, 2683-7; CT, 21 November 1967.
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remarks that Labor should review its Asian policies. Then, the Tet
Offensive in Vietnam early in 1968 encouraged the United States to
gradually disengage. Australian decisionmakers, Labor and Liberal, had
little choice but to follow, but Labor found the change easier to make
136and could even claim some moral vindication. While its defence
policies were still vulnerable for their vagueness, Labor’s opponents
generally matched Whitlam's inclination to concentrate on domestic
issues. Free of much pressure, Whitlam and Barnard were able to
137continue the defusing operation begun in 1967. The 1969 Federal
election, where Labor increased its share of the vote (two party
138preferred) by 7 per cent, saw mainly domestic issues aired. Opinion
polls showed continuing and increasing public concern with domestic
issues and growing disillusionment with the war. Both trends favoured 
139Labor. With the development of the moratorium movement and the
On both these events, see Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy ..., 
166-8; Gordon Greenwood, ’The Political Debate in Australia’, Gordon 
Greenwood & Norman Harper, ed., Australia in World Affairs 1966-1970, 
Melbourne, 1974, 68-73. For samples of ALP feelings of vindication, 
see VCE 9 February 1968, ALP (Victorian Branch), State Executive 
Minutes, NLA mf G8142 and, less stridently, Whitlam, Beyond Vietnam, 13. 
Also: CPD H. of R. 58, 26 March, 2 April 1968, 471-2 (Barnard); 643-4
(Whitlam).
137Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt Australian Labor Party Attitudes ...,
190-5, says that the dominance of Whitlam and Barnard over foreign policy 
1967-72 was assisted by the lack of discussion of the subject in Caucus. 
Criticisms of government policies were general or on specific points of 
detail. The lack of authoritative statements by Caucus gave the leaders 
the opportunity to make pronouncements of their own. Other politicians 
made statements which might have taken a different tack but Whitlam's and 
Barnard's bore more weight because they were made by the Leaders. They 
also continued to reflect majority opinion in Caucus.
^~^Don Aitkin, 'The 1969 Federal Election', Politics, 5 (May 1970), 45-7; 
Alan Hughes, 'Political Review', AQ, 41, 4 (December 1969), 15-25;
Colin A. Hughes, 'Australian Political Chronicle: September-December 1969
The Commonwealth', AJPH, 16 (April 1970), 65-72.
139Aitkin, Stability and Change ..., 231-5; Albinski, Politics and 
Foreign Policy ..., 194-209; Cooksey, 'Australian Public Opinion and 
Vietnam Policy', 5-11.
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publicity given to individual cases of resistance to conscription, the
focus of activity relevant to Vietnam shifted away from conventional
politics, a development probably welcomed by Labor, which took little
or no official part in these activities. Labor hoped to compensate for
its irrelevance to many of those who demonstrated over Vietnam and
conscription by making itself attractive to the suburban middle classes
140who sought social and economic goods from governments.
Conclusion
This chapter has tried to show the importance in the making of
Australian Labor Party foreign and defence policy in the years 1966 and
1967 of ambiguity and interpretation. These are both characteristic of
what March and Olsen call ’garbage can’ processes of decisionmaking, the
subject of our HYPOTHESIS XVI. Decisions, these authors believe, 'are
fundamentally ambiguous’ since participants have differing goals, see
issues differently and have differing conceptions of the task in which
141they are jointly engaged. Thus, one could argue that Calwell in May 
1966 wanted to destroy conscription for overseas service, believed that 
was the main issue and committed himself to a crusade to achieve his goal. 
Whitlam, on the other hand, may have been most concerned with preserving 
the American alliance and protecting Labor from the consequences of
Whitlam's views about official ALP participation in demonstrations 
were contained in a letter to Chamberlain written on 18 December 1969 
(Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 168-9: 'As Leader, I have not thought 
it proper or prudent to sign statements or to appear with persons 
expressing a less complete view than our Caucus or Conference or 
presenting a different emphasis .... Members of the Party should not 
give the false and damaging impression that under a Labor Government 
foreign policy would be determined at mass meetings or by public 
petitions. For this reason I concentrate my own actions in party and 
parliamentary channels'.
141March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 25-6, 84-5.
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policies which voters might think threatened the alliance. He also 
recognised the uncertainties and complexity of Vietnam and sought, above 
all, flexibility for a future Labor Government. Someone like Beazley 
may have seen anti-Communism as the dominant consideration while others 
leaned towards anti-Americanism. Yet these men of diverse outlooks 
could join together to produce the Caucus resolution of May. Similarly, 
twelve months later, Cairns, Cohen and Uren joined Beazley, Oliver and 
Whitlam to produce a Committee recommendation which partially satisfied 
all of their differing goals. The recommendation was unfavourably 
received by/elements of the party whose more radical goals then had to 
be partially accommodated by the stiffening provided in the Batt 
amendment.
This ambiguity and scope for interpretation does not occur primarily
by chance or because of incompetent drafting. It is deliberate and
governed by the nature of the party as a coalition and by other related
and independent factors. Cairns said in 1966:
To discuss A.L.P. foreign policy, it had to be 
stated what was written in the Platform, and borne 
in mind that policy was being applied by the 
Parliamentary Party and changed and formed all the 
time. It was impossible to avoid selection and 
varying emphasis in any discussion of policy. In 
order to state written policy, selection and 
emphasis had to be used. Different people would 
be entitled to use different emphasis and 
selection.142
From one point of view, Cairns was merely stating the constitutional 
position: under rule 5(d) the Parliamentary Party implemented party
policy and established its own collective attitude on matters before
142Fact, 11 February 1966. My emphasis; original expression.
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143the Parliament, within the guidelines of the party platform. But
Cairns does not say what criteria should govern selection and emphasis.
Presumably, convenience is one criterion: a crisis in Malaysia did not
require recitation of the party’s complete foreign policy; when Labor’s
faith in the United Nations looked misplaced it could emphasise instead
its belief in alliances with large powers; when no threat seemed
imminent Labor spokesmen spoke more about civil aid than defence
preparedness. But there is a further implication in Cairns' remarks:
that, except perhaps in times of deepest peril, individual Labor
politicians and other spokesmen are entitled to express their personal
144interpretations of party resolutions. In so doing, they will be 
motivated by the same sets of influences as worked upon them when they 
tried to influence the making of the resolution itself: the goals of
the controllers of State Branches to which they owe loyalties, their 
own personal inclinations, their 'exclusive-' or 'inclusiveness', their' 
desires for compromise decisions and party unity and ther links with 
forces and influences outside the party machinery.
143ALP, Federal Platform 1965, 40. There is some confusion as to whether 
in following this rule Caucus can make new policy. Cairns says above tkctt 
policy was being 'changed and formed all the time' and it is certainly 
possible for 'critical decisions', as we defined them in chapter 1, to be 
thus made. Yet, further on in the same speech, Cairns said 'there could 
be no new formation of policy because there was no Federal Conference 
until next year'. Whitlam said: 'The relevant documents [on ALP foreign
policy] are those issued by the body which determines general policy, the 
Federal Conference of the A.L.P. and the body which advocates and 
effectuates the policy, the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party' (Whitlam, 
Beyond Vietnam, 14. My emphasis).
144There is perhaps some comparison with (1) Chifley s statements as 
Labor Prime Minister that 'Ministers speak not on behalf of the Government 
but to express their personal views. The views of the Government are 
expressed by its Leader'; (2) the Federal Executive's letter to Caucus 
members in March 1963, 'that authority to make public statements on party 
policy is the prerogative of the Party Leader and/or his Deputy and the 
appointed spokesman of the Federal Executive ...' (L.F. Crisp,
Australian National Government, Camberwell, Vic., 1970, 193n. My emphasis) 
This would mean that some interpretations carried more weight than others.
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What is loosely called 'the decisionmaking process’ actually
involves at least five processes, all of which may occur simultaneously:
the formulation and expression of the goals of sub-coalitions in
relation to the issue; the adjustment of the conflicting goals; the
registration of the temporary balance of forces in the form of a
’decision’; interpretation of the decision by the various sub-coalitions
in accordance with their own goals; implementation of the decision,
again in accordance with their own goals. Although sub-coalitions will
still pursue their own goals, it is not true to say that the decision
’means nothing’. Some of their own goals will be goals applicable to
the whole organisation. They believe the goals they pursue for their
sub-coalition will also benefit the coalition as a whole and the world
outside it. Often they are right. The most important thing to note
about these processes is that they are rarely, if ever, sequential.
Lindblom points out that goals are continually modified during the
process of adjustment. Allison reminds us that participants are both
encumbered and assisted by their differing interpretations of events
during the decisionmaking process and of the decision itself. Rommetveit
and March and Olsen suggest that the registration of decisions provides
145only a temporary respite from the political process in organisations.
We have been unable to say much about implementation of either state aid 
or Vietnam policy since Labor remained in opposition in Canberra for 
much of the period studied. Implementation of decisions, of course, 
requires interpretation of them. Yet, the unity ticket case study 
provided a good example of how the implementation process, enforcement 
of the unity ticket ban, was influenced by the same sets of factors as 
influenced the making of decisions: the goals of State Branches, the
145See above pp.284-9.
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fear of splitting the party, the resentment of outside pressure and 
the ambivalent relationship with the DLP, to name just a few. In the 
state aid case study, too, there was much conflicting interpretation.
What did ’fringe benefits' mean? Did the Surfers Paradise decision of 
July 1966 merely remove prohibitions against granting direct aid, 
specify a particular type of direct aid and preclude others or prevent 
further action without another Conference decision? To whom in the 
party did it apply? Could State Branches phase out direct aid?
The proportions of expression, adjustment, registration, 
interpretation and implementation will vary from issue to issue. Where 
an issue has been well-traversed in the past and positions are little 
altered and well enough known, there will be less expression of the 
goals of sub-coalitions. There will always be some adjustment to modify 
conflicting goals (without conflicting goals there is no politics) and 
achieve a majority or unanimous decision. But the intensity of the 
adjusting process will depend on the importance of the issue to the 
participants, the width of the differences between them and the sheer 
numbers of participants to be reconciled. Three decisionmakers will 
obviously spend less time quibbling over one minor word in a press 
release than will six State Branches, a Parliamentary Caucus, the Federal 
Executive, proud individuals and powerful outsiders over a party policy 
which has caused great bitterness in the past and involves the 
disbursement of great amounts of money in the future - unless the three 
have become so embittered by past encounters that even the smalle^b 
skirmishes become battles. Most decisions in most organisations are 
routine, the application to cases of general decisions. Few of these 
w»‘H involve registration of a political struggle, except where the issue
remains controversial in the organisation. Thus, the many unity ticket
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decisions applying the ban in individual cases registered the current 
state of the internal debate on unity tickets as well as deciding upon 
the facts of the cases. While unity tickets remained of deep interest 
to many sub-coalitions it could not be otherwise. Similarly, the state 
of the complex battle over state aid was registered many times between 
1957 and 1966, the decisions interpreted, goals modified and new periods 
of adjustment commenced.
In the light of these general considerations the ambiguity and 
interpretation prevalent in our study of foreign policy may be further 
examined. Ambiguity has been highlighted at the expense of other 
characteristics which have been covered in other chapters. Although 
there are less decisions on Vietnam policy than there were on state aid 
and unity tickets, it is still possible to identify elements of 
incrementalism (HYPOTHESIS XV) in the Vietnam resolutions of 1965, 1966 
and 1967. References to the need for a negotiated settlement, for a 
United Nations role, for civil aid, for free elections in South Vietnam 
were common to all of them. There were no sudden changes of policy or 
wholesale jettisoning of planks while they still carried some members of 
the party coalition. Solutions became attached to different problems as 
the balance of forces in the party and the conditions of the war changed. 
Three pieces of advice to the United States on how to conduct the war and 
seek peace (cease bombing, convert to a holding operation, admit the NLF 
to peace negotiations), became also conditions governing the presence of 
Australian troops in Vietnam. The July 1967 Federal Conference 
resolution was another incrementalist bite at the problem, as ho-ci been, the 
May 1966 Caucus resolution and Calwell’s speech of May 1965, as 
endorsed by the 1965 Federal Conference.
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Similarly, we could have searched for more evidence of a process
1 A 6of partisan mutual adjustment (HYPOTHESIS XIV).~ The party was united 
behind opposition to the decision of April 1965 to send troops to 
Vietnam. The diverse sub-coalitions could agree on this if on little 
else. In 1966, opposition to conscripts being part of the force was 
the common ground. In both cases, the common ground was provided as 
much by Labor traditions as by an identifiable process, but we know that 
the details of Calwell's speech of May 1965 and of the Caucus resolution 
underwent some process. Cairns ensured that the speech contained the 
formula ’we shall do our best to have that decision reversed' and more 
radical elements of the party seized upon these words. Without that 
formula, Calwell's speech would not have received Federal Executive and 
Conference endorsement. The following year, Calwell, members of Caucus 
and the influence of the metropolitan press, helped produce a Caucus 
resolution which made concessions to all major viewpoints within the 
party and which, consequently, was supported by all parts of the party.
In 1967, the Foreign Affairs Committee recommendation received the 
support of all members of the Committee, at least for the time being.
Yet, by itself, it was unsatisfactory to a section of the Federal 
Conference, although probably not to a majority of delegates. Since it 
was more important to present a united front than to adopt the Committee 
recommendation against vocal opposition, the amendment was added. 
Chamberlain's alternative was unable even to attract Victorian support. 
Once the Committee recommendation, plus Batt's amendment, was adopted 
the interpretation process continued. Adopting both recommendation and 
amendment, rather than one or the other, merely provided more
IÄ6See above, note 34.
342
interpretative by-ways for Labor spokesmen to wander into in the coming 
months. Interpretation would have occurred in any case, because it was 
inseparable from the decisionmaking processes of the party.
All these details serve to support HYPOTHESIS XVI; ambiguity of 
decisions is a characteristic of decisions made through the process of 
the garbage can. Ambiguity provides scope for interpretation and we 
have traced a process of interpretation of foreign policy decisions over 
two years of Labor’s history. What of the other characteristics included 
by March and Olsen? They refer, for instance, to 'ambiguity of 
organisation', the variable participation of individuals in the 
organisation from decision opportunity to decision opportunity and from 
time to time during the making of any one decision. Time is scarce and 
decisionmakers have many responsibilities, both inside the party and 
outside it. They move from decision opportunity to decision opportunity 
depending partly upon the claims on their time and, secondly, partly on 
the features of each decision opportunity, that is, what the decision, 
when it is made, is supposed to be 'about'. In this case, decisions 
were supposed to be about foreign and defence policy. March and Olsen, 
indeed, suggest that the first factor will be more important than the 
second. 'Substantial variation in attention stems from other demands on 
the participants' time (rather than from features of the decision under 
study). ' ^ ^
There are reasons to believe, nevertheless, that the content of the 
decisions in the case, at least, strongly influenced patterns of 
participation. Foreign and defence policy was not a major interest of 
most Federal Executive and Federal Conference members. While most
147March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 47.
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delegates possessed generalised opinions about issues in this area,
even if they lacked detailed knowledge, translating these preferences
into party policy was less important for most of them than were domestic
matters. The union officials and State Branch office holders who made
up the bulk of non-politician delegates had always been more interested
in industrial, social and economic matters. Even Federal politicians
who became Conference delegates enjoyed relatively few opportunities for
Parliamentary debate on non-domestic matters. To a large extent, this
lack of interest in the world outside Australia reflected community
148feeling in the 1950s and early 1960s.
At times of crisis, however, such as the Vietnam War_community and
party interest in Australia’s environment grew. Although domestic issues
were still important to more voters, Labor could not avoid interest in
the world outside. Its Federal bodies had to produce, in March and
Olsen's words, 'something that could be called a decision '. In foreign
policy matters, these decisions were often made without the lengthy
debates and intense lobbying sessions which preceded those on, say,
state aid and unity tickets. There were differences over foreign policy.
Oliver was preoccupied with China. Chamberlain was appalled by all war,
149even against Communists, and by militarism. McNolty was deeply committed
148Calwell said in 1959 that 'the result of elections will continue to be 
decided in this country on the state of the economy and other domestic 
issues', unless the voters feared war was imminent (Arthur Calwell, The 
Australian Labor Party and Foreign Policy, Melbourne, 1959, 20). See 
also: Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy ..., 3-11, 27-30; Australian,
30 April 1966; Colin A. Hughes & John S. Western, The Prime Minister's 
Policy Speech, Canberra, 1966, 166, 169.
149F.E. Chamberlain, interview; F.E. Chamberlain, NLA interview 
transcripts, 1:1/11-15, 2/9-11; Western Sun, August 1967, 4. Chamberlain 
was court-martialled in 1919 for overstaying leave after the war had 
ended. He was gaoled for two months. Later, he had qualms about joining 
the Tramways in Perth because it required wearing a uniform.
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to the peace movement long before Vietnam. There were great differences 
over Vietnam between State Branches, especially Victoria and New South 
Wales. If a battle had been joined it might have been bitter. Some have 
suggested or implied these differences were part of the reason for 
avoiding the issue within the party. Greenwood suggests that divisions 
in the Labour movement were heightened 'not because of any unwillingness 
to oppose Australian intervention but because of disagreement about the 
tactics to be pursued, the forms of protest to be adopted, and the likely 
impact of these upon the American relationship'. Whitlam himself is 
said to have remarked to the Caucus late in 1968: 'If we can survive an
issue like this, it is difficult to see how any other issue could divide 
the party during the next 12 months
Different interpretations of decisions allowed battle not to be 
joined. As long as resolutions were broad enough or contained enough 
parts and as long as no one tried to impose his own interpretation 
exclusively, the parts of the party could co-exist. Since politicians 
were more interested in foreign policy than were non-politicians they 
did most of the interpreting. Yet even among politicians, while 
differences may have been wide, they were often not intensely felt. If 
they had been, interpretation could not have been so flexible. If 
foreign policy had been a 'prize' of internal political battles as state 
aid policy had been, the winners of the battle would have been far less 
inclined to allow the losers leeway.
March and Olsen also suggest that individuals will tend not to 
participate in decisions if they believe their participation will make
~^~^ Age, 17 February 1969; Gordon Greenwood, 'The Political Debate in 
Australia', 87.
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little difference to the outcome. This has some relevance to 
foreign policy, where many of the causal factors are outside the 
control of Opposition party decisionmakers. The environment changes 
largely without their intervention. Federal delegates could recognise 
the need for flexibility in foreign policy. In practice, this meant 
leaving scope in resolutions for future Labor Governments to interpret 
policy in accord with changes in circumstances between Federal 
Conferences. Calwell's interpretations were probably more congenial 
to the majority of the Federal Executive than were Whitlam's, but 
once Whitlam became Leader, the curbs on his ability to interpret 
came not so much from Federal Executive as such as from a combination 
of his opponents in Caucus, individual members of Executive and 
Conference, the residual influence of Calwell and the influences of 
other strands of Labor tradition than the ones he was trying to 
emphasise (independence rather than alliances, support for nationalist 
movements rather than defence preparedness). His opponents felt the 
pressures of the electorate, especially the continuing loyalty to the 
American link, almost as much as did Whitlam. While welcoming the 
vindication they saw in the United States' turning towards peace and 
Vietnamisation, they also might have recognised the correctness of 
Whitlam's warnings about closing off options.
The above points lead us to consider, finally, whether decisions 
in this case study became garbage cans in the same sense as in the 
previous chapter. Did decisions ostensibly about 'Vietnam' and 
'conscription' see the linking together of problems and solutions 
extraneous to these two issues? Will allowing real responsibility
^“*Hlarch & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 46.
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in a policy area to shift to 'interpreting' politicians prevent 
extraneous matters in the internal party battle attaching 
themselves?
The evidence in this study suggests foreign policy garbage cans, 
that is, decision opportunities regarding foreign policy, attracted 
less extraneous matter than did decision opportunities in other areas. 
While some garbage can processes, notably the production of 
ambiguities, did occur, others did not - at least, not frequently.
This may have occurred in this case, first, because there was little 
room for disagreement over these decisions within the party. Once 
the minimal united oppositions to conscription and expeditionary 
forces had been established, differences turned on details. As long
as these differences were not pursued so as to threaten the basic
\
policy (qualifying it out of existence) and thus involve the mass of 
Caucus who had supported it, key participants were few. Interpretation 
was the focus of activity, not decisionmaking itself. The great mass 
of Caucus repeated formulae established by those of the foreign policy 
opinion leaders whose interpretations they preferred. Executives and 
Conferences concurred. Where a broad policy was relatively settled 
and the party was basically united, there was less scope for 
extraneities to intrude.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there were relatively few 
garbage cans or opportunities for attaching problems and solutions to 
decisions. Throughout this chapter we have tried to stress that the 
crucial point in policymaking on foreign and defence policy from 1964 on 
was the interpretation by relatively few actors, mostly Caucus leaders, 
of Caucus and Conference statements made at infrequent intervals. If, 
for example, the Federal Executive at its seven meetings (an unusually
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high number) during 1966 had taken time from its discussion of other 
matters to make decisions on foreign policy, one might reasonably 
assume that the way members decided on foreign policy matters would 
have been influenced by their feelings on the subjects they had just 
put down. Problems arising in connection with state aid might have 
found solutions in decisions on foreign policy. Calwell’s desire to 
prevent Whit lam succeeding him, which had left the state aid garbage can, 
might have attached itself to the solution of expulsion of the Deputy 
Leader via a foreign policy which disallowed the sort of interpretation 
Whitlam was trying to place on the May Caucus resolution. This did not 
occur. Even after the Adelaide Conference, when delegates had had 
plenty of time to see the trouble interpretation was causing Labor, they 
still passed a resolution which provided rich ground for interpretation.
To summarise: we have been concerned with two characteristics of
a garbage can model of organisational decisionmaking. Much of the 
chapter has provided support for the existence of one characteristic, 
namely, the ambiguity of decisions and their capacity for interpretation. 
But the last few paragraphs have advanced reasons why another garbage 
can characteristic, the tendency for decision opportunities to attract 
problems and solutions related to subjects other than the ostensible 
subject of the decision, is less likely to be present in foreign policy 
case studies than, say, in chapter 3. Most problems and solutions 
dumped in 1966 and 1967 in garbage cans labelled ’foreign policy’ were 
related to foreign policy.
There were a number of reasons why Vietnam and conscription decisions 
did not become garbage cans in this second sense. To put these reasons 
in context we can suggest that differences over foreign and defence policy 
have not tended to be a basis for factional division in the ALP. The
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most notable exceptions were the conscription split of 1916-17 and 
perhaps the divisions over the same subject in 1942-43. We have already 
suggested that most Labor decisionmakers in our period were not very 
interested, in normal circumstances, in foreign affairs. When required 
to be by pressures of the environment, they reacted according to a 
combination of innate general feelings (the threat from the North, 
opposition to conscription and expeditionary forces, disarmament, peace, 
the American alliance - in combination or separately, depending on the 
person and the situation) and deference to individual opinion leaders in 
the party, who seemed to know something about the details of the issue. 
Rawson has written:
Foreign policy for the A.L.P. often has a symbolic 
rather than a substantive importance. Foreign 
policy serves to rationalise the divisions of the 
party into conflicting groups which may in fact 
not be very interested in the issues as such, or, 
more likely still, regard the amount of freedom 
to manoeuvre open to any Australian Government in 
a crisis as very limited indeed .... Consequently 
they debate foreign policy questions quite 
genuinely but without really feeling great 
commitment to the results. Any real change in 
external circumstances is likely to see one or 
both sides modify their policies without much 
ceremony.16 2
Foreign policy stances were often not deeply thought out. They 
followed the general orientation of the sub-coalition which produced 
them. For instance, State Branches like New South Wales, which saw the 
winning and retaining of government as the highest goal, preferred a 
policy which would lead to electoral success and was flexibly designed 
for the benefit of the politicians who would have to administer it. A 
Branch like Victoria, which saw itself as protecting certain principles 
against siege, was worried less about votes and more about foreign
152D.W. Rawson, 'Foreign Policy and the Political Parties', 34.
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policies which were an expression of its principles. While differences
over foreign policy did lead to formations differing in significant ways
from those over other policy issues or those formed by State or
personal loyalties, they were less fundamental than these. Further,
because foreign policy interest was intermittent, attitudes to foreign
policy were less central than other policy attitudes. For most
policymakers in the ALP during this time, foreign policy views derived
from previously existing stances and loyalties. Real consideration of
the merits of alternative foreign policy was reflected in differences in
interpretation between a small number of relatively well-informed or
committed activists and in infrequent and short-term jousts at Committees
and Conferences, notably in 1967. It is possible to say that there was
consistency of positions over a number of issues, that there were
individuals who could be classified, for example, as at once Whitlam
supporters, from New South Wales, pro-state aid, in favour of reform of
153the organisation and moderate in foreign policy. But it is also true 
that the foreign policy attitude would usually be last in the queue,
J.M. Wheeldon, interview. Note also Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt 
Australian Labor Party Attitudes ..., 69: 'If a member [of Caucus]
supported reform [of the party] he tended also to support Whitlam's bid 
for Leadership, his attitudes on foreign policy and aid to independent 
schools'. But note elsewhere (79-80) that Beazley points out that the 
majority of Caucus voted against Whitlam in the Leadership spill of 
April 1966 while it probably supported his attacks on the Federal 
Executive. Incidentally, if one extended the idea of the garbage can 
beyond the four components of decision opportunities, participants, 
problems and solutions to include influence by general orientations (as 
described above), the case of ALP foreign policy could be covered: 
participants would be influenced by the attitudes they carried to the 
garbage can. Writers like Allison point out that participants are 
influenced regarding issues by orientations derived from participation in 
other decisions, but March and Olsen are less explicit on this point. 
Obviously, participants will be influenced by their pre-existing attitudes 
but since March and Olsen see participants primarily as bearers of 
problems and solutions, the evidence here goes to suggest a possible 
addition to the concept rather than to support it in its present form.
See also the following note.
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the one dormant for the longest periods, the one least thought out and 
most easily modified.
Finally, if foreign policy was like this for most actors did it 
sometimes tend to be decided by default, to be thrown into garbage cans 
with other labels? If a policy area is not central for most actors will 
it sometimes, rather than being the outcome of pulling and hauling 
between those who are interested, become the by-product of decisions on 
more important areas? To a large extent, the same negative answers 
apply. To take again the Executive meetings in 1966, during the height 
of the Vietnam issue in Australia and the middle of the period in Labor 
history in the 1950s and 1960s when more major issues were in flux than 
at any other, the substance of foreign policy was not drawn into the Happeo.- 
i'nqs e-Yu the Federal bodies. The undoubted ability of these bodies to 
impose restraints on politicians regarding policy was not invoked 
against Whitlam, the centre of these complex events, as he ranged more 
and more widely in his efforts to interpret policy on Vietnam. The 
Federal bodies did not put foreign policy labels on garbage cans (nor 
did the Caucus on the central foreign policy issues after May 1966 except to 
reaffirm the decision of that month) nor did they attempt to place foreign 
policy problems and solutions in cans with other labels. Policy over 
Vietnam and conscription was made and interpreted in a largely separate 
channel.^  ^
154Kim C. Beazley's thesis promises to consider the effects on foreign 
policy of 'intra-party, factional disputes and concerns for the Party's 
electoral success [and] it is argued that these ... considerations were as 
significant an influence on determining A.L.P. policy on the American 
alliance, as perceived threats to Australian security and the requisite 
means of dealing with them' (Kim C. Beazley, Post-Evatt, Australian Labor 
Party Attitudes ..., abstract. My emphasis). The thesis is stronger on 
showing the differing attitudes to foreign policy matters between the 
'Left' and the 'Right' in Caucus than it is on the connections between 
these and 'factional disputes'. Beazley's analysis is consistent with 
the idea that attitudes to foreign policy matters follow alignments based 
on domestic and non-policy considerations, although most of his thesis
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154 (continued)
is about the factional opinion formers on foreign policy, the Whitlams, 
Calwells, Barnards and Beazleys, rather than the followers. It is 
possible to argue, as I do, that general approaches to foreign policy 
are established in this way but that decisions on foreign policy do 
not attract extraneous problems and solutions and, vice versa, that 
major foreign policy problems and solutions are not attached to non- 
foreign policy decisions. Beazley does not devote enough consideration 
to the connection, if any, between factional disputes (state aid? 
Victoria versus NSW? Caucus versus Federal Executive? Whitlamites 
versus Calwellites?) and foreign policy for us to establish if he 
would wish to argue a different line to that above. He does point out, 
rightly, (22): ’Victory on a particular policy matter carried with it
evidence of factional dominance of an aspect of Party activity', but 
the factions he refers to are defined in terms of attitudes to foreign 
policy alone.
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Chapter 5: By-passing
This chapter generalises about how the Australian Labor Party made 
critical decisions during the years after 1955. It extracts three 
related types of problems which the case studies reveal and then shows 
a number of attempts to solve these problems. The final chapter will 
suggest that, while some of these solutions enjoyed fair success in 
their own terms, none of them provided a long term solution to the 
problems revealed. They showed, instead, that the party required a new 
synthesis in its approach to decisionmaking.
How Labor Made Decisions
In the first chapter of this thesis thirteen hypotheses were 
presented. Five (HYPOTHESES I-V) related to internal strivings in pursuit 
of State Branch goals, personal preferences, exclusive or inclusive 
approaches, coalition unity and compromise decisions. Eight (HYPOTHESES 
VI-XIII) referred to the influence of external forces - affiliated unions, 
environmental changes and the actions of other parts of the political 
system. There has been no attempt in subsequent chapters to find support 
for every hypothesis in every decision made. If the thirteen hypotheses 
provided an inventory of likely influences on decisions, each decision 
has been studied in terms of which influences seemed to have been 
most important on it. In most cases multiple influences have been 
discernible, so that one decision could have provided support for a 
number of hypotheses, but limitations of space have compelled sketchy 
presentation of some less important influences for the sake of expanding 
upon those that seemed more crucial. There was little point, for 
example, in delving in the history of Labor and state aid for support for
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HYPOTHESIS VIII about relations with Communists, when the history 
provided ample support instead for hypotheses about State Branch goals, 
personal preferences of decisionmakers, the balance between inclusive and 
exclusive approaches, the influence of the Catholic church and the actions 
of the Federal Liberal Government. On the other hand, the unity ticket 
issue yielded, with very little delving, evidence to support almost all of 
the thirteen hypotheses. Again, the foreign policy case study could be 
told in terms of relations between environmental changes, government acticn, 
electoral response and the response, in turn, of Labor decisionmakers.
Given the limitations of the case study approach, it is still 
possible to make some generalisations about the way in which influences 
like those summarised in HYPOTHESES I to XIII are likely to affect 
organisational decisionmaking. There seem to be two ways in which sources 
of potential influence differ in relation to decisions on particular 
issues. They differ in their interest in the issue and thus in their 
interest in the decision upon it and they differ, secondly, in their 
access to the decisionmaking machinery. In chapter 4 it was suggested 
that participation in decisionmaking on foreign affairs issues depended 
partly on interest in the issues and the value placed by potential 
participants on a decision which accorded with their goals. Members of 
Parliament seeking a realistic and electorally popular policy played more 
part than did trade union officials pursuing the interests of their 
members in economic security and industrial conditions. Interest in the 
issue seems generally relevant, however, to all the external pressures 
enumerated in HYPOTHESES VI to XIII. The contents of issues activated 
pressure from some of these sources in some cases but not in others.
Many trade union officials, not themselves party officials, were deeply 
interested in the party's attitude to unity tickets involving their own
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members but they cared little about state aid. The Catholic church's 
interest in issues involving Communism was maintained throughout the 
period (although more intensely in Victoria than in New South Wales) 
though its desire to pressure the ALP declined somewhat after the 
Liberals began providing state, aid. The media was always interested in 
Labor activities, partly because the desire of party participants to 
disseminate their own version of events provided journalists with easy 
copy. But media coverage varied according to the news value of different 
issues and the compatibility of Labor decisionmakers with the news source. 
Whitlam's activities received more favourable coverage than Calwell's 
because he seemed more acceptable to the 'modem' society Australia had 
become, to its newspaper readers and television watchers and to the 
younger and better-educated journalists who gathered the news. Calwell's 
attractive qualities belonged to a past age. A party dominated by 
Parliamentarians like Whitlam was more attractive than one which made 
deals in back rooms and used people like Calwell as mouth-pieces.
Finally, the non-Labor parties found different amounts of political 
profit in pursuit of Labor on different issues. Unity tickets and foreign 
policy provided opportunity to attack Labor for Communist influence; in 
state aid there came to be more profit in the non-Labor parties offering 
aid themselves than in attacking Labor. HYPOTHESIS XIII, about the 
influence of the non-Labor forces on Labor decisions, is relevant to 
Chapter 4 because the ALP often felt constrained to match Liberal offers, 
not because the Liberals spent an inordinate amount of time attacking 
Labor for failing to offer direct aid.
Interest seems a less relevant concept when looking at the internal 
strivings encapsulated in HYPOTHESES I to V_. In a sense, some of these
strivings are 'givens' or 'constants'. Delegates elected to Federal
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Executive and Conference from State Branches will always tend to see 
things in terms of State Branch interests unless other interests 
intervene. In practice, the subjects of the hypotheses to do with 
strivings as individuals or groups, in pursuit of personal goals, 
principles or votes, party unity and compromise decisions, will be 
mixed with the goals predicated by delegates’ formal status as Branch 
representatives. In the case of politicians like Whitlam, Bryant,
Calwell, Cairns, Beazley and others, State Branch loyalties were less 
important, other influences correspondingly stronger. It is difficult 
to distinguish between the first, ’internal’ set of hypotheses and the 
second, 'external' set in terms of which is most likely to be supported 
by any case study. All of our case studies provided evidence for the 
first five hypotheses: delegates pursued different State Branch goals;
they were influenced by their personal preferences and relationships; 
they made different judgments of the desirable balance between inclusive 
and exclusive approaches; they tried to maintain the unity of the party 
and they sought compromise. The second set of hypotheses, on the other 
hand, are best seen as an inventory of possible external influences 
likely to be triggered by the content of the issue at hand. They may 
not be supported by every case study but they provide a reasonably 
comprehensive list of influences which might figure in a number of case 
studies. Each finds some support in at least one of the case studies in 
the previous three chapters. It is hard to imagine a decision which 
could be made without at least some external influences; indeed, we 
have defined 'critical decisions’, the object of our interest, as those 
which show evidence of both internal strivings and external pressures.
From one point of view, the 'external pressures' encapsulated in 
HYPOTHESES VI to XIII might seem assured of influence over party decisions
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only if they could impress their case on the individuals who had formal 
power-to make the party’s decisions, that is, in these cases, the 
members of Federal Conference, Executive and Caucus. In a formal sense 
this is true. Viewed narrowly, the 'life' of a political party is the 
interaction of individuals in positions. Taking a broader view, we have 
tried to discover some of the external influences which might have 
affected office holders, whether they liked it or not. The factor 
which determines whether external influences will affect decisions is 
access, the ability of influences to gain entry to the decisionmaking 
process in relation to a particular decision. In chapter 4, it was 
observed that certain decisionmakers, notably members of the Federal 
Executive, who had access, who, indeed, were in the most central of all 
decisionmaking positions, tended to forego direct participation in 
foreign policy decisions, partly because of lack of interest, partly 
because of lack of time and partly, at least in 1966, because they felt 
that the political leader to whom they had ceded power was making much 
the same decisions as they would have made themselves. The State 
Branches, too, also had automatic access because they were formally 
represented on Federal bodies. How well they used it depended on the 
resources they brought with them. Most Federal and many State 
politicians, even if not formally represented, could also expect to be 
listened to. The desire for unity and the search for compromise 
decisions, while not concrete entities like politicians or Branches, 
seemed to be ubiquitous and in that sense, they, too, had 'access' to 
the making of critical decisions.
External influences were in a different position. The affiliated 
trade unions, because of the party's financial dependence upon them, 
were most assured of access. When they spoke, party decisionmakers
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tried to listen and found their voices difficult to ignore. Party 
decisionmakers always took notice of what the media said about them, 
even if they did so with a bad grace, because they knew voters were 
influenced by the media. Media access was assured if not welcomed. 
Similarly, the actions of the Liberal Government. Oppositions spend 
a lot of time reacting to governments and know from experience the 
extent to which governments set the tone of political debate. Events 
in the environment, too, can often be little affected by oppositions 
but their effects are felt, nevertheless. Catholics and the DLP found 
access more difficult. When the Catholic vote seemed to be drifting 
away or when DLP preferences were keeping Labor out of office, Catholic, 
views and activities could not be ignored. But the lingering memories 
of the Split made it difficult, if not painful, for many to woo these 
sources of pressure and support. As time passed, resistance to these 
influences lessened; they were given access in the sense that their 
demands, notably for state aid and for a more pro-Western foreign 
policy, were catered for and their votes generally sought, even if 
their influences as blocs had tended to decline in any case. Of those 
influences summarised in the second set of hypotheses, only the Communists 
still failed to be wooed by any significant part of the ALP. While they 
had access in the sense of belonging to affiliated unions and through 
personal associations with ALP decisionmakers in peace movements and 
other bodies, even in 1972 the anti-Communist environment of Australia 
made it dangerous for a moderate party to be seen to be consciously 
attracting Communist allies.
These, then, were the first two sets of hypotheses, differing in 
interest and access according to the issue, the time and the attitudes 
of decisionmakers. A third set of hypotheses (HYPOTHESES XIV-XVI),
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drawn from the study of organisations other than political parties, 
brought together a number of ways in which the combined influences in 
the earlier hypotheses might affect ’how Labor made decisions TK« third.setoF 
hypotheses introduced the concepts of partisan mutual adjustment and 
disjointed incrementalism and the set of characteristics labelled 
'garbage can processes'. We saw these three concepts as referring to 
ways in which party decisionmakers tried to reconcile the conflicting 
external and internal influences in a decision-situation in order'to 
produce a decision bearing the name of the organisation. Again, space 
and simplicity of presentation has meant that not every example in 
support of each hypothesis has been treated in detail but chapters 2,
3 and 4 have provided instances of all three ways of making decisions.
Let us now make some general conclusions about these decisionmaking 
'methods' in the light of the case study evidence.
THE SEARCH FOR COMPROMISE THROUGH A PROCESS OF PARTISAN MUTUAL ADJUSTMENT 
HYPOTHESIS V suggested, on the basis of the stress on 'unity' and 
'solidarity' in party rhetoric, the attempts at balanced State Executives 
and, especially, the remarks of decisionmakers themselves, that critical 
decisions would reveal a search for a compromise between the goals of 
sub-coalitions. Decisionmakers would strive for an outcome that made 
concessions to a number of sub-coalitions, with the knowledge that 
failure to do so might threaten the unity of the coalition (HYPOTHESIS IV). 
Partisan mutual adjustment requires that one proposal should satisfice 
the goals of a number of decisionmakers. The foreign policy chapter 
provided a number of instances of interpretation of ambiguous decisions 
according to diverse goals. The unity ticket chapter showed how the 
Victorians were allowed to 'enforce' the unity ticket policy so as to
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nullify it. The approach to Commonwealth finance for education in 1963
allowed the sinking of differences between state aiders, anti-state
aiders and those who wanted a completely new approach to education. In
these and other cases decisionmakers sought to encompass diverse goals,
even if this required that some sub-coalitional goals should be foregone.
Partisan mutual adjustment facilitates compromise decisions.
Nevertheless, a problem arises in the search for compromise by
partisan mutual adjustment. 'The Labour Movement’, wrote a Federal
Caucus member in 1966, 'is to a strange degree, not pre-occupied with
votes, but largely with formulae to resolve differences'. Beazley
complained that the party was so concerned with looking for compromises
to ensure its survival more or less in one piece that it neglected to
produce vote-winning policies.'*' 'Whatever else organizations seek, they 
2seek to survive'. Unless they maintain themselves, organisations, 
including political parties, will not achieve the goals of their members. 
'This strain toward survival may even on occasion lead to the neglect or 
distortion of the organization's goals' as it is reduced to 'cumulative, 
unplanned adaptive responses to threats to the equilibrium of the system
3as a whole'. In other words, a political party facing successive crises 
will often seek first to minimise the effect of these crises on its 
internal stability. Other goals, especially the policies which the 
party hopes to implement in government, are not ignored but suffer an
Kim E. Beazley, 'Labour and Foreign Policy', AO, 20 (August 1966), 132.
2James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations, New York, 1973, 10.
3Alvin W. Gouldner, 'Organizational Analysis', Robert K. Merton, Leonard 
Broom & Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., ed., Sociology Today, New York, 1959, 
405. See also on the general phenomenon of 'goal displacement':
Richard M. Cyert & Kenneth R. MacCrimmon, 'Organizations', Gardner 
Lindzey & Elliot Aronson, ed., The Handbook of Social Psychology 
Volume One, Reading, Mass., 1968, 574-5.
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eclipse. Voters search vainly in party pronouncements for a guide to 
its likely actions in government. The party rank and file lack the 
rallying point of coherent policies. Party decisionmakers may be able 
to co-exist with ambiguous decisions (designed for that very purpose) 
but must suffer external criticism of Labor's equivocations and internal 
contradictions. Decisions register the state of play between sub­
coalitions searching for common ground more than they express the 
collective wisdom of the party.
This tendency affects the ability of the ALP to present policies 
to the voters at periodic elections. But there are some qualifications 
to the relevance of the partisan mutual adjustment concept and to the 
ubiquity of the search for compromise. The possibility of compromise 
depends on some goals being negotiable. 'If leaders agreed on everything 
they would have no need to bargain, if on nothing, they could not bargain. 
Leaders bargain because they disagree and expect that further agreement 
is possible and will be profitable . . . . ' ~* Decisionmakers have sets of 
goals which are ranked roughly in order of priority, from those which 
can be foregone completely, through those that can be modified (partisan 
mutual adjustment involves the adjustment of goals during the process) 
to those that will be defended at all costs. Disagreement on the third 
set of goals will persist through the process, as one sub-coalition
Gouldner points out that parts of the organisation may concentrate on 
survival while other parts pursue other goals. James G. March & Johan 
P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, Bergen, 1976, 16, 
provide the best short summary: '[T]he formal decision-making process
sometimes is directly connected to the maintenance or change of the 
organization as a social unit as well as to the accomplishment of making 
collective decisions and producing substantive results'. (My emphasis).
^Robert A. Dahl & Charles A. Lindblora, Politics, Economics and Welfare, 
New York, 1953, 326. For the relationship between the term 'bargaining' 
and 'partisan mutual adjustment', see my chapter 2, d p .154-7. Lindblom 
developed the latter from the former and we have argued in chapter 2 
that the latter comprehends the former.
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resists persuasion from other sub-coalitions. Brown, the Victorian
Federal delegate, remembered: 'if you got to a position that was
fairly near to your own State position you'd tend to settle for it,
£
provided the basic principles of the State line were protected'.
This qualification is inherent in the idea of compromise, but it 
appears from the cases that pressure on a sub-coalition to compromise, 
to adjust its goals to achieve a mutually acceptable decision, may 
actually lead it to take other means to protect its basic goals.
Pressure may ultimately reduce the area where compromise is possible. 
Three examples will suffice. First, the Victorian Branch, party to the 
unity ticket compromise of rhetorical opposition to unity tickets but 
flexible enforcement, had come under the control by 1962 of a group of 
militant unions, who did not look unkindly on unity tickets and defended 
the independence of unions, especially militant ones. Strong Victorian 
enforcement of unity ticket policy was less likely after 1962, even in 
the absence then of significant Federal pressure, partly because of the 
consolidation of Victorian resistance under earlier Federal pressure. 
Secondly, in the state aid case studies, the defenders of the principle 
of 1957 twice consolidated their defence in the face of pressure for 
Labor to concede direct aid. The 1963 Federal Conference, while making 
concessions in related fields, restated the 1957 principle in a way 
intended by the defenders to strengthen it. Then, in February 1966, the
W.W.C. Brown, interview. Brown reminds us that some delegates had 
binding instructions from their State Branch not to concede more than a 
certain amount; i.e. they were bound to a certain line if not to a 
certain specific decision of their own Branch. The strictness of this 
binding may have depended on individual delegates. K.E. Beazley 
(interview) recalls that Chamberlain sometimes argued that bound 
delegates had the authority to support only the State Branch resolution 
exactly as it had been passed at State level. If they could not achieve 
all that the State wanted, they could not support any amendments 
(proposed during a process of partisan mutual adjustment).
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Federal Executive majority tried, most notably through the legal 
examination resolution, to halt Labor’s hesitant movement towards 
granting direct aid. Thirdly, those who favoured state aid, centred 
in the New South Wales Branch, reacted to pressure to desist, 
especially after the loss of power in New South Wales in May 1965, 
with more strident demands for direct aid. Their aim was as much to 
promote the long-term, fundamental goal of establishing and maintaining 
Labor Governments in Sydney as it was justice for non-state education. 
Again, pressure led to consolidation.
In all three cases, consolidation of one goal still was accompanied 
by concessions affecting other goals (for example, defence of ’no direct 
aid' but concessions in indirect aid). Moreover, consolidation at one 
point in one policy area might be followed on the next occasion by 
concession. Incrementalism, 'moving compromise’ did not proceed in the 
one direction; it involved ’more' or ’less’ of particular goods, 
depending on the combination of influences working to produce decisions. 
Pressures to consolidate and to concede operated simultaneously, both 
were part of the search for compromise, the most common characteristic 
of ALP decisionmaking during the period of our interest. Medding’s 
remarks apply to Labor:
In general, the more diverse the party and the more 
aggregative it is, the greater the likelihood that 
it will fit the [pattern of consensual decisionmaking].
Bargaining will be the key mechanism of decision 
making. In a diverse organization there are few 
alternatives to a bargaining process occurring at 
many levels within the organization ....7
Peter Y. Medding, ’A Framework for the Analysis of Power in Political 
Parties', Political Studies, 18 (March 1970), 12. Medding's aim is to 
oppose the Michelsian picture of oligarchy with one where organisational 
decisionmakers seek consensus. 'Aggregative' means channeling external 
influences.
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Concessions will be sought and made not only because the 
organisation’s unity and survival would otherwise suffer. There may 
not be a connection between HYPOTHESIS V and HYPOTHESIS IV. One can 
detect among Labor decisionmakers the view that the diverse parts of 
the coalition were entitled to have their views considered in any or 
most cases. Representation of a number of views usually carried a
g
higher value than domination by one view. This may be merely the other
side of the coin of 'compromise to survive' but it often seems to
9appear as a separate consideration. What appears as total victory for 
one side, in the sense that its formulation regarding an issue is 
adopted unaltered, is not conclusive evidence of that side's domination.' 
The formulation itself may be a compromise, since the apparently 
victorious group is aware of the views of other groups and makes such 
concessions as do not disturb its own central goals. There may be a 
compromise decision even without a physical meeting involving bargaining
For discussion of the importance of this idea, see chapter 1, pp.42-6. 
Note that an argument of those who sought reconstruction of the Victorian 
and NSW Branches in 1970 was the decline in representation of viewpoints 
within the party.
9Similar phenomena have been noted by observers of the politics of 
states: '[A] policy can last only if it does not long divide the
community into winners and losers, if it embodies a standard of justice 
acknowledged by all sides' (Dankwart A. Rustow, The Politics of 
Compromise, Princeton, N.J., 1955, 232). Note, especially, the idea of 
a game in which 'all entitled to play ... should get a fair deal'
(Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 
1968, 64).
^'As for the role of partisan mutual adjustment internally in the 
party, party discipline does not prove internal centrality [domination 
or oligarchy]. The disciplined support of a line of decisions by party 
leaders may be the result of a bargain struck internally or a result of 
any of the other methods of partisan mutual adjustment within the 
party' (Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy, New York & 
London, 1965, 119). Note that in this book Lindblom uses partisan 
mutual adjustment as the comprehensive term. By the 1968 version (The 
Policy-Making Process, 95-8) 'mutual adjustment' has been substituted.
For my justification for preferring the former usage, see chapter 2, 
pp. 154-7 above.
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or adjustment between decisionmakers with differing goals. An allegedly 
'dominant' group can consider other goals than its own. The 'winner’s' 
prize is often a compromise. 'Winning' a battle often means merely 
achieving more of a set of goals than must be foregone.
DISJOINTED INCREMENTALISM REVISITED
Disjointed incrementalism has characterised each case study; in 
each study there has been a series of attacks on gradually changing 
problems by unco-ordinated bodies and individuals. Some increments 
were more important than others. For instance, the Federal Conference 
decisions on state aid in 1957 and July 1966 produced larger increments 
(explicit support for aid to the scholar rather than implicit support 
for aid in general and, in 1966, removal of all barriers to direct aid 
rather than exclusion of it) than, say, the decision of the 1963 Federal 
Conference, which confirmed and strengthened existing policy. There was 
never a complete reversal of policy or even a change of policy as great 
as Menzies' decision to provide science laboratories.^ The ubiquity of 
incrementalism follows from the nature of the organisation and the need 
to compromise. Incrementalism is a process of moving compromise, where 
decisionmakers seek, not a final solution bringing in utopia, but a 
formula upon which all, or at least a majority, can agree. They settle 
for, are satisficed by, the minimum which achieves this goal. They need 
go no further. Sub-coalitions come together behind a resolution, drift 
apart and come together again behind a new resolution to cope with a 
change in the problem. To the extent that each sub-coalition's
■^Even some of Menzies' Liberals had shown some signs of rethinking 
attitudes towards state aid. See chapter 3, note 67. Moreover, 
the change was rather from ignoring the issue than from explicit 
rejection of the policy.
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attitude changes other sub-coalitions must adjust their positions again 
to achieve common ground.
Lindblom developed the concept of disjointed incrementalism out of
his criticism of concepts of rational decisionmaking in organisations.
Decisionmakers demonstrably did not act from perfect information in
pursuit of a course of action chosen from among a set of alternative
courses to maximise the goals of the organisation. Incrementalism
described more realistically how organisations worked. Whether it was
inevitable was rather less certain.
If disjointed incrementalism is viewed as the sole 
alternative to [rational] decision-making, a model 
that is ’merely impossible', the former becomes by 
default a description of governing under all 
circumstances. Like any residual category, it is 
indiscriminate. We are not given criteria showing 
how this universal model can be made into a variable.
When is governing not in accord with disjointed
incrementalism?12
The constant presence of incrementalism in our case studies suggests 
that incrementalism is a characteristic of the government of permeable 
coalitions like the ALP. But why should this be so? The need for 
compromise and the need for incrementalism, a series of compromises, 
both arise from the same causes in the structure of the 
organisation and the influences upon the organisation. To borrow 
Medding's words, 'the more diverse the party and the more aggregative 
it is, the greater the likelihood that' it will reveal disjointed
13incrementalism, as well as bargaining or partisan mutual adjustment.
12Richard Rose, 'Models of Governing', Comparative Politics, 5 (July 
1973), 481.
13Medding, 'A Framework for the Analysis ...', 12. Rose, 'Models of 
Governing', 480-2, suggests decisions for long-term capital investment, 
catalytic decisions like declarations of war (catalytic for the whole 
government of a society, e.g. because they bring in a war economy), 
decisions not easily reversible and (by implication) decisions during 
revolutions do not fit the incrementalist pattern. Rose has not noticed
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Despots, philosopher kings and purely oligarchical political parties
(if such exist) are unlikely often to reveal disjointed incrementalism;
parties like the ALP have to learn to live with it.
Is disjointed incrementalism then undesirable? Lindblom says no.
His prescription of the method is clear from his title for its fullest
exposition, The Intelligence of Democracy. Lindblom argues that
incremental decisionmaking by partisan mutual adjustment is both
easier, because it is frustrated neither by differing goals of
decisionmakers, by imperfect information, nor by complexity of issues
and alternative policies, and because it is more able to cope with
rapidly changing circumstances. What appears as indecisiveness is
actually the most sophisticated form of decisionmaking. ’The
pieceraealing, remedial incrementalist or satisficer may not look like
an heroic figure. He is nevertheless a shrewd, resourceful problem-
solver who is wrestling bravely with a universe that he is wise enough
14to know is too big for him.’ The incrementalist ’strategy’ recognises
also that only small changes are politically feasible. 'Drastically
different policies fall beyond the pale’ of community acceptance.
Incrementalism is not ’pathological’ but ’the core of the basis for
effective social governance and the system of trust on which such 
, . ,16governance lies .
13 (continued)
that these are the very types of decisions Lindblom himself excludes 
(David Braybrooke & Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, London, 
1963, 61-82). Disjointed incrementalism, according to this book, is 
only one of a number of alternatives to rational or ’synoptic’ 
decisionmaking but Rose and others have tended to assume it is the only 
alternative. Lindblom (A Strategy of Decision, 71) says incrementalism 
occurs especially in decisions ’made day by day in ordinary political 
circumstances by congressmen, executives, administrators, and party leaders’
14Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, 27.
^Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, 26-7.
16March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 271.
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Lindblom defends the incrementalist strategy against charges of
conservatism, claiming it reacts quickly to societal changes and makes
no assumptions about final social states (radical or conservative) or
speed of change.^ More important than its possible conservative
implications are the entangling effects of the incrementalist technique.
Continuing compromise may mire an organisation in self-contradiction.
Most incremental decisions, except where the 
external environment is stable, might be argued 
to promote internal adjustment and consensus to 
the detriment of long-term stability. It might 
be argued that this is, indeed, the process by 
means of which most civilizations collapse.18
Most political parties, too? Partisan mutual adjustment seeks agreement
between participants, not final solutions to problems. It does not
require that one view should prevail but that all participants can
identify something of their own goals in the outcomes of the process.
A series of such decisions, taken in response to changes in rthe external
environment' and reflecting changes in the configuration of forces within
the party, risks piling confusion upon confusion. Since each decision
involves only an increment of the status quo, much of the previous
compromise will remain part of the new policy. Once interpretation of
the new form of words commences, contradictions may emerge between the
expressions of the present and previous positions of each participant
as well as between the present positions of all participants. The
Braybrooke & Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, 106-10. For examples 
of such criticism, see reviews of this book: Kenneth J. Arrow,
Political Science Quarterly, 79 (December 1964), 588; K.E. Boulding, 
American Sociological Review, 29 (December 1964), 930-1. Also: Amitai 
Etzioni, The Active Society, London & New York, 1968, 268-73. 
Interestingly, Boulding's characterisation of the strategy as 'the Lead 
Kindly Light philosophy (one step enough for me)' parallels exactly a 
radical epithet for the ALP (Humphrey McQueen, 'Glory without Power', 
John Playford 6 Douglas Kirsner, ed., Australian Capitalism, Ringwood, 
Vic., 374).
18Morton A. Kaplan, [Review of A Strategy of Decision], Annals, 352 
(March 1964), 189.
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latter set of contradictions may be resolved by partisan mutual
adjustment but the policy will still contain many parts to be
extrapolated and interpreted by those who wish to do so. Hartley's
remarks about the state of incrementalism regarding unity ticket policy
by 1965 could be applied more widely:
There are no less than 23 separate and distinct 
entries in this confused hotch-potch of decisions 
and rules which, according to the convenience of 
the moment, are sometimes read separately, 
sometimes together - in part or in full, and 
sometimes in juxtaposition to one another.19
Similarly, C. Fitzgibbon told the 1966 New South Wales Branch Conference:
I would defy anybody to say that our State-aid 
policy is a policy which most of us in the A.L.P. 
can understand or interpret and it is a policy 
very few of the public could understand or 
interpret. If the public cannot do this how in 
the dickens are we going to win?20
The entangling characteristics of incrementalism have implications 
for our HYPOTHESIS III, that decisionmakers will prefer different 
balances between 'exclusive' and 'inclusive' approaches to the electorate. 
Some participants believed the party's first duty was to serve those who 
supported a relatively immutable core of 'Labor principles'. Others were 
more prepared to believe that Labor principles as well as policy would 
change continually as the party sought votes from diverse sections of 
the community. We suggested this hypothesis might not be consistently 
supported by the case study evidence, if individual decisionmakers 
shifted stance from issue to issue. At points in the case studies we 
have seen self-proclaimed 'men of principle' like Calwell and Chamberlain
19Socialist and Industrial Labor, July 1965, 5. For the list of 
resolutions, see: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965,
125-33.
20SMH, 13 June 1966. See also: Richard Hall, 'How Labor Confers',
Dissent, 17 (Winter 1966), 28-9; SMH, 2, 7 June 1966 (NACE minority 
report and Whitlam's explanatory letter).
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temporise and appeal nakedly for votes, a pragmatist like Oliver take 
a stand on his interpretation of Labor principles in foreign policy, 
union officials seeking benefits for their members, regardless of their 
political persuasions, yet supporting the Labor 'principle' of non­
interference in union affairs. Some of those who spoke loudest about 
Labor principle produced only the puniest statements of what it
comprised, falling back on the formula 'Labor principle is found in the
21majority decisions of Labor Conferences'.
Incrementalism, the process of moving compromise, made the 
exclusivists' task more difficult still. While they spoke of principle 
their own efforts at compromise whittled principle away. Did 'aid to 
the scholar not the school' become meaningless when the party conceded 
that non-state schools could use science and other facilities at state 
schools? Had it always been meaningless, since the 1957 decision did
Crisp argues that the principle of majority rule does not give 
'absolute rightness' to constitutionally arrived at majority decisions 
but merely 'the highest practicable moral authority until and unless 
equally freely and fairly reversed in the light of experience'
(L.F. Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party, 1901-1951, London, 1955, 
4). The difference, if any, between 'absolute rightness' and 'highest 
practicable moral authority' would often be blurred in practice and 
majority rule thus attain the status of an ideology rather than a method 
of choice. Chamberlain said 'Labor principles were the decisions of the 
Federal Conference at the time and they had to be put up with even if 
you didn't agree with them' (F.E. Chamberlain, interview). Chamberlain's 
own attempts to develop a set of principles met only limited success, the 
result lacking coherence or comprehensiveness, just as the Objective and 
Preamble of Labor's Federal platform were criticised for their vagueness. 
For Chamberlain, see: F.E. Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles 
on Australian Labor Party Principles, Perth? 1964. For criticism of 
the lack of substance of Labor 'principles', see the anti-VCE journal 
Labor Comment. The hollowness of principle is not, of course, unique to 
the ALP: 'Policy indeed is often nothing but "the product of political
compromise dressed in the language of justification by the philosophers 
of the winning side"' (Rustow, The Politics of Compromise, 232, quoting 
Pendleton Herring, The Politics of Democracy, New York, 1940, 40).
In coalitional parties, 'principles' often provide a cloak for outcomes 
of sub-coalitional battles, rather than a basis for policy.
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not affect aid in the form of scholarships and other benefits ’to
students’, which one could argue went to the school eventually to pay
fees? When Federal Labor, at Conferences and election campaigns between
1957 and 1965, offered comprehensive schemes of disguised and indirect
aid, the claims of defending the principle of 1957, however restated,
seemed hollow indeed to those who stopped to analyse Labor's decisions.
One rank and filer's remark that state aid as a governmental policy 'has
been gradually extended over the years without any one decision being
obvious or vital enough for the opponents of State Aid to challenge'
applied just as well to Labor's own approach - except that in the party
22the potential challengers were also the extenders. In unity ticket 
policy, the compromise of 1956-57 arose, not from one Labor principle, 
but from a balance between two principles, the independence of unions 
and anti-Communism. Those who spoke of 'the foreign policy principles 
of Hobart, 1955' referred to a ragbag, not a cohesive body. Different 
'principles' had been produced by different sets of circumstances in the 
past and would become appropriate to various participants at different 
times in the present and future. HYPOTHESIS III, especially in its 
references to principles and its assumptions of immutability, emerges 
shaky indeed from our examination.
E. Chick, President, Maribyrnong Electorate Assembly (writing 
privately) to Hartley, 24 November 1965, Vic. Rec., Central Executive 
1966-1967. For the ALP itself, note the verdict on the NSW 
Government's parental allowances innovation (a 1963 example of 
'indirect' aid) of a then member of the Branch Education Committee: 
'Whilst I do not think it was intentional that decision ... had the 
effect of further breaking down opposition to state aid and thus made 
it easier to get major proposals through the 1966 [July Special] 
Conference' (J.B. Holmes to the author, 14 November 1978). The 
significance of individual decisions, as this remark suggests, is often 
not realised until later: 'Policy acquires meaning because an observer
perceives and interprets a course of action amid the confusions of a 
complex world' (Hugh Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and 
Sweden, New Haven & London, 1974, 4). Observation and interpretation 
is usually very much post hoc.
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The entangling possibilities of Labor's incrementalism cast doubt 
on its desirability without detracting from its inevitability. We have 
seen in previous chapters that ambiguity has its uses in satisfying 
participants with diverse goals. As long as there is no need for 
interpretation of an ambiguous policy and for action upon an interpretation, 
a form of words may serve either purpose quite satisfactorily. But 
interpretation and action, forced by crisis, electoral pressure or even 
the preference of Labor politicians, threatens to reveal all the inherent 
contradictions in forms of words designed as much for keeping a coalition 
together as for utility of implementation. Others say: 'The words do not
mean that' and battle for the success of their own interpretation, for 
which the text provides support as well. Opponents of the party say:
'Labor is divided again' and have concrete evidence to present to voters.
Yet the confusion which arises from incrementalism is only greater 
in degree from that which can arise from one decision. Incrementalism 
can pile confusion upon confusion, but confusion exists in individual 
decisions. It is necessary to place the possible consßque^oes of 
the process of moving compromise within a more general context: the
characteristic tendency of Labor decisions during our period to arise 
out of internal strivings and external pressures, rather than be made on 
their 'merits' as coherent proposals for the government of country or 
party.
POLICIES AND THEIR MERITS: THE PARTY'S ELECTORAL FACE
The Australian Labor Party has always sought to win government. The 
strength of this desire has varied from time to time and from section to 
section of the party but has never been absent entirely. Like other 
political parties, Labor hopes to win government by presenting policies
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to the voters at periodic elections. These policies, what the party
proposes to do if elected to government, form part of the ’face’ it
presents to the electorate, part of the criteria upon which it hopes
it will be judged. Its success in producing these policies will be
crucial to its success as a party. True, other policies, such as unity
ticket policy, which relate to its own internal organisation (what the
party is doing and proposes to do about itself) will affect its
electoral success.;but if the conventional idea of democratic parties
23is correct its electoral policies or promises should be central. The
following paragraphs concern the effect of the relationship between
internal strivings and external pressures, as mediated by the decision
techniques of partisan mutual adjustment, disjointed incrementalism and
the processes of the 'garbage can', upon Labor's ability during our
24period to produce what we shall call 'electoral policies'.
Earlier in the thesis we introduced the idea of 'garbage can 
processes' as a common characteristic of organisational decisionmaking.
We have detected instances of such processes in some of the decisions 
studied. Despite its unattractive label this concept does not describe 
a pathological condition but one that occurs frequently in many 
organisations and occasionally in all. Decision-opportunities tend to 
become garbage cans, into which participants dump problems and solutions,
~23Whether this conventional idea is accurate will be taken up later in 
the thesis.
24This term is chosen for the following reasons: 'electoral' because
directed primarily towards the electors (in the sense of an offer of 
future government action in return for their votes) as distinct from 
decisions, e.g. on unity tickets, which may have electoral effects but 
do not involve government actions; 'electoral' rather than 'election' 
because the relationship exists between, as well as during election 
campaigns; 'electoral policies' rather than 'platform' because the 
latter in the ALP refers to a printed document as well as to something 
a candidate stands on ('platform-making' in the ALP is best confined to 
those decisions which affect the printed platform). See Introduction, 
above.
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when the organisation's goals are unclear, when its members flounder
amid its procedures and when participation fluctuates, with no group
dominating the decision at all phases. Garbage can characteristics
are only an extreme example of tendencies recognised by other students
of organisations. In our first chapter we noted the ancestry of March
and Olsen's work in the earlier work of March, Simon, Cyert and others
and its overlap with the writings of Allison and Lindblom. Allison,
for instance, detects imperfect information and communication, deliberate
ambiguity, fluctuating participation and participants whose approach to
one issue is affected by their attitudes to another. The result which
emerges from 'bargaining games' frequently does not match exactly the
views of any one participant or group of participants, for 'what moves
the chess pieces is not simply the reasons that support a course of
action, or the routines of organizations [but] the pulling and hauling
25that is politics'. March and Olsen recognise more explicitly the
complexity and confusion of organisations. 'An organization', they
suggest, 'is a set of procedures for argumentation and interpretation
as well as for solving problems and making decisions'. As chapter 4
showed, sometimes the process, the opportunity for argumentation and
subsequent differing interpretation by participants, is more important
to participants than the outcome, the 'something that can be called a
decision'. Decisions may be made, interpreted and implemented or
'forgotten', in isolated steps by different sets of participants,
2 6subject to different influences.
Lindblom, while again less prepared to decouple the 'cycle of 
choice' (individual beliefs - individual actions - organisational
25Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision, Boston, 1971, 6-7, 145-6.
26March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 25. See chapter 4, above.
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actions - environmental responses) than are March and Olsen, recognises
the inherent complexity of much organisational decisionmaking.
A policy is sometimes the outcome of a political 
compromise among policy makers, none of whom had 
in mind quite the problem to which the agreed 
policy is the solution .... [Policymaking is] 
an extremely complex analytical and political 
process to which there is no beginning and no 
end, and the boundaries of which are most 
uncertain.27
The ’ideal way’ of what is variously called rational decisionmaking, 
policy analysis or, by Lindblom, ’the synoptic conception of problem 
solving’,
is to choose among alternatives after careful and 
complete study of all possible courses of action 
and all their possible consequences and after an 
evaluation of those consequences in the light of 
one’s values. That is to say, ideally one treats 
the policy question as an intellectual problem; 
one does not look upon a policy question as calling 
for the exercise of something called ’political’
forces.28
In reality, while such a process does sometimes occur, many 
organisations make many decisions by a process where analysis and 
politics are inextricably combined. Partisan mutual adjustment, 
Lindblom's key concept, is itself defined as ’policy analysis by one 
policy maker to find a way in which a policy he desires can serve the 
values of another policy maker to whom the persuasion is directed'.
It is by no means 'intellectual' or neutral, since each participant is 
committed, with varying degrees of passion, to goals which conflict 
with those of others. He hopes not for the objectively ’best' solution, 
but for adoption of as many as possible of his own goals. Partisan 
mutual adjustment incorporates policy analysis 'as an instrument or
27
28
Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, 4.
Braybrooke & Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, 40.
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weapon into the play of power .... It does not avoid fighting over
29policy; it is a method of fighting'. Like Allison's 'bargaining' and 
March and Olsen's 'decoupling' and 'garbage can', Lindblom's concept 
recognises the effects of the multiple goals of the diverse parts of 
organisations upon the decisions which emerge. The goals which one 
partisan mutually adjusted decision serves may range as widely as the 
survival of a State Labor Government, improving the condition of 
playgrounds in Catholic schools, promoting the centralisation of 
government in Canberra, securing revenge for personal injury suffered 
during the Split and curbing or promoting the ambitions of a politician.
The difficulty of decisionmaking which allows for the effects of 
internal strivings and external pressures to be registered in outcomes 
is that the desire to balance these conflicting forces may prevail over 
that to produce a coherent, practicable policy. Participants seek 
agreement, 'something which can be called a "decision"'. They stop 
searching when they succeed in this quest, even if an outside observer 
could say that the decision produced is objectively, 'on its merits', 
not the best solution to the problemsunder consideration or that it 
has left many problems without solutions. To participants who say 'our 
processes ensure that our party survives united', observers reply 'it 
is a poor thing indeed that survives'; when participants insist 'the 
people will call us to govern when the conservative parties are proved
wanting', observers retort 'if Labor cannot make decisions in opposition,
30how can it make them in government?'
29Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, 30-4.
30Some writers on organisations suggest decisionmakers avoid making 
decisions wherever possible and that it is hard to point to something 
that can be called a 'decision'. See, for example: Chester I. Barnard,
The Functions of the Executive, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, 189-90; Cyert 
& MacCrimmon, 'Organizations', 580-1; Warner R. Schilling, 'The H- 
Bomb Decision: How to Decide without Actually Choosing', Political
Science Quarterly, 76 (March 1961), 24-46. But these writers are searching 
for evidence of rational decisionmaking and decisions which 'settle' 
issues. They are really using the word 'decision' in a different wayfrom 
our present usage.
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It is too sweeping to say that ALP electoral policy was merely a
'by-product' of internal strivings and external pressures mediated
through the three decisionmaking techniques outlined. Participants
have differing sets of goals. People like Bryant, Wood, Whitlam and
Tonkin, to name a few, had deep convictions and knowledge about desirable
education policy. Beazley, Whitlam again, Fraser and others were
interested in cohesive foreign policy alternatives designed to respond
to external problems facing Australia and sought to promote them
through the machinery of the party. The merits of policies were an
ingredient in the mixture from which outcomes emerged. Even so, one
critic could correctly refer to the Federal and State platforms of the
early 1960s as 'fragmented compromise[s] of pressure group interests'
and a decade later an observer of the reconstructed Victorian Branch
concluded that 'in the struggle for position within the party, it is
paradoxical that policies received only intermittent and scanty attention
31at State Council meetings'. In times of crisis for the party, as in 
the 1960s, or times of factional realignment, such as after Federal 
intervention in Victoria, the party machinery, occupied with ensuring 
unity, will be even less able than normally to produce coherent electoral 
policies unless the problem-ridden machinery can be by-passed by an 
alternative structure dedicated to this task alone.
31The first quotation is from Ian Turner, 'The Future of the ALP: 
Socialists and the ALP', Outlook, 6, 3 (May-June 1962), 10, and the 
second from R.F.I. Smith, 'Victorian Labor since Intervention',
Labour History, 27 (November 1974), 52, who reveals, incidentally, 
that features of the second period were 'consensus motions' produced 
'with the aid of ingenious drafting by [the same] Ian Turner'. For 
similar general remarks: Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party,
269; D.A. Dunstan, 'A.L.P. at Work', Outlook, 6, 5 (October 1962),
3.
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The party Leader's policy speech had always been a method of
advising voters what Labor would do for them in the three years after 
32an election. But during the Evatt and Calwell years, this speech grew
not from the party, whose activities were directed primarily towards
coping with threats to its stability, but from the Leader's preferences
and ad hoc reactions to current pressures.
The leader held a sparsely attended caucus meeting 
[1954] at which numbers of members threw in bright 
ideas. None of these were contrary to party 
policy, but the priorities had never received any 
mature consideration. The resultant pastiche 
announced by the Doc [Evatt] surprised not only 
the rank and file but a great many of those who 
would have had to form the ministry in any Labor 
government. It was completely novel to the
Federal Executive.33
Both Evatt and Calwell were criticised for policy speeches containing 
dozens of unco-ordinated promises, thrown together at the last moment, 
without overall philosophy or financial responsibility, a response to 
ephemeral rather than long-term considerations. 'In every Federal 
election since 1949', lamented Whitlam in 1969, 'the Liberals and the 
press have had one line of attack on Labor's policies - "Where's the 
money coming from?'" Moreover, Wyndham added: 'As your list of
32James Jupp, Australian Party Politics, Carlton, Vic., 1968, 210, 
suggests such speeches 'alone ... provide a clearly worded statement 
of the party's intentions'. But, given that many of the same 
influences towards ambiguity will affect the speech as affect the 
platform, clarity will not always be present.
33Dunstan, 'A.L.P. at Work', 3. A number of interviewees referred 
to Evatt taking down suggestions on the back of an envelope but 
Crean remembers that Evatt left the envelope behind (F. Crean, 
interview). The main surprise was Evatt's promise to abolish the 
means test. For subsequent developments, see later in this chapter.
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promises gets longer, the ordinary voter doesn't believe them any 
longer'.^
This explosion of promises stemmed from the absence of a 
comprehensive platform to guide potential Labor ministers. The 
platform's clear prohibitions and explicit rejection of alternative 
schemes defined broad parameters of acceptability rather than ways of 
proceeding. In the early 1950s Crisp had written that the platform 
'is not sufficiently close-knit, penetrating and rounded to pass
35creditably as an up-to-date statement of Labour's faith and aims'.
To the extent that the platform was a guide to action in government it 
was often vague, reflecting the circumstances of its genesis. This 
might be to the advantage of future Labor ministers, who could justify 
their actions within vague guidelines, but could mean that a government 
in name Labor had no relation to the wishes and traditions oF its 
extra-Parliamentary machine. If Labor's pretensions to internal 
democracy were to be balanced against its ambition to govern, it needed 
a procedure which not only produced good electoral policy but which also 
rooted the machinery firmly in Labor aspirations without suffering the
34A.L.P. Journal, May 1969, 15; Australian, 8 April 1968. For 
similar comments from Labor people: Fact, 15 March 1968 (Barnard);
Labor Comment, December 1967, 5 (C. Fitzgibbon); D.W. Rawson & Susan 
M. Holtzinger, Politics in Eden-Monaro, London, 1958, 31 (A.D. Fraser, 
1954); Elwyn Spratt, Eddie Ward, Adelaide, 1965, 237-8 (Ward, 1958). 
Note also the efforts of the Federal Executive during 1961 to cost 
Labor proposals (below, note 148). For the cost issue at particular 
elections: Age, 11 November 1963; C-M, 8 November 1963; DT, 8, 19,
26 November 1963; SMH, 7 November 1963; West Australian, 27 November 
1963 - and in 1966 - Advertiser, 23 November 1966; Age, 13 August 
1966; Australian, 14, 18 November 1966; Daily Mirror, 18 November 
1966.
35Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party, 269.
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defects of decisionmaking processes which sought compromise rather 
than coherence.^
How Labor Sought to By-pass the Problems of its Coalition Structure 
Partisan mutual adjustment, disjointed incrementalism and the 
methods of the garbage can were all techniques to resolve the conflicts 
between those internal strivings and external pressures which were 
relevant to particular issues. They were used to produce something 
which could be called a 'decision' bearing the party's name. Their use 
led to the types of problems we have outlined. But they were used 
because they seemed most fitted to the type of organisation that the ALP 
was, a permeable coalition. Indeed, their use was to a great extent 
determined by the nature of the organisation itself. If the coalition 
was to remain in existence it had to mutually adjust, proceed by small 
steps and recognise that its members would approach many decision- 
situations bearing problems and solutions unconnected with the subject 
ostensibly at hand.
Richard Rose states the general problem thus: 'The intentions that
a party offers may be relatively vague. A vague policy has the 
tactical advantage of allowing a party to justify, post hoc, almost 
anything done as consistent with its intent. But it has the 
disadvantage of leaving ministers uncertain or confused about what it 
is that they ought to do' (Richard Rose, The Problem of Party 
Government, Harmondsworth, 1976, 373). In the absence of guidance 
from party sources, Labor Governments could be reduced to ad hoc 
responses to pressure groups or, especially, subservience to the 
public service. Rose quotes a British Labour minister: 'The point
of the manifesto is not to persuade the voter. The point of the 
manifesto is to give yourself an anchor when the civil service tries 
to go back on your word. If a politician enters Whitehall without a 
manifesto, without a programme, he is lost .... Your only hope then 
is to work in opposition. So what Labour should be thinking about in 
opposition is not slogans which will sell us to the electorate but 
policies which, when we have got to office, will hold us steady next 
time' (R.H.S. Crossman, The Politics of Pensions, Liverpool, 1972,
24, quoted, Rose, The Problem of Party Government, 378-9).
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Yet it was still possible for some reformers to hope that the 
party could make more decisions, especially on electoral policy, on 
considerations of the merits of alternatives as solutions to problems 
and as vote winners. To these reformers, Labor’s coalitional 
structure and the type of decisionmaking it engendered militated 
against producing good electoral policy.
There were three related attacks upon the problems caused by 
Labor's structure for its electoral policy. Each attack involved ’by­
passing the problems seen by the by-passers as inherent in the existing 
structure.,in favour of a structure which could consider electoral 
policy on its merits as solutions to problems and on its capacity to 
win votes from electors, rather than on how it could be reconciled to 
the conflicting goals of party sub-coalitions. All hoped, too, by 
removing the detailed consideration of electoral policy from Federal 
Conference and Executive, to enable lengthier consideration than could 
be given by these infrequently meeting bodies. The lack of time to 
consider electoral policy and the lack of interest in it could both be 
overcome. A by-passing strategy would allow careful consideration of 
a programme for Labor, hampered neither by the demands of party 
administration, of papering over cracks in party unity, nor by the 
pursuit of personal and sub-coalitional goals unrelated to electoral 
policy. These activities would certainly continue but in a separate 
channel from the work of producing the policies by which Labor would 
return to power in Canberra. Conference and Executive's role in 
electoral policymaking would be confined to endorsing the proposals 
produced in other forums. The structure as such would not be by-passed; 
it would instead be deprived of the opportunity of introducing 
'extraneous' matters into the making of electoral policy.
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The first attempt was the reform of Federal Conference and 
Executive, the second the development of Federal Policy Committees 
and the third the establishment of a network of policy advisers 
centred on E.G. Whitlam as Leader after 1967.
THE REFORM OF PARTY STRUCTURE 1964-1967
Since its inception, Labor's Federal structure had rested on the
equal representation of State Branches. There were no other
categories of representation. In particular, there were no ex-
officio Parliamentary representatives, although some politicians had
37always been elected as ordinary State representatives.
The disappointing Labor result in the 1963 Federal election
encouraged many party members to re-examine the traditional structure.
During the campaign Menzies had warned voters of the ALP's 'outside
back-seat drivers - the 36 men' who would, he alleged, control a 
38Labor Government. Searching for reasons for the defeat, elements 
of the party seized on the 'faceless men' issue. They believed the 
party urgently should increase the proportion of politicians, its 
publicly known representatives, on its Federal bodies to remove the
37In 1957 there were fourteen State and Federal politicians, in 1961 
ten and in 1965 thirteen, including Calwell, Federal Leader of the 
party.
38Liberal Party of Australia, Federal Election 1963 Policy Speech 
(Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies), Melbourne, November 12, 1963, 
Canberra, 1963, 6-7; SMH, 26, 27 November 1963. See also: Liberal
Party of Australia, Back to Methuselah: The Faceless Men and the
Power Structure of the Labor Party, Canberra, 1964? Labor lost ten 
seats at the election.
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bite from an apparently effective issue. Whitlam, the Deputy Federal
Leader, reported to the New South Wales Central Executive that '[t]he
party’s deliberations and image will be impaired unless and until the
Federal Parliamentarians play, and are seen to play, a full part in
formulating and interpreting Federal policy’. Politicians were best
equipped to express policy to the electors and in Parliament and, on
many issues, particularly foreign affairs and defence, best informed
and best able to contribute to policymaking. Increased representation
of Parliamentarians on Federal bodies, Whitlam argued, would both
improve the party's public image and recognise that '[t]he core of any
political party consists of its members in parliament'. As a first
step, the Leader and Deputy Leader of the Federal party should be
40ex-officio members of both Federal Conference and Executive.
Superficially, the reforming impulse after 1963 was an attempt to 
reduce the power of the extra-Parliamentary machine in party decisions.
The Federal Caucus overwhelmingly resolved that Caucus members submit 
reform proposals to Calwell and speakers urged direct Caucus 
representation on Federal bodies. The New South Wales Conference of 
1964 said that the two Federal Leaders should be full delegates to both 
Federal bodies and that Federal Caucus should elect three of its number 
to them as well: ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report, 1964 Annual
Conference, 9; SMH, 19 March 1964; F.E. Stewart, interview. For 
other party views on the salience of the faceless men issue: Maurice
Isaacs, 'Federal Election Report - North Sydney Electorate, 1963', 
A.P.S.A. News, 9, 1 (March 1964), 10; SMH, 2,7 December 1963 (Alderman 
C. Wallace, Wyndham); Noel B. Ward, Secretary, Phillip FEC, to 
Colbourne, 13 April 1964, NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/317/797.
40DT, 14 April 1964.
4^Whitlam himself complained that the Federal bodies had not been 'self- 
effacing and discreet' while Oliver criticised the Federal officers' 
visit to Sydney as a blatant example of illegitimate intimidation of a 
State Government: ALP (NSW Branch), Official Report 1964 Annual 
Conference, 1-4 (Oliver's Presidential address); ITT, 14 April 1964. 
Press comments also pursued this line: Age, 9 December 1963; C-M,
7 December 1963; SMH, 3 December 1963. Menzies argued that a party 
controlled from outside and subject to Communist influence could not be 
trusted with the sensitive areas of foreign policy and defence. The
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Some participants over the next three years rarely saw the issue as 
more than the distribution of power within the. party. But to Whitlam, 
who was to become the most forthright of the reformers, it was more 
than that. He believed Labor’s decisionmaking processes, particularly 
when making electoral policy, should be both more representative and 
more responsive - representative of the various sub-coalitions in the 
party and responsive to them and to people outside the party whose 
votes Labor sought. The main barrier to these related aims was 
Labor's Federal structure. Delegates who formally represented a clear 
majority of Australians or a clear majority of party members could be 
frustrated by three States voting en bloc. If this happened frequently 
on important issues, Labor would seem irrelevant to the bulk of 
Australians. Further, since State Branches typically suffered 'locked
41 (continued)
most celebrated incident regarding the faceless men had been Calwell 
and Whitlam's wait outside the Special Conference in March 1963, while 
delegates discussed the North West Cape base. Yet Labor men had been 
confident for most of the year of victory at the election, whenever 
it was held. Whitlam was of this view (Graham Freudenberg, A Certain 
Grandeur, South Melbourne, 1977, 21; Laurie Oakes & David Solomon,
The Making of an Australian Prime Minister, Melbourne, 1973, 111).
Menzies called the poll soon after the Federal officers' state aid 
visit to Sydney, suggesting that, for him at least, this incident was 
more crucial. For this incident and its consequences, see chapter 3, 
pp.191-5 and chapter 3 generally. The Federal Executive was certainly 
in no hurry in mid 1963 to tackle the issue. It referred to the not 
yet operational Federal Secretariat an item from Western Australia 
requesting publicity for the ALP's internal democracy to counter 
attacks 'that a group of irresponsible individuals formulate Labor 
policy' (FX 24-25 July 1964, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/125/57/154-5).
The 1963 Federal Conference did resolve to admit journalists, presumably 
as an answer to the 'faceless men' allegation, but the journalists 
refused to accept the terms of the offer and did not attend after the 
first day (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 4-5, 
10-12). Labor's confidence made defeat in 1963 the.more galling and 
encouraged the search for reasons. One journalist commented that Labor 
'has at no time in its history been more shocked by an election failure' 
(S.W. Stephens, Advertiser, 7 December 1963) and the NSW Executive 
spoke of '[t]he unexpected result of the Federal election ... at a 
time when it was confidently expected that sufficient seats would be 
won to ensure the election of a Labor Government . . . ' : ALP (NSW Branch),
1964 Annual Conference, Executive Report, 14.
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in' control by one sub-coalition, their Federal delegates were often 
unrepresentative even of party members in the State. The Federal 
Conference was too small, too dominated by paid party officials, too 
secret and met too infrequently. The party's union base, too, was
increasingly unrepresentative of union members because large white-
k 42collar unions were not affiliated.
Whitlam's solution by-passed the State Branches altogether.
Federal Conference, he believed, 'should not be constituted on the
archaic and non-Labor Federal basis, but it should comprise
representatives from Federal electorates and Federal unions and ...
43endorsed candidates for the next national election ...'. Whitlam
argued that the modern ALP should represent not workers but 'employees',
not merely the traditional blue collar affiliates but white collar
unionists and those ineligible to join unions. In 1960, he had written:
More and more men and women with professional 
training are employed on salaries rather than self- 
employed. All teachers, scientists and journalists, 
most economists and engineers, and many lawyers and 
doctors, are in employment .... They can be 
expected in increasing degree to vote for Labor in 
the 1960s.
42E.G. Whitlam, 'Trade Unionists and Politics', Henry Mayer, ed., 
Australian Politics: A Reader, Melbourne, 1967, 252-3. This was a
paper delivered in Newcastle in June 1965.
43DT, 14 April 1964. From the earliest days there had been intermittent 
pressure, mainly from the larger States, for a population basis for 
representation, which would have produced a Conference of similar 
composition to the Whitlam version (Crisp, The Australian Federal 
Labour Party, ch.II, passim; D.W. Rawson, Labor in Vain?, Croydon,
Vic., 1966, 26). For earlier examples of the National Conference 
concept: ALP (NSW Branch), Annual General Conference 1958, Agenda,
33, 64 (Parkhill Branch; Shop Assistants' union); 1961, Agenda, 59 
(Zone 9 Regional Conference); C. Gardner, Secretary, Hawthorn Branch, 
to Hartley, 17 April 1964, Vic. Rec., Federal Conference 1965.
44Laurie Oakes, Whitlam PM, Sydney, 1973, 86. See also: ALP, Official
Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 256; C-M, 2 May 1964; DT,
14 April 1964.
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As the newly elected Leader in 1967, Whitlam envisaged Labor as a
democratic socialist party putting forward candidates for election
before it was a party in close association with unions. The union-
party relationship should be preserved but people should see Labor as
45a more comprehensive party. While Whitlam did not stress the point, 
a ’National' Conference based on Federal electorates would not be 
controlled by union dominated State Branches. Its delegates, in theory 
at least, would be representative of the ALP members in each electorate - 
boilermakers, carpenters, watersiders and unionists in working class 
areas and teachers, economists, lawyers, public servants and members of 
employee associations in middle class areas. Thus they would represent 
not only party members but the whole population.
This was the theory. In practice, greater representativeness 
probably would have been achieved through politicians being elected to 
the new National Conference. Whitlam hoped, said Robert Murray, ’to 
recreate an electorally successful left of centre party dominated by its 
Parliamentarians’.^ But the domination by politicians during the Curtin 
and Chifley years had been achieved by negotiation with and manipulation 
of a potentially powerful machine. Rather than recreating this style, 
the new Conference could easily have been dominated by politicians 
elected as representatives of Federal electorates or of unions. Sitting 
politicians, enjoying free travel, would have made attractive delegates 
for party units chronically short of funds. Politicians were also the
45Four Corners - 25th February 1967. Interview with the Hon.E.G. 
Whitlam, Leader of the Opposition, Vic. Rec., M.P. S to W 1965-1968. 
Whitlam once confided to a colleague that he would have liked the ALP 
to be more like the American Democratic Party which, of course, 
represents employees of all types but has no affiliated unions (Oakes 
& Solomon, The Making of an Australian Prime Minister, 57).
46Robert Murray, The Split, Melbourne, 1972, 353. My emphasis.
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most visible and well known of the potential delegates in local areas 
and the most familiar with the questions likely to be discussed at a 
National Conference. Whitlam, supported by Wyndham’s experience of 
the British Labour Party, believed that party's greater electoral 
success could be traced to the higher proportion of politicians in its 
mass Conference. Australian Labor's rank and file would have ensured 
that her new, Whitlam-style Conference had a similar composition. 
Furthermore, much of the policy produced by the Conference would have 
been based upon proposals derived by politicians during their 
Parliamentary and other work between Conferences. The National 
Conference would have by-passed the deficiencies of the State Branch, 
union dominated structures and their reflection at Federal level, by 
constructing a new structure, dominated by politicians and responding 
to grass roots movements as politicians interpreted them. The 
Conference would have been weakened as a means of ironing out 
differences between State Branches and would have become instead a
47forum for, and tool of politicians.
The likelihood of domination by politicians was recognised by 
observers at the time, as were the points about the high cost of 
transporting delegates and (by the small States) domination by large 
States (since they had more Federal electorates): C.R. Cameron,
interview; Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles ..., 53-4; 
CT, 3 August 1967; J. Jupp, F.E. Stewart, J.P. Toohey, interviews;
Ken Turner, 'Who, Whom? "Outside Control" in the ALP', Dissent, 21 
(Spring 1967), 24; G.T. Virgo, interview. Electorates without a 
Federal Labor member could still have elected Senators or State 
politicians. Whitlam said little publicly about how delegates should 
be elected. A more recent party inquiry has canvassed the possibility 
of their election by State Conferences (Committee of Inquiry, 1978).
In general, while State Branches continued to exist so would the 
possibility of delegates being forced to vote in State blocs. 
Incidentally, regarding the British precedent, writers on the subject 
have pointed out that the balance of power between politicians and 
non-politicians at the British Labour Party Conference is not static 
but shifts constantly: Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western
Democracies, New York, 1967, 294-305; Rose, The Problem of Party 
Government, 261-8,333-7, 348-9.
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Whitlara became the most vehement and articulate proponent of
party reform. But his arguments attracted varying degrees of
enthusiasm. On one hand, the New South Wales Executive recommended
to the 1964 Branch Conference that the Federal Leader and his Deputy
become members of both Federal extra-Parliamentary bodies. Its other
recommendations also reflected Whitlam's ideas: there should be a
review of Federal policy 'to bring same more in line with changing
methods of Education, Industry, Transport and the Scientific Age’,
greater attention to interesting youth in the party and closer
48contact with white-collar organisations This was refurbishing
designed to make Labor more relevant to the trends from which Whitlam
and others believed it had become detached. On the other hand,
R.W. Holt, the Victorian Branch President, believed that if Federal
Conference was to be enlarged there was 'no reason to expect any
superior contributions from M.P.'s. Moreover, the imposition of
policy from the top echelon is in fact the reverse of the democratic
, 49process .
The Federal Executive itself recognised the need for some answer 
at least to the faceless men charge. It announced in March 1964 
that the Leader or any other Caucus member was welcome to attend 
Conference, as a matter of course, even when they were not delegates, 
and that the Leader or his Deputy could attend Executive
^Circular 64/29, Federal Elections 30th November 1963 - Officers' 
Report and Recommendations, 21 February 1964, NSW Rec., ML MSS 
2083/459/1192; DT, SMH, 22 February 1964.
49Federal Secretariat Information Release No.16, Annual Conference, 
Victorian Branch, Australian Labor Party, Presidential Address of 
Hon. R.W. Holt, LL.B., Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/147/194.
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meetings.^ Then, in August, the Executive decided to meet outside 
Federal Parliamentary sessions wherever possible, to facilitate the 
Leaders’ a t t e n d a n c e E v e n  with this further concession the 
innovation was a strictly limited reply to the post election 
agitation.
Wyndham, the new Federal Secretary, agreed with Whitlam that
more fundamental changes were required. He presented his views to
the August 1964 Federal Executive meeting, which authorised him to
53review party structure and report back. Wyndham’s recommendations
This was less than Calwell had asked for and came too late to help 
counter the faceless men charge at the 1963 election. Before the 
election, Calwell asked that all four Federal Leaders be made ex- 
officio members of both Federal bodies with the right to attend and 
speak but not vote. That, in the event, there was no ex-officio 
membership made very little difference, as the practical results of 
both Calwell and Executive proposals were the same, except that only 
two Leaders benefited from the latter. That there was some resentment 
in the Executive, to assuage which required the reduction from four to 
two, was seen in its first reaction to Calwell's request: a suggestion
that Calwell be allowed to attend the Executive in exchange for the 
Federal Secretary attending Caucus meetings. The eventual plan for 
attendance by two Leaders was an amendment to this proposal. This 
resolution was adopted before the election but the change was not 
announced till after it, because of the need to await Calwell’s reply: 
Advertiser, 7 March 1964; FX 30 September-3 October 1963, 3-5 March 
1964, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/125/57/202-3; 119/35; SMH, 4 March 1964.
By July 1964, Calwell was opposing the attendance of all four Leaders 
at the Executive although he was not averse to a greater representation 
of politicians as ordinary delegates. He remained opposed throughout 
to ex-officio voting membership for party Leaders: Australian, 16 July
1964; CT, 5 August 1964; SMH, 6 August 1964.
51FX 4-6 August 1964, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/35.
52Federal Leaders, their Deputies and other politicians had regularly 
addressed Federal machine meetings by invitation and often assisted in 
their deliberations in other ways; now no specific invitation was 
required in the case of the two Leaders. Note that, although the 
October resolution said the Leader err his Deputy, in practice both seem 
to have been able to attend simultaneously. ALP, Official Report, 
Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 102, reports the decision as 'and/or' 
and there seems to have been no trouble over the point.
53Agenda Appendix R: Establishment of a Northern Territory Central
Executive; FX 4-6 August 1964, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/35, 37; 
Australian, SMH, 6 August 1964.
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(May 1965) reflected much of Whitlam's thinking on representativeness 
and responsiveness but recognised the difficulty of persuading the 
party to make the large change to a National Conference in one step."^ 
’Although personally favouring a Federal Conference comprising direct 
representation from Federal electorates and Federal unions', Wyndham 
was content, ostensibly because of the unwillingness of State Branches 
to supply necessary information about finance and membership, to 
recommend an inquiry by the National Organising and Planning Committee 
(comprising himself, the Federal Leader and the State Secretaries) 
into the feasibility of such a Conference. Meanwhile, Wyndham 
proposed an expanded Federal Conference of ten delegates from each 
State, plus the four Federal Leaders, all six State Leaders, two 
representatives of the party women's organisation and one each from 
autonomous Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory Branches, 
making a total of seventy-four delegates. Federal Executive would 
comprise three delegates per State plus the Federal Leader and his 
Deputy, the President ex-officio if he was not a delegate and the 
General Secretary, the last without voting rights. The new Federal
54 [ALP, Commonwealth Conference, 1965?] Document 7: Party Re-
Organisation. Recommendations of the General Secretary. Although the 
document is signed by Wyndham as General Secretary, Federal Executive 
members at the time believed that Whitlam and/or his staff had 
contributed to it (J.B. Keeffe, G.T. Virgo, interviews). Wyndham was 
familiar with mass Conferences in Britain and may have discussed their 
advantages with Whitlam even before 1964. Whitlam himself says that 
Wyndham kept his re-organisation plans 'fairly close to his chest, 
although he wanted something like the British arrangement'. Whitlam 
agreed with him on this point - the mass conference - although says 
he [Whitlam] was against direct representation of unions (E.G. Whitlam, 
interview). Direct union representation does appear in Whitlam's 
National Conference idea at the time, so perhaps it represents a 
concession to Wyndham. Finally, Cameron suggested Whitlam received 
the National Conference idea from Austrian Socialist practice, via his 
friend, Chancellor Kreisky (C.R. Cameron, interview).
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Conference should meet annually, instead of bi-ennially, and the new
Executive at least once every two months.^
Wyndham's proposals involved less by-passing than the National
Conference would have. The expanded Conference still had a solid
Federal core, and small States were still over-represented. State
machines would still have great influence on Federal deliberations.
Wyndham believed the ten-person delegations would enable the Conference
to cover more work in the time available and provide Conference places
for more State personnel including, he suggested, ’at least one
Federal Parliamentarian, one State Parliamentarian and one representative
5 6of the Party Federal electorate councils'. Wyndham probably believed 
that, given the arguments over cost and large State domination in a 
National Conference, as well as the need to work out such details as 
how delegates would be elected - details which Whitlam himself had not 
addressed - such an expansion was a reasonable first step to a mass 
conference. At the same time, explicit provision for representation 
of politicians would counter the ’faceless men’ criticism.^
Other areas of the lengthy document do not concern us here. They 
covered, inter alia, policy review, uniform methods of preselection, 
new fund-raising schemes, a membership drive, refurbished local 
organisation, improved electoral organisation and standardisation of 
State rules.
"^Document 7: Party Re-Organisation, 2. One observer also suggested
that the expanded numbers would ’tend to lessen the possibility that 
one or two individuals can hold the national party to ransom. Decisions 
may still be narrow, but they will be less likely to depend on such 
factors as who drinks with whom shortly before a vote is taken’:
CT, 1 June 1965 (J. Jupp). Although harsh, this comment had a grain 
of truth: Federal Conference had always been less influenced by
personal relationships than had the Federal Executive, partly because 
it was larger. The new Conference would have been larger still.
^Wyndham’s proposals were rather modest, since his suggested 
constitutional minimal representation for politicians (ten on Conference, 
two on Executive) was lower than the existing proportion.
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The acceptance of Wyndham's plans depended formally on the 
attitudes of the State Branches, directly and through their delegates 
to the National Organising and Planning Committee (NOPC) and the
(
Federal Executive. Almost from the beginning a majority of States 
were unfavourable. When the scheme was sent to the States for
comment, Victoria, for example, attacked Wyndham for trying to boost
58New South Wales and to reduce the role of unions in the party. The 
Western Australian Executive denied the need for basic change, drawing
attention instead to the assistance rendered at the existing Conference
59by the Standing Policy Committees and the Federal Secretariat. This 
reflected Chamberlain's view that Federal Conference should protect 
Labor's mass supporters against politicians straying from Labour 
principle. 'I believe that you've got to have a strong organisational 
set-up to give effect to the requirements of the people that have 
supported you at an election.' Chamberlain opposed any broadening of 
Federal machinery that would increase the influence of politicians, 
while he was quite willing to draw on sources of advice tapped by the
These criticisms were made despite the Secretary's explicit 
retention of the equal representation of States and his specific 
proposal that Federal unions could send agenda items direct to the 
new Conference (FX 28-30 July 1965; Wyndham to McNolty, 9 July 
1965, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/38; 47/Outwards Correspondence 
1/7/65-28/8/65; VCE 9 July 1965, ALP (Victorian Branch), State. 
Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8142). Eventually, Victoria did 
support the proposal for ten-person Conference delegations: ALP
(Victorian Branch), Record of the 75th Anniversary Conference, June 
10-13, 1966, 4.
59Decisions of the [WA] State Executive A.L.P. at its Meeting on 
7th September 1964, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/70/State Branches - WA - 
State Executive.
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Policy Committees. Brown had always been concerned at the danger of
overshadowing 'the machine, the representative of the rank and file.
Parliamentarians as a whole are too sensitive to things other than the
61principles which are supposed to guide our actions.'
Others opposed the concept of ex-officio representation of
politicians because it implied that politicians had a community of
interest requiring them to vote en bloc. These critics argued that
when politicians voted on opposite sides in the Federal bodies the
62press would seize on the fact to Labor's detriment. Still others, 
especially those from smaller States, were unconvinced by Wyndham's 
arguments for an expansion of State delegations. While he favoured a 
National Conference, which would disadvantage the smaller States, be 
costly and probably dominated by politicians, and while he recommended 
an inquiry into its feasibility, delegation expansion could be seen 
only as 'a foot in the door' to the more fundamental change. Thus, 
relatively small, isolated and union dominated States, like South
60F.E. Chamberlain, NLA interview transcripts 3:1/22-3. In March 1967, 
Chamberlain was to repeat this argument in reply to Whitlam's advocacy 
of the National Conference concept (Age, SMH, 18 March 1967; Western 
Sun, March 1967, 2). Chamberlain and the Policy Committees will be 
discussed later in the chapter. It is sufficient to suggest here that 
Chamberlain might have seen the Policy Committee-Federal Conference 
relationship as analogous to that between the House of Representatives 
and Senate, with the Conference helping protect the rights of small 
States like Western Australia. In a 1964 speech, he likened the equal 
representation in Conference to that in the Senate, without drawing 
any clear conclusion (Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles ..., 
54).
61W.W.C. Brown, interview. My emphasis.
62W.W.C. Brown, F. Crean, interviews. Whitlam's resignation as 
Federal Leader in April 1968, after he had been opposed on crucial 
votes by other politicians on the Federal Executive (some elected as 
delegates and some ex-officio after the 1967 reform), revealed 
clearly that politicians did not vote en bloc: Freudenberg, A Certain
Grandeur, 129-37; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 170-83; Maximilian Walsh,
'The Harradine Affair', AQ, 40, 2 (June 1968), 31-9.
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Australia and Queensland, opposed most of Wyndham's limited proposals.
Tasmania, isolated and impecunious but more favourable to politicians,
supported most of the Secretary’s main recommendations, as did New
South Wales, the strongest and most pro-politician Branch, which also
64endorsed the National Conference concept.
The clear majority of States against the Wyndham proposals was
reflected in the NOPC decisions. On the eve of the 1965 Federal
Conference this Committee referred back to the States the crucial
question of delegation expansion, ignored the recommendation to
investigate a National Conference and rejected or shelved other minor
proposals. It did recommend that the party write into its rules the
existing rights of the Federal Leader and his Deputy to attend and
6 5speak at, but not vote in, Federal meetings. This was the most 
limited reform possible.
G.T. Virgo, interview. For South Australia: Advertiser, 15 June
1964; SASE 7 June, 15 July 1965, 22 April 1966, SA Rec., Executive 
Minute Book 1964-69. For Queensland: Agenda Attachment N : Party
Re-Organisation. Memorandum by the General Secretary, FX 9-11 February 
1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/43.
6 AALP (NSW Branch), Circular 65/95: Annual Conference 1965, Federal
Executive and Conference Structure; Minutes of the Annual General 
Conference [1965] NSW Rec., ML MSS 2083/432/1118/1; 1116 part 5/19;
FX 8-11 May 1967, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/44. Given the small 
States’ fears of being dominated, it is interesting that the NSW 
officers' first National Conference recommendation (108 delegates 
comprising six State Leaders, two Federal Leaders and one hundred 
State representatives to be determined on the basis of party 
membership) would have favoured NSW, which had far the largest 
membership, even against Victoria. The officers accepted an amendment 
for a 132 member Conference, based on a representative from each 
Federal electorate, plus the eight politicians. This scheme, which 
NSW put up at the Executive meeting of May 1967, was slightly less 
favourable to herself.
65The reactions of State Branches, NOPC and Federal Executive to each 
Wyndham recommendation were contained in: 1967 Federal Conference:
Party Re-Organisation: Federal Executive Recommendations, Fed. Rec.,
NLA MS 4985/149/207.
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Almost two years later, the Federal Executive, over the opposition
of New South Wales and Tasmanian delegates, Wyndham and Whitlam, again
declined to support more than minimal changes. The Executive agreed to
recommend to a Special Federal Conference that the Federal Leader and
his Deputy be given the constitutional right to attend and speak at
Federal Executive.and Conference. Other minor changes were endorsed
but the crucial recommendations for delegation expansion and for an
6 6inquiry into the National Conference idea were rejected.
The two year delay between first presentation of Wyndham's
recommendations (May 1965) and the Federal Executive's final
pronouncement upon them (May 1967) reflected the unwillingness of the
majority of States, in their various guises (directly, NOPC and Federal
Executive) to countenance major organisational changes. Most State
representatives saw the strength of the faceless men argument but saw
little need for reform other than that required to pull this argument's
teeth. 'As far as the majority were concerned', Virgo recalled, 'the
only real problem was overcoming the faceless men idea as seen at the
Hotel Kingston' (as Calwell and Whitlam awaited the North West Cape
decision). Making Federal Conferences public was part of the answer
(the first public Conference was in 1965); writing the two Leaders'
rights into the rules formalised the recognition that the Executive had
6 7been quick to give the problem early in 1964. While some delegates 
wished to keep politicians off Federal bodies, while others feared 
swamping in a National Conference, while others knew their Branches 
lacked money, while still others refused to share their power with
FX 8-11 May 1967, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/44.
6 7G.T. Virgo, interview. For the 1964 invitation, see note 50 above. 
Even Oliver saw this as the main problem and lacked enthusiasm for the 
National Conference concept (C.T. Oliver, interview).
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newcomers, all could agree that the presence of non-voting politicians
would benefit the party without altering the balance of the Federal
bodies. If it took so long for the Executive to come to even this
limited conclusion it was because the States did not place a high
priority on a decision and because the Executive was occupied with
68other matters during 1966.
But would others be satisfied with this small change? Whitlam
became Federal Leader in February 1967 and indicated at once that his
interest in a new structure which avoided the deficiencies of federalism
had not waned. Labor was still a coalition of State Branches when it
should be a national party. He told his first press Conference as
Leader that he preferred a new-style Conference of delegates from 'the
members of the party who live in each federal electorate, and ... from
69affiliated bodies like the trade unions . . . ' . In the months before 
the 1967 Special Conference, Whitlam and his Deputy, Barnard, spoke 
continually of the need for 'a democratic and representative'structure'
The reluctance to move quickly had been shown as far back as August 
1964, when the Executive deleted or made redundant all specific dates 
in Wyndham's proposed timetable for investigation and report. Not 
until December 1966 was it announced that all States had completed 
their review of Wyndham's recommendations, which had been supplied to 
them in May 1965. Finally, the May 1967 Executive noted the NOPC's 
failure to report to the Executive on its further deliberations after 
the Conference and resolved to consider its report forthwith.
Meanwhile, the NOPC had enquired when the Executive would consider 
its report: (FX 4-6 August 1964, 7 December 1966, 8-11 May 1967, Fed.
Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/35; 120/40, 44). Given that most of the NOPC
were also Executive members and all were State representatives (except 
Wyndham and Calwell) there is no point apportioning blame, except to 
note how difficult it is for organisations to reform themselves. For 
the Executive's other occupations in 1966, see earlier chapters.
69ALP Federal Secretariat Information Release No. 4/67 Press Conference 
Mr E.G. Whitlam, Q.C. 9/2/67, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/146/187.
396
suitable for responsive national policymaking and government rather 
than an extension of the collective deficiencies of the State Branches. 
Labor would not gain power in Canberra, they argued, unless its 
organisation could produce and promote modern and relevant electoral 
policies. It could survive indefinitely as a pressure group; its 
success as a party depended upon fundamental organisational reform.^ 
'There was little hope', Freudenberg recalled, 'that the Federal 
Conference would reform itself without pressure from outside'. Given 
that Federal Caucus, one source of pressure, was not especially 
interested and that the States, another source, had a vested interest 
in the status quo, Whitlam sought to stir the rank and file.
Freudenberg says Whitlam 'took every opportunity - branch meetings, 
union meetings and party conferences - to hammer the theme of reform'.^
Age, 30 March, 27 May, 10 June 1967; Australian, 10, 13, 23 May,
10 June 1967; C-M, 2 May 1967; Examiner, 16 March 1967; SMH, 13, 
16-18, 30 March, 10, 23 May, 10 June 1967; West Australian, 7 March 
1967; E.G. Whitlam, Address at the Conference of the Union of Postal 
Clerks and Telegraphists, Sydney, 22 May 1967; Let Us Now Begin! 
Towards a National Party with a National Purpose, Canberra? 1967.
^Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 91-2. Freudenberg suggests that 
Whitlam's campaign began after the May Executive meeting but the dates 
in note 70 show it was well advanced before this. (The effect of the 
May meeting on Whitlam is suggested in the next paragraph.) Whitlam 
circulated at the three June State Conferences a pamphlet summarising 
the arguments for reform and including extracts from his earlier 
speeches: AFR, 9 June 1967; Australian Labor Party: A National
Party with a National Purpose, Vic. Rec., State Annual Conference 1967. 
The effect of Whitlam's speeches on local branches is difficult to 
assess. The New South Wales and Victorian Conferences of 1967 received 
between them about fifty items supporting some type of reform. Some 
of these would have been prompted by Whitlam's activities since 
February. Yet the South Australian Convention on the same weekend 
received a solitary item on the subject and one delegate told the 
Convention there was little interest in the branches in organisational 
reform: Advertiser, 14 June 1967; ALP (NSW Branch), Annual General
Conference 1967 Agenda, 13-15; (SA Branch), Official Agenda, Sixty- 
Fourth Annual Convention, 1967, item 64; (Victorian Branch), Annual 
Conference: Agenda Paper 1967, 56-61.
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The aim was not to convert the oligarchs but to build up a ground
swell of opinion which the oligarchs could not ignore and which would
force them to make concessions in spite of themselves. Whitlam was
assisted by the media coverage afforded him. Most notably at the
Victorian Conference, where Whitlam combined a call for Federal
reform with an attack on the unrepresentative control of the State
Branch, his forthrightness attracted media interest. Similarly,
Whitlam's frequent expositions fuelled the issue in a way impossible
before he became Leader, when his speeches on the subject were more
occasional and circumspect. The press and Whitlam joined forces to
carry to the Federal party decisionmakers the banner of reform.
Whitlam must have realised the strength of the opposition. While
his vehemence suggested a man bent on winning the main prize - a
National Conference - he hinted in some speeches that the Wyndham plan
72would be an acceptable first step. When the Federal Executive in May
seemed to close the door on the Wyndham plan, Whitlam tried a new
entry. 'I do not expect', he said to the South Australian Convention
in June, 'a brand new organisation to emerge fully fledged from next
month's Federal Conference'. He proposed instead a Commission of one
representative from each State, himself, Barnard and Wyndham, to
report to a later Special Conference on the feasibility of a National 
73Conference. The Special Commission would have had a majority in 
favour of the National Conference (Whitlam, Barnard, Wyndham and the 
New South Wales and, probably, Tasmanian representatives) but the
72Age, 12 May 1967; Australian, 13, 17 March 1967; SMH, 13, 17 March,
10 May 1967.
73Age, 12 June 1967; AFR, 9 June 1967; Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 
99; Sunday Mail, 11 June 1967; Whitlam, Let us Now Begin.' ..., 19.
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suggestion for its establishment recognised the need to proceed slowly, 
to gather support, to work out details and to assuage fears in the 
party. The activities of the Commission would assure the electors that 
Labor was serious about organisational reform without provoking, as a 
precipitate change might have, party discord to worry the same 
electors.^
Not surprisingly, given Whitlam’s clear preference for a National
Conference, the inquiry proposal was regarded suspiciously by some
States. Like Wyndham's delegation expansion proposal it seemed 'a foot
in the door' to more fundamental reform. The publicity which surely
would accompany, and the hopes which would be aroused by such an inquiry
would make it difficult to reject a proposal for a mass Conference.
Thus Victoria, South Australia and Queensland stood firm against an 
75inquiry. However, Western Australia provided an unexpected break. 
Addressing the Branch Conference on 7 July, Whitlam urged delegates to 
support the inquiry plan and the immediate seating of himself and Barnard 
as full Federal Conference and Executive members. Against Chamberlain's 
opposition, the Conference supported both propositions.^ Nevertheless,
Whitlam himself set much store on a University of Melbourne survey in 
September 1966, which showed that 42 per cent of respondents regarded 
the ALP's organisation as its most important or second most important 
weakness (Whitlam, Let Us Now Begin! ..., 5).
^ Advertiser, 13, 14 June, 12 July 1967; Australian, 15 July 1967;
C-M, 17 July 1967; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 158; SMH, 17, 31 July 1967.
There were suggestions that South Australian delegates en bloc and/or 
individual Queenslanders might support an inquiry but, after lobbying 
from both sides, neither possibility eventuated.
^K.E. Beazley, interview; CT^ , 10 July 1967; SMH, 8, 10 July 1967;
West Australian, 8, 10, 12 July 1967; Western Sun, July 1967, 1-2;
J.M. Wheeldon, interview. Chamberlain, convenor of the Branch committee 
on Federal matters, had recommended the Branch endorse only the limited 
Federal Executive proposals. J.M. Berinson, Senior Vice President of 
the Branch, moved an amendment from the floor supporting the inquiry and 
Beazley and Webb supported him. Whitlam had spoken earlier and, 
according to Chamberlain (in an unusually informative article in his 
normally taciturn Western Sun) lobbied extensively before .the vote. A 
second motion endorsed the immediate seating of the two Leaders.
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even with Western Australia’s six delegates added to those from New 
South Wales and Tasmania, Whitlam still lacked a majority for his 
inquiry. On the eve of the Special Conference, to be held in 
conjunction with the Adelaide Commonwealth Conference, the possibility 
of a first step towards replacing the State based structure seemed 
remote.
Conference delegates met in Adelaide on 31 July in the aftermath
of Labor’s triumph at the Corio by-election nine days earlier. As
with the Dawson by-election in the previous year, Whitlam hoped to use
an election success for which he believed himself largely responsible
as a lever to win internal changes.^ Nevertheless, the National
Conference inquiry proposal dropped from most delegates’ view fairly
early in the intensive and confused lobbying which surrounded the public
sessions of the Adelaide Conference. Only Whitlam and perhaps Wyndham
seemed very interested. Eventually, in a little over three minutes on
the morning of 1 August 1967, delegates unanimously agreed that all
four Federal and six State Leaders should become full members of
Conference and that the four Federal Leaders should become full members 
78of the Executive. Some of the most heated private discussions had
One anti-reform delegate recalled: ’Whitlam had sold to the media the
myth that his win at Corio was a justification and a mandate for party 
re-organisation. The Conference met in this atmosphere’ (W.H. Hartley, 
interview). For the media view of Corio, see: Age, Australian, CT, SMH,
24 July 1967. Labor won the seat with a swing of 10.7 per cent (Malcolm 
Mackerras, Australian General Elections, Sydney, 1972, 99).
78ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference and Special Conference, 
1967, 111. A new delegate from the Northern Territory to each body gave 
the new Conference forty-seven delegates, the Executive seventeen 
delegates. Details of the lobbying contained in press reports and the 
author’s interviews suggest it was unusually complex, although it is of 
the nature of such processes that different participants perceive them 
differently. The main points of difference concerned: (1) Who were the
most important individuals? Barnard, Cairns, Cameron, Chamberlain,
Dunstan, Oliver and Toohey were mentioned as key actors. One delegate
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concerned not the desirability of fundamental, long-term reform but 
the short-term question of whether four or two of the present set of 
Federal Leaders would join the Executive and who, consequently, would 
command a majority there.^
'Some commentators saw the result as a.victory for Whitlam, while
i80others called it a defeat;' To Whitlam afterwards, the seating of the 
Parliamentary Leaders in their own right was the 'irreducible minimum'
78 (continued)
provided the wisest answer, however: 'everyone is involved, there are
no most important people'. (2) Whence came the final solution? 
Chamberlain says he thought of it and argued for it throughout. Oliver 
says Chamberlain was adamant against places for politicians until the 
last and the idea came from New South Wales - as the 1967 Branch 
Conference Minutes show. (But Oliver himself was never strong for the 
National Conference and believed the 'faceless men' image was the main 
problem.) (3) Who held out? Some say Chamberlain resisted the 
concession to politicians, others that Whitlam hoped till the last for 
an inquiry, haranguing delegates, even threatening resignation, only 
giving in when his own supporters began to desert him. Details: ALP
(NSW Branch), Minutes of the Annual General Conference [1967], NSW Rec., 
ML MSS 2083/438/1135/ 45-7; interviews with W.W.C. Brown, C.R.Cameron, 
F.E. Chamberlain, W.R. Colboume, W.H. Hartley, C.T. Oliver,
E.G. Whitlam; press reports in seven newspapers and Nation, 12 August 
1967.
79Cameron argued that conceding only two Leaders (then Whitlam and 
Barnard) would give Whitlam a majority on the Executive on most issues 
of 8-7 (since the likely Northern Territory representative, J. Nelson, 
would support Whitlam). Adding four Leaders by including the Senate 
Leaders, Cohen and Murphy, both regular opponents of Whitlam, would 
reverse the general balance to 8-9 and retain the status quo, measured 
on the existing Executive as 5-7. On both sides the participants thought 
first of the factional colour of the current Leaders: Whitlam and his
supporters' goal was two only, although the argument about representation 
of politicians should not have depended on factional considerations; 
Cameron, Chamberlain and others realised they had to concede something, 
regardless of principles, and balanced Whitlam and Barnard with two of 
their own. The short-term thinking of both sides was underlined when 
Cohen's replacement in 1969 by Willesee reversed the notional balance. 
This balance, in any case, only held for some issues. Organisational 
reform was one of these but by 1969, when the balance changed, this was 
a dead issue. Incidentally, the inclusion of six State Leaders on 
the Conference caused few difficulties for any Adelaide participant.
For all these points: Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 100; Oakes &
Solomon, The Making of an Australian Prime Minister, 15; the references 
in the preceding footnote.
80Oakes, Whitlam PM, 159.
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for which he had struggled. His vehemence of the preceding months 
would have been pointless, however, if he had not hoped for more than 
this minimum. But his very vehemence and the ground swell he seemed 
to have created forced the Conference majority to concede more than 
the Executive's maximum concession desired in May - the non-voting 
presence by right of two Federal Leaders. 'The idea of getting two 
Federal Leaders on had got too much of a start for nothing to be done', 
said Cameron in an interview with the author. Another delegate 
remembered the fear of a damaging deadlock, eighteen votes all, when 
hopes of some reform had been raised. A third delegate summarised the 
views of most of his fellows as 'what is the furthest we can go in this 
change?' From at least 1964 members of the Federal Executive and 
Conference had been looking desultorily for a compromise that was 
acceptable to the party's sub-coalitions. All recognised the problem 
of the faceless men; a majority hoped that the cosmetic change 
suggested by the Executive would solve it; Whitlam and his allies 
helped ensure that more was conceded. If there had been a Federal 
majority against reform of any sort, there had been plenty of 
opportunities to close the door upon it. Yet in August 1964, when 
Wyndham was commissioned, in May 1965, when his report went to the 
Branches, at the 1965 Federal Conference, when the NOPC's report was 
received and its work continued, and in May 1967, when the Special 
Conference was arranged, the Federal bodies made no final decision. 
While they whittled away the more extreme proposals, their failure to
81E.G. Whitlam, interview. See also: ALP, Official Report,
Commonwealth Conference and Special Conference, 1967, 51-3 (Whitlam's 
address); Australian, 7 August 1967 (Whitlam interviewed);
Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 91, 100.
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settle the issue left the way open for Whitlam, working outside the
formal machinery, to influence the terms of the compromise which 
82finally emerged.
Whitlam believed that Labor's commitment to reform through a 
national government compelled it to have an organisation based on its 
national rank and file rather than one concerned primarily with 
reconciling differences between States. A National Conference would 
by-pass the State Branches and replace the archaic Federal structure. 
Rank and file and community opinion would be interpreted and articulated 
by politicians. Whitlam knew this prospect alarmed the States, for he
82It is beyond the scope of this chapter to test further our HYPOTHESES 
XIV, XV and XVI. Nevertheless, there is evidence in this narrative of 
incrementalism, partisan mutual adjustment and garbage can characteristics 
Labor decisionmakers nibbled at the problem over nearly four years, they 
looked for mutually acceptable decisions - even if, as often happened, 
these were decisions to defer - and they were affected by their time 
commitments to other matters, their other problems (bring Whitlam 
down a peg by defeating him over re-organisation; help Labor back into 
government in New South Wales by refurbishing Labor's Federal image) 
and their different goals, which made them perceive decisions differently. 
They were continually expected to produce 'something which can be called 
a "decision'". Given Labor's coalitional nature and its permeability by 
multiple outside influences it is likely to make decisions in similar 
ways whether the outcomes are a preselected.candidate, an election 
campaign strategy, a re-organised party, a revised policy or a 
combination of all these. Four further comments may be added:
(1) '[0]rganisational changes cannot be seen in isolation. They are
always associated, even if unintentionally, with particular tendencies 
in policy and in factional control; and this, of course, is what 
largely explains resistance to them': D.W. Rawson, 'The A.L.P. Federal
Machine’, AQ, 37, 3 (September 1965), 26. (2) An article which
describes the role of misinformation and ambiguity (cf Allison, March 
and Olsen) in a party Leadership crisis: Australian, 29 April 1968
(Alan Ramsey). (3) The ALP often elects as leaders or candidates
individuals described as 'compromises'. This usually means that more 
talented contenders have been too extreme to win a majority of votes 
and sub-coalitions have been satisficed by a candidate against whom a 
majority have no strong objections. As with policies produced in the 
same way the 'winner' cannot be opposed publicly. (4) Finally, on 
how re-organisations may become garbage cans, see March & Olsen, Ambiguity 
and Choice ..., 314-37.
403
quoted to the Victorian Branch Conference their own press spokesman:
'These [National Conference] delegates would be responsible to nobody
except their own Federal campaign committees. Consequently they could
well pursue policies which were in conflict with those of their own
State Executive or Annual Conference.' Whitlam retailed the Branch
hierarchy's fears with relish: 'Herein lies the value and necessity
of a change from the present system. Our present Federal structure is
not geared to win elections for the House of Representatives, where all
83the great initiatives and responsibilities now lie.' The extent to
which Branch fears - and Whitlam's hopes - would have been confirmed
would have depended on the detailed arrangements worked out for a
National Conference. It may have been, in Crisp's words, that 'so long
as governmental federalism lasts, Party federalism will continue to be
84appropriate and, indeed, indispensable'. The need to run candidates 
at both State and Federal levels may have worked against any significant 
separation of structures. The party could not afford two separate 
structures and while State organisations continued they would seek to 
exert control over all classes of candidates and delegates, who would be 
unwilling to risk the displeasure of the State side of the structure for 
the sake of supporting particular national policies. Further, while the 
possibility of State control of national delegations remained, so did 
the possibilities of bloc voting and of resentment by the outnumbered 
smaller States.
8 3Whitlam, Let Us Now Begin! ..., 10, quoting Sun, 7 June 1967.
84Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party, 13. At the time of writing 
this thesis, the party's Committee of Inquiry was trying to solve just 
the problems outlined above. Moreover, its new media director, describing 
how he would keep Federal politicians in touch with feeling in the 
electorate, said he 'would draw on advice from the ALP's Federal 
electorate councils particularly, but he denied that this was a ploy to 
bypass the ALP's State machines' (CT, 16 January 1979).
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None of these problems had to be faced in 1967, because the inquiry 
85proposal failed. With hindsight one can argue that the ex-officio 
representation of politicians blurred the division into Branch blocs, 
since politicians often looked at a different set of considerations 
than did Branch delegates and were not so tied by State instructions.
The level of interest and expertise in electoral policy also was 
enhanced. Ex-officio representation may have encouraged the election 
of more politicians as Branch delegates, which further changed the 
outlook of the Federal bodies. But the change of 1967 was not as much 
augmenting or reforming as by-passing. It drew the teeth of the 
unattractive bogey of external control of members of Parliament. It 
'should destroy for all time', said Keeffe, 'the claim of our political 
enemies that Labor policy is formulated by so-called "faceless men"'. 
Whitlam agreed:
Before 1967 it could have legitimately been said 
that the Federal Executive of the Labor Party 
could treat Labor Members of Parliament as puppets.
It can't be said now. And in fact half the people 
on the Federal Executive are members of the Federal 
Parliament.^ 6
Some reports had it that, in return for the limited reforms at Adelaide, 
Whitlam agreed to cease the struggle for more fundamental changes (Age,
2 August 1967; DT, 1 August 1967; Socialist and Industrial Labor,
August 1967, 1). Although Whitlam told the Conference after the decision 
that '[i]t's true that there can be, I would hope in due course there will 
be, still further changes' (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference 
and Special Conference, 1967, 53), he seems to have made little public 
attempt to promote them.
86ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1969, 159 (Keeffe's 
Presidential address); Anonymous, ed., Whitlam and Frost, London, 1974,
44 (interview in August 1972). For comments on the effects of the 
seating of politicians: Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 100; Michelle
Grattan, 'The Australian Labor Party', Henry Mayer & Helen Nelson, ed., 
Australian Politics: A Third Reader, Melbourne, 1973, 393; Oakes,
Whitlam PM, 159; Louise Overacker, Australian Parties in a Changing 
Society, 1945-67, Melbourne, 1968, 130. The 1972 Executive's proportion 
of Federal politicians may be compared with that in 1959, one out of 
twelve. Conferences changed similarly: in 1959 there were four Federal
and eight State politicians out of thirty-six delegates; in 1969 there 
were thirteen Federal and twelve State politicians out of forty-seven
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THE POLICY COMMITTEES
Until the late 1950s almost the first act of any Federal ALP
Conference had been to divide into Conference Committees based on
broad subject areas and comprising one representative from each
delegation. Each Committee considered agenda items from the States
and reported back to the full Conference, which usually adopted most
of the Committee’s recommendations to discharge, adopt or amend and
adopt items. Meanwhile, quite independently, Federal and State
Parliamentarians became specialists in electoral policy areas because
of knowledge gained in Parliament or as ministers. Occasionally,
politicians would assist Conference Committees (when they were not
themselves members of them as Conference delegates) or delegations
from their State. Non-politicians with an interest in particular
subjects, such as J.W. Wood and S. Encel in education, also contributed 
8 7desultorily. Rarely, such help from non-delegates was formalised.
Thus, the 1957 Conference appointed a committee, eight out of ten of 
whose members were Federal politicians, to examine the possibility of a 
national health scheme. The 1959 Conference adopted the findings of 
this committee without demur and itself appointed committees to revise 
the social services and economic sections of the Federal platforms.
86 (continued)
delegates. See also note 37 above. Finally, it is worth noting that 
the introduction of proportional- representation to the reconstructed 
New South Wales and Victorian Branches in 1970-71 introduced sub- 
coalitional divisions to their State delegations and further blurred 
State blocs.
8 7C.R. Cameron, F. Crean, interviews; Crisp, The Australian Federal 
Labour Party, 22-3; Dunstan, 'A.L.P. at Work', 3; Labor, April 1957,
6; J.W. Wood, interview. Federal politicians such as Crean, A.D. Fraser 
and McKenna addressed Conference and Executive as a whole on policy 
matters. Crean himself suggested the social services committee referred 
to above: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1959, 37;
FX 11-14 August 1958, Fed. Rec., 'NLA MS 4985/123/55.
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Both committees were two-thirds politicians. These ad hoc decisions 
helped the party produce some well-rounded, internally consistent 
policy statements which rose above mere piecemeal reactions to State 
Branch items or attempts to reconcile differences between party sub­
coalitions .
In early 1961, the three existing 'Standing Committees' - as they
had come to be called - on social services, health and economic planning
began work on detailed proposals for the Federal elections due in that
year. Much of the credit for this innovation was Chamberlain's. He
had become Acting Federal Secretary in September 1960 and Secretary in
February 1961 and he sought the cooperation of the new Federal
Parliamentary Leader, Calwell (elected March 1960) in devising improved
methods of composing Labor's electoral promises. Evatt, Calwell's
predecessor, had been notorious for trying to write election policy
alone and at the last moment. After his unexpected promise in 1954
to abolish the means test, the machine had tried to supervise more
closely but its attempts had been too belated to permit much more than
89revision of an existing draft. Chamberlain hoped to introduce more
88ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1957, 64-5; 1959, 33,
36, 40-2; 1961, 74, 81; FX 30 June-2 July 1958, Fed. Rec., NLA MS
4985/123/55. Theoretically, all three committees comprised a 
representative from each Branch and representatives of the Federal 
Caucus, but about half the Branches appointed Federal Parliamentarians 
as their representatives in any case. The first two committees were 
chaired by Fraser, the third by Crean. Both met at least seven times, 
sometimes over two or three days. Finally, it is worth noting that 
the ordinary Conference Committees had the power to co-opt non-delegates 
to assist them (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1957, 7; 
1959, 4) but there is no evidence of how often this power was used.
89See note 33 above. The 1955 Federal Conference had decided such 
consultations should be held and, indeed, the Executive used this 
resolution as the basis of its activities during 1961 (ALP, Official 
Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1955, 51; 1961, 66). For pre-election
consultations under Evatt: FX 31 October-3 November 1955; 11-14 August
1958, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/123/55. The respective election dates 
were 10 December and 22 November.
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comprehensive cooperation between organisation, Caucus and sympathetic
advisers. The aim was not so much by-passing the Federal bodies as
joint production of more thoughtful policy well before polling day.
Politicians and experts provided most of the ideas, the Executive
reviewed progress, made some alterations and produced occasional policy
90documents for the press in the months before the election.
Despite the instruction from the 1959 Conference, there was no
attempt during 1960-61 to revise comprehensively Labor’s Federal
platform. The Executive postponed consideration of the unsatisfactory
platform and its lack of relevance for elections, in order to give
detailed consideration to the policy speech itself and to make much of
91its contents public well in advance of polling day. The April 1961
90ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1961, 66; Chamberlain 
to Schmella, 6 May 1960; correspondence between Chamberlain and Calwell, 
August-October 1960 and between Chamberlain and Calwell, Chamberlain and 
Executive members, Chamberlain and Cairns, Crean, Fraser, R. Pollard and 
A.V. Thompson, MPs, and B. Fitzpatrick and E.L. Wheelwright, December 
1960-September 1961; FX 5-8 September, 5-8 December 1960, 13-16 
February, 3-7 July, 21-24 August, 26-28 September 1961; documents 
inserted in Minute book, covering deliberations of Economic Planning 
Committee; copies of policies as adopted by Executive, Fed. Rec., NLA 
MS 4985/9/F3_, F6; 124/56/24, 30-3, 36-94, 129-44, 153-4, 161-3, 166,
168-76, 186-90, 198-214; Dunstan, 'A.L.P. at Work', 4; SMH, 10 July 1961 
(Whitlam outlines the process). Preliminary versions of some of the 
documents as well as advice from the contributors were available to 1961 
Federal Conference delegates. The final versions usually contained 
contributions from a number of sources. The Federal Executive formally 
adopted twelve policies (Social Services, Taxation, Overseas Investment, 
Import Controls, Overseas Aid, Hire Purchase, Commonwealth-State 
Financial Relations, Housing, National Development, Rural, Northern 
Territory and Financing Labor’s Proposals) although others had been 
discussed. The policies adopted were less comprehensive than Calwell's 
ultimate policy speech (Arthur Calwell, Labor's Policy - Blueprint for 
a Government, Canberra [?] 1961).
91Although the 1959 Conference had instructed the Economic Planning and 
Social Services Committees to review the relevant policy entirely, the 
Executive agreed, in Chamberlain's words, 'that attention should be given 
to the question of the Australian economy [then in the midst of the 
'credit squeeze'] in the light of what the Party could go to the electorate 
on': Minutes of meeting between Federal Executive Officers, Federal
Parliamentary Labor Party Leaders and Members of A.L.P. Economic Committee 
(Melbourne, 10-12 January 1961), FX Minute Book, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/ 
124/56/56. This became the goal of the whole exercise and, indeed, as 
the list in the previous note shows, all the documents had a connection 
with the economy.
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Federal Conference, impressed with the work of the three existing
committees and the likely results of the work begun by Chamberlain,
resolved to expand the system. It directed the Executive to establish
Standing Committees (later often called 'Standing Policy Committees' or
simply 'Policy Committees') on Economic Planning, Social Services,
Health (these three already existed under the previous arrangements),
Education, Foreign Affairs, Rural Policy and any others which the
Executive might determine. The Committees were to continually review
party policy in the light of modern trends and to consider specific
questions referred to them by the Executive. They began meeting after
the 1961 Federal election and most of them reported to the Federal
92Executive before the 1963 Federal Conference.
The deliberations of this Conference showed the new system had far
more capacity to consider policy at length than had the old Conference
Committee system. Moreover, almost all parts of the Standing Committee
reports were adopted, new planks being incorporated into the Federal
platform or Committee recommendations on Branch items being accepted
almost invariably. For the first time, Federal Conference no longer
appointed its own Committees. In future, State Branch items would be
referred to the Standing Committees. If any further proof were required
of the new system's acceptability, Chamberlain's letter to Standing
Committee Chairmen provided it:
The new methods of formulating policy are now 
meeting with general approval, and this is due in 
no mean measure to the diligent manner in which
92ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1961, 38; Chamberlain 
to nominees for Education Committee, 21 July 1961; FX 8-11 October 
1962, 24-27 June 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/13/F43; 124/56/253-77;
125/57/61-71. One specific reference before the 1963 Conference was 
the state aid question. See chapter 3, above.
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Committees have applied themselves to the task of 
providing the fullest possible information in 
respect to their subjects for the benefit of 
Conference.93
Chamberlain's remark overstated Conference's role if it implied
that delegates used the new Committees' work as raw material for
detailed discussions on the Conference floor. Even under the Conference
Committee system detailed discussion, such as it was, took place outside
94Conference sessions. The old system was designed to overcome the
difficulties of detailed consideration by a Conference of thirty-six
members but, by comprising one member from each State,these Committees
ensured that their recommendations were based on the same need to
reconcile State Branch goals that motivated the Conference as a whole.
The new system rested on a different base. We saw that the first three
Committees comprised a Federal element (one representative from each
State) and a Parliamentary element (Caucus representatives). State
Branches further recognised the potential contributions of politicians
95by appointing them as State Branch representatives. The Federal 
element of these pioneering Committees was thus further broken down. 
Politicians brought to the discussions, in theory, at least, a desire
91Chamberlain to Bryant, 16 August 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/13/F43. 
My emphasis. See also: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference,
1963; SMH, 6 August 1963.
94For one Conference delegate's view, see Dunstan, 'A.L.P. at Work', 3. 
The author refers to the lack of background information, either from 
the States sending the items or from other sources, the adoption of 
half-baked and badly expressed ideas and the shelving of other matters 
without adequate consideration. That sensible decisions emerged 'was 
often more surprising than otherwise'.
95See above, note 88.
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for electoral and administrative feasibility, cohesiveness and clarity
96and, above all, a knowledge of the issues.
The system which developed by 1963 sought also to tap a wider range
of expertise. Since his first Federal Conference in 1948, Chamberlain
had been shocked by the perfunctory consideration of policies, by the
lack of information on the merits of policies, and, especially, by
Labor’s failure to seek the help of sympathetic experts in time for
Conference delegates to be well-advised well before Conferences. ’Labor
has in its ranks the specialist in many fields of human endeavour. Our
97only trouble is that we are not availing ourselves of their services.’ 
The new system sought to remedy this deficiency. Simultaneously, it by­
passed the State-based machine. 'No longer are these [Committees] to 
be representative of branch organisation’, wrote Dunstan after the 1961 
Conference. 'They are to be small groups of people knowledgeable in
the particular field of the committee's work and empowered to co-opt 
98assistance.' True, the Federal Executive still supplied a member of
This may not have worked in practice: 'Several State branches appointed
delegates who had little qualification as experts ... but who, since 
they were Federal Parliamentarians, could travel to committee meetings 
without cost to the Branch' (Dunstan, 'A.L.P. at Work', 3). Politicians 
appointed to these first Committees did include well-qualified men:
Crean, whose economic expertise would have been useful to the National 
Health Committee, McKenna, a former Social Services Minister, Tasmanian 
representative on the Committee in that area, and Senator Dittmer, a 
doctor on the same Committee. Still, free travel was always a 
consideration in appointing politicians.
97Chamberlain, A Selection of Talks and Articles ..., 10 (written 1956); 
F.E. Chamberlain, interview.
98Dunstan, 'A.L.P. at Work', 4. Dunstan was a member of both Federal 
Executive and Conference at the time, as well as of Standing and other 
Committees. According to the Executive itself, committee members, 
both politician and non-politician, were selected for their 'specialised 
knowledge', (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 94).
On co-opting, see note 125, below.
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each Committee as liaison and Chairman, but otherwise expertise should 
be the criterion. The very method of filling Committee places by
Executive appointment was designed to allow this criterion to operate.
Chamberlain remained Federal Secretary until late 1963. Under his 
leadership the Committees remained small and the few documents available 
do not suggest Committee members drew upon a wide range of community 
sources for information and ideas. Fourteen of the twenty-six 
Committee places early in 1963 were occupied by Parliamentarians and 
the evidence suggests that the Committees relied mainly on information 
gleaned by these men in the course of their political work. The few 
non-politicians, such as Encel and Wood in the Education Committee, 
brought some outside expertise. Most of the six Executive members 
acting as Chairmen lacked detailed knowledge of their Committee’s 
subject.100
Chamberlain’s successor, Wyndham, came from Victoria, which already 
had a tradition of seeking policy contributions from a wide range of 
people. Wyndham had sought to encourage this tendency and believed the 
same methods could be followed in Canberra.101 What Chamberlain had
99
99FX 3-7 July 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/114-18, shows that the 
first places were filled on the basis of a mandatory place in each for an 
Executive member, then appointment of all individuals whom Executive 
members nominated. This method meant Committees ranged in size from 
three to seven.
10°ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 8, shows this 
breakdown of Committee places: Executive members as Chairmen: 6; Federal
politicians: 12; State politicians: 2; Others: 6 (including a State 
Branch President, State Branch Assistant Secretary, and four senior 
party members with expertise). But the Committees did receive some help> 
at least from Deputy Leader Whitlam. (See note 125, below).
101In 1959-60, 102 branch members comprised fifteen Victorian Branch 
’policy propaganda committees’ working to produce short pamphlets to 
publicise Labor policy to various groups in the community (pensioners, 
widows, farmers, teachers, public servants, etc.). The scheme seems to 
have faded away after only limited success: Age, 16 March 1960;
Circular B. 7: R. Balcombe, Assistant Secretary, VCE,to all branch
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commenced, Wyndham continued. Standing Policy Committees were not the 
only participants in electoral policymaking during Wyndham’s term 
(1963-69) but they were important. We shall examine their role in 
terms of the extent to which they by-passed the party's existing 
Federal machine.
The ability to by-pass turned on the Committees' relations with
both Federal Executive and Federal Conference. The Committees and the
Executive were connected formally through the Executive providing the
Committee Chairmen and by the Federal Secretary, who normally convened 
102the Committees. Secondly, the Executive developed rules covering
101 (continued)
Secretaries, 11 May 1959, Vic. Rec., Circulars 1959; Propaganda Committee, 
26 August, 16 October 1959; VCE 6 November 1959, ALP (Victorian Branch), 
State Executive Minutes, NLA mf G8740. The 1962 Branch Conference then 
adopted Wyndham1s recommendations for a system of policy committees to 
review - rather than publicise - policy. Four were established initially 
(Health, Disarmament, Trade and Industrial) to add to five others already 
existing under earlier Conference decisions. A further VCE decision in 
August 1964 took the number of committees to fifteen and 150 members 
answered a call for volunteers to man them: ALP (Victorian Branch),
Central Executive Report 1962-63, 1-2; 1964-65, 19-23. By late 1964 one
academic and party member could see the committees as an opportunity for 
Labor’s professional component to assert its influence (James Jupp,
'Victoriana’, Dissent, 13 (Spring 1964), 37) and from 1964 to 1967 
Victoria produced the best discussion pamphlets on party policy of any 
Branch of the party in the Looking to the Future pamphlets on education, 
town planning and science and a pamphlet on reform of the law relating 
to insanity and criminal responsibility.
102The 1965 Federal Executive report described the practice of appointing 
an Executive member as ’an effective link between the two bodies'. Wyndham 
convened and was ex-officio member of all Committees but Secretary only 
to some (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 108). Had 
the Federal Secretariat been provided with sufficient funds by the State 
Branches it could have provided the research facilities which early plans 
had envisaged. As it was, its research activities (carried out by Wyndham 
in spare moments between administrative and publicity work) went little 
beyond provision of speaker's notes and information releases. Wyndham 
expanded the party’s library and subscribed to overseas journals but there 
is little evidence in the party’s published and private documents that 
the Secretariat's limited work was much availed of by party units. The 
Secretariat's history from conception till temporary closure can be traced 
through Federal Conference Reports from 1959 to 1969. Not until 1979 did 
a small research unit begin work in the Secretariat. One of its tasks 
was servicing Policy Committees (CT, 16 January 1979).
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Committee reports. The original terms of reference, adopted in July
1961, stated merely that Committees ’shall report, either by way of
interim or finally to the Federal Executive’ and not until May 1963
were more detailed arrangements formulated. The new rules formalised
the practice of the previous two years. ’Whenever possible, all
reports of Standing Committees shall firstly [that is, before going to
Conference] be submitted to the Federal Executive for examination, who
shall have authority to amend.' Even by 1963 the Executive recognised
that it could not always consider Committee reports before they reached
Conference. While retaining a reserve power for the Executive, the
rules allowed by-passing of at least the Executive part of the Federal
machine. The Executive had not altered many reports in the past, except
those relating to state aid, but the 1963 rules recognised the
opportunity for Executive alteration was not necessary. ’Shall report’
103in 1961 became, in effect, ’may report’ in 1963. By 1965,delegate 
Virgo of South Australia could ask if it was possible for the Executive, 
in any circumstances, to give the Committee reports the consideration 
they deserved. Although the Executive defeated a motion (Nicholls- 
Virgo) that all Committee reports should be sent direct to Conference
1 0 iFX 3-7 July 1961, 7-9 May 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/115; 
125/57/35-6, 40. My emphasis. The procedures were adopted, with 
inconsequential changes in wording, by Federal Conference: ALP,
Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 9. ’Whenever’ became 
’wherever’. The Executive debate began with a motion from Dunstan 
which proposed rules which, on balance, would have given the Committees 
rather more freedom in relation to the Executive than they eventually 
received. For instance, while the Dunstan version allowed the Executive 
to send reports or parts of them back to the Committees, it could not 
’itself alter the report of a Committee unless with the agreement of 
the Committee*. The procedures as eventually adopted included provision 
that the Chairman, when presenting the report to Conference,should 
inform the Conference of any differences between the Committee majority 
view and the Executive majority view.
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in the form received by the Executive, it was clear that some delegates 
increasingly were prepared to forego examination of such documents. At 
most the Executive could give informed consideration only to 
controversial issues where State Branch attitudes were already well 
defined. Thus the 1965 pre-Conference Executive meeting covered a 
dozen reports in less than eight hours and only the Foreign Affairs and 
Defence and Education Committee reports received detailed consideration. 
Delegates could have argued that their Branches had no interests in 
those documents dismissed more perfunctorily, but the limited time 
available meant that any discussion on merits as well as out of self- 
interest was curtailed.
The Executive’s tendency to pass Committee reports to Conference 
almost unaltered continued in 1967, 1969 and 1971. In 1967, it sent 
nineteen reports up with only a cursory glance and two years later the 
extent of the withdrawal of the Executive from the policymaking field - 
as well as the extent of the decline of the issue itself - was reflected 
when it handed over without comment the report of the National Advisory 
Committee on Education. This report contained the proposal for a Schools 
Commission, which would distribute funds to all schools, state and non­
state. While Labor had removed in 1966 the barriers to its offering aid 
to non-state schools, it had yet no positive policy on the distribution 
of aid. There were anti-state aiders on the Executive who could have 
renewed the fight, had they chose. Instead, they left the final skirmish
104FX 28-30 July 1965, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/119/38. The Science, 
Economic Planning and Broadcasting Committee reports were all approved 
without debate, all others after short discussion and with between 
none and three amendments each. In the 1965 Conference report, the 
Committee reports cover ninety-seven pages, the consolidated Federal 
Executive amendments to them three pages.
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to Conference. It could be argued that the Conference reflected the
composition of the Executive and that the Executive's withdrawal
represented a reasonable division of labour: while the Executive
looked after organisation, the Conference considered policy. The goals
of Branches and of ex-officio Parliamentarians still could be served.
Yet the Executive of the early 1960s had been careful to reserve a role
for itself should the need arise, that is, in controversial matters.
As late as 1966, Conference confirmed the 1963 formula that the Executive
'[w]herever possible' should examine and, if necessary, amend Committee 
106reports. The Executive found time then to look at controversial 
matters; by the late 1960s it was less concerned to do so. In February 
1970, on the motion of Chamberlain and with little opposition, the 
Executive agreed to dele te even the permissive requirement of the 
existing rules. While the rules still did not deny the Executive the 
right to a role in policymaking, this change formalised what had become 
increasingly clear since the establishment of the Policy Committees: that 
they meant the effective by-passing of the Federal Executive in the 
making of Labor's platform.
1Q5Age, 28 July 1967, 23 July 1969; DT, 28 July 1967; FX 26-29 July 
1967, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/44; Susan C. Read, The 1969 Federal 
Conference of the Australian Labor Party: Its Impact on the Shape of
the Election Campaign and the Outcome of the Election, unpublished thesis 
[MA Qualifying?] Department of Political Science, School of General 
Studies, Australian National University [1971?] 22. The 1969 Executive 
also remitted most other reports with little discussion. For the 
Conference skirmish, carried by Cameron and I. Cathie (Victoria): ALP,
Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1969, 146-7; C.R. Cameron, 
interview. The NACE technically was,not a Standing Committee but it 
stood in the same relationship to Executive and Conference as they did.
106ALP, Special Commonwealth Conference July 1966: Report, Findings and
Documents, 61.
^^FX 25-26 February 1970, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/121/48. The Executive 
also removed the requirement that Conference shall be informed of any 
differences between the views of the Committee majority and the Executive. 
Given the Executive's inactivity this provision had long been redundant. 
Following the 1970 change, the pre-Conference Executive meetings of 1971 
were concerned only with recommendations on rules and miscellaneous policy 
items (FX 13-15 April, 16-17 June 1971, Fed. Rec., NLA MS'4985/121/49).
For the 1972 policy speech and the Executive, see below p.447.
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The implication of the preceding paragraphs is that one reason
for the Executive’s withdrawal from an electoral policymaking role was
the Executive's trust in the Committees’ ability to do the job. The
very expansion of the Committee system through the 1960s provides
further evidence for this conclusion. The Executive itself was charged
108with setting up Committees as it thought fit. It would have hardly
expanded a system to which it objected. By 1965, there were thirteen
Committees. In April 1968, there were sixteen, until a re-organisation
reduced the number to twelve, plus two other Committees, set up under
different rules, covering Women's Affairs and Youth matters. By
December 1971, the number of Policy Committees proper had grown again
to fourteen. They covered the whole range of a Federal Labor Government’s
likely activities. For example, the list at December 1971: Aboriginal
Affairs, Arts and Media, Economic, Education, Electoral, Foreign Affairs
and Defence, Health (which included social welfare matters generally),
Immigration, Industrial, Industry (including national development), Legal
and Constitutional, Resources and Rural, Transport and Urban Development
109(including housing). On paper, at least, the party had developed a 
formidable system.
^^See above p.408.
109Agenda Document One: Appointment of Committees. Memorandum by the
General Secretary; FX 17-20 April 1968, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/120/46,
45; ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 143; Names 
and Addresses of Policy Committee Members, Dec. [sic] 1971, Fed. Rec.,
NLA MS 4985/127/76. The 1968 re-organisation aligned the Committee 
subject areas with those of the Federal Caucus Committees and tried to 
demarcate more clearly the areas of Committee responsibilities to avoid 
overlapping. The Women and Youth Committees, like the National Advisory 
Committee on Education, a Legal Advisory, an Immigration Review and 
other committees set up at various times, were not strictly Standing 
Policy Committees, although some, like the NACE, existed for some years. 
They bore the same relationship to Conference as did Standing Committees. 
The NACE declined in importance once the needs concept of educational 
finance had been adopted. It reverted to a conventional Policy Committee.
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If the Federal Executive increasingly refrained from a significant 
policymaking role and constructed an alternative system, what of the 
Federal Conference? If Federal Conference duplicated the detailed 
discussions which the Policy Committees had been established to 
undertake then the whole point of the Committees would have been 
destroyed. By-passing would have been hollow indeed. An examination 
of Conference reports from 1963 to 1971 suggests, however, that 
Conferences were prepared to limit their role to one of general 
oversight and, sometimes, not even that. In a real sense, by-passing 
occurred and Labor’s supreme body became primarily an endorser of 
policy proposals discussed elsewhere.
Three related sets of reasons may be suggested for the ease of 
acceptance of Committee reports by Conferences. First, there were 
reasons in the Committees themselves. Clyde Cameron, a politician, 
State machine man, Federal delegate and Committee member provided this 
summary:
The Policy Committees came to be so efficient and 
this was recognised by the affiliates, who trusted 
in the Policy Committees. People felt any good 
ideas around would be picked up by these Committees, 
since they were composed of experts. They knew 
there was a wide range of contributions - even from 
judges under the lap - from a very knowledgeable 
group of people.
Toohey and Chamberlain agreed. There had long been a suspicion of 
'experts’ in parts of the ALP, but these comments suggest this 
suspicion could be overcome. Cameron recalled that unanimity in the 
Committee usually meant Conference adopted the report rapidly. On 
reports, or parts of them, where the Committee had disagreed the 
Committee minority might encourage their allies in the Conference to 
a floor debate. On the other hand, Committee members could often
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persuade delegates on the basis of superior knowledge gleaned from 
Committee duties.
Secondly, as both Crean and Cairns pointed out, there often was 
little in the Committee reports that could be objected to. If the 
reports emerged from a process of compromise on a Committee whose 
composition resembled that of the Conference, most delegates could 
identify with the recommendations. ^  Long before the Committees were 
established Conferences made many more decisions easily than with 
difficulty. Few delegates could object, for instance, to a recommendation 
that pensions be increased or taxes reduced. Controversy in any 
organisation attends only a minority of proposals, whatever their source.
The third pair of reasons concerns the Federal Conference itself. 
First, the Conference during the 1960s came to resemble the Committees.
We have noted earlier that the proportion of politicians on the Conference 
rose during the 1960s. There were ten Federal and State Parliamentarians 
at the 1961 Conference; by the 1969 Conference there were twenty-five,
C.R. Cameron, F.E. Chamberlain, J.P. Toohey, interviews. Interestingly, 
all three related their support of the Committees, especially of the 
scope they provided for non-politician, non-machine contributions, to 
attitudes to other possible contributors. Thus Cameron believed the 
Committees produced a far greater aggregation of wisdom than could have 
been produced by the National Conference proposal, while Toohey praised 
the system especially because it ’brought in the contributions of people 
outside the Parliamentary party'. Thirdly, Chamberlain, in interview and 
in 1967, used the success of the Committees as an argument against the 
Whitlam plan for a National Conference. 'If the policy was good', as’ 
both he and Whitlam agreed, 'then the machinery that produced it [the 
Federal Conference and the Committees] could not be out of date' (West 
Australian, 10 July 1967; Western Sun, March 1967, 2; July 1967, 1-2). 
On the question of deferral to experts note the remark of one commentator 
about the easy passage of the 1965 Science Committee report: A delegate 
would not risk 'making an ass of himself in public by arguing about 
science with a professional scientist' (Nation, 16 October 1965). Still, 
the opinion of education experts often seemed to have little effect on 
attitudes to state aid as the commentator, S. Encel, himself an expert 
and former Education Committee member, well knew! Obviously delegates' 
attitudes to the issue were important as well as their attitudes to 
experts.
^^J.F. Cairns, F. Crean, interviews.
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a majority of the new forty-seven member body. Politicians did not
vote en bloc but they tended to bring a different outlook, more
electorally oriented, more acquainted with the details of policy, from
that of many of the non-politicians whom they replaced. Further,
since a solid proportion of the Conference came to be Federal
politicians (thirteen out of forty-seven in 1969, including the four
Leaders ex-officio) the Conference’s familiarity with Federal issues
was enhanced. Most importantly, as proposals came to the Conference
from Committees comprised heavily of politicians (in 1969 Federal
politicians occupied thirty-nine Committee places, State politicians
eight, out of seventy-three places in ten Committees) Conferences were
likely to consider views which closely resembled their own. To the
extent that Labor's electoral policy emerged out of the mingling of
views of politicians and non-politicians, the mix of views on Committees
112and Conference became increasingly alike.
Moreover, as Crean reminded the author, Conferences were often more
113concerned with ’crisis-management' than with detailed discussion.
Even with a thirty-six member Conference, often aligned in tight State 
blocs, opportunities for debate were limited; a forty-seven member 
Conference further reduced them. In any case, there was little point 
having Committees if delegates did not concede responsibility to them.
I have been unable to obtain a complete list of Committees reporting 
to the 1969 Conference and this list also excludes the NACE, technically 
not a Standing Policy Committee. But the proportions in this 
incomplete list of places filled by Federal, State and all politicians 
broadly reflect the full lists of 1965 and 1967. These lists reveal 
another fact that helped to influence Committees and Conference along 
similar paths: in 1969, twenty-two Conference delegates had been
members of the Committees whose reports they considered.
113F. Crean, interview.
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Conferences, with limited time to spare, dealt first with any matters 
where party sub-coalitions were opposed, where bitterness threatened 
or already existed, where unity was threatened. Where no such clouds 
loomed, Conferences often sought to conserve peace. 'Conferences are 
often attempts to avoid s c a r s . I f  there was little to object to in 
the recommendations of a respected, knowledgeable and hard-working 
Committee, delegates adopted its recommendations and turned to other 
matters.
The tendency to perfunctory consideration was accentuated by the
nature of the policies the Committee presented. So often they involved
elaboration of policies long accepted by the ALP, new expressions of
old principles or even entry into policy areas which, while new for
Labor and often for Australian Federal politics, did not conflict with
the basic goals of delegates and the Branches they represented. Thus
the 1963 Federal Conference found little difficulty in passing
unanimously a series of Education Committee recommendations which
provided the basis of a Federal Labor education policy. Most delegates
agreed that the Commonwealth's responsibilities should expand,
ct*v oreo-
especially in education,/which the Liberals were believed to have 
ignored. Even those who guarded the interests of State Labor Governments, 
believed that Commonwealth-State co-operation could be preserved under 
the scheme. Thus Labor moved decisively into a new area of 
responsibility. The same Federal Conference unanimously adopted a 
series of 'alterations and additions to policy progressive reforms' 
presented by the Economic Planning Committee. These items included,
114G.M. Bryant, interview.
^~*ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 34-6. For the 
details of Labor's growing interest in a Federal role in education, 
see the early pages of chapter 3, above.
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inter alia, ’immediate increases in social services’, increased funds 
for housing, regulation of fringe banking institutions and hire purchase, 
prevention of inflation, reduction of taxation on lower incomes,
116investigation of monopolies and extension of public enterprises.
Every proposal would have been unexceptionable in Chifley's or even
Fisher’s day. Politicians could see such proposals as vote winners or
responses to short-term trends in the community; the most ’principled’
non-politicians, who looked askance at plans which sought more electoral
popularity, could accept many schemes as new ways of achieving the same
ends. The National Superannuation scheme of 1969 attacked the same
problems for which pension increases had been the panacea in the past;
policies for new cities in the late 1960s found precedents in the
'regional development authorities' endorsed at the 1963 Conference;
abolition of fees at universities served the same goal of equality in
117education as had tertiary scholarship schemes.
The acceptance of the Policy Committees and their success in changing
the party platform can be traced through the 1960s. Dunstan could say
even of the work of the two Policy Committees reporting to the 1961
Conference that they enabled delegates to produce 'constructive and
radical re-thinking over a large area of policy and of a kind that had
118not taken place since Chifley's plans for post-war reconstruction'.
The Sydney Morning Herald’s correspondent attributed the 'outstanding
success' of the 1963 Conference to the Committees' work. 'These reports
were the basis of all the decisions made last week and deviations from
119their recommendations were the exception, not the rule.' During the
116
117
118 
119
ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 45-6.
Some of these proposals will be referred to later in this chapter.
Dunstan, 'A.L.P. at Work', 4. 
SMH, 6 August 1963.
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1965 Conference, which revised two-thirds of the existing platform,
delegate J. Berinson (Western Australia) moved:
That all Committee reports be dealt with seriatim 
and except in those instances where opposition or 
amendment is indicated each item to be considered 
as carried unanimously without the necessity for 
motion or vote.
Although the motion was ruled out of order on procedural grounds delegates
next adopted the Science Committee report, item by item, without debate,
with one inconsequential amendment and by thirty-four, thirty-five or
120thirty-six votes to nil. Indeed, the most striking characteristic of 
the published Conference reports of 1963, 1965, 1967 and 1969 and the 
unpublished Minutes of the 1971 Conference is the frequency with which 
the word 'Carried* 1 appears opposite a motion to adopt a Policy Committee 
recommendation. In June 1967, Chamberlain estimated that ninety to ninety- 
five per cent of Committee recommendations were accepted. This estimate 
applies just as well to those Conferences after as to those before it was 
made; the ease of passage of the great bulk of Committee recommendations 
was all the more remarkable in view of the tangles the party involved 
itself in over other matters being discussed simultaneously, such as 
state aid.^^
120ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 30-4. The two-
thirds estimate was widely used and based on Whitlam's remark to the 
Conference: 'When Conference met the Platform consisted of fourteen
closely printed pages. If the Conference reports are adopted, nine of 
those pages will have been rewritten' (Official Report, 258). In 1969, 
Wyndham estimated that 75 per cent of the platform had been revised in 
the last five years (Australian, 17 February 1969).
121For Chamberlain's estimate: Western Sun, June 1967, 1-2. This estimate 
was used by Turner, 'Who, whom? . ..', 23-4. Some examples from the 
unpublished Minutes of the 1971 Conference underline the phenomenon:
(1) All except two of eighty Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee 
recommendations or platform alterations and agenda items adopted; the 
other two adopted as amended (these were on the controversial issues of 
conscription and the American base at Pine Gap); all other proposed 
amendments defeated easily; almost without exception, successful platform 
amendments carried to nil; (2) Ten votes on the Fuel and Energy Committee
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Who were the Standing Policy Committees? From the gradual
beginnings of the system in the late 1950s, politicians had been important 
122members of them. The table shows the position between 1963 and 1973:
Table 5.1: Composition of ALP Standing Policy Committees, 1963-1973, by
Committee Places held by Various Categories of Committee 
Membersl23
Year
(a)
No. of 
Committees 
(b)
Federal
MPs
State
MPs Total MPs
FX
Members
(c)
Others Total No. of Places 
(d)
1963 6 12 (48%) 2 (8%) 14 (56%) 6 6 26
1965 13 43 (57%) 5 (7%) 48 (64%) 8 19 75
1967 16 62 (58%) 9 (8%) 71 (66%) 8 28 107
1969 10
(incomplete)
39 (53%) 8 (11%) 47 (64%) 4 22 73
1971 14 53 (63%) 14 (17%) 67 (80%) 5 12 84
TOTAL 209 (57%) 38 (10%) 247 (67%) 31 87 365
Source: Official Reports of Conferences, except 1971 (see below).
121 (continued)
report carried by 31-44 votes to 6-0; (3) Five votes on the Transport
Committee recommendations carried by 44-45 to 2-0; (4) Even where solid
debates occurred, such as on Industry (over socialism), Resources and Rural 
(on rural, subsidies) and industrial (over penal clauses) the great 
majority of Committee recommendations went through, although in the last 
two cases the recommendations modified were the more important and 
controversial ones: Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/116/13. For comparisons
between the ease of passage of most Committee recommendations in 1965 
and the simultaneous struggles over state aid: CT, 9 August 1965;
Nation, 16 October 1965; West Australian, 7 August 1965.
122By the 1963 Federal Conference, Labor men used the Committees’ 
domination by politicians to counter the 'faceless men’ charge; by 1965, 
similar remarks accompanied boasts about the extent of platform revision: 
ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 257; Oakes, Whitlam 
PM, 123 (both Whitlam, 1965); SMH, 2 July 1963; Virgo, Herald (ALP, SA 
Branch), August 1965, 5.
~^a) Utoeare the memberships of Committees as they appear on their 
reports to the Conference in the year given. There were occasional 
changes of Committee membership in the years between Conferences. The 
1971 Conference Committee list could not be obtained and the figures are 
derived from a list of names and addresses dated December 1971, i.e. 
after the Conference. The 1969 list is incomplete because not all 
Committees reported to the Conference and a complete membership list was 
unavailable. (b) This excludes the Immigration Review and Legal Advisory 
Committees in 1965 and the NACE in 1969 (the latter did not report in 
1967) which were technically not Standing Committees. (c) Excludes 
Federal Executive members who were also politicians. (d) Does not 
include the Federal Secretary acting as Committee Secretary, as Wyndham 
did for fourteen Committees in 1967.
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Once the structure was established politicians dominated it. They 
did so for the same reasons as they were drawn upon in earlier times for 
policy advice: expertise, interest in policy, willingness to do the job 
and ability to travel without cost to the party. Their presence meant 
that the 'working material' of Conferences, the reports Conferences 
considered, came from bodies more informed by judgments of merits and 
electoral acceptability than were the old-style Conference committees.
Who were the politicians? The 247 places were occupied by ninety 
politicians, sixty-eight from the Federal Parliament, twenty from the 
State Parliaments and two who occupied places as both State and Federal 
politicians. Thirty of the ninety occupied three or more places, as 
shown in the table below:
Table 5.2: Standing Policy Committee Membership of Politicians, 1963-1971
No. of Places Politician
11 J. Keeffe
10 G. Whitlam
9 G. Bryant, S. Cohen
8 J. Cairns
7 F. Crean, L. Murphy, H. Webb
6 L. Barnard, C. Cameron, D. Dunstan (S), G. Duthie
5 K. Beazley, F. Collard, M. Cross, F. Dittmer, 
H. Jenkins (S/F), A. Luchetti, M. Nicholls
4 A. Fraser, J. Harrison, H. Hudson (S), A. Mulvihill
3 ■ N. Beaton, J. Cavanagh, 
D. McClelland, T. Uren,
K. Enderby, W. Hayden, 
D. Willesee
2 (23)
1 (37)
S = State Parliamentarian; S/F = Held places as both State and Federal
Parliamentarian.
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Three important caveats should be entered regarding this table. 
First, some of the politicians held places as Federal Executive members 
serving as Chairmen. While this did not necessarily mean they 
contributed any less to the Committee, such positions were sometimes 
allocated on availability rather than ability and knowledge. Taking 
account of such Chairmanships alters the picture in the table. Thus, 
ten of Keeffe's places were held in this fashion, against only two of 
Whitlam’s; Cohen held two positions as Federal Executive member - 
Chairman, Murphy, four, Webb, five and Nicholls, three. Secondly, 
the range of interests differs widely. The method of construction of 
the table does not distinguish between membership of one Committee 
over a number of years and membership of different Committees. Whitlam, 
for instance, was a member thrice of Economic Planning Committees, 
twice of Foreign Affairs Committees and once each of Papua New Guinea, 
Civil Liberties, Aboriginals, Industrial and Automation and Urban 
Development Committees. In contrast, Cairns’ eight places comprised 
Economic Planning, five, and Foreign Affairs, three, and Crean's seven, 
Economic Planning, four, and Social Services, three. Thirdly, and 
most importantly, the Federal Leader and his Deputy occupied a 
special position. Since early 1963 they had been invited to 
attend all Policy Committee meetings. While Calwell was usually 
too busy as Leader to take great advantage of this, Whitlam revelled
Two minor caveats may be added: (1) Some politicians also filled
places before and/or after they were politicians. These places have 
been excluded. (2) Names of some Committees and distribution of 
responsibilities between them changed over time. These changes 
affect neither the table nor the supplementary information.
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125in it. By late 1965, a journalist concluded, after a long interview
with Whitlam, that he was ’indefatigable in, and in some, indispensable
126to’ the Committees which reported to the 1965 Federal Conference.
Yet Whitlam was appointed only to one 1965 Committee. Similarly, after
a change in the rules for Committees in 1966 made the Leader and his
Deputy ex-officio members of each Committee, Whitlam contributed to
Committees other than those to which he was elected by the Federal
12 7Executive or the Federal Caucus.
We shall return shortly to the relative contributions of different 
people and groups to the Policy Committees and to electoral policy 
generally. First, we must look at the other categories in Table 5.1. 
'Federal Executive members' covers places occupied by members of that
125ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 108; D.A. Dunstan, 
'The Federal Executive of the A.L.P.', AQ, 36, 2 (June 1964), 11. Note 
that the 1963 Economic Planning Committee report includes a section 
(unsigned) by Whitlam on 'Labor Policies and Commonwealth Powers' (ALP, 
Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1963, 72-5 cf E.G. Whitlam,
On Australia's Constitution, Camberwell, Vic., 1977, 73-9). Before 
early 1963 the Committees had power to co-opt and Whitlam may have 
contributed under this rule. But after Calwell had objected to Whitlam 
being co-opted to meetings of the Foreign Affairs Committee in 1962, 
when he himself was precluded by other duties from attending, invitation 
replaced co-option, although the Committees were still enjoined to 
obtain information from any helpful source: Correspondence between
Dunstan and Beazley, Dunstan and Chamberlain, April 1963; FX 26-27 
February, 12-15 March 1963, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/13/F45; 124/56/282-3;
125/57/12-13.
I 0 4
Bulletin, 11 December 1965 (Brian Johns). In March 1965, Whitlam had 
told a television audience that the Parliamentary Leaders had much 
influence, usually the determining influence, on policy, although this 
was not obvious to the public. To make it so, the Federal Leaders 
should become full members of the Federal Executive and Conference 
(Oakes, Whitlam PM, 123).
127The 1966 rule changes provided for nine-member Committees comprising 
a Chairman elected by and from the Federal Executive, one member elected 
by the Federal Caucus, five members elected by the Federal Executive and 
the Leader and his Deputy ex-officio. A meeting in 1970 removed the 
stipulation of nine members but did not alter the other rules: ALP,
Special Commonwealth Conference, July 1966; Report, Findings and 
Documents, 60; FX 25-26 February 1970, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/121/48.
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body (other than members who were also politicians) appointed as
Committee Chairmen or elected by the Executive as ordinary members.
Thus Oliver chaired Foreign Affairs Committees, Hartley, a Northern
Development Committee, and Colbourne, Economic Planning Committees,
while Holt, Hartley and T. Burns of Queensland were ordinary members
of Foreign Affairs, Repatriation and Communications and the Arts
128Committees, respectively.
Who, then, were 'Others’? All were elected by the Federal Executive 
but none were members of it. Some were senior members of the party or 
the Labour movement, such as M. McCarney, New South Wales Central 
Executive member and Secretary of the Vehicle Builders' union (Education 
Committee, 1963-65), J.A. Mulvihill, Assistant Secretary, New South Wales 
Branch (Foreign Affairs Committee, 1963, remained a member as a Senator), 
J.A. Bale, C.H. Fitzgibbon and T.J. Doyle, State Executive members and 
transport union officials (Transport Committee, 1965) and R.J. Hawke, 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (Economic Planning and Industrial 
Committees after 1965). Others less senior in the party but possessing 
particular expertise included J.W. Wood, a former Assistant Secretary of 
the Victorian Branch, but closely acquainted with education during his 
Presidency of the Victorian Council of State Schools' Organisations 
(Education Committee, 1963-65 and later a member of the NACE), K. Crook, 
unsuccessful candidate for an unwinnable Federal seat in 1966, academic 
geologist, member of Committees on Science and Resources, K. Inall, 
member of similar Committees, a scientist and ALP branch President, and 
P. Young, unsuccessful candidate in 1969, a former Army officer, who 
became a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee.
128Table 5.1, by including among 'politicians' Federal Executive members 
who were also politicians, understates the 'Federal Executive members' 
category.
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The party credentials of people in this category, especially those 
not senior members of affiliated trade unions or Branch officials, were 
usually not the main reason for their being invited to join Policy 
Committees. The group of ’others' are best seen as the tip of an 
’iceberg’ of potential policy advisers whose common characteristics
were their sympathy to the party and their expertise. The appearance of 
such people as formal members of Policy Committees was only a symptom
of a movement which some party decisionmakers hoped would contribute
greatly to Labor’s electoral policy. ’There has never been a time in
the history of the Labor Party’, said Whitlam in February 1967, ’in
which so many people of such diverse experience and expertise were
129ready and available to assist the party’. Some of these ’friendly
advisers’ became members of Policy Committees, others contributed through 
contacts who were members of Committees, others found points of access 
through individual politicians or machine members. Thus, economist 
A.R. Hall provided Calwell with assistance on housing policy while his 
colleagues H. Arndt, K. Hancock and R.I. Downing may have been suggested 
as contributors by Professor G. Firth, a member of the Economic Planning 
Committee. When Downing set out a proposed national superannuation 
scheme, Wyndham sent it for comments to T.M. Fitzgerald of the Sydney
129Australian, 18 February 1967. See also an earlier remark in similar 
vein: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 256. Regarding
the partisanship of policy contributors in general, the remarks of two 
of them may be quoted: ’I had been active in the ALP locally but this
didn’t have much bearing for Whitlam or Mathews’ [his private secretary] 
(P.N. Troy, interview). J.S. Deeble and his collaborator on proposals 
for a national health scheme, R.B. Scotton, were not ALP members.
Scotton had actually been President of the Liberal Club at Sydney 
University while Deeble had been a Fabian. ’Like thousands of others 
at this time’, both became sympathetic to Labor during the 1960s. Deeble 
had the impression that a fellow worker on Labor’s health policy was 
hampered by active party membership, tending to push too hard within the 
party for her favoured plans (J.S. Deeble, interview).
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Morning Herald and C.J. Lloyd, a journalist on Barnard's staff.
F.M. Daly, MP, suggested that G.A. Lonsdale, a dentist and veteran
party member, be asked for a submission on health policy and Wyndham
later asked Lonsdale to join the Health Committee. When he wanted
some information on Indonesian nuclear capabilities for use by the
Foreign Affairs Committee, Wyndham sought it from E.K. Inall, a
physicist and party member, known to him from Inall's work on the
Science Committee. When N.W.F. Fisher, an economist and party member,
wrote to Wyndham offering assistance, he was asked 'to put your views
down on paper in a form which would be suitable for inclusion in the
130Party's Platform'.
This chapter is constructed around the idea of 'by-passing' the 
deficiencies of the coalitional and Federal structure. By-passing was 
attempted in a number of ways. Whitlam and Wyndham tried unsuccessfully 
to replace the Federal Conference. The introduction of ex-officio 
politicians to the Federal bodies achieved results of a different kind. 
The development of Policy Committees reduced the Federal Executive's 
role in electoral policymaking almost to nil and the role of the Federal 
Conference to the passage almost unaltered of Committee reports. Under 
the party rules, the Conference, the.supreme policymaker, still had to 
endorse Committee reports, but Conference delegates as such or as members
130These details are based on: Hall to Calwell, attached to Minutes,
Housing Committee, 29 June 1965; correspondence between Wyndham and 
Arndt, Downing, Firth and Hancock, c.1968-69; Wyndham to Fitzgerald, 
Wyndham to Lloyd, 24 June 1968; Wyndham to Daly, 5 January, Wyndham 
to Lonsdale, 18 February 1965; Wyndham to Inall, 4 February 1965; 
Fisher to Wyndham, 7 July 1966; Wyndham to Fisher, 15 February 1967, 
Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/2/envelope 'Housing Committee Minutes 29 June 
1965, 1st Meeting'; 126/65-7; 29/Economic Planning & Trade Committee 
FXC/9; 46/Outwards Correspondence 16/11/64-31/3/65/125, 342; 
46/Outwards Correspondence 16/11/64-31/3/65/212; 30/Federal Executive 
Committees - National Fuel Policy FXC/19.
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of Conference Committees were relieved of the detailed consideration of 
electoral policy proposals. Labor’s platform and policy speech were to 
be constructed elsewhere.
WHITLAM AND NETWORKS OF ADVISERS
The establishment of Policy Committees and the influx of 
Parliamentarians to the Federal bodies institutionalised the influence 
of politicians, those Labor men with a broader constituency than the 
party alone and, consequently, a broader outlook. The presence of 
politicians, especially in the Federal Conference and Executive, drew 
the teeth of the harmful ’faceless men’ image, while the inclusion in 
Committees of friendly advisers gave the party access to a wider range 
of thought than previously. Together the changes diluted or by-passed 
some of the defects of the old Federal machinery as a maker of electoral 
policy.
However, the Policy Committees were not free of problems. First, 
the Committees' success depended to some extent upon how often they met. 
Conferences had suffered from lack of time for discussion; the 
Committees were to be more leisurely. Yet the evidence available 
suggests many Committees met infrequently. Meeting schedules had to 
suit politicians with myriad other duties, party administrators coping 
with routine work and frequent elections, and private citizens who had 
competing priorities. The evidence suggests most Committees met from 
one to three times between biennial Federal Conferences, with meetings 
covering one or two days each. Before the 1965 Conference a number of 
Committees met only once and that in the last few weeks before the 
Conference. The seven meetings of the Economic Planning Committee which 
reported to the 1963 Conference were probably not typical of Committees
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reporting to that Conference and became even less typical of Committees 
during the 1960s. By 1969, the Resources Development Committee could 
dispose of its commitments in less than six hours and even the National 
Advisory Committee on Education (technically not a Standing Committee 
but standing to Conference in the same relationship as they did) found 
that the remnants of the state aid issue did not detain it longer than 
a weekend.
The lack of meetings may have meant that discussion was skimped _or 
that there was little to discuss. Construction of a new channel to by­
pass a faulty one does not mean necessarily that there will be water to 
flow along it. The Committees were not only supposed to recommend on 
State Branch items but also to produce and develop comprehensive and 
modern policies able to be implemented by a Federal Labor Government.
To some observers, the ’hey day' of the Committees was from 1963 to 1965, 
after which they ran out of ideas or could do little but tinker with 
fairly comprehensive and settled policies which lay awaiting Labor's 
accession to power. Thus when Wyndham wrote to his new Leader in 1967 
he suggested that, after the work done in 1965, not all Committees need 
meet or do more than make any necessary slight changes by correspondence. 
The transport, industrial, social services, health, housing and science 
sections of the platform, he suggested, needed little change. Other 
sections needed work, either because the existing version was weak,
131These estimates are derived from interviews with Committee members and 
Minutes and reports of nine separate Committees over the years 1963-69, 
found in party records and published Conference Reports. A factor 
militating against more frequent meetings was their cost. The 1969 
Federal Conference was told that the total cost of the system in 1968 
was $7,800, mainly for members' fares. One Committee met once at a 
cost of $1,100, another twice for $1,300 - and produced no recommendations 
(Australian, 29 July 1969) .
432
because key members had been absent or because the Committee had not
met at all. Wyndham was encouraging individual Committee members and
132sympathetic experts to provide ideas. He wrote to one member
of the Northern Development Committee:
I am sure you will agree that it is one of the 
weakest parts of the Platform. Unfortunately, the 
previous Committee gave very little attention to 
the platform and with a normal Federal Conference 
being held next year, I think it is time for 
people like yourself, who have an expert knowledge 
of the problem, to consider re-writing that 
particular section of the platform.^ 3
Irregular attendance or insignificant contributions by Committee 
members meant much work devolved on a few members. Thus Crean complained 
that two fellow Committee members had been given the credit' for an
I Q  /Economic Planning Committee report to which they had hardly contributed. 
Gaps could be filled by contributions from sympathetic experts with 
access to the Committee but there is some evidence that Committee 
’networks’ were rather incomplete and incapable of providing a wide 
range of expert contributions. We have seen that whether a sympathetic
1 "1 ?Wyndham to Whitlam, 15 February 1967, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/31/Federal 
Parliamentary Labor Party - Leader (E.G. Whitlam) Correspondence 1967 - 
FPLP/4. Writing to. the Chairman of the Legal and Constitutional 
Committee, Wyndham told of the consequences of infrequent meeting in one 
case: ’ [T]he work of this committee has been inhibited in the past 
because of the inability to get members together, and for that reason 
some of the items which appear in the Platform have not been reviewed’ 
(Wyndham to Murphy, 10 March 1969, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/30/Legal & 
Constitutional Committee).
Wyndham to F. Sweeney, 23 June 1966, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/30/ 
Committees - Development - FXC/17. Since the 1965 Committee comprised 
seven politicians (and Chamberlain as Chairman) its lack of work may 
have been a function of the politicians' lack of time. But the new 
Committee seems to have met only once and suggested few alterations to 
the 1967 Conference, suggesting instead that a more detailed statement be 
prepared for the 1969 Conference and the elections in that year (ALP, 
Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1967, 12, 56). The 1969 
Conference received no such report.
134F. Crean, interview.
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expert became a Committee member often depended on his work becoming
known to individual decisionmakers, on links with professional networks 
135or on chance. The limited evidence available suggests that similar
factors influenced the information available to Committees. While the
Secretary of the Science Committee, K. Crook, wrote to a cross section
of Australian scientists in 1965 seeking contributions to Labor's
policymaking process in that area, the party’s records contain little
evidence of other attempts to establish comprehensive networks to
136service Committees. After the Federal Secretariat closed in April 
1969, there disappeared even the rudimentary co-ordination Wyndham 
provided in the intervals between his other duties. The new part-time 
Secretary, M.J. Young, had even less time to spare.
The most detailed evidence of recruitment of advice relates not to a 
Policy Committee but to the setting up of a committee to inquire into 
medical benefits funds. It may be indicative of the methods by which 
experts became Committee members or contributors. Letters were sent to 
likely prospects, one of whom declined since it was not his field and 
another of whom had gone overseas. A third, M. Everett, Minister for 
Health in Tasmania, accepted. Wyndham then asked M. Cass, a doctor and 
member of the VCE, for suitable names or 'we will end with somebody 
like Arthur Clarey I! [a Victorian MLA and accountant]'. Cass suggested 
J. Paterson, a union research officer, who accepted, while admitting he 
lacked specific knowledge of the field and asking if Wyndham knew of 
anyone who had such knowledge for him to contact. Meanwhile, J. Pomroy, 
a Treasury statistician, had accepted the third position and commenced 
researching and talking 'with a few well-informed people' (Correspondence, 
October 1964-February 1965, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/30/Health Funds
Committee; 46/Outwards Corresp. 1/9/64-31/10/64).
1
Draft letter, c. early 1965, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/30/Northern 
Development Committee. The letter included the words: 'One of the main
functions of the Committee will be to act as a clearing house for the 
views of the scientific community in Australia and the transmittal of 
these views to the Leadership of the A.L.P.'. Crook received about one 
hundred replies, containing many complaints about the state of relations 
between science and government, as well as many useful comments.
Although to some extent the addressees were selected because of their 
known ALP sympathies there was some concern among other scientists about 
being seen to be partisan. Crook later visited many of the respondents 
to follow up their comments. He retains complete files from the period 
(K.A.W. Crook, interview).
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If the party failed to tap all available services and relied
instead on familiar ones soon exhausted, the Committees risked losing
inspiration and policies faced stagnation. Like the party of earlier
years, Labor of the Committee era could have become the advocate of
an immutable set of precepts rather than a seeker of relevant and 
137modern policies. The success of by-passing channels thus depended 
on the quality and quantity of what flowed through them. From the 
beginning of the system, not long after he became Deputy Federal Leader, 
Whitlam had done much to ensure both criteria were maintained. Not 
only did he sit upon or attend more Committees than anyone else, but 
also did he provide data and, often, well-worked proposals. Thus the 
1969 Conference adopted Committee recommendations for a national 
superannuation scheme and abolition of the means test over six years, 
for a national health scheme financed from a specified portion of
C.J. Lloyd, interview, made the point about the effect of the 
Secretariat’s closure. Because of their small size, infrequency of 
meeting, lack of staff and the competing responsibilities of their 
members, Committees relied on inputs from politicians, experts and 
State Branches rather than what they could do themselves. Some party 
officials had hoped for more. As Wyndham reminded the Legal and 
Constitutional Committee, a Committee 'not only attends to matters 
specifically referred to it but also has the right to initiate 
consideration of any matter which it thinks should be deleted from, 
included in or altered in the Platform of the Party'. He set out legal 
matters on which the Platform was silent: Legal and Constitutional
Committee: Memorandum for the attention of the Committee prepared by
the General Secretary, 2 September 1968, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/30/
Legal & Constitutional Committee. This may have been merely a 
reminder to an idle Committee (see note 132 above) but another piece 
of evidence suggests that few Committees took such initiatives: Clyde
Ccmeron suggested that the Industrial Committee, under his Chairmanship, 
was the first to take such initiatives when it took a comprehensive 
policy to the 1971 Conference. Other Committees followed suit and 
agenda items from the Branches declined in importance (C.R. Cameron, 
interview). Some Committees before 1971 had done more than just 
recommend on agenda items and platform changes but most lacked the time 
or facilities for their own research. Individual members may have done 
research and communicated the results to their Committee but generally 
the Committees seem to have been reactive rather than initiating.
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taxation revenue and for an Australian Schools Commission to dispense
Commonwealth funds to all schools on the basis of need. While the
health scheme at least existed in some form in the platform already,
Whitlam was given credit for its latest formulation and for the other
two innovations. He had certainly promoted them publicly and in the
Policy Committees. For some observers the 1969 Conference was primarily
138a process of endorsing policies devised by Whitlam.
Whitlam's contributions to party policy can be traced from the
early years of his political career. Freudenberg implies that Whitlam
was largely responsible for the earlier version of a national health
139scheme, adopted by the Federal Conference of 1959. By 1961, Whitlam
was contributing papers on national development, an Australian newspaper
commission and housing. The report to Conference of the Economic
Planning Committee, of which he was a member, outlined methods by which
the Commonwealth could play a constructive role in the national
140economy within the existing Constitution. This was the argument 
Whitlam had put in his Chifley Memorial Lecture of 1957, had developed
1 38ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1969, 139-40, 143, 
177-9, 197; Read, The 1969 Federal Conference .... While some later 
went as far as describing the Conference as 'in effect, a showcase for 
Whitlam's policies' (Laurie Oakes, 'The Years of Preparation', Anonymous, 
ed., Whitlam and Frost, 32), most contemporary accounts stressed rather 
the smoothness of the Conference, its amicability, the lack of bloc 
voting, and the rise of new, younger Parliamentary and party figures, 
rather than the sources of the important innovations (Age, 4 August 1969; 
Australian, 2, 7 August 1969; Bulletin, 9 August 1969). This confirms 
the view of seven politician-delegates interviewed by Read in 1970 (Read, 
The 1969 Federal Conference ..., 26-7) and the general tenor of her 
thesis that the Conference was important especially in a public relations 
sense. Still, it was well known that Whitlam had publicly espoused the 
named policies and his centrality may have been assumed.
139Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 100.
140ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1961, 50-1, 82; FX 
6-9 April 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 124/56/89-91. See also note 90 above.
436
during his membership of the Constitutional Review Committee (1956-59)
established by the Menzies Government and had expounded to the members
of the Economic Planning Committee and the officers of the party in 
141January 1961. The 1963 Economic Planning Committee report benefited
even more from Whitlam's activities and other Committee reports on
rural policy, foreign affairs and defence and the ’methods’ section of
142the Federal platform all bore the marks of his work.
Whence did Whitlam draw his inspiration? Three sources may be 
distinguished: his own experience and career; his Parliamentary work
and his accompanying research; his contacts with friendly advisers.
This thesis is neither a biography of Whitlam nor a study of the 
development of his political philosophy, but each source can be 
elaborated insofar as it relates to the general theme of ’by-passing'.
Much of Whitlam's policy initiative was directed to the suburban 
dweller, a role he knew well. 'I am the first Labor leader who has ever 
represented the urban sprawl, who has represented the outer suburbs. I 
have lived in these areas [in 1968] for twenty-one years.' He had
Minutes of meeting between Federal Executive Officers, Federal 
Parliamentary Labor Party Leaders and Members of A.L.P. Economic 
Committee (Melbourne, 10-12 January 1961), Federal Executive Minute 
Book, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/124/56/57-8.
142On the Foreign Affairs and Economic Committees, see notes 125, 126 
above. Whitlam was a member of the committee on clause 3(b) (i) of 
'Methods' ('To clothe the Commonwealth Parliament with unlimited powers 
and with the duty and authority to create States possessing delegated 
Constitutional powers'), which suggested to the Conference such measures 
as reviving the Interstate Commission as provided in the Commonwealth 
Constitution, transfer of State powers to the Commonwealth, use of 
section 96 grants and legislation extending Federal responsibilities - 
all of which could be traced to the recommendations of the Constitutional 
Review Committee and to Whitlam's preferences. The Rural Committee 
provided a document 'for information' which referred to Constitutional 
Review Committee recommendations regarding organised marketing. Whitlam 
may have provided help here. The Conference took no action on these 
parts of both Committee reports (ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth 
Conference, 1963, 47-8, 58, 83, 90-3).
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experienced their inadequate sewerage, transport, health, educational,
143recreation and cultural facilities. The solution to these problems
also was rooted deep in his own background. Brought up in a public
service family in Canberra, inspired by the unsuccessful attempt of
the Curtin Government in 1944 to transfer to the Commonwealth by
referendum increased powers over post war reconstruction and made
aware by his work on the Constitutional Review Committee of the
possibilities of shifting the constitutional balance, he sought
alleviation of suburban and other problems by an expanded role for the
144central government. Looking back in 1975 to his Chifley Memorial 
Lecture of 1957, delivered in the midst of his work on the Constitutional 
Review Committee, Whitlam could see in that early exposition the basis 
of his later work. ’The themes foreshadowed in that lecture became the 
basis for the substantial rewriting of the Platform at subsequent Federal 
Conferences of the Australian Labor Party, particularly the great reform 
Conferences of 1967, 1969 and 1971.'^^
Secondly, from the time he took his place in the House of 
Representatives in February 1953 Whitlam used Parliamentary forms and 
his own skills to amass information upon which to base arguments for the
143Oakes, Whitlam PM, 183-4.
144Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 65-70, 160, 297; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 
44-6, 76-8. Regarding the Curtin influence, Whitlam said in 1972: 'The
work of 1942-45 makes a firm foundation for the great work of 1972-75 
and beyond. [The 1944 referendum planks remain] as a prospectus for a 
Labor Government' [E.G. Whitlam], Urbanised Australia - 1972-75: John
Curtin Memorial Lecture delivered by E.G. Whitlam, QC, MP, University of 
Western Australia, Wednesday, 12 July 1972, 8.00 p.m., 2.
145E.G. Whitlam, The Road to Reform - Labor in Government. Can Labor 
Carry Out its Mandate? 1975 Chifley Memorial Lecture, [Carlton, Vic., 
1975?], 4. For the original lecture: E.G. Whitlam, The Constitution 
versus Labor: Chifley Memorial Lecture, 1957, Carlton, Vic., 1957.
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best solutions to the problems of Australian post war society as he 
perceived them. His research files dwarfed those of his fellow back­
benchers. He indexed Hansards. He asked ministers thousands of 
questions on notice, revising the information with further questions 
on the same topics. ’His speeches were well-argued, and backed by 
reams of facts and figures - a testimony’, writes Oakes, ’to his 
general knowledge, his work in the Parliamentary library, and the 
efficiency of his comprehensive filing system'. Others attest to his
prodigious memory, to his ability to make an informed contribution on
146a wide range of subjects. From these activities grew his ability 
to make a larger contribution than any other individual to the platform 
revisions of the 1960s and to the Labor Government of 1972-75. 'To 
find the sources of his ideas', concluded Race Mathews, one of his 
private secretaries in Opposition, ’one has to look back through his 
Parliamentary questions and speeches over the years
Nevertheless, perhaps Whitlam's greatest strength was his ability 
to enlist the aid of what we have called 'friendly advisers’ - people 
with a general commitment to Labor and the goals it espoused, often 
party members, always with some form of expert knowledge. He sought 
information also on the solutions developed by ’comparable countries’ 
to the problems Australia faced. His skill in tapping and utilising 
such advisers and information was recognised almost as soon as was the 
extent of his contribution to electoral policy.
146Bulletin, 11 December 1965 (B. Johns); P. Cullen (Whitlam private 
secretary, 1966-69), interview; Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 78- 
80; R. Mathews (Whitlam private secretary, 1967-72), interview;
Oakes, Whitlam PM, 64, 69, 91, 129; SMH, 18 June 1965 (C. McGregor).
^^R. Mathews, interview.
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Ideas are his accessories. He uses them. Whitlam 
may not be original but he has an uncommon regard 
for the importance of seizing on the best ideas 
that are available. He plays the entrepreneur 
well - once taken he works hard to assimilate the 
ideas unto himself .... Mr.Whitlam has made 
enthusiastic and intelligent use of outside 
advisers, extending well beyond his home State ....
Almost invariably the Deputy’s schemes will be the 
expression of the ideas of experts, usually 
academic, in the various fields, with whom he 
keeps in frequent contact.148
Such advice had always been available to Labor but Whitlam drew upon
149it more widely than anyone else in the party. He was the entrepreneur 
and interpreter (into a form saleable to the electorate) of the schemes 
of specialists. ’He drew on a wide variety of sources, to be sure, 
academics, interest groups and so on, but he provided the conceptual 
integration and very often the minutiae.' He mixed the raw material 
others provided with the fruits of his own research in Parliament and 
placed the whole within the broad framework of an increased role for 
the Commonwealth government. He then put the mixture before the 
electorate as programmes that Labor would undertake. He stood at the 
centre of a network of policy advisers but saw himself - especially once 
elected Leader - as the network’s mouthpiece and most important component.
148Bulletin, 30 October 1965, 11 December 1965. An early example of 
Whitlam's technique: foe advised the Federal Executive that he had
arranged for a paper from H.R. Hudson, Senior Lecturer in Economics, 
University of Adelaide (later a South Australian Labor MP, member of 
Federal Policy Committees and South Australian minister) on the costing 
of Labor’s proposals: FX 26-28 September 1961, Fed. Rec., NLA MS
4985/124/56/186.
149See chapter 1, pp.62-4 for the earlier sources of some of this advice, 
this chapter, note 90, for the use made of it during the preparation of 
policies for the 1961 campaign and Whitlam's speech to the 1965 Conference 
for a reference to the advisers 'on tap' at the Australian National 
University for Labor politicians during Parliamentary sittings (ALP, 
Official Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 256) . While Whitlam 
himself may have drawn on the last-named source, other evidence suggests 
use of the ANU by other MPs circa 1965, especially by Calwell, was 
haphazard: H.W. Arndt, 'Three Times 18: An Essay in Political
Autobiography', Quadrant, 13, 3 (May-June 1969) 33; C.J. Lloyd, interview
150R. Mathews, interview.
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There's no scheme anywhere that will make any 
progress unless it can be hitched to a politician.
You have to interest a politician. And I was a 
pretty aggressive sort of politician.151
Whitlam, pursuing goals he had long held, gleaned ideas and
information from his own research, Parliamentary work and experience and
from a network of policy advisers, interpreted them into an electorally
presentable form and advocated them aggressively. The Federal Conference's
role was confined to endorsing proposals put to it, formally by Policy
Committees, informally by Whitlam and his alternative policymaking
process. This allowed that by-passing of the machine's drawbacks which
the changes to the Federal bodies had only partially achieved and which
the Policy Committee system had developed before it threatened to lose
inspiration. In combination with the changes the new Conference and the
Committees had achieved, the 'Whitlam network' produced an important
restructuring of the electoral policy or platform making processes of
the ALP in the five years between Whitlam's accession to the Leadership
in 1967 and the Labor victory in 1972. Since it was so important in
by-passing the old Conference and Executive based structure, we shall
152examine this network in more detail.
'Whitlam might have been the chief policy maker and the sales
153director but he certainly had a large staff under him.' The 
co-ordination of the network and, increasingly, many of its substantial 
products came from the small private staff of Whitlam and his Deputy,
^^E.G. Whitlam, interview.
152Some overlap with earlier pages in this chapter is inevitable since 
the same people often were involved in both Committees and network.
153Richard Farmer, 'The Victory Period', Anonymous, ed., Whitlam and 
Frost, 72. In another business anaio^y, which makes Whitlam somewhat 
more central, Cairns described him as 'the managing director who wanted 
to keep control of things' (J.F. Cairns, interview).
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Barnard. Thus John Menadue, Whitlam’s private secretary since 1960, 
early in 1967 asked a number of contacts in Australian universities to 
act as continuing policy advisory groups. When Mathews replaced 
Menadue in August 1967, he maintained the contacts, seeking their 
advice on new developments and monitoring the flow of information they 
provided for Whitlam's speeches in Parliament and in public.
Contributors like J.S. Deeble (national health) and P.N. Troy (transport 
and urban planning) recall that they saw Whitlam himself infrequently, 
dealing instead, by telephone or in person, with Mathews. Most sources 
suggest that Mathews was the central co-ordinator of the network, but 
Peter Cullen (1966-69) and Richard Hall (after 1970) were responsible 
for contacts with specialised contributors such as public servants and 
airlines regarding aviation matters (Cullen) and trade unions and the 
Catholic Church (Hall). Freudenberg, Whitlam’s press secretary from 
1967, shaped the disparate information into the distinctive literary 
style which marked Whitlam’s main speeches. Mathews and later Hall 
produced more routine speeches. The two Leaders' staffs also channeled 
material to party Policy Committees and produced almost daily press 
releases on current issues. Finally, the staffs themselves researched
The following paragraphs are based on: J.F. Cairns, M.H. Cass,
K.A.W. Crook, P. Cullen, J.S. Deeble, interviews; Freudenberg, A Certain 
Grandeur, 100-5; C.J. Lloyd, R. Mathews, R. Murray, interviews;
Oakes, Whitlam PM, 89-90, 183; Oakes & Solomon, The Making of an 
Australian Prime Minister, 60-1; P.N. Troy, E.G. Whitlam, interviews.
There is some disagreement about these university contacts. 
Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 100-1, suggests that, apart from the 
advisers on a national health scheme, the advisory groups faded away. 
Troy, a major contributor to policy himself, and Mathews support this 
view partially, at least regarding continuing sustained contributions 
as against ad hoc answers to questions. But Cullen (who resigned in 
1969) is more generous to the universities while Lloyd feels that the 
intention was perhaps not as elaborate in conception as Freudenberg 
says (interviews).
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material for their employers' speeches. Menadue, following Whitlam's
custom, had collected large masses of material for the Leader's
speeches, especially on rural matters and the national health scheme.
Mathews became expert in social welfare and education. Hall
contributed material on aboriginal affairs, Cullen on aviation and
Papua New Guinea. James Spigelman, a private secretary to Whitlam
during the final months of Opposition, produced material on government
secrecy. Clem Lloyd, Barnard's private secretary from 1967, much of
the revised defence policy of 1967 and 1969. By about 1970, all could
draw on the developing Legislative Research Service of the Commonwealth
156Parliament for research papers and information.
The private staff of the two Leaders never numbered more than 
four or five during the period 1967-72.^^ The contributions they 
co-ordinated, apart from those they, Whitlam and Barnard provided 
themselves from their own experience and from 'comparable countries 
overseas', came from a group which overlapped the non-politician 
membership of, and contributors to, the Policy Committees. Thus Keith
Menadue became Labor's candidate in the rural seat of Hume in 1966; 
Mathews had been Secretary of the Victorian Fabian Society and of the 
VCE's Education Committee, largely writing the latter's Looking to the 
Future pamphlets on education policy (1964 and 1967); Hall specialised 
in industrial journalism; Cullen had developed an interest in transport 
while private secretary to Senator Kennelly; Spigelman wrote Secrecy, 
Sydney, 1972; Lloyd wrote L.H. Barnard, Australian Defence-Policy and 
Programmes, Melbourne, 1969. Lloyd and Cullen both mentioned the role 
of the Legislative Research Service in providing information, 
especially on education, welfare and defence matters (interviews).
The author was a member of this Service, an arm of the public service, 
during 1975 and formed the impression that some of its members regarded 
the work for the Labor Opposition during 1970-72 as its finest 
achievement. On the Service, see: A.L. Moore, E.J.G. Prince &
Oliver Mendofsohn, 'Parliament and Research', Politics, 9 (May 1974) 
83-6.
^■^The success of Labor's small staff provoked Prime Minister Gorton to 
complain during the 1969 election campaign that he himself lacked 
'Mr Whitlam's large [sic] staff' - which was actually smaller than his 
own: Oakes & Solomon, The Making of an Australian Prime Minister, 61.
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Crook, a Policy Committee member, assisted with science and energy
matters. Dn Moss Cass, who became a member of Parliament in 1969,
had contributed from at least 1964 his professionally based ideas on
health and welfare matters to State and Federal committees. He
introduced Whitlam and others to sympathetic academic and practising
doctors. Other contributors were unearthed by Menadue and Mathews.
Ruth Inall, a health economist and honorary Hospital Board member,
assisted with health policy. Health economists, J.S. Deeble and
R.B. Scotton of the Melbourne University Institute of Applied Economic
and Social Research, provided detailed and continuing assistance in
forming a scheme for a national health service based on a taxation
contribution. Dr. Rex Patterson, a public servant concerned with
northern development, enhanced Whitlam’s own knowledge of this subject,
while winning and holding the Dawson seat for Labor in 1966. Patrick
Troy and John Paterson, urban planners, assisted in an area where
Whitlam had a special interest. Economists at Flinders University
advised on the car industry, Professor Richard Downing discussed the
implications of his national superannuation concept, Professor Keith
Hancock journeyed to Canberra to assist with Labor's attack on the 1968
and 1969 Budgets, Professor G. Firth contributed both to the Economic
Policy Committee and the Whitlam network, Professor Zelman Cowen was
invited to assist the Legal and Constitutional Committee, whose leading
158spirits were the Senate Leaders, Murphy and Cohen.
158See the references in note 154 above, plus: CT, 3 February 1968;
Minutes of Third (1968) meeting, Legal and Constitutional Committee, 
Sydney, 2 September 1968, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/30/Legal & Constitutional 
Committee; Oakes, Whitlam PM, 129; SMH, 17 September 1969. According 
to Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 100-5, the national health scheme - 
and health policy generally - saw the most intensive work. For the views 
of the central contributors - apart from Mathews, Menadue and Whitlam 
himself, see: M.H. Cass, A National Health Scheme for Labour, Melbourne,
1964: Ruth J. Inall, 'Research into Health', AQ^ , 40, 1 (March 1968), 75-
82; R.B. Scotton & J.S. Deeble, 'Compulsory Health Insurance for 
Australia', Australian Economic Review, 4th Quarter, 1968, 9-16.
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The Whitlara network neither provided all policy inputs nor worked
completely independently of other channels. By-passing the Federal
bodies and their defects did not mean the whole electoral policymaking
process was shifted to one alternative structure. Nevertheless,
Whitlam's influence pervaded structures other than the one he headed
and his office co-ordinated. Thus Crean believed that the Caucus
Committees were probably more significant than the Policy Committees
of the Executive, whom they often provided with ideas which were
adopted, partly through the influence of the Caucus representatives on
159the Policy Committees. Yet Whitlam himself was the most significant
contributor of policies in Caucus, its Committees and the Executive's
Committees. Whitlam's dominance over platform making was never
seriously challenged in Caucus, according to Lloyd:
You have to remember there were two Caucuses: the
first, after the defeat of 1966, had a lot of the 
old ’dinosaurs’ who could contribute little. This 
put a big burden on Whitlam but one which he was 
not unhappy to carry. Caucus was a void and he 
filled it. By the time the second Caucus arrived 
after 1969, Whitlam was entrenched and even most 
of his traditional opponents were prepared to 
follow his lead.160
Most of the Executive's Policy Committees, too, found that Whitlam’s 
network provided their most fruitful sources. 'In no field did Whitlam 
contribute less than half', concluded Mathews with only moderate 
hyperbole. 'In those policy fields that mattered, the focus of the
F. Crean, interview. On the other hand, Troy, the outsider who 
dealt mainly with Whitlam's and Uren's offices, believed the Caucus 
Committees were 'insignificant. They only had a limited idea of 
policymaking: what can we dangle before the electorate?' (P.N. Troy,
interview). The worth of Caucus Committees probably varied from 
Committee to Committee.
160C.J. Lloyd, interview.
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1972 policy speech, the input was overwhelmingly Whitlam's.' Cairns
and Lloyd confirm the thrust of Mathews’ remark.
Whitlam also provided the opportunity for the most important source
of policy production and presentation apart from his own network, the
system of ’shadow ministers'. In March 1967, Whitlam asked the Caucus
to elect fourteen of its members to monitor the activities of Liberal
ministers and, more importantly, to prepare for a future Labor 
162Government. Part of Whitlam's strategy as Opposition Leader was 'to
build up people as "shadow ministers" so they'd [the public] be able to
identify who would be in primary charge of various things if we are 
163elected ...'. While performance varied considerably, a number of
J.F. Cairns, C.J. Lloyd, R. Mathews, interviews. Another aspect of 
Whitlam's relations with the Committees is suggested in Wyndham's 
letter to him as the new Leader. Not only did Wyndham ask Whitlam 
what policies could be presented by Committees dealing with economic 
planning, overseas investment, aborigines and New Guinea, but he also 
revealed his willingness to tailor the work of the Committees, 
especially those dealing with more controversial subjects, to Whitlam's 
strategic and policy preferences: 'As you know, I have held off
convening them until you were safely installed and [sic] you would not 
find yourself restricted .... Foreign Affairs and Defence. This is a 
problem, as well you know. It is useless stalling the Committee, as 
Charlie [Oliver, its Chairman] intends. What we do with it, is the 
question: '.. . . Education [The platform is too long]. But do we at this 
stage want to review State Aid because this will surely happen?':
Wyndham to Whitlam, 15 February 1967, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/31/Federal 
Parliamentary Labor Party - Leader (E.G. Whitlam) Correspondence 1967- 
FPLP/4.
162SMH, 23 February, 2 March 1967. One observer pointed out that the 
shadow portfolios were arranged according to the structure of a future 
ALP Government (AFR, 2 March 1967).
163Anonymous, ed., Whitlam and Frost, 45 (interview with Whitlam, August 
1972); C.J. Lloyd, interview. Before 1967, despite an attempt to 
develop a shadow system in 1965, the Caucus had elected a fourteen member 
Executive, without designated responsibilities, and separate Caucus 
Committees. Whitlam described the old system thus: 'The Caucus
Executive would meet for an hour a week, mainly to discuss"who's going 
to take the Bill"' [i.e. lead the Opposition in Parliamentary debate on 
the legislation] (E.G. Whitlam, interview).
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shadows and other senior Caucus members, who became ministers in 1972,
made notable contributions, not only to the ’selling’ of policy and of
164themselves as future ministers, but to the making of policy as well.
Thus, Cameron, shadow Minister for Labour, was largely responsible for
the comprehensive industrial policy adopted by the 1971 Federal 
165Conference. Murphy, shadow Attorney General, worked on civil
liberties and law reform. Beazley, who became Education minister,
166contributed to aboriginal affairs, foreign affairs and education.
Daly worked on immigration, Cass and Hayden on health and welfare, 
Patterson and A.J. Grassby on agriculture, Crean, shadow Treasurer, on 
economic policy, R.F.X. Connor on fuel and energy matters and Uren on 
urban and regional development."^^
On the eve of the 1972 Federal election shadow ministers, future 
ministers and senior Caucus members contributed to a book, Towards a 
New Australia, ’to identify the particular problems which would face 
an incoming Labor government, to explain how Labor would set up various 
structures to meet these problems, and to indicate the goals towards
The following sentences are based on interviews with Beazley, 
Cameron, Cass, Crean, Crook, Cullen, Deeble, Lloyd, Mathews, Oliver, 
Troy and Whitlam.
"*~^Mathews described Cameron's contribution 'as the one big exception 
[to Whitlam's dominance]. He made it almost as much his own personal 
fief as Whitlam did the rest’ (interview). Since this contribution 
was made through the Industrial Committee of the Executive, it 
enabled Cameron himself to provide the most enthusiastic verdict on 
the Committees as a whole: 'They prospered in spite of Whitlam'
(C.R. Cameron, interview).
166On Beazley in the Foreign Affairs Committee, see chapter 4,note 114.
^^Troy recalls that Uren's presentation of urban policy was often 
better received by non-specialists, including journalists, because 
it was not obscured by Freudenberg's 'literary' style as Whitlam's 
speeches on the same subject had been (interview).
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which this planning would aspire'. At the same time, the Federal 
Executive was listening to the chief policy contributor, Whitlam, 
explaining the outline of the policy speech and listing the priorities 
for a Labor Government. When he had finished, the Executive resolved 
'that the Leader of the Parliamentary Labor Party be commended for the 
work that he has done in preparing the outline of the speech which
169recommends itself unanimously and enthusiastically to the Executive'.
The book, an exposition of their ideas and intended actions by a group 
of Federal Parliamentarians, bore neither the explicit imprimatur of, 
nor more than a passing reference to the party machine. The resolution 
was an effusive endorsement of a policy speech which owed little to 
the machine as such. The book and the resolution emphasised how far 
and how effectively the problems of the State-based machine had been 
by-passed in the making of Labor's electoral policy.
Conclusion
The previous three chapters showed how, in varying degrees, 
decisionmaking by the Federal Conference and Executive was influenced 
by the pursuit of State Branch goals, by personal factors, by various 
external pressures and by the search for system-maintenance (keeping 
the coalition together) and compromise decisions. The conflicting 
external and internal pressures were mediated through disjointed
^^John McLaren, ed., Towards a New Australia, Melbourne, 1972, viii.
The contributors were given as Whitlam (foreign affairs), Barnard 
(defence), C.J. Hurford (planning), Crean (economics), Cairns (tariffs), 
Murphy (science), Grassby (rural), Uren (urban), Wheeldon (civil 
liberties), D. McClelland (arts and media), D. Kennedy (education),
Cass and Hayden (aspects of health and welfare). All except Kennedy 
(defeated), Hurford and Wheeldon became ministers later in the year.
i 69'FX 4-5 September 1972, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/121/50.
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incrementalism, partisan mutual adjustment and the processes of the 
garbage can. Hence, policies which Labor presented to the electors, 
such as its education policy in 1963 and its Vietnam policy in 1966, 
as well as decisions with less direct electoral impact, like those on 
unity tickets, were intricately connected with the party’s internal 
politics. Thus they contained ambiguities, internal inconsistencies 
and curious concessions. At the same time, party Leaders made policy 
speeches containing many items on which the party as such had said 
nothing. There was an incomplete, scrappy platform and a series of 
lengthy, diffuse speeches.
We have traced in this chapter three attempts to by-pass the
hcuideficiencies of the coalitional structure which/led to the haphazard 
consideration of electoral policy. All three attempts contributed 
something not only to by-passing but also to the construction of a new, 
less rigid, structure for the making of electoral policy. The Federal 
machinery did not disappear. The Federal Leader's role changed.
Formal changes involved grafting pieces onto the old structure, rather 
than wholesale replacement, but new types of people became important 
and the focus of the media's continuing fascination with the Labor 
Party shifted from the Federal Executive and Federal Conference.^^
^^See above, pp. 406-7.
^^A relationship between the Federal policymaking machinery of the ALP 
and an outside structure was not unique: some writers have suggested
that the main impetus of the wartime Labor Governments came not from 
the party machinery but from the public service. The Curtin and 
Chifley administrations, by this account, merely attached themselves to 
a burgeoning, confident public service and shared the credit for post 
war reconstruction. The Federal party machinery protected the 
Governments from radical rank and filers who believed the party-public 
servant tandem was moving too slowly. Deprived of bureaucratic 
inspiration by the defeat of 1949, Labor, in the eyes of many, lived 
on its memories, drew desultorily on the ideas of isolated 
Parliamentarians, allowed an already dated and incomplete platform to
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Commencing in 1961, the Policy Committee system and the overlapping 
Whitlam network drew on the services of politicians and friendly 
advisers to expand and modernise Labor's platform with an eye to 
solving problems perceived to exist in the community and to winning 
votes from the community. The Federal Conference and Executive were 
prepared to concede that the new structure and its incumbents were 
performing tolerably well a task that the machinery had done badly or 
not at all. Most Policy Committee reports were adopted by Conferences 
with little change, the Federal Executive withdrew fairly easily from a 
supervisory role, Whitlam as Leader was able to exert great personal 
influence on electoral policy.
Two questions remain. First, did by-passing lead to changes in 
Labor's relationship with the electors? Secondly, were the products of 
by-passing, the policies produced, significantly different, in quantity 
or nature, from what previously carried the label 'ALP'?
To answer the second question first. One measure of difference is 
the size of the party's printed platform: in 1959, the platform covered
6'2 pages, by 1965 it had grown to 22^ pages and by 1971 to 29^ 4 pages.
At the same time, the number of Conference resolutions, not part of the 
platform but still formally binding on the whole party, grew from two 
in 1959 to 42 in 1965 and 31 in 1971. Many of the resolutions and some 
of the platform planks came from the Conference floor but, even allowing
171 (continued)
stagnate further and then turned inwards to its own factional battles 
while hoping that the voters would ignore Labor disunity if bribed by 
attractive, ad hoc election promises. For the 1940s: L.F. Crisp,
Ben Chifley, Croydon, Vic., 1963, especially chapters 14 and 17; 
R.I.P.A. Study Group, 'Commonwealth Policy Co-ordination', Henry 
Mayer, ed., Australian Politics: A Reader, 513-26; S. Encel, Cabinet
Government in Australia, Melbourne, 1962, 195; W.J. Waters, 'Labor, 
Socialism and World War II', Labour History, 16 (May 1969), 14-19.
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for these, Labor’s electoral policy greatly expanded in conjunction 
with the establishment and expansion of methods of by-passing.
One can also measure the changes in the content of the policies 
through the 1960s by measuring the proportions of the platform under 
different headings. The measure is crude at best, since both the 
headings and the placement of planks under them change and the method 
makes no distinction between important and less important planks. 
However, the following table indicates general trends:
Table 5.3: Content of ALP Federal Platforms, 1959, 1965 , 1971 (%).172
Heading 1959 1965 1971
Objective, Interpretation, Principles of Action 20.8 6.5 2.1
Constitutional Matters 0.8 0.6 2.6
Economic Planning 15.4 5.3 3.0
Education 0.8 14.4 7.7
Science and Technology - 6.5 6.6
Industrial Development - 2.0 3.6
Cultural Affairs - - 1.1
Cities 0.9 7.5 7.6
Health 20.8 8.9 7.7
Social Welfare 3.1 1.2 1.8
Repatriation 1.6 0.4 1.5
Industrial Relations 9.2 4.3 19.7
172The headings used in the table are those in the 1971 platform. This 
has required, for instance, that ’Banking and Finance' and 'Taxation' 
of 1959 are lumped together under 'Economic Planning', the housing 
planks under 'Social' in 1959 and under 'Housing' in 1965 are included 
under 'Cities', which included housing planks in 1971, and 'Aid to 
Private Schools' of 1965 appears under 'Education'. The titling of 
platform sections is, of course, significant of the changing priorities 
of the platform and the different ways in which problems are seen.
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Heading 1959 1965 1971
Rural 6.9 4.5 3.9
Transport 3.8 4.3 3.3
Northern Development 0.2 2.4 2.0
Immigration 1.6 1.0 0.8
Aborigines 0.8 2.0 2.8
Defence 7.7 3.5 4.9
Foreign Affairs 3.8 15.7 6.2
Civil Liberties 1.0 2.0 3.0
Law Reform 0.8 0.8 4.4
National Insurance Office 1.1 0.4 0.3
Arts and Media - 5.7 3.3
Source: ALP, Official Report, Commonwealth Conference , 1959; 6C)-6;
Federal Platform Constitution and Rules as approved by the 26th
Commonwealth Conference 1965; Platform, Constitution ,and Rules as
approved by the 29th Commonwealth Conference, Launceston, 1971.
The table shows that, just as the by-passing structures were grafted
onto, rather than replaced the existing structure, so too were the new
policy planks added to the old. The platform sections which decline as
a proportion of the whole, notably the Objective, Economic Planning and
Health, change little in length. The expansion is in areas where nothing
or almost nothing existed before (Education, Science, Industrial
Development, Cities and Arts and Media) or where an area traditionally
important is expanded still further after a temporary slump (Industrial 
173Relations). Nor did the expansion into new areas mean that more
173The Objective section in 1959 covered 1^ pages, in 1965, 1%, and in 
1971, just oyer half a page. Economic Planning was in 1959 (as 
’Banking and Finance and Taxation'), slightly less than 1% in 1965 and 
just under one in 1971. Health was lh in 1959, 2 in 1965 and 2 in 1971. 
The fall in the Foreign Affairs proportion in 1971 is largely due to the 
deletion of one page written on the assumption that Papua,New Guinea 
would remain an Australian Territory.
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traditional concerns were neglected when elections loomed or the Leader 
presented his policy speech. Thus, Whitlam's radio broadcasts between 
May and October 1972 bore such titles as 'A Better Army', 'A New Deal 
for Health', 'A New Deal in Welfare', 'What the Budget did Not Do' and 
'"Full Employment" Means Just That' as well as 'Equality in Education', 
'Cities are the Nation's Problem' and 'Secrecy versus the People'.
When he addressed the Federal Executive in September 1972, Whitlam 
listed Labor's priorities, if elected, as employment, prices, overseas 
economic control and economic growth, ahead of cities, education and 
health. The campaign advertisements covered inflation, prices, 
unemployment, national planning and foreign investment, education, 
health, rural matters and social welfare - a list that reflected as 
much the longer term concerns of Labor as the new or expanded planks 
of the platform.
A brief outline of 'differences' begs at least three questions.
If old problems (economic planning, defence, welfare) were still 
recognised, were there new suggested solutions to these problems, 
reflecting the influence of policy produced by by-passing just as much 
as in the 'new' areas of education, cities and science? Although 
traditional Labor goals like full employment and control of inflation, 
social security and strong defence were still mentioned, were these 
references responses to short-term considerations, such as the economic 
instability of 1972, while the main interest of the party had shifted 
to other areas? If this interest had shifted were the new priority
174Gough Whitlam, The Macquarie Broadcasts, Canberra, 1972.
175FX 4-5 September 1972, Fed. Rec., NLA MS 4985/121/50. See also: 
Gough Whitlam, Into the Seventies with Labor: 1969 Policy Speech;
Whitlam, On Australia's Constitution, 265-307 (1972 policy speech).
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policies meant to serve the same groups in the community as in the 
past or groups in whose welfare Labor traditionally had be'en less 
interested? These questions can only be approached via a complex 
analysis of the relationship between the sources of the new policies, 
their content and their perceived 'target areas' in the electorate.
This will be one of the tasks of the final chapter.
There were two other implications of by-passing. Both involved 
a noticeable change from the picture of the Labor Party painted in 
chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis. Both were inseparable from 
Whitlam's style of Labor Leadership. First, by-passing helped link 
the platform and the policy speech as they had not been under Evatt and 
Calwell.
The chief fault of the platform [Whitlam believed] 
was not that it was electorally unattractive. Its 
fault lay in its irrelevance. It had become 
irrelevant to winning, or losing, elections. More 
importantly, it had become irrelevant as a plan of 
action for any Labor Government. In framing their 
election policy speeches_, Evatt in 1954, 1955 and 
1958 and Calwell in 1961 and 1963 largely ignored 
the printed platform. They were forced to do this 
because the printed platform was quite unhelpful 
as a guide to action. It had become a mass of 
unrelated proposals, reflecting the interests, 
concerns or whims of Labor conferences going back 
to the 1920s and beyond. In matters like education, 
health and foreign policy, it was far clearer on 
what should not be done than on what should be 
done.176
Instead, Whitlam hoped to make the policy speech grow out of the 
policymaking processes of the party and form a link between the party's 
conception of community needs and what it would do in government. 'The 
policies I outline tonight are not my policies alone; they are the
176Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 74.
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policies of a united and determined Labor P a r t y . A  policy speech:
is not an occasion for pulling rabbits out of the 
hat or producing last minute half-baked proposals 
and promises. Labor's program ... has been 
carefully developed over the last six years. It 
has been subject to the most searching scrutiny 
by friendly experts as well as hostile critics.178
According to Freudenberg, who wrote it, the 1972 policy speech was
'simply a summary of the work of the previous six years' and his own
task 'one of organizing a mass of material worked over for years past
into a coherent framework'. Whitlam was annoyed that anyone should
think it could be anything else. He had worked to 'marshal the
examples in other countries' to show their feasibility in Australia, to
cost them fully to avoid the old charge of financial recklessness, to
keep himself and his senior colleagues before the voters as competent
and responsible future ministers. The policy speeches of 1969 and 1972,
more than any of their precursors, were rehearsed, honed and predictable.
Whitlam, as the most indefatigable worker and as the mouthpiece at the
campaign opening, provided a living link between the platform and the
policy speech. When Labor came to power, he insisted on its 'mandate'
179to implement its programme, as set out in the policy speech.
^^Whitlam, Into the Seventies with Labor ..., 2.
178Whitlam, The Macquarie Broadcasts, 29. See also his 1972 policy 
speech: Whitlam, On Australia's Constitution, 266, 306.
179For material on the connection between platform, policy speech and 
government activity, as seen by Whitlam: Age, 13 September 1967;
A.L.P. Journal, May 1969, 15; Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 226-8, 
244, 257; C.J. Lloyd, interview; C.J. Lloyd & G.S. Reid, Out of the 
Wilderness, North Melbourne, 1974, 197-210, 225; Whitlam, Into the 
Seventies with Labor ..., 1, 2; The Road to Reform ..., 4; 
(interviewed), Whitlam and Frost, 44, 45, 57, 141. As the living link 
and interpreter Whitlam enjoyed independent power, especially in 1972. 
Lloyd and Reid deny that Whitlam's speech followed the wording of the 
platform in every respect. 'The policy speech is highly selective 
and dominated by the interpretation of the Party Leader who draws up 
the document’ (Lloyd & Reid, Out of the Wilderness, 207). But there 
were few complaints that the platform had been blatantly flouted.
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We shall return in the final chapter to some of the implications 
of.the above paragraph. Meanwhile, the other indirect result of the 
by-passing procedure was its tendency to shift the focus of activity 
in the party - and thus of external interest in it - away from the 
machine to the Parliamentary party and especially to Whitlam as 
Parliamentary Leader. In chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis and to a 
much lesser extent in chapter 4, politicians tried primarily to 
influence Federal Conference and Federal Executive in certain directions. 
In chapter 4 and to a lesser extent in the two preceding chapters, 
politicians tried to manoeuvre within the decisions of these Federal 
bodies. In this chapter, politicians, led by Whitlam, became much more 
catalysts and contributors, with the Federal bodies the reactors. To 
some extent, this had always been true regarding electoral policy but 
it had been less important for the character of the party and less 
noticeable for those who observed it, simply because the party, as 
such, had produced much less electoral policy. The expansion and 
changing emphasis of electoral policy in the mid to late 1960s resulted 
from an identifiable party process in which politicians played a central 
role. At the same time politicians came to centre stage in a party 
where they had tended to recede, paradoxically, behind the 'faceless 
men’ of the machine in the decade before 1965.
The revived importance of politicians became obvious at Conferences.
Once an arena for sub-coalitions, Conference became rather a stage for
members of Parliament. Thus, in 1965 observers contrasted the eclipse
of Calwell, negotiating in back-rooms with his Executive allies, by
180the confident Whitlam, the thoughtful Duns tan, the sincere Hayden.
1 80Age, C-M, CT, 9 August 1965.
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By 1969, while Whitlam himself rationed his contributions, Parliamentary
colleagues like Beazley, Cameron, Dunstan, Hayden, Holding and Murphy
181dominated the discussions. Simultaneously, observers of Conferences
remarked upon their smoothness and the absence of much of the personal
182enmity that had often marked past meetings. In the few months 
between the 1969 Federal Conference and the Federal election of that 
year and, with some notable exceptions, for most of the years 1970 to 
1972, Federal Labor conveyed the image to the public, through the 
media, of a reasonably united, responsible alternative government, led 
by its politicians. Sub-coalitional dissension did not disappear but, 
for the most part, it became less obvious. The party re-organisation 
in New South Wales and Victoria in 1970-71 certainly re-awakened 
memories of the old, squabbling Labor Party but, even then, the 
intervention forces were led as much by politicians as by machine men. 
Perhaps, too, the startling innovation of Whitlam, while still Leader 
of the Opposition, seizing the initiative to act as world statesman in 
China balanced these episodes so characteristic of a Labor Party doomed 
to opposition. Finally, the Federal Executive, so often in the 1950s 
and 1960s the source of unfavourable publicity for Labor, in that it 
was portrayed both as the continuing arena of Labor disunity and the 
ugly watchdog over Labor politicians, became a much more quiescent 
body. This was partly due to the presence thereon of politicians,
181Advertiser, Age, 4 August 1969; Australian, 2, 7 August 1969; 
Independent (Perth) 7 September 1969.
1 8?Age, 29 July, 4 August 1969; Australian, 2, 4 August 1969; CT,
2 August 1969; Oakes & Solomon, The Making of an Australian Prime 
Minister, 26; R.F.I. Smith, 'Political Review', AQ, 43, 3 (September 
1971), 95-6.
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partly to the belief that could not have helped but infect it that
T , - „ . , 183Labor was at last destined to govern.
Federal Executive meetings during 1969 to 1972 were pre-occupied 
with internal party matters, such as finance, the fate of the Federal 
Secretariat, the Victorian and New South Wales reconstructions, 
autonomy for the ACT Branch, the Harradine case and a preselection 
dispute in Shortland, New South Wales: FX 1969-72, Fed. Rec., NLA
MS 4985/121/47-50. But observers of these meetings noted that, as 
the 1972 elections approached, delegates avoided some questions 
directly related to Labor’s electoral face, such as the endorsement 
of a draft resister to stand for a Victorian seat and the possibility 
of tax increases to pay for Labor's promises: Age, 18 March 1972;
Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 227; Colin A. Hughes, ’Australian 
Political Chronicle: The Commonwealth January-April 1972’, AJPH,
18 (August 1972), 269-70.
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Chapter 6: A New Synthesis?
Provided they survive the strains produced by internal strivings 
and external pressures the ability of political parties to implement 
electoral policies depends upon their gaining access to governmental 
power. In Labor’s case, since it rejects formal and informal coalitions 
with other parties, this depends on its winning a majority of seats in 
its own right at Federal elections. But to win a majority different 
strategies could be employed. This chapter will set out what can be 
called 'the Whitlam strategy' - since he was its leading proponent and 
most identified with it - then it will suggest weaknesses in the 
strategy and, thirdly, it will suggest another strategy, a 'new 
synthesis' of some aspects of the Whitlam strategy and some other 
strategies which were overshadowed during the years of Whitlam's 
dominance.
The Whitlam Strategy and Whitlam's Concept of Politics
This thesis began with Philip Selznick's idea of 'critical 
decisions', decisions which affect the development of an organisation, 
which alter its 'character', which involve 'the dynamic adaptation of 
the total organization to internal strivings and external pressures'.^ 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of the thesis found plenty of evidence of internal 
strivings and external pressures. It is more difficult to discover if 
the character of the organisation has been changed. Selznick's main 
concern is the institutionalisation of organisations, their 
transformation into 'social organisms', and he sees character formation
Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration, Evanston, 111., & White 
Plains, N.Y., 1957, 31, 35, 36.
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as a phase of this process. He mentions parties in passing as
institutions whose character may change, for example, ’from a
majority-forming agency ... into a more narrowly ideological
instrument’, (in the terms introduced early in this thesis, this would
be a change from an ’inclusive' to an 'exclusive' party.) However, we
have suggested that parties have an intense internal life of their
own, such that it is impossible to characterise them so crudely: they
comprise members who can be placed at various points on an inclusive-
exclusive continuum at various times. They also evolve processes for
reconciling differences between decisionmakers in order to present
policies to the electorate under the party label. Again, policies
change over time. Selznick says 'the emergence of organizational
character reflects the irreversible element in experience and choice ....
The acceptance of irreversible commitments is the process by which the
3character of an organisation is set.' Yet, if Selznick's concept is to 
fit political parties, which seek control of the government of a state 
by offering policies at elections in return for electoral support, the 
number of critical decisions motCle. by l-he will be severely limited,
since very few of these commitments or 'promises' are incapable of 
reversal. A promise to cut taxes may become a tax increase just as 
rapidly as economic conditions change; a promise not to send troops 
to foreign wars may be ignored as soon as the election has been won.
The problem is that a political party in its relationship with the 
electorate is defined just as much by what it offers as by the extent 
of its institutionalisation. It is a set of attitudes, a list
2Selznick, Leadership in Administration, 48.
3Selznick, Leadership in Administration, 40. My emphasis.
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of promises, as much as it is a self-sustaining organism. More 
generally, the decisions it makes regarding electoral policy or its 
own internal organisation, even if they are later reversed, help 
determine its institutionalisation. They help determine whether and 
in what form it survives. At the most, 'irreversible commitments' are 
'commitments that seem irreversible at the time they are made'.
In political parties most, if not all, commitments are reversible
no matter how immutable they seem when first made. An individual may
bear the marks of a childhood experience for the rest of his life. A
party's structure may, in Duverger's words, bear 'the mark of its
origin' (for example, as one based on trade unions) or of traumatic
experiences (such as the battle between Parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary wings in Australian Labour in the 1890s, which produced
4the candidates' pledge). But parties can always reverse decisions 
previously made or excise features of their own bodies. They are freer 
than Selznick's individual to rewrite their own history. This is 
especially so with decisions directed towards the electorate, where 
the aim is always as much to win votes as to express character.
Given the problems of the idea of character changing as part of 
the concept of critical decisions,must this concept refer only to those 
decisions which show evidence of internal strivings and external 
pressures? In chapters 2, 3 and 4, the evidence of strivings and 
pressures is clear. These case studies were chosen since they were
4Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, London, 1954, xxxv. The full 
quotation is: 'It is the whole life of the party which bears the mark
of its origin ...' Duverger concentrates upon party structure. The 
argument of the above paragraph is that the internal politics of a 
party cannot be so neatly characterised. Many decisions - part of 
party 'life' - do not bear these marks.
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areas in which the ALP expended much time and energy. Those who 
observed the party believed decisions in these areas were important 
because of the value party decisionmakers attached to a favourable 
decision, because of the intensity of feeling decisions engendered 
among participants and because of the intensity of the efforts made 
by external pressure centres to influence the decisions made.
Certainly, the participants believed that Labor would be a different 
party if it granted state aid or gave only scholarships to non-state 
students, if it ignored unity tickets or prosecuted them, if it 
supported the commitment to Vietnam or opposed it. To a large extent, 
critical decisions in these three chapters were those which participants 
believed were critical.^
Chapter 5 shows, however, that there is no necessary connection 
between the amount of striving and pressure and the effect of the 
decisions, as measured in this case by the changes they wrought in the 
ALP Federal platform. Chance remarks associated with the subject 
matter of earlier chapters raised this possibility. For example, 
Wheeldon complained that the party had spent far too long on the 
'trash* of state aid, a relatively minor part of any education programme 
or budget, while Whitlam lamented in Beyond Vietnam that the Vietnam 
obsession was precluding consideration of a more comprehensive foreign 
policy for Australia and Labor. Writers on organisations and their
Cf the discussion in David Braybrooke & Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy 
of Decision, Glencoe & London, 1963, 62-4, of decisions effecting 
'large' and 'small' changes. Categorisation depends greatly on the 
values people attach to the changes and these values differ. But there 
is a tendency to a common view and people tend to make issues of the 
same decisions.
^Note a comment on the 1965 Federal Conference: 'The course of intra­
party debate in the preceding three months made it certain that the 
most controversial (if not necessarily the most important) issues 
facing the conference would be unity tickets ... state aid ... and 
reform of the party': L.J. Hume, 'Australian Political Chronicle May-
August 1965: The Commonwealth', AJPH, 11 (December 1965), 368. My
emphasis.
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internal processes have recognised the phenomenon, too. 'Low salience 
in decisions does not necessarily mean that the process will be calm 
or free of conflict.'^ On the other hand, organisations may 'make 
apparently major decisions with only minor participation by key
g
administrators and significant constituents’. Similarly, the history 
of Labor's Federal Policy Committees and the 'Whitlam network' during 
the 1960s and early 1970s shows that the Federal platform was 
substantially expanded with little resistance from the Federal 
Conference and Executive. As a result, the face which Labor presented 
to the electorate was altered, even though the basic structure of the 
party was augmented rather than overturned. Some aspects of character 
change more than others.
It could be argued that this augmentation merely shifted the focus
of striving and pressure to the Committees and the Whitlam network.
The evidence relating to this point is limited and conflicting, but on
balance it suggests that conflict in these areas was desultory at the
most. Cairns suggests that many Committee recommendations were
compromises between opposed views and Cameron adds that the full
Conference occasionally saw conflict between members of the majority
9and minority on Policy Committees. Then, in chapter 4, we examined the
James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, 
Bergen, 1976, 270.
g
March & Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice ..., 10.
9J.F. Cairns, C.R. Cameron, interviews. For two specific examples, note 
the report of the 1965 Social Services Committee ('we readily admit that 
there were honest differences of opinion as to the order of priority 
which should be given to the various benefits') and the disagreement in 
the 1969 Rural Committee between Pollard, a Committee member, and Rex 
Patterson, who advised the Committee, over wheat marketing: ALP, Official
Report, Commonwealth Conference, 1965, 189; Susan C. Read, The 1969 
Federal Conference of the Australian Labor Party: Its Impact on the Shape
of the Election Campaign and the Outcome of the Election, unpublished 
thesis [MA Qualifying?] Department of Political Science, School of 
General Studies, Australian National University, Canberra [1971?], 22.
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efforts of the Foreign Policy Committee in 1967 to evolve a Vietnam 
resolution to satisfy the differing views of its members. The National 
Advisory Committee on Education, while technically not a Standing 
Committee, failed to reach agreement over state aid in 1966, showing 
that a controversial issue could not be defused by being sent to a 
committee. But few matters were as controversial as state aid and 
many were either unexceptionable new ways of solving old problems or 
suggestions for extending the role of the Commonwealth government.
They found few opponents in a party which had long possessed a strong 
centralising inclination. In these instances, those Policy Committee 
members who knew what they wanted usually had their ideas endorsed. 
’Ninety per cent of the time’, said Whitlam, ’if you know what you 
want it gets through. Those who come to Policy Committees unprepared 
and not knowing how to argue don't succeed.’^  In any case, the 
composition of the Committees encouraged agreement: their politician
members owed more loyalty to electoral success than to party sub­
coalitions and could agree easily to schemes which seemed likely to 
enhance it; their expert members could see the technical merits of 
schemes even if they were not personally responsible for them.
To summarise, although by-passing structures like Committees and 
the Whitlam network were unlikely to be free of conflict and of the 
need for compromise, they were less dominated by these characteristics 
than were the Federal Conference and Executive. There was more 
consideration of proposals on their merits as solutions to problems 
and as vote winners.^ What, then, is the significance of by-passing in
^E.G. Whitlam, interview.
"^To the extent that there was politics within the Committees there may 
be scope for the concepts of partisan mutual adjustment, disjointed 
incrementalism and the garbage can. But a detailed analysis of the 
life of the Committees is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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relation to the hypotheses tested in this thesis? Simply that there 
was a change in balance between internal strivings and external 
pressures in the making of electoral policy, with the latter influences 
becoming more important and, secondly, some external pressures becoming 
more important while others declined. Thus, in chapter 5, we noted the 
importance of ’friendly advisers’. These were the subject of our 
original HYPOTHESIS XI, which was able to be constructed on what was 
known of the influence of people like Brian Fitzpatrick, E.L. Wheelwright 
and J.W. Burton, of Fabian Societies and subscribers to small radical 
journals. But even in the early 1950s, these were isolated individuals 
rather than the more articulate representatives of a stratum in society. 
One could argue, on the other hand, that the experts in the universities 
and elsewhere who advised Labor in the 1960s and 1970s were the leading 
edge of a growing tertiary educated, professional, well-paid, middle 
class, suburban dwelling, politically interested wave of post war 
Australian society. Many of these people were sympathetic to ideals 
which they believed Labor represented and some of them were willing to 
put their expertise at the party’s disposal. They provide evidence for 
HYPOTHESIS XI (friendly advisers), but also for HYPOTHESIS VII 
(environmental changes), since they were symptomatic of a change in 
the social, economic and cultural environments of the Australian 
political system. New groups with new interests became important and 
placed demands on the components of the system, including the ALP.
The ’Whitlam strategy’ was to by-pass the Federal Conference and 
Executive structure for the making of electoral policy, using instead 
a structure of Policy Committees and informal networks with Whitlam as 
the main participant and chief articulator of the electoral policies 
produced. The most important external contributors were members of
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the new educated stratum described above. The politicians who dominated
Committee memberships or became shadow ministers realised that Labor
must appeal beyond its core supporters to the emerging groups. Policies
in education, housing, transport, health and the development of cities
were designed to appeal to people who lived in badly serviced suburbs,
who protected their children's health, who wished their children to
have a substantial education, whose homes were unsewered or far from
transport and community facilities. Rather than the educated middle
class, the policies were directed at a certain region, the outer
suburbs and their citizens, who possessed varcpVig levels of education and
political awareness. Labor had always been prepared to seek support
from new groups which had not previously supported it, to be 'inclusive'.
But in the Australia of the 1960s the political demands of the suburban
12dwellers had been only haphazardly catered for by both sides.
The external pressures these new groups imposed on the ALP were
welcomed, their demands sought out. Labor's electoral strategists
13believed outer suburban votes would bring victory. The party adjusted 
fairly easily to these changes in the social and economic environment 
(HYPOTHESIS VII). Simultaneously, other external pressures became less 
salient. Except where the interests of unionists were directly affected,
For remarks about the emergence of 'new issues', broadly classified 
as 'quality of life', associated with the political recognition of 
these groups, by Whitlam Labor and then by its opponents, see:
R.W. Connell, Ruling Class, Ruling Culture, Cambridge, 1977, 115-16;
John Edwards, 'What Future for Whitlamism?', Quadrant, 20, 2 (February 
1976), 10; Alan Hughes, 'Political Review', AQ, 41, 3 (September 1969), 
88; R.F.I. Smith, 'Political Review', AQ, 43, 3 (September 1971), 86. 
For a sample of Whitlam's mqin policy concerns, see the titles of his 
speeches in the Bibliography below.
13 'Labor won the [1972] election ... in Sydney and Melbourne. More 
particularly it won, as Whitlam had planned, in the outer suburban 
electorates of Sydney and Melbourne' (Laurie Oakes & David Solomon,
The Making of an Australian Prime Minister, Melbourne, 1973, 303).
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as in the industrial relations issue of penal clauses, which provoked
debate at the 1971 Conference, the relationship with affiliated unions
never reached the important position it held during the unity ticket
years (HYPOTHESIS VI). As the cold war receded and Vietnam turned sour,
the international political environment exerted less pressure
(HYPOTHESIS VII) . Parties and voters turned inward to domestic issues.
Here Labor, rather than the Government, set the pace and Liberals had
to match Labor proposals without being able to fall back on the bogeys
14of Communism and Labor's unreliability. HYPOTHESIS XIII, which 
underlined the way Labor in opposition might have to react to government 
actions, draws less support from the evidence of these years. Labor's 
relationship with Communists became less important, in election rhetoric 
and in reality, as Communist schisms made disunity rather than threat a 
synonym for that party (HYPOTHESIS VIII). This affected Labor's 
relations with the Catholic church and its followers (HYPOTHESIS IX) 
which improved also with the removal of Labor's barriers to state aid.^  
Finally, as Labor moved towards victory, the Democratic Labor Party came 
to look increasingly irrelevant. Many of its followers drifted to the 
Liberals, others back to a Labor Party which had lost its threatening 
aspects (HYPOTHESIS X).
We can state the Whitlam strategy in terms of the rise and fall of 
our three sets of hypotheses. It involved, first, by-passing the internal
Note, firstly, the comment about the close resemblance between the 
domestic policies of Gorton and Whitlam in 1969 and, secondly, McMahon's 
search for a telling anti-Labor issue: Alan Hughes, 'Political Review',
AQ, 41, 4 (December 1969), 22; Oakes & Solomon, The Making of an 
Australian Prime Minister, 249-74.
^But note that, if Labor won back Catholic rank and filers because of 
its state aid policy it did so against the views of most of the Bishops, 
who preferred the Liberal per capita grants to Labor's needs policy: 
Michael Charles Hogan, The Catholic Campaign for State Aid, Sydney, 1978, 
199-216.
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strivings of the traditional structure, as encapsulated in HYPOTHESES 
I-V. (HYPOTHESIS II receives support in the sense that Whitlam as an 
individual was more important in the party he led than was Calwell in 
the party he led. He dominated the electoral policymaking structure he 
led where Calwell had not dominated the coalition structure which 
Whitlam's strategy now by-passed. Yet Whitlam's battles with other 
strong individuals like Cairns and Murphy took place largely divorced 
from electoral policymaking. The details of the electoral policy bore 
the stamp of Whitlam’s personal preferences, not of his battles with 
other powerful individuals.)
Secondly, the strategy involved encouraging the influences of some 
external pressures, especially those covered by HYPOTHESES VII (the 
domestic part) and XI^ , and taking advantage of the declining potential 
for influence of others - HYPOTHESES VII (the international part), VIII, 
IX, X. and XIII - and the limited policy interests of affiliated unions 
(HYPOTHESIS VI) . It meant that electoral policy decisions were made 
much more on the merits of alternatives as vote winners and as responses 
to problems in the community. It meant that the party came to be seen 
as dominated by its politicians, who, for the most part, were 
inclusivists. By the late 1960s there were far fewer Labor decisionmakers 
taking an extreme exclusivist stance than there had been ten years 
earlier.
Did the Whitlam strategy then lead to mere crude pragmatism, 
swaying to the winds of the electorate? Did Whitlam's redefinitions of 
Labor principles in such terms as 'positive equality' mask a tendency
16to respond '[l]ike the brolga ... to the loudest noise in society ...'?
‘^Leslie Haylen, Twenty Years Hard Labor, South Melbourne, 1969, 177. 
Haylen's description is of Whitlam in his early days in the Caucus.
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His critics attributed this motive too easily to Whitlam and his
followers. For Whitlam was a teacher of the electorate as well as a
student of its whims. He saw himself as an advocate of professionally
produced, cohesive, radical proposals to an electorate which was only
gradually becoming aware of the possibilities for political action and
of the acceptability of a Federal Labor Government. Asked in 1972 to
describe his own best quality, Whitlam replied:
I think it’s probably that I will try to work out 
means of achieving of what I would think are my 
Party’s objectives - how to marshal the advisers 
in this country and then try to work how to explain 
it to people. I think that's probably what I've 
done best .... It’s what I tried to do.l^
In 1973, speaking of the ALP and ACTU President, R.J.L. Hawke, Whitlam
summarised the central idea of his own conception of politics:
I think he [Hawke] has an immense number of the 
gifts which are required in a politician, who has 
to explain and sell political policies. He is a 
very attractive campaigner. People like his 
aggressive presentation of issues.18
Those who observed Whitlam noted his obsession with finding the best way 
of conveying his message. ’The essence of his method', Freudenberg 
wrote, 'lies in a continuing search for a formula, the form of words 
which will say exactly what he means and which embodies a plan for 
practical action'. Interviewed by the present author, Whitlam described 
his approach to one area of policy: 'I refined it a number of times
until eventually I found the form of words I wanted'. He defended his 
approach to the Vietnam issue as not shifty but showing his desire for 
'precision'. His Caucus colleague, Haylen, complained: 'He tried to
prove everything with a set of figures or a quote .... Whitlam has an
^Anonymous, ed., Whitlam and Frost, London, 1974, 44.
18Anonymous, ed., Whitlam and Frost, 176.
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agonizing trick of harping on a theme until it is threadbare. It seems
19good to him and he flogs it into near madness for his supporters.’
Whitlam's speeches reveal clearly the amassing of statistics and the
20reiteration of themes and formulae of words.
Those who seek to educate electors need a platform. Whitlam found 
his in public meetings, in the media and in Parliament. 'A public
19Graham Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, South Melbourne, 1977, 70; 
Haylen, Twenty Years Hard Labor, 179; E.G. Whitlam, interview.
20Two typical Parliamentary speeches, on education and pollution 
respectively, include statistics on the job intentions of scholarship 
winners, university enrolments and scholarship holders, Higher School 
Certificate examinees, Australian education expenditure as a proportion 
of Gross National Product in comparison with other countries, the 
proportion of young Australians in full-time education and who complete 
secondary school and the number of Australian geologists and 
i'uav-Lorvs and - in the second example - fish catches off Western 
Australia, refuse outfall of Kwinana refinery, oyster production in 
Botany Bay, levels of contamination in Sydney oysters and the emission 
contents of Australian cars in comparison with other countries: CPD
H. of R. 62, 16 April 1969, 1177-82; 71, 31 March 1971, 1217-20. For
some examples of reiteration, sometimes word for word: E.G. Whitlam,
On Australia’s Constitution, Camberwell, Vic., 1977, 62-3 (delivered 
1961) cf. Labor's Role Today: Max Poulter Memorial Lecture delivered
by Mr E.G. Whitlam, Q.C., M.P., at the University of Queensland,
28 August 1968, 22-3; 'The Alternate National Health Program': Address
by Mr E.G. Whitlam, Q.C., M.P., to the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital 
Post-Graduate Seminar, 5/7/1968 cf. Labor's Role Today ..., 9-12; On 
Australia's Constitution, 60-1 (1961) cf. 'The Alternate National Health 
Program'; Planning for Clean Cities: Address by Mr E.G. Whitlam to
52nd Annual Meeting of the Town and Country Planning Association of 
Victoria in Melbourne at 1.00 p.m. on Friday, 20 February 1970 cf 
On Australia's Constitution, 125-39 (August 1970) . My emphasis on 
dates. Note, too, that Whitlam said he gave a basically similar speech 
on education to five gatherings of Catholic parents over six months in 
1968-69: Commonwealth Aid to Schools: Address by Mr E.G. Whitlam, Q.C.,
M.P. to Northern Suburbs Combined Parents and Friends Association at 
Odeon Theatre, Eastwood, Sunday Night, 20 April 1960. Finally, an 
appendix to a famous 1968 lecture by Whitlam lists eleven of his speeches 
delivered 1962-68 on urban and regional development. Eight of them 
were delivered in 1967 or 1968 (to September). The list comprised only 
'major addresses, on which numbers of subsequent statements and press 
releases have been based' (my emphasis). It includes none of Whitlam's 
numerous Parliamentary speeches on this topic (Responsibilities for 
Urban and Regional Development: Walter Burley Griffin Memorial Lecture,
Canberra, 25 September 1968.)
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meeting’, he said in 1973, ’is part of a continuous educative process
21that politicians have to engage in'. Further, '[o]nly at public
meetings can the people assess the stamina, concentration and grasp
of the leaders' and the leaders the reaction of the people to them
22and their proposals. The politician convinced the electors and 
refined his plans, the electors judged the politician under pressure. 
To illustrate the point, the table sets out Whitlam's speeches and 
press statements over six days in the middle of 1969.
Table 6.1: Speeches and Statements, E.G. Whitlam, 27 June-2 July 1969
Date Location Topic
27 June - (statement) Federal Finance
28 June Adelaide Education
29 June (morning) Mt.Gambier Regional Development
29 June (afternoon) Young Wool and Wheat Marketing
29 June (night) Young Education
30 June Sydney Housing and Land Costs
1 July - (statement) Public Servants and Politics
2 July Sydney? Urban Development
Source: Whitlam to the Editor, Australian Financial Review, 8 July 1969
Whitlam's liking for public meetings maintained and enhanced them
as a feature of election campaigns when observers predicted confidently
23that televised contact would replace them. Yet Whitlam was also a 
21Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 71.
22Australian, 23 October 1969. An observer of Whitlam as Deputy Leader 
noted his liking for weekend conferences and seminars which seemed to 
serve as contacts with experts and a safety valve for a politician 
frustrated in opposition, as well as keeping Whitlam's name before the 
public - or at least that part of it which attended such gatherings: 
Bulletin, 11 December 1965.
23Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 161, 235; Oakes & Solomon, The Making 
of an Australian Prime Minister, 162-9. For two predictions of the 
demise of the public meeting: Bulletin, 19 November 1966 (Alan Reid);
James Jupp, Australian Party Politics, Carlton, Vic., 1968, 201.
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polished television performer and prided himself upon his ability. As
Deputy Leader, he had waved unity tickets at television cameras and
baited the Federal Executive over state aid. As Leader, he used the
medium to put Labor's position on current events and its future plans
and to establish his credentials as a future Prime Minister. Survey
evidence suggests his television 'image' was relatively favourable and 
24became more so. He also devoted more attention than most of his
predecessors to maintaining friendly contacts with the printed media,
especially with working journalists, on whose reporting depended much
25public knowledge of his ability and proposals. Finally, Whitlam
believed, according to Freudenberg, in the 'teaching and informing
2 6functions' of Parliament. He had used the questions on notice 
procedure to gather masses of information. He used his speeches to 
expound his conception of Australia's problems and their solutions.
Given that Hansard is not widely read, nor Federal Parliament attended 
by more than a fraction of Australians here, too, media reports of the 
sittings enhanced the relationship between Whitlam, the party he led and 
voters. Labor's relationship with the media, the subject of our
Don Aitkin, Stability and Change in Australian Politics, Canberra, 
1977, 253, shows that favourable references to Whitlam's television 
abilities outnumbered unfavourable references by about 5 to 1 in 1967 
and 7 to 1 in 1969. Total references to his personal qualities ran 
at just under 4 favourable to 1 unfavourable in 1967 and 2^ to 1 in 
1969. Most of these impressions would have been formed from Whitlam's 
television appearances.
25Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 143-4, points out that the Canberra 
Press Gallery saw an influx of younger journalists around the time 
Whitlam became Leader. One of Whitlam's sympathetic chroniclers, who 
arrived at this time, writes: 'The politics of the gallery change
rapidly. From being predominantly Liberal in the mid-1960s it became 
pro-Labor (or at least pro-Whitlam) in the late 1960s and early 1970s': 
David Solomon, Inside the Australian Parliament, Sydney, 1978, 156. My 
emphasis.
2 6Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 79-80.
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HYPOTHESIS XII, became rather more cooperative than in the days when
most coverage of the party was critical.
Whitlam attempted to link the policies made by the by-passing
processes he headed, the policy speeches which expressed them, and the
actions of the Labor Government he led between 1972 and 1975. The link
was his version of the doctrine of the ’mandate’.
I interpret the mandate as being both general and 
specific - a general mandate to govern for the term 
for which we were elected and a specific mandate to 
implement the undertakings we made, within that 
term. But even when I speak of a general mandate I 
cannot accept the conservative definition of a mere 
mandate to govern, a permit to preside over the 
administration of government and, hopefully, to 
administer the existing system in a sufficiently 
acceptable way to give reasonable prospects of re- 
election for a further renewal of the mere mandate 
to preside. The mandate as I interpret it is to 
move by specific programmes toward the general 
goals and the general objectives accepted by the 
people at the elections.27
Whitlam's mandate doctrine provided the philosophic basis for the strategy
he believed Labor should employ in relation to the electorate. It
implied that the voters were aware of the content of the policy speech
and expected it to be implemented. As the promises in one policy speech
were implemented, a Labor Government would seek from the people 'a new
28mandate on new issues'. To Whitlam, 'politics' was, above all, 
convincing a rational electorate to entrust Labor with the task of 
reforming Australia along the lines contained in his policy speeches, 
which were based on a Federal Labor platform to which he had been the 
most important contributor.
27E.G. Whitlam, The Road to Reform - Labor in Government. Can Labor 
Carry Out its Mandate? [Carlton, Vic., 1975?] 5.
28Whitlam to the ALP (Victorian Branch), March 1973, quoted, C.J. Lloyd 
& G.S. Reid, Out of the Wilderness, North Melbourne, 1974, 206.
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An Incomplete Concept
’A biography of Whitlam must, almost inevitably, become the story
29of the Labor Party in the last decade.’ Conversely, it could be argued 
that the Labor Party at Federal level between, say, 1967 and 1975, ran 
largely according to the strategy that Whitlam devised. It will be 
argued now that the conception of politics underlying this strategy was 
incomplete and, thus, that the strategy bore the seeds of its failure.
It will be suggested, instead, that the remedy for the deficiencies 
disclosed in chapters 2, 3 and 4 in the making of policy directed 
towards the electorate lies in a synthesis of some elements of the 
Whitlam strategy and other elements which that strategy tried to discount 
or do without or which it employed inadequately.
Whitlam’s conception of politics emphasised the relationship with 
the people, with the voters, few of whom were members of the ALP. His 
emphasis on modernity and relevance was highly commendable. Labor 
under Calwell had increasingly seemed old-fashioned, obsessed with 
depressions when Australia was mostly prosperous, emphasising its
traditions when the culture was changing rapidly, dominated by an ageing
30elite when the population was youthful. Labor under Whitlam apparently
29Pat Weller, [Review of Oakes, Whitlam PM], Labour History, 26 (May 
1974), 103.
30These aspects of Labor before 1967 were commented upon incessantly: 
Anonymous, 'Australia: The Labor Party', Round Table, 51, 201 (December
1960), 92-3; Anonymous, ’Labor in Search of an Identity', Outlook, 10,
2 (April 1966), 3-4; Australian, 9 February 1967 (John Paterson); 
Creighton Burns, 'Labor Traumas', Dissent, 11 (Autumn 1964), 7-8; John 
W. Burton, The Nature and Significance of Labor, Carlton, Vic., 1958, 13; 
James Jupp, Australian Labour and the World, London, 1965, 30; Ted 
Wheelwright, 'The Future of the Labor Party', Bridge, 1, 3 (January 1965), 
24-5. At the 1966 election, Calwell, seventy years old, was Labor's 
oldest ever Leader and probably its most old-fashioned in relation to 
those from whom he sought votes. One could well argue that he was for 
many voters the symbol of an archaic party. A survey of four hundred 
people commissioned just before the 1966 election by the Victorian Central
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overcame much of this unfavourable feeling, to strike a chord with
emerging groups in the society without ignoring its traditional
supporters. The party seemed to have caught up with its environment.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to question the depth of this
relationship. How closely did Australians identify with Labor under
Whitlam? Whitlam's former private secretary, Race Mathews, remarked
to the author that the Leader was always overly sanguine about the
31rationality of people. Freudenberg borrows Bagehot's description of
Gladstone to describe Whitlam:
He has the didactic impulse. He has the courage 
of his ideas. He will convince the audience. He 
knows an argument which will be effective, he has 
an enthusiasm which he feels will rouse the 
apathetic, a demonstration which he thinks must 
convert the incredulous, an illustration which he 
hopes will drive his meaning even into the heads 
of the stolid. At any rate, he will try. He is
30 (continued)
Executive showed that 75 per cent of respondents were critical of the 
ALP; 22 per cent believed it was 'old-fashioned’ and 24 per cent 
'small-minded', against only 11 per cent calling it 'too socialist', an 
old catch-cry; 49 per cent believed Calwell was 'weak' or 'behind the 
times', 18 per cent 'too emotional' and only 9 per cent 'progressive'.
The younger the respondent, the worse the result for Labor: among
16-24 year-olds the proportions believing the ALP 'old-fashioned' or 
'small-minded' doubled (Australian, 10 October 1966). Almost a year 
after his retirement as Leader, Calwell was responsible for 10 per 
cent of all unfavourable responses to the ALP from 1668 people surveyed. 
This was as many as those who said Labor was 'too far to the left' (10 
per cent) and 'split, disunited' (10 per cent) and twice as many as 
referred to 'union influence' (5 per cent) and 'Vietnam' (5 per cent).
In the television age, references to a party Leader and main spokesman 
might be expected to dominate but surely not this long after his 
retirement unless he had been particularly distasteful? : Aitkin,
Stability and Change ..., 64-5 (survey September-November 1967).
Donald Horne, not at that time a Whitlamophile, encapsulates: '[Whitlam's] 
greatest advantage [was that] he was not Arthur Augustus Calwell. For 
one thing Whitlam was couth, a characteristic Australians now seem to 
look for in a politician: and whatever else might be said about
Mr.Calwell, he did not look like the world of today' (Bulletin,
11 May 1968).
31R. Mathews, interview.
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sure, if they only knew what he knows, they would 
feel as he feels, and believe as he believes.32
He treated the voters as rational men and women, asking them to commit
themselves to Labor after considering his arguments and matching his
proposals to their private goals. But were the mass of voters so
involved? To Freudenberg, the audiences at Labor meetings in 1969 were
’younger than usual, apparently more thoughtful, much quieter than in
1966, and giving some sign of coming to be convinced rather than 
33stirred'. In 1972, the audiences applauded dutifully promises that
had become familiar with repetition.
But most voters do not come to political meetings. If meetings are
educative, only a small proportion of people give themselves the
opportunity of education. Even before the great Federal policy revision,
Clyde Holding, MLA, and later Labor Leader in Victoria, wrote: 'because
we presume we have a good policy, we make the mistake of assuming a
political enlightenment amongst the general public which does not in 
34fact exist'. Four years later, R.W. Connell, an academic and party
member, answered the question 'how can Labor win?':
How? One thing we can be sure of: it can't be
done by modifying the Labor Party's formal policy.
Over the last eight years or so the federal 
platform has been progressively reconstructed by
Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 71. Note also Whitlam's remark in 
1973 that Labor in the 1960s had been wrong '[t]o be irrationally left.
I don't think there is any electoral liability in being rationally left' 
(Anonymous, ed., Whitlam and Frost, 173. My emphasis). Finally, the 
words of Wyndham, often Whitlam's ally: 'I know that if our policies
are right, the people of Australia will support us. I believe the 
Australian elector is an intelligent elector [not] apathetic and 
disinterested .... As socialists, we must believe he is an intelligent 
voter, that he can be reached, or everything we are doing means nothing' 
(Australian, 24 May 1967).
33Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 161.
34Holding to T.J. Doyle, undated c. early 1964, Vic. Rec., Hon. R.W. Holt, 
Federal Election Survey Committee 1964.
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parliamentarians, officials, and specialists (many 
from the universities); it is now an excellent, 
sophisticated, modern document. It’s a pity so 
few party members know about it. It is streets 
ahead of any programme put up by other parties.
But the electorate couldn’t be less impressed: 
it doesn't know about the platform and wouldn't 
care to if it had the choice.35
Alan Barnes, not an anti-Labor journalist, wrote in February 1969 that
Whitlam's 'brilliant expositions of what was needed of Government in
the 1960's failed to create the enthusiastic response they should have'.36
In mid 1969, despite the policy revision of 1965 and 1967, Labor's
opinion poll support stood at barely 40 per cent. At the State level,
there was not one Labor Government. The party was 'at the nadir of its 
37fortunes'. Its revived position in the second half of 1969, its near 
win at the Federal election of 25 October 1969 and its win in 1972 could 
be attributed to reasons other than the attractiveness of Labor's policies 
to the electorate. Despite flurries in Victoria and New South Wales and 
arguments between Federal shadow ministers in 1971, the party looked more 
united than before. It projected an image of competence - part of which 
derived from its performance at policymaking - and of reasonably 
attractive and authoritative leadership. Most of all, perhaps, the 
disarray of the Liberals encouraged many voters to 'give Labor a go'.
35R.W. Connell, 'Labor in the Age of Whitlam: 1. Winning Power',
Outlook, 12, 2 (April 1968), 11-12.
O £
Age, 17 February 1969.
37Neal Blewett, 'Labor 1968-72: Planning for Victory', Henry Mayer, ed., 
Labor to Power, Sydney, 1973, 6. Aitkin, Stability and Change ..., 216, 
using Gallup Poll data, shows that between the 1966 and 1969 elections, 
Federal Labor trailed the Coalition by 15 per cent in early 1967, 1 per 
cent in September 1967, about 14 per cent in early 1968, 5 per cent in 
October 1968, 12 per cent in early 1969 and 10 per cent in July 1969.
Only in the last few weeks before the 1969 election did Labor edge ahead 
in the polls (2-3 per cent at most).
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Survey evidence gathered just after the 1969 election (October 1969- 
February 1970) indicates the unimportance of policy - especially policy 
areas particularly stressed by Whitlam - in favourable responses to the 
ALP and its Leader. While domestic policy items had become more 
important than in 1967, when they comprised only 10 per cent of all 
favourable references, in late 1969 they still contributed only 30 per 
cent of such references. (The feeling that Labor made too many 
promises - a criticism of the Evatt-Calwell era ALP - remained a cause 
of some unfavourable references to the party.) Further, when asked 
about Whitlam as party Leader, respondents stressed his ’personal 
qualities' (78 per cent of all favourable and unfavourable responses in 
1969) rather than ’ideology and policy interests' (14 per cent). 
References to Whitlam in the latter connection were hardly more frequent 
than for his Coalition opponents and, when made, 'they were usually of 
the most general kind'. Discouraging indeed for a Leader who hoped to 
make the voters see the merits of his schemes. Finally, when 
respondents referred to 'the most important problems facing the federal 
government', the issues most often nominated - with the major exception 
of education (mentioned by 16 per cent of respondents in 1969) - were 
not especially those upon which Whitlam had concentrated since he became 
Leader. Thus 13 per cent mentioned pensions, a traditional Labor 
concern, but not one of Whitlam's top priorities between elections, 
against 5 per cent nominating housing and the price of land. Taxation, 
the cost of living, employment and assistance to primary industry, long­
standing economic issues, accounted for 11 per cent of answers between 
them, but foreign investment and Federal-State financial relations, both 
'Whitlam issues', garnered only 3 per cent. Aborigines were mentioned 
by only 1 per cent of respondents, northern development, decentralisation
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and resources by only 6 per cent, roads and transport by 3 per cent and
all three issues had declined since the equivalent 1967 survey, despite
38the number of Whitlam's speeches on these topics.
This evidence, while crude, casts some doubt on the success of
Whitlam's educative programme as Opposition Leader. The three marked
improvers among issues seen as important by voters - hospitals and
medical benefits (mentioned by 5 per cent in 1967 and 9 per cent two
years later), defence, including national service (5 per cent to 8 per
cent) and education (11 per cent up to 16 per cent) - were all issues
upon which Whitlam had concentrated. They helped boost the proportion
39of responses favourable to Labor which mentioned its policies. Yet, 
their increased salience to electors is not, in itself, evidence of the
to hciv/e
success of Whitlam's proselytising. In any case,/3 out of 10 respondents 
in a national survey showing a generalised response to domestic policies 
intensely promoted over three years of Whitlam Leadership is still a 
poor return for 'the didactic impulse'.
No similar survey was conducted in 1972 but a much smaller one 
covering 345 voters leaving polling booths in six Sydney marginal 
electorates revealed the following results:
Aitkin, Stability and Change ..., 227, 244-5, 250. On the reasons 
for liking and disliking leaders, the proportions of references to 
'ideology and policy' in both surveys were: 1967: Holt 18 per cent;
McEwen 17 per cent; Whitlam 10 per cent; 1969: Gorton 8 per cent;
McEwen 9 per cent; Whitlam 14 per cent.
39Favourable references to Labor's domestic policies concentrated upon 
education, health and social services (especially pensions). These, 
in turn, boosted the favourable proportion of references to Labor's 
domestic policies (i.e. a different measure) from 60 per cent in 
1967 to 75 per cent in 1969 (Aitkin, Stability and Change ..., 243- 
4) .
479
Table 6.2: Proportion of Voters mentioning Different Reasons for
Voting Labor, 1972 Federal Election (%)40
Habit It's Time Leaders Policy Other
All Labor Voters 
(n = 184)
17 56 6 47 5
Did not Vote Labor in 1969 
(were non-voters or anti- 
Labor voters [n = 76])
3 73 8 39 5
Source: Based on: McNair Surveys for the Australian Broadcasting
Commission, Reasons for the Swing to Labor: The Federal Election
December 2, 1972, North Sydney, 1972, 5-6, 11-12.
The survey is very small but some conclusions can be drawn. Reasons to 
do with the length of time in office of the Liberals (it’s time for a 
change, give Labor a go, sick of the Liberals, Liberals arrogant, etc.) 
are more important than those to do with Labor's policies, especially 
among those who had previously voted against Labor (or had not voted at 
all) whom Whitlam sought to 'include' among its supporters. Secondly, 
two out of three of the policy references by all Labor voters and half 
the policy references by those who did not vote Labor in 1969 are vague 
and generalised. Labor 'will do us a good turn', is 'better for the 
family man' or 'the working person', 'has the best policies', is 'fair'. 
Some of these generalisations may conceal a sophisticated knowledge of
and regard for the policies Whitlam enunciated but the survey as a whole 
does not suggest that Whitlam's appeal to the policy-oriented voter had 
startling success.^
The second category compresses three in the original, the third two 
(pro-Whitlam and anti-McMahon), the fourth twelve - in the 1969 voters 
table, eleven^but I suspect one small category has been left out by 
mistake in the original. For a partial report, see also: Ian McNair,
'Three Years of Labor - Some Reasons why Labor was Elected and Defeated', 
AQ, 49, 3 (September 1977), 97.
41In any case, the policies of Government and Opposition had many 
similarities, especially in domestic areas, at both elections, 1969 and 
1972: David Butler, The Canberra Model, Melbourne, 1973, 120, 123-4, 133;
Alan Hughes, 'Political Review', AQ, 41, 4 (December 1969), 22.
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It is a platitude of political science to say that voters are 
moved by other things than the merits of party policies. But evidence 
to support this platitude is of some significance when a politician 
seems to have based his approach to the voters on the assumption that 
they can be so moved. Whitlam may have succeeded more than others could 
have in educating the voter and making him identify with Labor policies 
but why was his success not more marked? Two reasons may be suggested. 
First, his relationship with the electorate may not have extended far 
beyond the experts whose ideas he sought and the journalists whose 
attention he attracted. No politician can relate closely to more than 
a fraction of the voters he seeks to govern but Whitlam stressed his 
connections with experts and the media more than most and his 
predilections coloured his approach to the electorate as a whole. He 
liked to speak to professionals and they liked to listen to him; he
t
envisaged a partnership between enlightened politicians, especially 
himself, and humanistic experts; the professionals, in the words of
42one of them, 'understood what he was saying. He made them feel wanted'.
A 2P.N. Troy, interview. Three examples from Whitlam speeches: '[The
pollution problem] is appreciated only by a minority. As members of 
that minority, we have a threefold responsibility' (Planning for Clean 
Cities ..., 14); 'I invite members of the medical profession ... to 
join me in devising [programmes] to ensure that Australians enjoy the 
health services which are their birthright' ('The Alternate National 
Health Program', 30); 'I invite you to participate in this great 
undertaking [of urban development]. I ask you to join in transforming 
the issues so that in due course we may together plan the transformation 
of Australia itself .... Increasingly throughout the world ... it is 
the planner who makes the decisions on which man's survival as a species 
will depend' (The Political Powers and Policies Needed for Effective 
Planning - Paper by Mr. E.G. Whitlam, Q.C., M.P., Leader of the Opposition, 
to Royal Australian Institute of Architects Centenary Convention at 
Wentworth Hotel, Sydney, Thursday afternoon 27 May 1971, 3, 9). My 
emphasis in each case. Incidentally, the reference to urban planners is 
interesting, given Whitlam's penchant for examples from 'comparable 
countries'. By 1971, the year of this speech, some architects in the 
United States were coming to question the whole concept of urban planning 
as it had then developed. See, for example, Robert Goodman, After the 
Planners, New York, 1971.
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The journalists, professionals also, saw in Whitlara an educated,
efficient, professional advocate, a relief from the bumbledom of post
Menzies Liberalism and the crassness of Calwell.^
Secondly, one could argue that, even more than that of teacher,
Whitlam's role was that of actor, the electorate the audience. He
observed his effect on audiences at public meetings, watched and
praised his television appearances, seeking to hone not only the word
but the gesture, the attitude. Many observers noted his histrionic
44skill, his narcissism. Some were too inclined to use this as evidence 
that the man lacked substance. His dedicated work in the defining of 
problems and the formulation of solutions, as well as his forensic 
skill, should have belied that suggestion. Whitlam as actor is better 
evidence of his incompleteness as a politician. Those who seek to change 
the agenda of politics and who propose new solutions - as Whitlam did - 
labour in vain if they only declaim and harangue. Only those of the 
audience in whom the seed has been sown by prior inclination or 
personal experience are likely to be inspired in new directions. 
Persuasion that policies match goals is a more subtle art than can be 
pursued before hundreds of people by an hour's speech or millions by a 
few minutes' interview. A more solid link with electors, a deeper 
identification by electors with the party's policies requires a different 
approach. The doctrine of the mandate, as enunciated by Whitlam,
43See above, note 25. Many of these new journalists were graduates, 
most were‘middle class suburbanites in their values. Whitlam's appeal 
extended to them as much as to others of this type. When Whitlam spoke 
at the National Press Club, Canberra, in February 1979, the President 
advised members it was the eleventh such occasion, more than any other 
guest and far more than any other politician.
44Allan Ashbolt, 'Why Whitlam Should Go Too', New Statesman, 94, 2418 
(22 July 1977), 106; Bulletin, 11 May 1968 (Donald Horne); Laurie 
Oakes, Whitlam PM, Sydney, 1973, 133-4; SMH, 18 June 1965 (Craig 
McGregor).
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extrapolating from one vote decisions on as many parts of the policy 
speech as the extrapolator desires, is a way of avoiding forging this 
more solid link.
A New Synthesis?
How could the party-electorate link be strengthened? More 
generally, what is required for a more complete conception of politics 
than that which underlay the Whitlam strategy? Assistance in answering 
these questions comes from James Q. Wilson's book, The Amateur Democrat, 
first published in 1962. The book concerns the Democratic clubs, local 
organisations of the Democratic Party in large cities of the United 
States in the 1950s. Parts of the book are too closely tied to the 
American milieu to be of use to us; A other parts of his descriptions of 
preferred party organisations, such as the desire of the 'amateur 
Democrat' for internal party democracy, do not always fit those in the 
ALP to whom we attempt to apply Wilson's concepts. However, his basic 
classification of political activists into two ideal types, 'amateurs' 
and 'professionals', is useful and enlightening. These labels are not 
synonyms for 'incompetent' and 'competent' or 'voluntary' and 'paid' but 
refer to distinct ways of relating the internal politics of the party, 
the formulation and importance of policy and the party's link with the 
electorate.
An amateur [writes Wilson] is one who finds 
politics intrinsically interesting because it 
expresses a conception of the public interest.
The amateur politician sees the political world 
more in terms of ideas and principles than in 
terms of persons. Politics is the determination 
of public policy, and public policy ought to be 
set deliberately rather than as the by-product 
of a struggle for personal and party advantage.
Issues ought to be settled on their merits; 
compromises by which one issue is settled other
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than on its merits are sometimes necessary, but 
they are never desirable .... Politicians ought 
to work for certain ends, not because such action 
is expedient or self-serving, but because they 
are convinced of the intrinsic worth of those 
ends.45
In the Labor context, to set public policy 'deliberately' meant by­
passing the traditional decisionmaking structure, where decisions emerged
through partisan mutual adjustment between sub-coalitions, ad hoc
responses to external influences and the occasional garbage can. Whitlam
46was the leading by-passer. He was also the leading 'amateur'.
The professional, on the other hand ... is 
preoccupied with the outcome of politics in terms 
of winning and losing. Politics, to him, consists 
of concrete questions and specific persons who 
must be dealt with in a manner that will 'keep 
everybody happy' and thus minimize the possibility 
of defeat at the next election .... Although he 
is not oblivious to the ends implied by political 
outcomes, he sees (or, since he is rarely given to 
theorizing, acts as if he sees) the good of 
society as the by-product of efforts that are 
aimed, not at producing the good society, but at 
gaining power and place for one's self and one's 
party.47
This approximates a description of some decisionmakers in the ALP during 
our period of interest. For example, we have seen that an important 
consideration underlying many of the actions of New South Wales Federal
45James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, Chicago & London, 1962, 3, 20.
46In life-styles, outlook and occupation Wilson's amateurs resemble 
many Australians attracted to Labor under Whitlam. They are 'young, 
well-educated professional people, including a large number of women.
In style of life, they are distinctly upper and upper-middle class ....' 
They are lawyers, public relations people, journalists, doctors, 
teachers and clerks, predominantly White Anglo-Saxon Protestant and 
Jewish but not Catholic (Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, 11-16). Their 
hero was Adlai Stevenson and there is a passage on page 52 of the book 
about their relationship with him which, mutatis mutandis, could be 
applied to Whitlam and his amateurs.
47Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, 4.
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delegates like Oliver, Colbourne and Mulvihill, was the need to maintain
and regain Government in New South Wales. Calwell's style of leadership
could well be characterised as ’keeping everybody in the party happy’.
Every pre-election Federal Conference in our period devoted as much or
more effort to maintaining an appearance of party unity for electoral
purposes as it did to examining policy proposals for a Labor Government
after the election. Sometimes, indeed, as Wilson says, 'electoral
victory must be subordinated to maintaining the party organization’, at
48least in the short terrain the hope of victory in the longer haul.
Every politician has a stronger commitment to winning and keeping his 
seat than to any amateur's scheme.
Nevertheless, the effect of professionalism of Wilson's type on 
Federal Labor in our period was nullified in a number of ways. First, 
the pseudo-ideological overlay and the downright bitterness engendered 
by the Split often clouded the judgment of men who were otherwise 
'professionals' in Wilson's terms. Men like Chamberlain, possessed 
of the negotiating and manipulative skills which are the essence of 
professionalism, often used them in the service of an ill-defined 'spirit 
of Hobart', which sometimes rose little above bigotry and doing down old 
enemies. Calwell, who slithered away from so many other firm stands, 
stood firm against the DLP, which often meant standing against policies 
which could have been adopted by the ALP without betraying any principle. 
On the other hand, the professionals of New South Wales devoted much of 
their efforts to the State level, depriving the Federal party of the 
skills of election-winning and coalition-maintenance perfected in that 
State over two decades. Given their minority position on many Federal
Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, 17.48
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issues and the persecution they believed they suffered because of the 
events of the Split, their attitude was perhaps not surprising.
Thirdly, many Federal representatives who were skilled union politicians 
remained much more interested in extracting concessions from State or 
Federal Liberal Governments or in the politics of their own unions 
than in applying their professionalism to a party which seemed doomed 
to perpetual opposition. Even if they had been more interested, the 
lack of resources at the Federal level would have thwarted them. 
Professionalism depends on having a machine and time, money and human 
manipulative and administrative skills to use in the specialised task 
of winning elections and sustaining the party organisation. Fifthly and 
finally, too many of the professionals devoted too much of their skills 
to retaining power within the organisation rather than to winning office. 
It is always difficult to discover motives and to distinguish between 
the organisation-maintenance necessary to win elections and that which 
preserves oligarchy, but Whitlam’s remarks in 1967 have considerable 
point.
There is nothing more disloyal to the traditions 
of Labor than the new heresy that power is not 
important, or that the attainment of political 
power is not fundamental to our purposes .... We 
can survive indefinitely as a pressure group ....
We can exist indefinitely with all the apparatus 
of a Party electing each other to positions, 
meeting with all the formality of conferences and 
executives, framing policy decisions, making 
speeches, and even having them reported in the 
press .... [But it] was not for this that most 
of us joined the Labor Party or believe in it ....
For too long, too much available energy has been 
concentrated more on gaining support within the 
A.L.P. than support for the A.L.P.49
E.G. Whitlam, Let Us Now Begin! Towards a National Party with a 
National Purpose, Canberra? 1967, 6, 20-1, 23.
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Whitlam the ’amateur' knew the value of political power as the 
means to implement his solutions to problems. If '[p]olitics is the 
determination of public policy1 capturing office is essential. But 
winning office is hollow if the relationship with the electorate is 
as incomplete as that sought by Whitlam. A new synthesis is needed, 
which recognises that winning office must have a purpose but that the 
party winning office is more than an articulate Leader and a collection 
of policies. Let us turn, then, to prescription. What would a new 
synthesis comprise?
A LARGER, STRONGER FEDERAL ORGANISATION CONTAINING MORE ’PROFESSIONALS’ 
There are two aspects to be considered under this heading. First, 
there is the administrative side. Criticism of the lack of administrative 
and organisational capacity of Labor's Federal structure, especially in 
the making of electoral policy, was a feature of our period. The Federal 
Secretariat existed as a full-time office in Canberra from late 1963 to 
early 1969, was resurrected in 1971, mainly for the purpose of winning 
the 1972 Federal election, and continued after Labor won in 1972. In 
1974 it moved from rented premises to a new national headquarters called 
John Curtin House. By early 1979, with the establishment of policy 
co-ordination and media units, the Federal Secretariat had a paid staff 
of about a dozen (National Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Research 
Director and Assistant, Media Director, plus typists and stenographers 
and other support staff) , still less than that of the Liberal Party of 
Australia and far less than that of the British Labour Party. The 
Secretariat enjoyed an occasionally uneasy relationship with State 
Branches, which feared loss of power, and with Parliamentarians, who 
feared interference, but there were signs that it could perform a useful
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role in co-ordinating Policy Committees and other research organisations 
connected with the party, such as the Labor Resource Centre (an 
information and research centre established by the party and unions in 
Melbourne), Fabian Societies and other study groups. Lack of time, 
money and knowledge of the existence of willing and able research 
workers remained problems, as they had always been. If the problems 
could be alleviated by more staff, larger contributions from State 
Branches and greater willingness in other arms of the party to allow 
the Secretariat an important role, this aspect of professionalism - the 
existence of a skilled, full-time staff - would be further enhanced.
Secondly, who should fill the party's important positions? Who 
should be its delegates to Federal Conference and Executive? None of 
our criticisms of the Whitlam strategy are meant to deny the importance 
of ideas and ideals in politics. They imply instead that ideas should 
be subjected to rigorous tests of political practicality and partisan 
suitability. Whitlam's significance for Australia has been compared 
to that of John F. Kennedy for the United States. But Whitlam's 
strategy, in American terms, accentuated the 'Ivy League', the academic 
adviser, while doing little to improve Labor's stock of 'professionals', 
people skilled in the arts of manipulation and persuasion for the twin 
goals of coalition-maintenance and winning elections. In America this 
job was often performed by the 'Irish Mafia' produced by the Democratic 
large city machines. When one of the few ALP men who fits this 
description, M.J. Young, Federal Secretary from 1969 to 1973, entered 
Parliament in 1974, the Federal machine lost the major part of his 
skills.There has never been a shortage of sympathetic advisers
~^These sentences based on conversations with party officials.
^On Young, see: National Times, 4-9 July 1977 (Craig McGregor); Oakes,
Whitlam PM, 184-6; Don Whitington, 'The Witless Men', South Melbourne, 
1975, 182-90.
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willing to help the party. Their actual contribution depends on the 
party's ability to tap them and this ability has gradually been 
improved. The level of 'professionalism' has received less attention. 
The party has done little to ensure that occupants of key Federal 
positions, in Conferences, Executive and Policy Committees, have the 
skills necessary to work out politically feasible policies in the 
Federal sphere. There are 'numbers men' and men skilled at working 
out compromises between sub-coalitions at the State level but not all 
can transfer their skills readily to different issues and different 
configurations of sub-coalitions when six State Branches, a Federal 
Caucus and a more complex set of external pressures have to be 
reconciled to produce decisions. Skilled individuals have emerged, 
like Chamberlain, Dunstan, Oliver and Toohey and, later, Burns, Hawke 
and Young, but the line of succession is not assured. The composition 
of Federal Labor's supreme policymaking bodies still depends far more 
on who can get the numbers in State Branches than on who is best able 
to contribute to Federal policymaking.
The contributions desired are not only ones of content but also of 
skills. An ideal Federal party structure would balance representation 
roughly evenly between politicians, policy experts and 'professionals'. 
The first group would provide the link between party machine and 
electorate, the second the ideas, the third the reconciling and 
stabilising skills and the link with the party structure. Each group 
would have different primary loyalties - to the electorate, to policy 
proposals and to the party, respectively. While it goes almost without 
saying that divisions between the three 'groups' would never be hard and 
fast, nor their loyalties undivided, the need to reconcile conflicting 
views on electoral policy would be more clearly recognised in such a
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structure than in one dominated by only one of the groups. Further, by 
the inclusion in policymaking bodies of people whose main concern was 
the promotion of policies, rather than the retention of a Parliamentary 
seat or of power within a party, the place of the problem-solving merits 
of policies in party discussions might be more firmly assured.
INSTITUTIONALISATION OF POLICIES IN THE PARTY
The second area for prescription follows naturally from the first.
If purposive organizations [including political 
parties like the ALP] become more important ...
[writes Wilson] then leaders capable of producing 
concerted action on the basis of ideas become more 
influential. But only a few such leaders will 
succeed in institutionalizing their influence, 
because only a few will be able to create an 
enduring organizational base for their claims.
Their importance in politics will be episodic and 
limited to those few policy areas that can be made 
the target of aroused passion.52
This danger applies as much to the policies a leader espouses as to his
parhj
personal influence. Indeed, it applies to any/decisionmaker and the
decisions that bear the party’s name. If the relationship between a
party and its policies is to be more than formal the party itself must
be indoctrinated. 'Policymakers must take account of the capacity of a
given organization to absorb a point of view', especially if the
53policies are new or likely to be resisted in the organisation. Even 
Freudenberg, not normally critical of Whitlam, admits that some of
Labor's problems in government arose because the policies the Leader 
promoted in the party 'were not fully absorbed by the Party as a whole, 
often not fully understood and rarely deeply felt'.^ The doctrine of the
52James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations, New York, 1973, 344.
53Selznick, Leadership in Administration, 58.
54Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 101.
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mandate, drawing justification from a vote of the people, not only 
protected the government from the party, as Michels knew, but also 
avoided the need to proselytise the party machinery.Since we have
t
suggested the mandate doctrine is shaky even as the expression of a
relationship with the electorate, the foundations of Labor's policy
house of 1972 become sandy indeed. Whitlam used the party as a vehicle
for certain desirable public policies and he saw politics as advocacy
to groups and the mass outside the party. He devoted insufficient
attention to convincing his own party or convincing other decisionmakers
who, possessed of more party-manipulating skills than he was, could
convince lower levels of the structure. One suspects that surveys of
Labor party members during 1972-75 would have shown only marginally less
bemusement about the details and worth of innovatory Government policies
than among non-members. Yet the structure for indoctrination existed
and if it had been better used the policy contributions dormant among
rank and filers might also have been tapped. Commonsense and the
experience of users of community services have just as much role to play
5 6as have expertise. For a-party to act effectively as a vehicle for 
public policy it must convince its own members first, for they are its 
partisans in the community, who can communicate its message with more 
discrimination than the party Leader can achieve in addressing the mass
55Robert Michels, Political Parties, New York, 1959, 181. Michels saw 
the appeal to the electoral mandate as characteristic of politicians in 
reformist Labour parties.
5 6Alternative sources become especially important if the sources the 
party is relying on show signs of drying up. We have suggested this 
was a danger in the Policy Committee system and that Whitlam was the 
most important single source. But here, too, one observer asked if 
Whitlam’s dull performance at the 1970 Senate election 'raises the 
possibility that he has exhausted his creative capacity and will be 
sustained in future only by his ardent desire to be Prime Minister': 
R.F.I. Smith, 'Political Review', AiQ, 43, 1 (March 1971), 105.
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and more fervour than the mass media allows in describing party proposals 
and government initiatives.
A MORE COMPLETE POLITICAL STRATEGY
’Even a Party leader who becomes a Prime Minister must still concern
himself with the manipulation of [Labor’s] clumsy and sometimes rusty
apparatus. ’^  Whitlam, as Freudenberg and others point out, was not good 
58at manipulation. He often attempted to 'crash through or crash' in his
relations with the party. This is not a method of manipulation but
rather an attempt to win all or lose all. In a sense, it is not politics
at all. Losses are sustained by bumping against barriers unable to be
crashed through; winning less than what was desired does not arise from
a willingly engaged in process of reconciling conflicting goals. Yet the
process of reconciling conflicts, rather than the advocacy at which
Whitlam excelled, is the crux of politics. Politics involves persuading
the voters, en masse and in groups, that their interests can be served
by a government programme. They must be shown there is no conflict
between their interests and those of the government. Politics involves
persuading a patty that its various interests can be served by following
59leaders committed to certain policies. This process embeds more firmly 
in the life of the party the policies which it tries to implement in 
government. In government, too, the party must engage in politics, 
reconciling the interests of pressure groups and various sections of the
^ Bulletin, 11 May 1968 (Donald Horne) .
58Bulletin, 11 December 1965 (Brian Johns); C.R. Cameron, interview; 
Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, 291; Labor Comment, November 1968, 3, 7
59Indeed, Selznick writes: ' [C]reative men•are needed ... who know how to 
transform a neutral body of men into a committed polity. These men are 
called leaders; their profession is politics’ (Selznick, Leadership in 
Administration, 61). My emphasis.
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public service as well as of the voters and the party. A set of
policies embedded in a party may sustain the party’s leaders in office.
’The point of the manifesto [party platform and policy speech]', wrote
Richard Crossman from British Labour's experience, 'is to give yourself
60an anchor when the civil service tries to go back on your word'. The 
party organisation provides the only bed for this anchor. 'If the 
Government is tough and persistent enough, of course it will get its 
way in the end' in the new political battle that begins after the 
election.^ The toughness and persistence required in government can be 
nurtured in opposition; both contexts require manipulative and 
persuasive skills.
A complete political strategy would have the party's policymaking 
machinery acting as a partisan filter on the various flows of influence 
from outside the party. A party is supposed to be partisan, to express 
a distinctive view of the world and promote policies which, while they 
seek support from all parts of the community, favour some parts at the 
expense of others. There will be some consistency in these favouritisms, 
whether they can be characterised as 'for the working class', 'for the 
suburban middle class' or 'for employees', but the most important basis 
for their distinctiveness is their relation to the preferences of the 
members of the party as they are reconciled by the party's internal 
politics. A party becomes a mere opinion polling organisation if it 
accepts all external demands without discrimination and without regard 
for the commitment of the proponents of the demands to the party as an
^R.H.S. Crossman, The Politics of Pensions, Liverpool, 1972, 24, quoted, 
Richard Rose, The Problem of Party Government, Harmondsworth, 1976, 378.
^David Solomon, (TT, 11 April 1973, quoted,Peter Wilenski, 'Labor and the 
Bureaucracy', Graeme Duncan, ed., Critical Essays in Australian Politics, 
Port Melbourne, 1978, 37. Solomon writes of the early battles between 
the Whitlam Government and parts of the public service.
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organisation rather than to the schemes they hope the party will adopt. 
The party should give the highest priority to those schemes which accord 
most closely to the needs and desires of its ’core' members and 
supporters, as these emerge through the internal politics of the party. 
It is not the party’s role to reflect faithfully every demand in the 
community; there are other organisations, other parties, pressure 
groups, even talk-back radio, not to mention government bureaucracies, 
which relay community demands to governments. Demands given a low 
priority by a single political party could be given a high priority by 
another organisation seeking goods from governments. The role of an 
individual political party is to give highest priority to the demands 
of those who have committed themselves to the party by joining it, or 
affiliating with it or voting regularly for it. It certainly should 
try to convince a majority of voters that their demands, too, can thus 
be served, but not at the cost of giving its 'core' less than the 
highest priority. The decisions bearing the party name must above all 
be related, as we have said already, to the life of the party itself.
In this life, external influences come and go, but the activities and 
demands of the core remain.
The experience of the Whitlam Government of 1972-75 led some party
decisionmakers to look critically at Labor’s attitudes to external
pressures. In December 1977 the newly elected Deputy Senate Leader,
John Button, said of his party:
I think we have developed too much of a tendency 
to listen to the strident voices of articulate 
minorities. Too much time is spent offering 
something to everybody. There are a lot of
For a discussion of this distinction, see: Helen P. Gouldner,
’Dimensions of Organizational Commitment’, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 4 (1959-60), 468-87.
people in the party who think it’s all about women’s 
issues or conservation or civil liberties or law 
reform or all of those things.63
Earlier, Kim Beazley, Whitlam’s Education Minister, had put it more 
succinctly: 'I am sick and tired of the Labor Party becoming the
spittoon for every special interest group in the community^ A more 
complete approach to politics would differentiate between external 
pressures in terms both of what was of the highest priority to members 
and core supporters of the ALP, as expressed in the decisions of its 
Conferences, and of what seemed politically feasible in relation to the 
electorate. The ability of a scheme to win support within the party 
after rigorous examination and subjection to the party’s internal 
political processes would indicate its chances of winning support 
outside the party. The intellectual attractiveness of the scheme to its 
expert proponents and to their political supporters would be insufficient 
for it to bear the party name. Its alleged merits as a vote winner 
would be taken with a pinch of salt, given what professionals would or 
should know about the limited connections between policy preferences and 
voting behaviour. Above all, professionals, pursuing a more complete 
political strategy, would recognise their different interest in a scheme. 
Unlike those who wish to use the party as a vehicle for pet projects,
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A QNation Review, 22-28 December 1977.
64Conversation with a delegate to a Western Australian Branch Conference 
which Beazley addressed. For similar remarks regarding Labor under 
Whitlam, see: Ashbolt, 'Why Whitlam Should Go Too', 106 ('freeloaders
and bandwagon-jumpers'); Graeme Duncan, 'The ALP: Socialism in a
Bourgeois Society?', Duncan, ed., Critical Essays ..., 93; Robert 
Murray, 'Labor: a Bubble Pricked', Politics, 10 (May 1976), 36 (the
Whitlam Government being 'taken in by a range of hustlers who descended 
on it in the euphoric days of 1972'). For the same phenomenon in other 
reformist parties, see: Samuel Eldersveld, Political Parties, Chicago,
1964, 329-30; Michels, Political Parties; 94-5; Wilson, The Amateur 
Democrat, 22.
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the professional knows he has to gain real support for it within the 
party, has to convince the bureaucracy of its worth, has to communicate 
its good points to the people and even, perhaps, ensure that the party 
and its government gain some credit for it. Unlike the amateur, the 
professional realises the party has to live with the policy and its 
consequences.
RECOGNITION OF THE LIMITED POSSIBILITIES FOR POLITICAL PARTIES
A party which synthesised the best of the Whitlam strategy and of
the professional approach would concentrate also on doing a less
grandiose job better. While it would be pleasant for a party to come
to office with a parcel of highly detailed policies and the informal
support of a party organisation and a majority of the electorate, in
practice this will never happen. Clem Lloyd, closely involved in the
working out of policies in opposition, underlined the haphazardness of
the process. Day-to-day political work, especially responding to
Government actions or organising Parliamentary tactics, always took up
the greater part of Opposition staff time. While the staffs of the
Opposition Leader and his Deputy were perhaps the single most important
source of ideas and co-ordination, apart from Whitlam himself, their
contacts with outside experts were discontinuous, problems of
implementation could only be guessed at and few schemes were worked out
in sufficient detail to enable implementation without massive amounts
65of work by public servants after the change of government. Lack of 
information will always bedevil oppositions. Crossman's exhortation 
about the programme as an anchor is easier to make than fulfil. Perhaps
65C.J. Lloyd, interview.
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the best parties can do is develop broad lines of acceptable action, 
a set of core goals from which they will not be swayed by pressures 
from interest groups or public servants. The main sources of detailed 
policy for a Labor Government, as for any other, will be elsewhere 
than its own ranks, but the life of the party, its internal reconciliation 
of the goals of its members and its closest electoral supporters, should 
define the general direction of the party’s years in office.^
A party should not try to by-pass its internal life, but to channel 
it to better ends than mere coalition-maintenance and satisficing of 
conflicting sub-coalitions. By ensuring that a supply of relevant 
electoral policies is continually channeled into this internal political 
process, that proposals for public policy are well-politicised and 
tested before becoming the subject of the Leader's advocacy, a party 
can combine the best of the Whitlam strategy and of the politics of 
coalitions. It must be able to respond to external pressures of the 
type encapsulated in our HYPOTHESES VI to XIII, without being so 
infatuated with pleasing outsiders that it ignores the preferences 
emerging from its own internal strivings, strivings which were exemplified 
in HYPOTHESES I to V_. But, if a party is a coalition, comprising sub­
coalitions with many conflicting goals, if the influences upon it are 
myriad and complex, if it enjoys only imperfect information and faces 
problems which are hard to define and continually changing, it is still 
likely to make many decisions by partisan mutual adjustment, by
On the inadequacies of parties as sources of detailed policies: 
Geoffrey Hawker, R.F.I. Smith & Patrick Weller, Politics and Policy in 
Australia, St Lucia, Qld., 1978, 31-9; Jupp, Australian Party Politics, 
210; Anthony King, 'Political Parties in Western Democracies: Some
Sceptical Reflections', Polity, 2 (Winter 1969), 134-7; R.S. Parker, 
'The Government of New South Wales', S.R. Davis, ed., The Government of 
the Australian States, Melbourne, 1960, 107.
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incremental steps and by the processes of the garbage can (HYPOTHESES 
XIV, XV and XVI). The goal of party reformers should be not to 
cauterise or work outside these processes but to turn them to better 
ends. The party can act as a partisan filter for community demands, 
an institutional bedrock for certain policy preferences, a source of 
competent political leaders, a repository of professionalism in 
politics and an organisation that can undertake and endure lengthy 
battles. It is rarely possible, inside or outside parties, to 
continually 'crash through'. Proposals must be subjected to a political 
process, which involves the often difficult and lengthy reconciling of 
conflicting goals, which often loses the 'merits' of issues in a 
whirlpool of 'extraneous' matters, which often produces frustrations 
and dead ends. It is, in fact, as Weber said, 'a strong and slow boring 
of hard boards' . ^
f) 7Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, 
ed., From Max Weber, London, 1948, 128.
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